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The role of intentio in Augustine’s understanding of the soul’s ascent to God:  
from de animae quantitate to de trinitate 
 
 
Margaret Enid Lane 
 
 
Augustine’s strategic use of the activity of intentio, (the volitional and tensional activity of 
directing the mind’s attention) as he begins to reflect on ascending to the one God who is 
Trinitarian, transforms intentio from an aspect of anthropological and psychological analysis 
into an integral part of a Trinitarian theory of cognition, whereby intentio becomes assimilated 
to the will, which in Augustine’s thought is connected with the Holy Spirit.  This thesis argues 
that there is a trajectory in Augustine’s use of intentio from its barely discernible traces in de 
animae quantitate to its explicit development in de trinitate.  The stages of ascent in an. 
quant. form the framework of this thesis and they do so against old advice that an. quant.  
‘represents an immaturity soon outgrown and it ought not to be quoted in illustration of the 
characteristically Augustinian positions.’ (Burnaby 1960, 63)  Instead, while mindful of 
Augustine’s own statement that ‘I am among that number who write while developing and 
develop while writing,’ (ep. 143:2) the approach here takes its cue from the general 
reinstatement of the early works recently effected by Carol Harrison (2006) in the hope that 
an.  quant. be specifically rehabilitated.  Using a methodology which is largely, though not 
exclusively exegetical, we will move in each chapter from a description of the stage of ascent 
in an. quant.  and the power of the soul involved, to a consideration of the significance and 
role of intentio as we find it in trin.  The overall conclusion will be that the volitional, 
directional and tensional aspects of intentio converge to make intentio a unifying theme in 
Augustine’s understanding of the soul’s ascent to God.   
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(Basel & Stuttgart: Schwabe & Co.  1986-).  Where dates are given for works in the text, they 
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Augustine’s Works 
 
Acad. De Academicis libri tres  
c. Adim.  Contra Adimantum Manichei discipulum liber unus 
an. et. or. De anima et eius origine libri quattuor 
an. quant. De animae quantitate liber unus 
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beata u.  De beata uita liber unus 
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conl. Max. Conlatio cum Maximino Arrianorum episcopo 
cons. eu. De consensu euangelistarum libri quattuor 
cont. De continentia liber unus 
correct. De correctione Donatistarum liber unus (=ep. 185) 
Cresc. Ad Cresconium grammaticum partis Donati libri quattuor 
dial. De dialectica 
disc. chr. De disciplina christiana 
diu. qu.  De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus liber unus 
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doctr. chr.  De doctrina christiana libri quattuor 
duab. an. De duabus animabus liber unus 
en. Ps(s).  Enarrationes in Psalmos  
ench. De fide spe et caritate liber unus 
ep (epp).  Epistulae 
ep. Io. tr. In epistulam Iohannis ad Parthos tractatus decem 
c. ep. Man. Contra epistulam Manichaei quam vocant fundamenti liber unus 
c. ep. Pel.  Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum libri quattuor 
ep. Rm. inch. Epistulae ad Romanos inchoata expositio liber unus 
exp. Gal. Expositio epistulae ad Galatas liber unus 
ex. prop. Rm.  Expositio quarundam propositionum ex epistula apostoli ad Romanos 
c. Faust. Contra Faustum Manicheum libri triginta tres 
c. Fel. Contra Felicem Manicheum libri duo 
f. et op. De fide et operibus liber unus 
f. et symb. De fide et symbolo liber unus 
geom. De geometrica (deperditus) 
Gn. litt. De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim 
Gn. litt. inp.  De Genesi ad litteram liber unus inperfectus  
Gn. adu. Man.  De Genesi aduersus Manichaeos libri duo 
gramm. De grammatica (Ars pro fratrum mediocritate breuiata, Regulae) 
gr. et pecc. or. De gratia Christi et de peccato originali libri duo 
haer. De haeresibus ad Quoduultdeum liber unus 
imm. an. De immortalitate animae liber unus 
Io. eu. tr. In Iohannis euangelium tractatus CXXIV 
c. Iul.  Contra Iulianum libri sex 
lib. arb. De libero arbitrio libri tres 
mag. De magistro liber unus 
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c. Max. Contra Maximinum Arrianum 
c. mend. Contra mendacium liber unus 
mor. De moribus ecclesiae catholicae  et de moribus Manicheorum libri 
duo 
mus. De musica libri sex 
nat. b.  De natura boni liber unus 
nupt. et. conc. De nuptiis et concupiscentia ad Valerium libri duo 
ord. De ordine libri duo  
orig. an. De origine animae (=ep. 166) 
pat. De patientia liber unus 
pecc. mer. De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo paruulorum ad 
Marcellinum libri tres 
perf. iust. De perfectione iustitiae hominis liber unus 
phil. De philosophia (deperditus) 
praed. sanct. De praedestinatione sanctorum liber ad Prosperum et Hilarium 
primus 
praes. dei. De praesentia dei ad Dardanum liber unus (=ep. 187) 
pulch. De pulchro et apto (deperditus) 
qu. Quaestionum libri septem 
reg. Regula  
retr. Retractationum libri duo 
reth. De rethorica 
c. Sec. Contra Secundinum Manicheum liber unus 
s (s). Sermones   
s. dom. m. De sermone domini in monte libri duo  
Simpl. Ad Simplicianum libri duo 
sol. Soliloquiorum libri duo 
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spec. Speculum 
spir. et litt. De spiritu et littera ad Marcellinum liber unus 
trin. De trinitate libri quindecim 
uera rel. De uera religione liber unus 
uid. deo. De uidendo deo liber unus (=ep. 147) 
util. cred. De utilitate credendi liber unus 
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Other Abbreviations 
 
Series, Translations, Periodicals, Editions, Encyclopaedias, Dictionaries, Miscellanea and 
Standard Works 
 
 
Abbott-Smith Abbott-Smith, G.  Manual Greek Lexicon of the New Testament 
(Edinburgh: T. & T.  Clark, 1929.) 
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1946–) 
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LCC   Library of Christian Classics (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953–
1966) 
LCL Loeb Classical Library 
Lewis &Short A Latin dictionary: founded on Andrews' edition of Freund's Latin 
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Liddell/Scott/Jones Greek-English lexicon.  Revised supplement / H.G.  Liddell, R.  Scott 
(et al.) ; edited by P.G.W. Glare; with the assistance of A.A.  
Thompson.  (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1996)  
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LXX Septuaginta, ed.  A.  Rahlfs (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 
2006) 
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NPNF Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, 1st series (Oxford: 1887; reprint: 
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OUP Oxford University Press 
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Abbreviations for books of the Bible 
 
 
Gen. Genesis 
Exod. Exodus 
Deut. Deuteronomy 
1 Sam. 1 Samuel 
Ps(s). Psalms 
Prov. Proverbs 
Eccl. Ecclesiastes 
Wisd. Wisdom 
Ecclus. Ecclesiasticus 
Isa.   Isaiah 
Ezek. Ezekiel 
Matt. Matthew 
Rom. Romans 
1 Cor. 1 Corinthians 
2 Cor. 2 Corinthians 
Gal. Galatians 
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1 Tim. 1 Timothy 
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Abbreviations for Greek and Latin Writers and their Works 
 
 
Ambrose Ambrose of Milan 
Abr. De Abraham (On Abraham) CSEL 32.   
Cain De Cain et Abel (On Cain and Abel)   CSEL 32. 
Iacob De Iacob et vita beata (On Jacob and the Happy Life) CSEL 32; FOTC 65. 
Ioseph De Ioseph (Joseph) CSEL 32; FOTC 65. 
Isaac Isaac vel anima (On Isaac, or the Soul) CSEL 32.2; FOTC 65. 
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Cassian John Cassian 
Conlat. conlationes (conferences) PL 49; CSEL 13; English trans. John Cassian : the 
conferences / translated and annotated by Boniface Ramsey, O.P. New 
York: Paulist Press, 1997; NPNF; LCC (7 conferences); CWS (9 
conferences). 
Cic. Cicero 
Fin. De Finibus (On the Ends of Good and Evil) Loeb. 
Hort. Hortensius (deperditus) 
Tusc.  Tusculan Disputationes (Tusculan Disputations)    Loeb. 
orat. de oratore (The Orator) Loeb. 
nat Deo. De natura Deorum (On the Nature of the Gods) Loeb. 
Gellius Aulus Gellius 
Noct. Att. Noctes Atticae (Attic Nights) 
Lact. Lactantius 
inst. div. Divinae institutiones (Divine Institutes) CSEL 27. 
Op. dei De opificio dei (The Workmanship of God) CSEL 27. 
Lampe Lampe, G.  W.  H.  (ed) A Patristic Greek Lexicon. 
Nemesius Nemesius of Emessa 
nat. hom. περί  ϕυσέως  ἄνθρωπου known in the West by its Latin title De natura 
hominis PG 40,. Latin text in De natura hominis / Némésius d'Émèse ; 
traduction de Burgundio de Pise ; éd. critique avec une introduction sur 
l'anthropologie de Némésius par G. Verbeke et J.R. Moncho. (Leiden : E. J. 
Brill, 1975.) English translation in Sharples, R.W.  and Van der Eijk, P.J.  
(tr.), On the Nature of Man, (Liverpool England: Liverpool University 
Press, 2008). 
Nicomachus Nicomachus of Gerasa 
Introduction to 
Arithmetic 
Introduction to arithmetic, translated into English by Martin Luther D'Ooge; 
with studies in Greek arithmetic by Frank Egleston Robbins and Louis 
Charles Karpinski, University of Michigan studies (London: Macmillan, 
1926). 
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Plato Plato Complete Works, (ed.) Cooper, John M.  (Indianapolis/Cambridge: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1997). 
Pliny Pliny the elder 
Nat. Natural Histories 
Plotinus Plotinus 
Enn. Enneads loeb 
Porph. Porphyry 
Regr. an. De Regressu animae 
Sent. Sententiae 
Plot. vita Plotini 
Possidius Possidius of Calama 
vita Vita s. Augustini (Life of Saint Augustine) Latin text: PL 32; FOTC 15.   
Tertullian Tertullian 
De anima De anima On the Soul CSEL 20; Ante Nicene Fathers 3. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
By archery in the traditional sense, which he esteems as an art and honours as a 
national heritage, the Japanese does not understand a sport but, strange as this may 
sound at first, a religious ritual.  And consequently, by the ‘art’ of archery he does not 
mean the ability of the sportsman, which can be controlled, more or less, by bodily 
exercises, but an ability whose origin is to be sought in spiritual exercises and whose 
aim consists in hitting a spiritual goal.1 
 
Each person allocates his or her limited attention either by focusing it intentionally like 
a beam of energy or by diffusing it in desultory random movements.2  
 
For Augustine, the bow was a symbol of the mind’s intentio (per arcum autem 
significat animi intentionem).3  Powered by elasticity and deliberately directed at a target, it 
captures perfectly intentio’s volitional and tensional activity of directing the mind’s attention.4  
The activity of attention is the way in which the soul relates to the body; to itself; to others and 
to God.  Because of the incorporeal,5 and therefore indivisible,6 nature of the soul, that activity 
is tensional.  As it is desire which moves something in the direction to which it tends,7 that 
activity is also volitional.  This volitional and tensional activity of attention accounts for the 
way in which the soul carries out its activities of animation, sense perception, imagination and 
cognition.8  All these activities, with the exception of animation, rely upon memory, which is 
itself explained by intentio9 and are acts of cogitation; including the soul’s highest activity of 
                                                          
1 Herrigel 1976: 14. 
2 Csikszentmihalyi 2002: 33. 
3 en. Ps. 77:34; en. Ps. 17:35; ciu. 17:4:3.  
4 According to TLL, intentio is from intendere and when used in relation to the mind ordinarily meant ‘attention’ 
or ‘will.’ Also, according to TLL, intentio was used in relation to the senses and the body to connote a physical 
stretching or tension: of the nerves (Cic. Tusc. 2:23:54); of the eyes (Gellius Noct. Att. 5:16:2); of the voice 
(Pliny) Nat. 28:53; of the strings of a musical instrument (Cic. Tusc. 1:10:19).  In the discipline of grammar 
intention meant emphasis Gellius Noct. Att. 6:7:5; 16:5:7. 
5 an. quant. 3:4. 
6 Ibid. 32:64. 
7 en. Ps. 9:5. 
8 See O’Daly 1987; Martino 2000.  
9 Hayen 1954: 38; Winkler 1954: 518 ‘la mémoire… phénomène intentionnel.’ 
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the understanding of intelligible, immutable truths (such as 2+2=4): the process of cogitation 
is always the same, though the nature of the object is different.10  The Trinity cannot be the 
object of the mind’s attention because it does not subjoin the mind but rather transcends it 
(Intentioni animi subiacet, excepta incommutabilitate Trinitatis, quae quidem non subiacet, 
sed eminet potius.)11  Nonetheless, to understand the Trinity is the ultimate aim of the 
Christian life12 and we must allow our faith to direct our attention towards advancing that aim, 
as far as it will go.13 
 
The overall importance of intentio to the life of faith, in which for Augustine the 
conversion and movement of our attention towards God is central, has been recognized, 
primarily by French scholars,14 and latterly by Lewis Ayres.15  Agaësse, notes that intentio, as 
an attitude of soul opposite to distentio,16 must be seen in the light of the basic Augustinian 
anthropological principle that the soul is only truly itself in relationship to God; intentio is the 
movement of transcendence which enables the soul to find above itself its true centre of unity, 
‘c’est en cherchant Dieu-intentio—qu’elle se trouve, c’est au delà d’elle-même-extensio-
qu’est son centre d’unité.’ 17  The act of intentio, as an act of focusing the whole of our 
attention on God, has the effect of unifying the soul.  Hayen, who was only concerned with 
Augustine’s thought insofar as his use of intentio influenced Aquinas, listed the multiple 
meanings of intentio that he found in Augustine: (a psychological act; an inward attitude; 
effort; tension; impetus; search; the application of attention which is concentrated and full of 
                                                          
10 sol. 1:5:11.  
11 lib. arb. 3:25:75.  
12 cui Trinitati pie sobrieque intellegendae omnis excubat vigilantia christiana, et omnis eius provectus 
intenditur, Ibid. 3:21:60. 
13 Ad illum enim tendimus itinere pietatis. Si ergo aliud de illo senserimus quam est, intentio nostra non in 
beatitatem, sed in vanitatem nos ire compellet, Ibid. 3:21:59; ea recta intentio est, quae proficiscitur a fide, trin. 
9:1:1. 
14 Agaësse BA 16. 589; Madec 1994; Hayen 1954. 
15 2010: 152-5, 168. 
16Also Solignac, BA 14.590 ‘l'intentio surmonte et corrige la distensio.’ Before Augustine, distentio was a term 
found mostly in Celsus’ treatise On Medicine in which there are over 20 occurrences and where it is used 
exclusively in relation to the nerves, otherwise it is a rare term.  For a brief history of the word distentio see 
O’Daly 1977.  
17 Agaësse BA 16.589. 
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concern towards an object or activity), including intentio as a synonym for conversio, where 
the mind was directing its attention towards God.18  Madec, giving a paper at a conference on 
the theme of interiority and intentionality in Augustine, also identified conversion with 
intentionality (and interiority) in Augustine.19  Lewis Ayres draws attention to Augustine’s use 
of the phrases intentio cordis and intentio credentium from 395-405, noting, in particular, the 
role of Christ in directing the attention of the faithful away from Himself (His humanity) onto 
the Father (His divinity).20  
 
This thesis examines Augustine’s use of intentio in the context of the soul’s ascent to 
God.  The metaphor of ascent structures the way in which Augustine thinks that human 
beings, created from nothing, fallen and unable to know or to do any good, are enabled to 
convert and return to their Creator, through his gracious indwelling and his outward revelation 
and teaching.  God's gracious revelation in creation, his presence within and above the 
memory and mind, is the reason Augustine is fond of ascensional schemes.21  Intentio is a key 
factor in ensuring that the ascent proceeds in the right direction; that nothing, other than God, 
is taken as an end in itself; that human beings keep moving onwards, inwards and upwards 
towards their Creator.   
 
The use of a metaphor of ascent to express the mind’s progress to the truth can be 
traced back to Parmenides at the end of 6th century B.C.  It was developed by Plato in 
Phaedrus and seems to have derived from the ancient stories of heavenly ascents that were 
commonplace, some of which can be found in the Bible.22  The rationale behind the Platonic 
                                                          
18 Hayen 1954: 38-9. He quoted in support, trin. 10:12:19 (Iamne igitur ascendendum est qualibuscumque 
intentionis viribus ad illam summam et altissimam essentiam,) and mus. 6:5:13 (Conversa ergo a Domino suo ad 
servum suum, necessario deficit: conversa item a servo suo ad Dominum suum, necessario proficit, ….intenta in 
Dominum intellegit aeterna eius,) 
19 Madec 1994b.  Conference held in Perugia in 1988 and papers subsequently published Luigi Alici 1990.  
20 trin. 1:12:27 Ideoque ad Patrem referens intentionem credentium et dicens: Non in me credit sed in eum qui 
me misit Ayres 2010:154.  
21 Ascensional schemes are found, for example, in ord. 2:11:30ff; an. quant 33:70-76; lib. arb. 2:2:6ff; mus. 6; 
uera rel.26:49ff; s. dom. m.1:3:10-11; doctr. chr. 2:7:9f; conf.7:10:16; 7:17:23; 9:10:24; 10:6:9-10:25:36; en. 
Pss. 119-133; s. 347; ep. 171A; trin. 11ff. Although most of these ascents occur in works before 400 the last three 
show that he continued to be interested in the metaphor of ascent which he coupled with a metaphor of 
interiority.  
22 Smith 1981: 407. 
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notion was Plato’s two- worlds view: one intelligible, where truth itself resided and one 
sensible made in the image of the intelligible.  The two- worlds view was developed into a 
hierarchy of levels of being by Plotinus who described reality as emanating from the One who 
transcends existence with Intellect as the first level of being, then Soul, then sensation and 
finally matter.  Each level of being is progressively more inferior, the further it gets from the 
One but everything that exists retains a trace of the One which is the source of all and this 
creates a desire in all to return to it.23  For Plotinus, the levels of being were levels of the self 
and therefore ascent was inward: a conversion of attention from the sensible to the intelligible 
realm.24  Augustine, like Plotinus, regarded the ascent as inward and as amounting to a 
conversion of attention from the sensible to the intelligible realm (though he preferred to use 
the biblical terms, carnal and spiritual (Illa sensibilia, haec intellegibilia; sive, ut more 
auctorum nostrorum loquar, illa carnalia, haec spiritalia nominamus.)25  This was not a 
matter of leaving the sensible realm behind but of being able to see ‘the invisible things of 
God (which) from the creation of the world are clearly seen, understood through the things 
that are made (inuisibilia dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciantur Rom. 1:20).’26  
This is because wisdom in this life is about learning to distinguish between God and His 
creation so that God alone can be praised.27  
 
Augustine’s understanding of the Christian’s ascent to God is that it is an ascent from 
faith to understanding: ‘the steps being laid down through the prophet who says, unless you 
believe, you will not understand (Praescriptum enim per prophetam gradum, qui ait, Nisi 
credideritis, non intellegetis).’28  The ascent takes place through an engagement with scripture 
                                                          
23 See O’Meara 1996 chapters 6 and 7 for derivation of all things from the One. 
24 Hadot 1995: 28-30. 
25 mag. 12:39.  He regretted his early use of the terms ‘intelligible’ and ‘sensible’ though he upheld the notion of 
the two worlds, retr. 1:3:2. He was influenced both by Plotinus and Porphyry though ‘there is no simple 
statement adequate to describe Augustine’s use of the Neoplatonists.’ See O’Meara 1982. 
26 Rom. 1:20 is linked with the ascent a corporalibus ad incorporalia possibly as early as an. quant. 34:77 
though the first explicit link is uera rel. 52:101.  Also see doctr. chr. 1:4:4 and retr. 1:11:1.  On Rom. 1:20 in 
Augustine see Madec 1962. 
27 an. quant. 34:77; diu. qu. 83:81:1. 
28 Isa. 7:9 LXX . lib. arb. 1:2:4. Augustine frequently quotes Isa. 7:9, the first occasion he does so is in mag. 
11:37.  He points out that Isa. 7:9 has also been translated as, ‘Unless you believe, you shall not endure;’  and 
whichever translation is correct; something which cannot be determined without recourse to the original, each 
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as we move through its different levels of meaning.29  For this our intentio needs to be trained 
by grappling with the inconsistencies and obscurities of scripture30 because understanding of 
the deeper meaning can only be attained by an intentio sobria.31  This is to be facilitated by an 
ascent through creation, which means through the levels of our own being.32  If, for example, 
we cannot understand the invisible nature of our own soul, then we are a long way from 
understanding the invisible, let alone the immortal, nature of God that is spoken of in 
scripture.33  When Augustine spoke about the move from carnalia to spiritalia,34 he was 
attacking the literal-mindedness that caused people to interpret passages literally that were 
meant to be interpreted spiritually35 and which prevented them from either behaving or 
believing appropriately.36  This literal-mindedness (carnalis cogitatio)37 included thinking that 
                                                          
translation has something important to say, doctr. chr. 2:12:17. 
29 conf. 3:5:9; trin. 1:1:2. The importance of engagement with scripture was recognized in an. quant. 34:78 and 
then more obviously in uera rel. 50:98-51:100.  Ord. and mus. are examples of ascents which do not engage with 
scripture but look instead to an education in the liberal arts for facilitating the ascent a corporalibus ad 
incorporalia.  Augustine later regretted the emphasis he had placed on teaching through the liberal arts which 
was not open to everyone because one had to be a freeman (ord. 1:11:31) and which therefore ‘many holy 
persons know very little about (while several of those who do know something about them are not holy,’ retr. 
1:3:2.  For Augustine and the liberal arts see Pollman &Vessey 2005. For more detail of the ascent in ord see 
chapter 5 n. 74. 
30 conf. 6:5:8 exercens intentionem, ciu. 16:11:2 exerceretur intentio.  
31 ciu. 20:21:2. This is a sign of purification for sobria is moderate, temperate, continent, prudent, clever and 
cautious. 
32 A human being knows, exists and lives and therefore comprises all levels of being en. Ps. 118:12:1; diu. qu. 
83:67:5; ciu. 5:11. God has given us scripture and creation to search for him trin. 2:1:1.  
33 trin. 2:9:16. 
34 Augustine also spoke of moving a temporalibus ad aeterna regressio, uera rel. 52:101; ex vita veteris hominis 
in novum hominem reformatio uera rel. 52:101; de uisibilibus ad inuisibilia et de corporalibus ad spiritalia …ab 
exterioribus ad interiora, ep. 55:5:9; ab imis usque ad summa corporalibus usque ad spiritalia, c. Faust. 21:13; a 
temporalibus ad aeterna, a uisibilibus ad intellegibilia, a carnalibus ad spiritalia, trin. 14:17:23; .a corporalibus 
et spiritalibus … ad inmutabiles, retr. 1:11:1.  
35 doctr. chr. 3:5:9; cat. rud. 4:8; 26:50.  
36 Concerning behaviour see en. Ps. 25:2:1.  Concerning beliefs, inappropiate beliefs would include not seeing 
the incorporeal nature of God, c. ep. Man. 23:25; Io. eu. tr. 18:6; en Ps. 121:5; s. 53:7 f; ep. 147:11:28f; not 
seeing the divinity in Christ, Io. eu. tr. 14:12 and 13;111:2; s. 4:2; trin. 1:13:31, 7:6:11; 8:1:2; s. 88:14; s. 160:3; 
not understanding how in the Trinity, ‘two or three persons are not greater than one of them alone,’ trin. 7:6:11; 
8:1:2; not believing that the Holy Spirit is a substance,  f. et symb. 9:20; difficulties comprehending the bodily 
nature of the resurrected Jesus, s. 229J; difficulties comprehending the non- material way in which the Father 
relates to the Son, s. 237; s. 375C; Io. eu. tr. 40:6; 23:9.  
37 c. ep. Man. 23:25; Io. eu. tr. 14:13; trin. 1:9:19; 8:1:2 - 2:3.  
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fulfilment of material desires would bring them happiness.38  The ascent therefore had to be 
both intellectual and ethical.39  It is this sort of ascent that we find from an. quant.40 through to 
trin.41  Although the first stage of ascent in the Christian life is faith, the ascent in an. quant.  
begins as an intellectual ascent, which it only later becomes clear would have failed had faith 
not been acquired at stage four.42  The ascent in trin., by contrast, follows the more familiar 
pattern of given faith leading to understanding:43 the soul’s activities of sense perception, 
imagination and cognition are viewed with the eye of faith which enables them to be seen as 
reflections, albeit inadequate, of the Trinity.  In both works, however, faith is necessary in 
order to attain understanding.  In addition to Plotinian influence, Augustine’s notion of ascent 
was influenced by the biblical psalms of ascent (Pss. 119-133),44 and thanks to the verse ‘God 
has arranged an ascent in his heart,’45 he was able to interpret the songs of ascent, which had 
been sung by pilgrims on their way up to Jerusalem, as songs of inward ascent and to identify 
the steps of ascent with the gifts of the Spirit in Isaiah 11:2-3.46  The fact that the steps of 
ascent of the faithful person are movements of the will towards God, which we ascend by 
loving,47 becomes clearer as time goes on.  Augustine’s development of ascent as a journey of 
the will is largely due to his own engagement with scripture from which it became clear to 
                                                          
38 en. Ps. 36:3:14 si autem adhuc carnaliter cogitas, et ista terrena felicitas uera felicitas tibi uidetur.  
39 In scripture we find the rules about how to behave and what to believe and the greater our intellectual capacity, 
the more we will find there doctr. chr. 2:9:14.  
40 387-388.  
41 trin. was composed over a long period of time and the different books are difficult to date precisely. For 
discussion on dating see Ayres 2010: 118-120.  He works with the following amalgam of La Bonnardière 1965 
and Hombert 2000: the work was begun 400-405 and concluded at the latest 427.  With regard to specific books: 
Books 2-4 written 411-414; Books 5-7 written after 416. Books 5-12a written 414-418; Books 12b -15 written 
419-427.  
42 an. quant. 28:55; 31:63; 33:73; 33:76; 34:78; 36:80. 
43 See n. 27. I am not suggesting that the work is divided in this way: an old view that was brought into question 
by Cavadini 1992: 103-4 but merely that this is the framework for the work as a whole.  In any case Augustine’s 
own view that faith leading to understanding is a dialectical process would militate against this old view. 
44 Madec AL 466.  
45 en. Ps. 83:10 (ps. 83:6) (Ascensus in corde eius). In the version available to Augustine, God was clearly the 
subject of disposuit, whereas in the Vulgate it is man (ascensiones in corde suo disposuit.)  
46 en. Ps. 119:2.  He combines these with the Beatitudes to form steps of ascent in s. dom. m. 1: 3:10-4:11 and s. 
347.  He also made steps of ascent out of the Beatitudes combined with the theological and cardinal virtues ep. 
171A. The steps of ascent in doctr. chr. 2:7:9-11 are a combination of all of these.  
47 Gradus, affectus sunt; iter tuum, voluntas tua est, en. Ps. 85:6. See also en. Ps. 38:2; en. Ps. 83:10; en. Pss. 
119-133; trin. 11:6:10.  
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him that the only knowledge he would find in scripture was that God alone must be loved and 
our love of everything and everyone else referred to Him.48  In view of this discovery that 
knowledge is of properly ordered love, our engagement with scripture and our ascent is both a 
process, and an experience, of ever-deepening and purified love.49  
 
However similar the Plotinian and Augustinian ascents were, and Augustine himself 
noted the similarities,50 there was a difference in the spirit in which the ascent was undertaken, 
which he designated as the difference between a spirit of humility (through scripture) and a 
spirit of pride ( through the Platonic books).51  Although the aim of both ascents is to know 
God by becoming like God (similem Deo fieri),52 for Plotinus, the knowledge that the soul 
gains (knowledge that its true nature is divine), brings it to live at a higher level,53 whereas, 
for the Christian, the knowledge gained is knowledge of how dissimilar it is to God.  That 
knowledge, coupled with the recognition that we cannot help ourselves (whereas Plotinus 
believes in self-help), leads to humility and realization of our dependence on God.54  We need 
a mediator and it is specifically the mediation of an incarnate God that is the fundamental 
difference between the two schools of thought.55  It took time for Augustine to come to his 
mature doctrine of the incarnate Christ as mediator whereby Christ is our mediator by virtue 
of his humanity, not his divinity.56  But, nonetheless, he recognized the indispensability of the 
                                                          
48 doctr. chr. 2:7:10. He had already come to this conclusion before writing an. quant. for in mor. he wrote that it 
is by the two commandments of Love of God and Neighbour that human life is ordered in the most salutary and 
the best way, mor. 1:28:57.   
49 conf. 12:14:17; ep. 55:11:21; trin. 1:13:31; 14:17:23. 
50 conf. 7:9:13-15; ciu. 10:2. 
51 conf. 3.5.9; 6.5.8; 7:9:13. 
52 ciu. 10:17.  For Augustine we became like God through becoming one spirit with him (1 Cor. 6:17) which is an 
assimilation of wills (see chapter 6 infra) and therefore what we are trying to discern through scripture is God’s 
will, doctr. chr. 2:9:14. 
53 O’Meara 1996: 104. 
54 doctr. chr. 2:7:10. 
55 conf. 7:7:9:14; s. 92:3 Homo verus, Deus verus: Deus et homo totus Christus. Haec est Catholica fides.  
56 exp. Gal. 24; conf. 10:43:68; s. 293:7; ciu. 9:15.  For a full discussion of his mature doctrine see ciu. 9 and 
Guretzki 2001.  Guretzki notes ‘Augustine’s mediator by virtue of being human himself, upholds the essential 
goodness of the created human body’ unlike the Platonists for whom it was precisely the human body that 
blocked our communication with the divine. 
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incarnation to our ascent from one of his earliest works;57 even if he had not yet worked 
through the full scope of this mediation whereby Christ was the starting-point, goal and way.58  
Moreover, He is also rescuer for we do not ascend simply by following his example because 
we did not sin merely by imitating Adam but rather because we were in some way in him.59  
We can therefore ascend only because we are somehow in Christ, for, after all, no one has 
gone up except Christ so, if we want to ascend, we must ascend in the body of Christ;60 hence 
the communal dimension of the ascent.61 
 
Although Augustine does not specifically use the term intentio itself in connection 
with the ascent in an. quant.  and although many of the characteristics of Christian ascent 
(scripture, the mediation of the incarnate Christ, communal dimension) are not clearly evident 
in this early work,62  this thesis will demonstrate that all these characteristics are there in 
embryo and that Augustine had already begun to think in ways which will later be articulated 
with the language of intentio; that he had already begun to think of intentio as an antidote to 
distentio;63 that much of what he says in an. quant. lays the foundation for the development 
and use of intentio in the life of faith; that there is clear continuity in his understanding of 
intentio from an. quant. to trin.  A secondary aim of this thesis is therefore to draw attention to 
an. quant. as an early articulation of ideas which will be central to Augustine’s later thinking, 
and to demonstrate that it is more interesting and significant than might initially be suggested 
                                                          
57 Acad. 3:19:42. According to Cary, the order of the Cassiciacum dialogues is Acad. 1, beata u. ord., Acad. 2 
and 3, see Cary 1998: 162. Also see conf. 4.12.19. Augustine himself had had difficulty in accepting that Jesus 
Christ was fully God and fully human, veering from one extreme (all God) to the other (all man) conf. 5:10:20 to 
conf. 7:19:25. 
58 ‘He is the starting-point of your ascent and the goal of your ascent; you climb from his example to his divinity.  
He gave you an example by humbling himself. en. Ps. 119:1.  Also trin. 7:3:5 ‘But we by pressing on imitate him 
who abides motionless; we follow him who stands still and by walking in him we move toward him, because for 
us he became a road or way in time by his humility while being for us an eternal abode by his divinity.’  
59 s. 294:15. 
60 s. 294:10; c. Faust. 12:26 In illo enim scalae a terra usque ad coelum, a carne usque ad spiritum; the ascent is 
therefore the ascent of the Church. See also en. Ps. 121:7; en. Ps. 122:1; en. Ps. 119:2. 
61 See en. Ps. 41:9 for an ascent expressed to be through creation, self, and then Church to God.  
62 There is a reference to the importance of examining the truths of the faith which are scattered through scripture 
in an. quant. 34:78 and there is a reference to the fact that we come to God through his power and wisdom in an. 
quant. 33:76 which is a reference to 1 Cor. 1:24; a verse he had already referred to in Acad. 2:1 and ‘a key anti-
“Homoian” verse’ see Ayres 2000: 57. See also chapter 4 n. 93. 
63 imm. an. 3:3 and 4 (387). 
  
25 
by the previous dearth of scholarship on it.   
 
In chapter 1, we trace the development of Augustine’s thinking concerning intentio as 
he seeks to explain (with an eye on the theological implications) the union of an incorporeal 
soul with the body.  Aristotle had already related body and soul on the basis that the soul was 
the life principle of the body (form/matter) but Plotinus, who did not make any serious attempt 
to understand Aristotle’s view, criticized it and proceeds to discuss the relationship of body 
and soul on the basis of the Platonic view that the soul is separate from the body.64  As we 
shall see, Augustine’s reflections are situated in the context of the Neoplatonic discussion.  
We shall also see that Augustine’s conclusion that the soul was present to the body by a kind 
of intentio, was arrived at early but that the full import of the term takes time to emerge.   
 
The discussion of intentio at the first stage of the ascent in an. quant. continues in the 
first part of chapter 2 where we find ourselves agreeing with Gilson’s view that the activity of 
sensation is an activity of intensification of attention.65  This finding further enriches the 
meaning of intentio at the first stage.  In the second part of chapter 2, we find Augustine keen 
to emphasize the activity of the incorporeal soul on the body.  It had been Aristotle’s criticism 
of Plato that, having separated the soul from the body, he had not been able to show how the 
soul acted on the body.  Aristotle and the Stoics had said that for one object to act on another, 
the two must both be bodies and be in close physical proximity.  Plotinus had attempted to 
close the gap66 and Augustine’s reflections take place in this context.  In chapter 2, we are 
introduced to Augustine’s first use of intentio as an antidote to the problem of distentio of 
time successiveness, in relation to our functioning in the temporal world.  We also observe 
intentio’s own move from corporeal to incorporeal as we see Augustine dematerializing the 
Stoic doctrine of τόνος, his primary philosophical source for intentio.67  Chapter 2 ends with 
                                                          
64 Blumenthal 1971a: 12-13. Augustine did not find Aristotle’s works congenial and, in any event, his knowledge 
of them was limited; see Courcelle 1969: 168. 
65 1961: 61-3. This is the first indication of what we will find throughout that there is a certain artificiality 
involved in imposing a scheme of ascent with distinct stages when in fact the stages run into each other and the 
material cannot be rigidly allotted to one stage or another.  
66 O’Meara 1996: 29f. 
67 O’Daly 1987: 44. Intentio is the Latin translatipn of the Greek word τόνος, whose basic meaning is the 
stretching of a cord. 
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an analysis of intentio in trin. as the unifying link in the soul’s, now Trinitarian, activity of 
sense perception and, potentially, as the connecting link between the soul’s three levels of 
perception: corporeal, spiritual and intellectual.  That intentio is the link between levels (of 
perception and ascent) begins to be borne out in chapter 3 by an examination of spiritual 
vision; the next level of perception.  In chapter 3 we also begin to see how memory might be 
explained by intentio.  In these first three chapters there is an emphasis on the chronological 
development of intentio and on its tensional, attentional and volitional aspects, and for this, 
the main texts examined are an. quant., imm. an., mus., Gn. litt., and trin., (with the addition 
of orig. an. in relation to animatio in chapter 1.)   
 
With chapter 4 the tone changes, for to understand intentio as conversio requires some 
explanation of the theological context.  Now firmly within the faith leading to understanding 
framework for ascent in the Christian life, another aspect of intentio can safely come to the 
fore: that of direction to a purposed end, and this is examined in the light of Phil. 3:14; 
Augustine’s primary biblical source of intentio.68  In chapter 4, we also find justified his 
insistence that intentio set out in faith in the incarnate Christ, if it is to begin to move the soul 
in the direction of understanding ‘the invisible things of God (which) from the creation of the 
world are clearly seen, understood through the things that are made.’ In chapter 5 we find 
Augustine departing from his philosophical forbears in his attitude to the will’s role in 
knowledge, as we explore his transfer of intentio from mens to voluntas; a transfer perhaps 
indicative of what he really meant by a corporalia ad incorporalia; namely a redeemed 
relationship with the corporalia, rather than a withdrawal from them.  We also focus on 
intentio voluntatis as direction of desire and conclude that the conversion of desire is 
something that can only happen through prayer, which is itself an act of intentio, in every 
sense of the word.  Chapter 6 brings us to a single-minded focus on God which demonstrates 
not only intentio’s role as motive but also that there is a communal dimension to intentio’s 
unifying role; a role which runs like a thread through the stages of ascent.  Finally, in chapter 
7 it becomes clear that through an act of understanding, formed from the memory per 
intentionem cogitationis,69 to produce an inner word, not only does intentio explain our 
                                                          
68 Agaësse BA 16. 589. 
69 trin. 15:23:43. 
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psychological activities of memory and understanding but also, where intentio proceeds from 
faith, it brings us as close as we can come, through an act of will, to an understanding of 
ourselves in relation to God and thereby by virtue of being His image, to the glimmerings of 
an understanding of God Himself.   
 
In 1 Sam. 7:12 (LXX) Samuel took a stone and set it up between the old and the new 
Mizpah, and gave it the name Ebenezer, which means ‘the stone of the helper:’  
 
Now Mizpah means intentio.  That stone of the helper is the mediation of the Saviour, 
through whom we must pass over from the old Mizpah to the new, that is from the 
intentio which looked for material happiness-a false happiness, in a material kingdom-
to the intentio which looks for spiritual happiness-the really true happiness, in the 
kingdom of heaven.70 
                                                          
70 ciu. 17:7:4. 
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But let us see to what extent your latent intentio can advance.  (Videamus tamen quousque 
progredi vestra latens possit intentio).1 
  
                                                          
1 ord. 2:5:17.  
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Chapter One: animatio 
 
The Master began by showing us various Japanese bows, explaining that their 
extraordinary elasticity was due to their peculiar construction and also to the material 
from which they are generally made, namely bamboo.2 
 
In the first place then, as anyone can easily observe, the soul by its presence gives life 
to this earth- and death-bound body (praesentia sua vivificat).  It makes of it (the 
body) a unified organism and maintains it as such (Colligit in unum atque in uno 
tenet) keeping it from disintegrating and wasting away.  It provides for a proper, 
balanced distribution of nourishment to the body’s members.  It preserves the body’s 
harmony (and proportion), not only in beauty, but also in growth and reproduction 
(congruentiam eius modumque conservat, non tantum in pulchritudine, sed etiam in 
crescendo atque gignendo.)  Obviously, however, these are faculties which man has 
in common with the plant world; for we say of plants too, that they live, we see and 
acknowledge that each of them is preserved to its own generic being, is nourished, 
grows, and reproduces itself.3  
 
Before we launch in to consider the soul’s power at the first stage of ascent in an. 
quant., some initial observations on the novelty of the idea of incorporeal substance for 
Augustine and the reasons for his preoccupation with the soul are in order.   
 
The novelty of the idea of incorporeal substance 
Augustine’s concept of the soul as ‘-an immaterial, dynamic, inextended and 
indivisible substance and good is Platonic in character and predominantly Neoplatonic in 
origin.’4  At the time he wrote an. quant. in 388, this was still a fairly new concept for him.  
He had been unable to conceptualize incorporeal substance,5 which was not surprising given 
that most thinkers in late antiquity, and certainly the ones that Augustine had come across, 
were materialists.6  There was a strong tradition of materiality in North African Christianity, 
                                                          
2 Herrigel 1976: 30. 
3 an. quant. 33.70.  
4 O’Daly 1987: 9.  
5 conf. 12:6:6 ‘True reasoning convinced me that I should wholly subtract all remnants of every kind of form if I 
wished to conceive the absolutely formless.  I could not achieve this.  I found it easier to suppose something 
deprived of all form to be non-existent than to think something could stand between form and nothingness.’ 
6 Brown 2000: 75.  
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deriving from the influence of Tertullian, who had believed in the corporeality of both God 
and the soul.7  Tertullian, who had been disparaging about philosophers, argued strongly 
against the Platonic conception of an incorporeal soul for he believed that scripture proved its 
corporeality.8  It was partly Augustine’s inability to see anything other than physical substance 
which drew him to the Manichees.9  He could not conceive how a good God could be the 
source of evil in the world and he therefore had no option (because he did have faith in a good 
God) but to accept the Manichee explanation of evil as a substance opposed to the good.10  He 
could understand Manichee contempt for Gen. 1:26 that man was made in God’s image 
because, to the materialist mind, this suggested a god made in man’s image.11  Once he had 
come to dismiss this anthropomorphism, he still had problems initially, thinking of God as 
other than corporeal:12 imagining him instead like a luminous body;13 like sunlight passing 
through air14 or like the sea filling creation as water soaks a sponge.15 
Augustine had also believed that his own soul was corporeal, ‘I did not know how to 
think of mind except as a subtle physical entity diffused in space,’16 including his power of 
intentio, which he was unable to distinguish from the images of corporeal things that he 
formed with it (nec videbam hanc eandem intentionem qua illas ipsas imagines formabam non 
esse tale aliquid, quae tamen ipsas non formaret nisi esset magnum aliquid.)17  He proceeded 
to do ‘much reading in the philosophers,’18 finding their views on the world more credible 
                                                          
7 Augustine mentions Tertullian’s view in Haer. 86 and criticizes it in Gn. litt.10.25.41 -26.45.   
8 De anima 7.   
9 conf. 3:7:12. On Augustine’s reasons for joining Manichees see Lieu 1992: 151-191.  For the length of time 
Augustine spent as a Manichee see Ferrari 1975.  The Manichee belief system described by Lieu is based on 
Manichaean sources from which it can be seen that Augustine’s own descriptions of the system are accurate, 
Lieu op. cit. 10.  
10 conf. 5:10:20.  
11 Ibid. 5:10:19.  
12 Ibid. 6:3:4; 7:1:1. 
13 Ibid. 4:2:3; 4.16.31. 
14 Ibid. 7:1:2. 
15 Ibid. 7:5:7. 
16 Ibid. 5:10:20. 
17 Ibid. 7:1:2. See chapter 4 n. 154 for comment on this. 
18 Ibid. 5:3:3.  See Solignac 1958 and BA 14, 92-93 as to what this reading consisted of.  
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than those of the Manichees.19  He then went to teach rhetoric in Milan, where he met Bishop 
Ambrose20 and was introduced to Neoplatonic philosophy and the idea of incorporeal reality.21  
Augustine attributes his conversion to this idea to ‘certain books of the Platonists translated 
from Greek into Latin by Victorinus, who had been a Rhetoric Professor in Rome and had 
died a Christian.’22  What Augustine discovered from these books was a method of ascent a 
corporalia ad incorporalia.  Embarking on the ascent himself, he describes being lifted up by 
an experience of love to a glimpse of the Truth, which convinced him that ‘the invisible things 
of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, understood through the things that are 
made (inuisibilia dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciantur Rom. 1:20).’23   
Reasons for preoccupation with the soul 
Once Augustine had wholeheartedly committed himself to the Catholic faith24 and 
been baptized,25 his abiding interest was to lead the faithful to an understanding of the faith 
through the things that were made and this included through an examination of their own 
human nature.  As part of this interest, in the early works, Augustine was concerned to refute 
the materialism of the Manichees and also to stress the unity of man as a body and soul.26  
                                                          
19 conf. 5:14:25. 
20 Ibid. 5:13:23. 
21 beata u. 1.4.  He says he discovered this idea from Ambrose’s sermons and in discussions withTheodorus, a 
Neoplatonic philosopher and the dedicatee of beata u.  In Courcelle’s view, Theodorus is the person who directly 
introduced Augustine to the books that triggered his conversion though he had been pointed towards 
Neoplatonism initially through Ambrose’s sermons, Courcelle 1969: 137 n. 48 and 138f.  Madec 1994a: 36 refers 
to Courcelle’s observation that Ambrose paraphrased entire pages of Plotinus’ Enn. in his sermons. Madec 
1994a: 36-8 also disputes the existence of a Milanese circle of Neoplatonic intellectuals previously mooted by 
Solignac BA 14, 529-536 except insofar as Augustine formed the centre of it.   
22 conf. 8:2:3.  Also Ibid. 7:9:13 coupled with Ibid. 7:10:16 makes it clear that it was these books that led directly 
to Augustine’s conversion.  Historically there has been great debate as to what these books were but O’Meara 
reviewing the debate found that general agreement had been reached that in 386 Augustine had read Plotinus’ 
Enn. 1:6 and Porphyry’s regr. an., see O’ Meara 1980: 136.  
23 conf. 7:10:16. On Rom. 1:20 in Augustine see introduction n. 26. 
24 He had always remained a nominal Christian, despite the fact that the beliefs he had sometimes held were, on 
his own admission, somewhat bizarre (conf. 5.10.20). He had been brought up in the faith and continued to go to 
Church and pray. (conf. 3:4:7 and 8. Gibb and Montgomery point out that mutavit in conf. 3:4:7 indicates a 
change in the nature of his prayers, rather than change in the direction of his prayers.)  After his spell with the 
Manichees, whom he regarded at the time as Christian, he returned to the Catholic Church (conf. 6:5:7) and by 
the time he experienced his intellectual conversion he was quite firm in the Catholic faith (conf. 7:5:7); 
committing himself wholeheartedly after experiencing the conversion of will described in conf. 8:12:29.  
25 Ibid. 9.6:14. 
26 Markus 1967: 355.  Most of his early works were or contained direct or indirect attacks on the Manichees 
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This was partly to counter the Manichean view of man as divided into a good soul and evil 
flesh (along with a bad soul),27 partly to counter the Neoplatonic conception of man as 
essentially a rational soul, which had fallen into an inferior composite state with a body, from 
which it desires to flee and to return to its true home.28  Throughout his works, Augustine 
quotes with approval the traditional definition of man as a rational mortal animal (animal 
rationale mortale)29 and treated it as axiomatic that man was composed of a body and soul.30  
But he struggled to understand and express the relationship between an incorporeal soul and 
corporeal body in a way which took account of his affirmation of the Neoplatonic hierarchy of 
being: being, life and knowing31 and which also valued the body in the light of the Christian 
doctrines of Incarnation and Resurrection.32  Augustine’s solution, purportedly following 
scriptural authority, was to distinguish between the ‘outer man’ (exterior homo) and the ‘inner 
man’ (interior homo):33  the ‘outer man’ being what we have in common with other animals 
and the inner man being that which sets us apart, namely, our rational mind.34  He emphasized 
that, contrary to the view of some people,35 the outer /inner man distinction did not correspond 
                                                          
(whom he regarded as Christian heretics haer. 46:2), as he sought to rescue friends (retr. 1:14:6) and put his own 
Manichee past behind him.  His first direct attacks on the Manichees were mor. (387/8 attacking the Manichees’ 
way of life while asserting the superiority of catholic way) and Gn. adu. Man. (388/9 countering their attacks on 
the Old Testament).  He continued writing against them until the early 400’s with nat. b. and c. Sec. 
27 For Mani, the body was intrinsically evil because it was created by something other than a good God, see haer. 
46:19. 
28 On the Neoplatonic conception of nature of man see Markus 1967: 222-35.  
29 egs. ord. 2:11:31; an. quant. 25:47-49; mag. 8:24; trin. 7:4:7; 15:7:11; ciu. 16:8:1.   
30 beata u. 2:7; ep. 3:4. though scripture often refers to a man as just soul since it is customary to name the whole 
from its better part trin. 7:4:7.  
31 diu. qu. 83:51:2. For the Platonic nature of this and Augustine’s sources see Ayres 2010: 135. 
32 There is division among scholars as to the extent to which he succeeded. O’Connell argued that, apart from a 
brief period between 411 and 417, Augustine was, and remained, ‘faithfully Plotinian’ in his view of the human 
person as a soul fallen subsequently into a body as a result of sin.  He is supported in this view by Gilson, Teske, 
Rist and TeSelle.  Against him are ranged Madec, O‘Daly, M Clark and Van Fleteren.  See Romb 2006 for a 
recent summary of the arguments on both sides and for Romb’s own belief that Augustine’s view changed as he 
began to grasp the implications of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo and its incompatibility with many aspects of 
the Plotinian world view.   
33 The main passages are 2 Cor. 4:16; Col. 3:9-10; 1 Cor. 15:49; see diu. qu. 83:51.  Although Augustine quotes 
scripture, Madec 1994b: 23 notes that the expression homo interior was Platonic before being Pauline and, 
whether or not Paul depends on Plato, Augustinian interiority has its origins from the fusion of the two.  In 
saying this however Madec is not flagging up the distinction in meaning that the expression denotes in Paul and 
Plato.  
34 diu. qu. 83:51:3; see trin. 12:1:1.  
35 Probably the Manichees who borrowed the terms ‘old man’ and ‘new man’ from Paul to denote the battle 
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to the body and soul but to Paul’s distinction between ‘the old man’ and ‘the new man’ (or 
‘the image of the earthly’ and ‘the image of the heavenly),’ and that therefore salvation did not 
require people to lay aside the body, but that it referred to the transformation of the inner man 
and required people to change their life for the better.36   
 
Augustine was baptized by Ambrose37 while still in Milan, and then went to Rome 
where he wrote an. quant;38 a dialogue with his close friend, Euodius.39  Of the six questions 
Euodius asks concerning the soul, Augustine is only really interested in the question of the 
soul’s greatness and this is the question from which the dialogue takes its name.40  Greatness, 
Augustine says, can be taken in two senses: size and power but it cannot mean size in relation 
to the soul because the soul, as an incorporeal reality, does not occupy any space.  Instead, it 
means the greatness of its powers.41  Augustine proceeds to show Euodius how great the 
soul’s powers are in relation to the body, to itself and to God and he does so in seven stages of 
ascent,42  which he terms ‘acts’ rather than ‘powers.’43  This designation is significant for it is 
the soul’s ability to act on the body that proves its superiority to the body and it is through an 
act of understanding, not the power of understanding, that we come closest to God in this life.  
It is, though, the soul’s general love of activity which distracts it from contemplation.44   
 
                                                          
between the body and soul: Lieu 1992: 23. 
36 s. 218A:3.  
37c. Iul. 1.3.10.  
38 retr. 1:8 :1.  
39 Euodius is mentioned by Augustine in conf.  9.8.17 as ‘a member of our circle, a young man from my home 
town.’  He was Augustine’s interlocutor in lib. arb. and later in about 414 A D, when he was bishop of Uzalis, he 
engaged in correspondence with Augustine. epps 158-164 and ep. 169. 
40 retr. 1:8:1. Augustine deals briefly in the last paragraph an. quant. 36:81 with Euodius’ last three questions and 
allots one paragraph apiece to Euodius’ first two questions (an. quant. 1:2; 2:3).  
41 an. quant. 3:4. 
42 Neil 1999 shows the stages of ascent in an. quant. owe a great deal to Varro and the Neoplatonists.  
43 an. quant. 34:78. 
44 mus. 6:13:40. 
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The soul’s first stage functions  
The first act of the soul corresponds to Varro’s first degree of soul, which ultimately 
goes back to the nutritive level identified by Aristotle; a level of being we share with all living 
things, including plants.45  The body merely exists and, without the soul, would be inanimate.  
It only lives because of the presence of the soul (praesentia sua vivificat).46  This life-giving 
function proves the superiority of the soul to the body because everything which gives life is 
higher than that which receives life and, says Augustine, no one disputes that the body 
receives its life from the soul.47  Taking his cue from Plotinus, Augustine also took this life-
giving function as proof that the soul was not a body because no body is capable of providing 
another body with life.48   
 
It is part of the soul’s life-giving function ‘to gather the body into one and hold it 
together as one’ in order to maintain the body in existence as ‘a particular thing.’ To be a 
particular thing is one of the three characteristics of every created thing; the others being that 
‘it is distinguished from other things by its own proper form; and it does not transgress the 
order of nature.’   The three characteristics reflect creation by a threefold God: Father, Son 
and Holy Spirit.49  The characteristic of ‘being a particular thing’ is associated with the Son 
and with the way in which He reflects, with complete likeness, the unity of the Father.  
Everything exists to the extent that it reflects this unity and to that extent it is true.50  This 
means for a body to exist, it has to exist in some way as a unity.51  But a body (defined as 
                                                          
45 Augustine describes Varro’s three degrees of soul in ciu. 7:23.  
46 Also diu. qu. 83:51:3.  
47 Ibid. 54. On this basis Augustine drew an analogy of the soul animating the body with the spirit giving life to 
the Church. This enabled him  to argue that those outside the Church were not members, (Io. eu. tr. 124:27:6; 
14:10 (Donatists) correct: 9:42; s. 267; s. 268);  that God doesn’t make the world and then withdraw just as the 
soul doesn’t withdraw from body (imm. an. 8:14) and to argue against Apollinarianism that Jesus had to have a 
soul if he had a body, because if you dispense with the soul, all you have is an inanimate body (en. Ps. 29:2:3.) 
48 conf. 10:6:10; Enn. 4:3:7:14f; 4:3:10:38 (Chadwick’s note to his translation of conf.).  
49 uera rel. 7:13 (written 389/390).  In Gn. adu. Man. 1:16:26 and 1:21:32 already these appear as three 
principles of being mensuras et numeros et ordinem where they are linked with Wisd. 11:20 ‘You have arranged 
all things in measure, number and weight.  The three characteristics are variously expressed and later the 
Trinitarian implications specifically drawn out (see chapter 4 n. 175). For further details see Roche 1941 
O’Donnell on conf. 1:7:12; 5:4:7 and Harrison 1988:  
50 uera rel. 36: 66.  
51 mor. 2:6:8; ep. 18:2. 
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anything that has length, breadth and height so as to occupy some local space; occupying a 
larger place with a larger part of itself and a smaller place with a smaller part and being 
smaller in a part than in the whole)52 is not a simple unity for it consists of parts extended in 
space and time.53  It can, though, imitate perfect unity when its parts are brought together and 
held together by the soul in a harmonious and composite unity (Colligit in unum atque in uno 
tenet).54   
 
The more harmonious the unity is; the better is the imitation of perfect unity.  The 
soul’s life-giving function therefore extends to more than merely keeping the body in 
existence; it is also responsible for maintaining the body’s harmony and for enabling it to 
fulfil its potential (modus).55  The concept of harmony is the key to the health56 and the beauty 
of the body and potentially affects the soul’s concentration.  With regard to the body’s health, 
although hunger and our other physical needs and pains may seem natural, Augustine says that 
these were imposed as part of our penal condition after the Fall.57  As a result of the Fall, the 
body places a greater burden on the soul because it requires the soul to pay more attention to it 
in order to keep it in a state of health so when scripture (Wisd.  9:15) refers to the corruptible 
body weighing down the soul, it is referring to the fallen body not the body per se.58  We are 
                                                          
52 Gn. litt. 7:21:27; orig. an. 2:4. an. et. or. 4:21:35. Euodius must understand the nature of bodies before 
understanding that the soul is not a body an. quant. 31:63. 
53 imm. an. 3:3. 
54 Also an. quant. 31:62 ‘air and fire are both kept in a body made of earth and moisture, by the presence of the 
soul, so that there is a blending (contemperatio) of all four elements.  Also Gn. adu. Man. 2:7:9 the soul by 
animating the material of the body shapes it into a harmonious unity, and does not permit it to fall apart into its 
constituent elements.  The language Augustine uses of colligit in unum in relation to the unifying of the physical 
organism is the first stage of a gathering into one, which occurs in some way at each stage of ascent. 
55Modus, another name for mensuras and therefore one of the three characteristics applying at every level of 
being, meant the manner of being of each kind of created thing, in the sense of the limit, or boundaries, of its 
nature as well as its potentiality or capability to receive form. nat. b. 3; ciu. 12:5.  Examples-the modus of angels 
is creation outside time (conf. 12:15:22); the modus of soul is its wisdom beata u. 4:33; and immortality, ep. 
166:2:3; s. 65:3:4. There are ethical connotations of modus: of knowing one’s own limits, ‘How much more 
should an ordinary human being, such as I am, recognize his limits so that he does not think more of himself’ ep. 
199:10:35. See also n. 49. 
56 ‘The health of the body is the harmony of those things of which it consists.’ We can easily lose our state of 
balance and hunger, thirst and tiredness can all unbalance us s. 277:4.  Also the humours (blood, phlegm, yellow 
bile and black bile) need to be balanced ep. 205:3.  If, for example, we get angry, this causes the bile to increase 
and we become out of balance. ep. 9:4.  For Augustine’s medical knowledge, see chapter 2 n. 79. 
57 en. Ps. 37:5, Gn. litt. 11:32:42; ciu. 12:22; 13:1 and 3. 
58 ciu. 13:16. Augustine points out that the writer of Wisd. added the word ‘corruptible’ to show that the body 
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unaware of things affecting the body except when there is something wrong (for example 
when our guts start playing up)59 so to be in a state of health is to live in the body and feel 
nothing of its being a burden.60  
In the case of the body’s state of health, it is disharmony that distracts the soul, 
whereas in the case of the body’s beauty it is more likely to be its state of harmony that 
distracts the soul for even in its feeble state of post-Fall functioning, the body’s beauty is so 
apparent as to distract the lustful soul (imagine what the resurrection body will be like!)61  
Augustine was applying the Stoic definition of beauty when he defined the beauty of the body 
as ‘the harmony of the parts along with a certain pleasing colour.’62  He placed the emphasis 
on the first part of the definition, indicating that animals had more beauty than plants because 
they had a greater harmony of parts.63  Whether it is a question of visible symmetry or audible 
harmony, it is the equality of the proportioned parts produced that manifests reason to the 
senses.64  It is the integral nature of beauty and the fact that, even though each part may be 
beautiful in itself, the greater beauty is the sum of the parts,65 which allows the body to be so 
readily used as an analogy for the Church as the body of Christ.66  The idea of the integral 
nature of beauty could be extended to the idea of an integral fittingness maintained by the 
antithesis between good and evil,67 and this provided Augustine with an approach to the 
                                                          
wasn’t naturally corruptible but only through sin. He quotes this part of Wisd. 9:15 115 times throughout his 
work. For details see La Bonnardière 1970: 206-215. 
59 s 277:8.  
60 s. 277:6. 
61 s. 243:7.  Its beauty had significance for the resurrection body, ciu. 22:20: 3.  
62 ep. 3:4; ciu. 22:19 cf. Tusc. 4:13:30. For the Stoics, the world was perfect in all its proportions and parts Cic. 
nat. deo. 2:7:18. In c. Faust. 21:6 Augustine links Stoic harmony with Wisd. 11:21 surely indicating that their 
Creator is God.  
63 mor. 2:16:43. 
64 ord. 2:11:33; mus. 6:10:26; 6:13:37. 
65 Gn. adu. Man. 1: 21:32; Gn. litt. 3:24:37.  A good analogy of the beauty of the whole is the comparison of a  
mosaic to one of its seemingly ill-fitting cubes ord. 1:1:2.  
66Augustine obviously builds on Pauline imagery but see Io. eu. tr. 14:10 for an example of Augustine’s use of 
the analogy of the human body to the body of Christ-one soul works with the hands, walks with the feet, hears 
with the ears and sees with the eyes so one Christ who gives out a variety of gifts to the members of his body and 
Ibid. 18: 9 each organ does different things but each organ acts on behalf of the whole body so the eye sees for 
the body and the ear hears for the body.  
67 ord. 1:7:18. 
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problem of evil and suffering, without yielding to the Manichee solution of the existence of an 
evil substance opposed to God, which detracted from God’s omnipotence.  What the properly 
adjusted soul will see when it has rendered not just the body harmonious and beautiful but 
also itself, is not only the integral beauty of the whole but also Beauty itself.68 
How is the soul present in the body: the development of the role of intentio. 
This then is the first act of the soul: to give life to the body and to maintain it in 
existence by holding it together in a harmonious unity enabling it to become what it was 
created to be.  But the question is how the soul is present to the body in order to carry out this 
function.   
 
Philosophical context 
The question of the soul’s union with the body was introduced into philosophical 
debate by Porphyry and brought to the fore by the Christian, Nemesius.69  Porphyry records 
‘Once I, Porphyry, went on asking Plotinus for three days about the soul’s connection with the 
body (πῶς ἡ ψυχὴ σύνεστι τῷ σὡματι) and he kept on explaining to me.’70  He doesn’t go on 
to say what the explanation was and there have been different suggestions: their discussions 
may have focused on finding an analogy to express the nature of the union between an 
incorporeal and corporeal substance,71 or on the question of how the soul could be present as a 
whole in any part of the body, while remaining omnipresent to the body.72  These are both 
questions about how the soul animates the body and both questions are discussed in an. quant. 
Plotinus considered various analogies of how the soul could be said to be present to the body 
                                                          
68 Ibid. 2:19:51. Alternative names for the stages in an. quant. are given in terms of beauty, pulchre de alio; 
pulchre per aliud; pulchre circa aliud; pulchre ad pulchrum; pulchre in pulchro; pulchre ad pulchritudinem; 
pulchre apud pulchritudinem, an. quant. 35:79.  Augustine’s interest in the question of the nature of beauty and 
his understanding of the difference between the beauty of the whole and the proportional beauty of parts 
prompted him to write his earliest work on the subject: pulch. written at age 26 or 27 (conf. 4:15:27.)  On pulch. 
see BA 13, 670-673.  
69 Motta 2010:511.  
70 Plot. 13. 
71 For Dörrie’s suggestion that Enn 4:3-5 is product of the 3-day discussion see Blumenthal 1971a: 16 n. 20.  In 
Enn 4:3:9 Plotinus makes it clear that he is considering how the soul comes to be in the body and particularly the 
first communication of the soul with the body.  
72 For the suggestion that Enn. 6:4-5 ‘On the presence of being one and the same, everywhere as a whole,’ shows 
how Plotinus would have replied see O’Meara 1996: 22.   
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and dismissed them as inadequate.73  His own proposal was that the soul is present to the body 
as fire (as the source of light) is present in air because fire, like soul, is present without being 
present;74 it is present throughout the whole; it does not mix with the air but remains itself and 
it reinforces Plato’s own view that it makes more sense to talk about the body being in soul, 
than the other way round.75  Plotinus later amends his analogy, drawing a parallel between 
body/soul and heat/air which, as Blumenthal observes, is ‘clearly more satisfactory since it 
shows that the soul does have a real effect on the body, and at the same time that the effect is 
different from the cause.  But it still maintains the complete independence of the soul.’76   
Nemesius discusses in nat. hom. 377 the problem caused by the union of an incorporeal 
soul and the body, namely, the effect on the nature of the two substances when they come 
together to constitute a single substance.  How can the soul become embodied while keeping 
its own substance unconfused?  Historically, with regard to the union of bodily substances, 
there were two options: henosis (ἕνωσις) where, like water and wine, the two are unified, lose 
their identity, are both changed and therefore perish together and parathesis (παράθεσις) 
where two substances, like chorus men are juxtaposed or beside each other.78  Neither works 
in the case of union of the body and an incorporeal soul because with henosis the soul would 
perish along with the body and with parathesis there cannot be said to be real union.  
Nemesius adopts the solution, which Ammonius Saccas, the teacher of Plotinus, gave to the 
problem:79 the soul, as an intelligible thing, had such a nature as to be both unified with the 
body and yet, when unified, to remain unconfused so that it does not perish along with the 
                                                          
73 Enn. 4:3:20-21.  For the sources behind these see Blumenthal 1968.  
74 Probably a reference to the fact that hypostasis Soul is not present in individual body. For understanding of 
different souls in Plotinus see Blumenthal 1971b.  
75 Enn. 4:3:22.  
76 Blumenthal 1971a: 19. 
77 Written about 400 A.D. (Motta 2010:509) 
78 See Sharples 2008: 79 n. 376 for sources and use of these types of mixture in the philosophical tradition. 
79 There are conflicting views as to whether or not this was mediated through Porphyry’s now lost symmikta 
zetemata (Miscellaneous Inquiries), see Dörrie 1959. (The title of the work seems to be a misnomer for Dörrie’s 
work has revealed all the inquiries had a unified theme: the soul). The subject matter of one inquiry was pieced 
together by Dörrie from Nem. nat. hom. 3 and the title of this inquiry was quite possibly how was the soul 
present to the body πῶς ἡ ψυχὴ σύνεστι τῷ σὡματι For a detailed and informative review of Dörrie’s work see 
Rich 1962, 121-4. This view was challenged by Rist 1988.  For his hypothesis and other references see Sharples 
2008: 78 n. 372. 
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perishable body.  The soul is therefore unaltered by its embodiment but is unified with the 
body without being compounded with it; as ‘light is unified with the air, mixed with it without 
being compounded, in the same way the soul is unified with the body while remaining 
altogether uncompounded (καἰ ἑνοῦται τῷ ἄερι τὸ ϕῶς, ἀσυγχύτως ἃμα αὐτῷ κεχυμένον).’  
The presence of the soul to the body in an. quant. 
The nature of the union of the body and soul has important implications for questions 
of the unity of the person; the persuasiveness of the idea of an incorporeal soul; the cogency of 
the notion of incarnation and for an understanding of the two natures in Christ: God and 
man.81  As we have noted, the purpose of the dialogue in an. quant. was for Augustine to lead 
Euodius to see the incorporeal nature of his soul and that its greatness, which far surpassed 
that of the body, lay in its powers, not in its material size.82  Augustine is anxious to prove the 
soul’s incorporeality because the sacred mysteries carry the injunction that ‘whoever desires 
to restore himself to the state in which he was made by God, that is, like to God, should 
contemn (contemnat) all corporeal things and renounce this whole world, which as we see is 
corporeal.’83  Because of this provision, Augustine is convinced that the soul is not a body and 
he proceeds to give his reasons; therefore strictly following the order of authority then reason, 
which he was to emphasize throughout his writings.84  Euodius is prepared to admit the 
existence of non-bodily things, for example, the principle of justice, but not that the soul is 
one of them.85  So Augustine embarks on a course of educating him.  Euodius believes that the 
soul is corporeal, like the wind and that it is inside and outside the body: inside because it is 
the body’s life; outside because the body is sensitive to touch.  Because it can sense touch all 
                                                          
80 Nem. nat. hom. 3 as quoted in Fortin 1954.  Fortin has drawn attention to the similarity of this excerpt from 
Nem. nat. hom. 3 with a passage from the Neoplatonist Priscian of Lydia, (both of which mention, and clearly 
depend on, a common source: Porph. Symmikta) and the similarity of both passages with Augustine’s ep. 137:11. 
But against this see Rist 1988.   
81 Nemesius, although Christian, adopts a philosophical rather than theological approach to the nature of man 
according to Motta 2010:510 and uses incarnation  to prove relation between body and soul rather than vice versa 
see Sharples 2008: 84 n. 406. On the body/soul relation as an analogy for the union of the two natures in Christ in 
ep. 137 see Ayres 2008. 
82 an. quant. 3:4; 20:34; 31:64. 
83 Ibid. 3:4. For Augustine’s continued use of contemnere and his view of the body see chapter 5 infra. 
84 See chapter 4 infra.  
85 an. quant. 4:5.  
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over the body, Euodius believes that the soul must be as great as the body in size.86  Augustine 
says there is something related to the question of the soul’s extension that he is still not certain 
about and he hopes that, in dialoguing with Euodius, he might learn something himself.87  But 
before coming to the question of how the soul is present, Augustine has to convince Euodius 
how the soul is not present88 and this means demonstrating that the soul is not a body and 
therefore cannot be in the body as a body would be in a place.  The conversation meanders 
around two related questions: whether the soul has extension and how the soul, if it has no 
extension itself, can be extended through the body by some means, like diffusion, in order to 
sense a stimulus on each part of the body.89  Augustine introduces Euodius to a different kind 
of vision: a seeing in the mind, where images can be seen, which have the characteristics of 
bodies but the bodies are not actually present to be seen by the eyes of the body.90  His 
purpose is to show Euodius that the soul cannot possibly be confined to the same size as the 
body because of the countless images the memory contains and also because of the size of 
some of the images.  But Euodius still cannot conceive of the existence of the soul as 
incorporeal and Augustine has some further training to undertake.  He turns to geometry and 
to lessons in abstract reasoning.91  By this means, Euodius is successfully brought to 
acknowledge that the soul is not corporeal but the question remains as to what it is92 and 
whether, even though it is not a body, it has any size and extension in space.93   
Augustine points to the powers of the soul to show that the soul’s greatness lies in 
them, rather than in its extent94 for, even though it is not corporeal and therefore cannot be 
                                                          
86 Ibid. 4:6 for Euodius’ view of the soul as wind and Ibid. 5:7 for his view of its greatness. 
87 Ibid. 5:7. It is clear from the way in which discussion proceeds that this uncertainty is about how to think of the 
soul’s presence in the body see e.g. Ibid. 15:26.  
88 As Augustine often points out, coming to know what something is not is part of knowledge and a preliminary 
to knowing what something is. ord. 2:16:44; trin. 5:1:2; 8:2:3; Io. eu. tr. 23:9 and 10; s. 21:2; ciu. 12:7. 
89 an. quant. 15:26. 
90 Ibid. 5:8. See chapter 3 infra. 
91 an. quant. 7:12. 
92 Augustine defines it as ‘a special substance, partaking of reason, adapted to rule the body (Nam mihi videtur 
esse substantia quaedam rationis particeps, regendo corpori accommodata.)’ Ibid. 13:22. 
93 Ibid. 14:23. 
94 Ibid. 14:24. 
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present to the body as in a place, it ‘is present so effectively in the body as to control all the 
members of the body serves as a pivot of action, so to speak, for all motions of the body.95  
The question of how it can be said to be present still remains unanswered and Euodius 
remains unconvinced that the soul is not extended through the body as in a place:  ‘Then, if 
the soul is diffused through the extent of its own body, how can it be without extension itself?  
But if it does not have such diffusion, how does it sense a stimulus on any and every part of 
the body?’96  This is something which Augustine, despite having pondered at length, does not 
feel he has satisfactorily resolved but intends to offer Euodius a provisional answer.97  They 
go off on more detours but Augustine says that their concern for the moment is simply to 
make clear that the soul is not called small or great with regard to local dimensions.98  He 
suggests they approach the matter by examining the question of how the soul exercises the 
sense of touch throughout the whole body99 and, after yet more diversions, they focus 
attention on the question, ‘If the soul does not have a spatial magnitude commensurate with 
that of the body why is it that it feels wherever the body is touched?’100  After a full discussion 
of how the soul senses through the body,101 Augustine concludes that the argument from 
sensation does not prove that the soul is physically extended through the body by means of 
diffusion, as blood is.102  Euodius has one more attempt at arguing that the soul is corporeal; 
this time on the grounds of vivisection which, he argues, shows that the soul is cut into pieces 
along with the body.103   
It is time for Augustine to offer Euodius an illustration of how the soul might be 
present to the body which, although he is not personally convinced by it, he says it is the 
                                                          
95 Ibid.14:23. 
96 Ibid. 15:26. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 20:34. 
99 Ibid. 21:35. 
100 Ibid. 22:40. 
101 See next chapter. 
102 an. quant. 30:61.  
103 Ibid. 31:62. 
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simplest explanation of many and the best choice for Euodius’ own case.104  He likens the 
soul’s presence in the body to that of the meaning and sound of a word:   
Then since a word consists of sound and meaning, and the sound has to do with the 
ears and the meaning with the mind, do you not think that in a word, just as in some 
living being, the sound is the body and the meaning is, as it were, the soul?105 
A human being then is like a word for a human being consists of body and soul as a word 
consists of sound and meaning.106  His concern is to demonstrate that the soul gives life to the 
body as meaning gives life to a word and, as the sound of the word without the meaning is just 
formless noise (as can be seen in the case where a word is divided into its letters which 
individually have no meaning), so the body without life is without form and ceases to exist.107  
He also demonstrates how the whole soul can still be present in the case of vivisection by 
pointing to the division of a word into two separate words which therefore still have meaning.  
He does not regard an illustration of this kind as ultimately doing justice to the question of 
how the soul is present in the body but there he leaves the matter for he recognizes that he has 
brought Euodius to the limit of his understanding for the moment and that further training will 
be necessary before he can understand ‘whether what certain very learned men say is actually 
true: namely, that the soul can in no way be divided in itself; but that this is possible by reason 
of the body.’108  
                                                          
104 Ibid. 31:64. 
105 Ibid. 32:66.  
106 There is something miraculous even about the sound of words because we can learn from the fact that 
everyone in common can hear the sound of one voice that we can all hear God’s word at the same time but even 
better we can all hear it all at once because its syllables are not successive. If we can learn this from sound what 
can we learn from meaning? And what does this say about God’s word? With meaning we both utter it and keep 
it to ourselves (unlike the sounds which are uttered and then gone). When we want to communicate the meaning 
in our heart we look for sound as a vehicle and we convey the meaning by it. If we can do this with an idea in our 
mind then this shows the plausibility of the incarnation and the word becoming flesh in order to communicate 
Himself s. 28:4 and 5 (397). Also ss. 187:2; 120:3 and 225:3. Augustine develops the distinction between sound 
and meaning into the verbum quod foris sonat and the verbum quod intus lucet with the latter, inner word being 
the word properly so called trin. 15:11:20. See chapter 7 infra. 
107  an. quant. 32:67.  
108 This reference at the end of an. quant. 32:68 to what ‘very learned men’ meant by saying that the soul can in 
no way be divided in itself but that this was possible by reason of the body’ seems to be a reference to the belief 
in the existence of a world soul as held by Plotinus. For Plotinus’ belief see Blumenthal 1971b.  Augustine 
doesn’t make a decision on the existence of a world soul but leaves the question open, an. quant. 32:69; imm. an. 
15:24; mus. 6:14:43; retr. 1:5:3; 1:11:4. 
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We are therefore left with the unsatisfactory analogy:  
The soul, you see, occupied not space, but the body which it controlled.  It is quite like 
to that meaning which, without being extended in time, yet animated, as it were, and 
integrated all the letters of the noun with their individual pauses and durations.109 
mus. 
mus. was written as part of an unfinished and abandoned project to write a 
commentary on each of the liberales artes–grammar (gramm.), music (mus), rhetoric (reth.) 
dialectic (dial.), geometry (geom.), arithmetic (arithm), philosophy, (phil) because a liberal 
arts education was recognized as leading a person a corporalibus ad incorporalia,110 
Augustine wanted to arrive at incorporeal things by way of corporeal and wanted to lead 
others to do the same.111  Having been schooled in the liberal arts himself112 and then later a 
teacher of them,113 he had been initially convinced that instruction in them would produce 
devotees ‘more alert and steadfast and better equipped for embracing truth…so that they more 
ardently seek and more consistently pursue and, in the end, more lovingly cling to that which 
is called the Happy Life.114  However, the project had been largely abandoned, unfinished, 
before he wrote an. quant. with only the six surviving books of mus. on rhythm left to be 
written afterwards.115  He had planned to write perhaps another six on melody, but did not 
have the time once he had become immersed in pastoral duties.116  Books 1 and 6 are an 
ascent through the different ways in which we encounter music.  At the beginning of book 1 
                                                          
109 an. quant. 32:68.   
110 This had been Varro’s understanding of the rationale of an education in the liberal arts see Solignac 1958: 
122. 
111 retr. 1:6. He completed gramm. but that became lost immediately.  The others remained unfinished and 
Augustine lost what he had written on reth., dial., geom., arithm., phil. However, dial was rediscovered and 
although its authorship has been disputed most now agree it is by Augustine.  See entry for dial. in AugEncy. 
112 Possidius vita 1  
113 conf. 4:1:1. 
114 ord. 1:8:24. See chapter 4 for The Happy Life. 
115 retr. 1:6.  
116 ep. 101:3.  It is clear from ep. 101:4 that, at some time before 408 when the letter was sent, book 6 was found 
corrected (emendatum repperi) but it is unclear what this emendation consisted in, how radical it was or when it 
took place. The likely extent of emendation is the preface (mus. 6:1) and epilogue, the likely date being not long 
after composition of the original work because Augustine still believes in the importance of the disciplinae 
liberales in seeking truth. For a clear, thorough and critical examination of the scholarly arguments see Jacobsson 
2002: xiv-xxviii. 
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we are introduced to the effect that different metre has on the sound that we hear.  The same 
word may sound differently because it is pronounced differently according to whether it is an 
adverb or a verb and yet two words which are different may sound similar because they are 
pronounced in a similar way like modus and bonus.  We can say that the difference is in the 
sound but it is also a difference heard by us and a difference in the way the word is 
pronounced.  The difference is accounted for by the different metre in the sound and the 
science of these different metres is the discipline of music which Augustine defines as ‘the 
science of measuring well’ (scientia bene modulandi).117  If good measure has been kept to, 
the sound we hear will please us by its harmony and appropriateness for the occasion (a dirge 
at a funeral).118  Augustine ascends through the various ways in which we encounter music- 
sounding, hearing and performing- all of which involve the senses in some way until he 
ascends further into the theory of music and turns to the rational analysis of numerically 
ordered movements and the fixed laws of numbers that underpin them.119  This rational 
analysis is the subject matter of Books 2 to 5 and, as Augustine himself said, these books are 
difficult to understand unless one is guided through them by someone with knowledge.120  
Book 6 reprises and expands the theme of ascent of book 1, developing it in a philosophical 
and theological context so that the search for the source of the traces of Number121 found in 
the things of sense, has become the search for God.122  Book 6 was written for those educated 
in the liberal arts but without faith, to help them to recognize that the purpose of their secular 
studies is to bring them to the one true God.123  The ascent in book 6 to find the source of 
music is undertaken by means of an analysis of the metric feet in a verse of one of Ambrose’s 
hymns, Deus Creator omnium.124  Five stages of ascent are initially identified: the rhythm in 
                                                          
117 mus. 1:2:2; also mus. 2:1:1 the province of music is the rational and numerical measure of sounds.  
118 mus, 1.3.4; ord.:2:11:34. 
119 mus. 1:11:19. Augustine’s adherence to a Pythagorean numerical view of reality is in keeping with his time 
and his sources would have been Varro and the handbook Introduction to Arithmetic by the Neo-Pythagorean, 
Nicomachus of Gerasa see Solignac 1958.  For the revival of interest in this mathematical view in late antiquity 
see O’Meara 1989. 
120 ep. 101:3. 
121 Augustine notes that what the Greeks call ‘rhythm,’ is called ‘Number’ in Latin mus. 3.1.2, ord. 2.14.40. 
122 See Harrison 2011for a helpful elucidation of the ascent in mus. 6 and its theological context.  
123 mus. 6:1:1. 
124 Ibid. 6:2:2. Augustine often quotes this verse. For attribution to Ambrose and full text of hymn see conf. 
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sound, which is attributed to the body; the rhythm in our sense of hearing, which is a reaction 
of the soul in the body to the sound; the rhythm in the activity of producing the sound; the 
rhythm in remembering the sound and finally the rhythm in judging the sound by exercising 
our natural judicial power (inner sense not rational).125  However, when it comes to ordering 
the stages, there is a problem which stems from the disciple’s misunderstanding of the nature 
of the relationship between the body and soul and the discussion revolves around whether, in 
sense perception, the soul acts on the body or the body on the soul.  This is the context in 
which Augustine discusses the presence of the soul to the body and in which we find him 
suggesting that the soul animates the body by means of intentio:  
 
I think that our body is not animated by the soul in any other way nisi 
intentione facientis.  Nor do I think that the soul is being acted upon in any way 
by the body, but I think that the soul produces something out of the body and 
acts in it as in something that is subject to its dominion by God’s will.126 
It is by no means clear what he meant by intentione facientis, as evidenced by the 
attention the phrase has attracted from scholars.  There have been five suggested 
interpretations of its meaning: ‘for the purpose of action;’127 ‘according to the will or intention 
of its Maker;’128 ‘by the intentionality of its acts;’129 ‘through the will or intention of the 
agent’130 and ‘through the agent’s concentration.’131   
                                                          
9:12:32.  
125 mus. 6:4:5. Later on in the dialogue Augustine adds a sixth by distinguishing the approval or disapproval of a 
rhythm which is heard (judicial) from the evaluation of whether or not it is right to enjoy the rhythm and this is 
the level of the rhythms of reason itself. mus. 6.9.24. 
126 Ibid. 6.5.9 tr. Jacobsson 2002). This is not Augustine’s first use of intentio for which see imm. an. but his first 
use of intentio in the context of the soul’s animation of the body and in the context of ascent. 
127 Thonnard BA 7, 517 n. 78 referred to in, and supported by, Teske 2008: 205.  
128 Colleran ACW 9: 219 n. 123. Also seen as a possible interpretation by Thonnard BA 7, 379 (referred to Teske 
op.cit. 205) but this interpretation is generally disregarded Pizzani, U. 1990: 43. 
129 Rohmer, 1954: 494. 
130 Jacobsson op. cit. 27 in translating nisi intentione facientis as ‘through the will of an agent’ is following 
translations of Bettetini and O’Daly. 
131 O’Daly 1987: 85. 
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The soul was given to the body to control and direct it (quod agendo atque 
administrando corpori anima data sit),132 and it is the soul’s job, acting as God’s 
intermediary, to ensure that the body fulfils its potential by transferring form to the body 
which the soul receives from God.133  In mus. Augustine describes this as the soul imprinting 
rhythms into the body after having received them from God (sed de illis, credo, quos non a 
corpore accipit anima, sed acceptos a summo Deo ipsa potius imprimit corpori.)134  What he 
is trying to emphasize is that the soul acts on the body rather than the other way round.  The 
soul is not subject to the body as matter as to an artificer; it is not the body that creates things 
in the soul but the soul that creates in the body and the extensive use of facere and its cognates 
in the passages leading up to nisi intentione facientis, where the discussion centres round 
whether the body creates rhythms in the soul or vice versa135 is related to this issue and 
confirms that facientis refers to the soul rather than God; the point being that the soul acts on 
the body rather than vice versa (facientis as opposed to factis).136   
With regard to the meaning of nisi intentione facientis, Rohmer has argued that this 
famously difficult phrase becomes crystal clear if understood in the light of what Augustine 
does with the Stoic theory of sense perception.  According to Rohmer, intentio is the 
translation of the Greek term συνέντασις, which was one of the concepts in the Stoic theory of 
sense perception.  Rohmer argues that in his theory of sense perception, Augustine clarifies 
and spiritualizes the Stoic theory of sense perception and thus heralded the Scholastic doctrine 
of intentionality as he sought to provide a solution to the problem of how to transcend 
                                                          
132 an. quant. 36:81. 
133 imm. an. 15:24; retr. 1:11:4.  
134 mus. 6:4:7. 
135 mus. 6:4:6 . The following references are to Jacobssen, 20,3 facientes factis; Ibid. 6:4:7 :20,8 factis facientes; 
20,10 faciunt ; 20, 12 faciunt; factis; 20,14 in anima fit; in ea fit; 20,18 faciant/fiant; 20, 20 Mirare potius, quod 
facere aliquid in anima corpus potest; 22,11 in ea fit, quam omne quod fit in corpore; 22, 17 corpore facta est; 
22,19 in corpore fit; 22, 20 in anima fit; 24,5 fiunt/fiant; 24, 6 facientes/factis; mus. 6:5:8: 24,19 nisi aliquid a 
corpore in anima fieri; 24,24 fiunt in anima. Note also a similar predominance of facere and cognates and the 
similarity of language in imm. an. 8:14 (At si quod vere dicitur, factum est corpus; aliquo faciente factum est, nec 
eo inferiore.) 
136 This is given added weight by Vanni Rovighi’s suggestion that the source of nisi intentione facientis is a 
passage of Plotinus in which he states, with regard to the soul, that it: ‘is a matter of power, not of being affected 
in some way but of being capable of and doing the work to which it has been assigned (τέτακται ἐργάσασθαι.)’ 
Enn 4:6:2. See Vanni Rovighi referred to in Martino 2000.   
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sensation, namely through the intentional act of the soul and that this intentionality is the 
nature of the soul’s acts towards the body.  Rohmer thinks, therefore, that Ego enim ab anima 
hoc corpus animari non puto, nisi intentione facientis is best translated as ‘J’estime que l’âme 
anime le corps par l’intentionnalité de ses actes.’137  This certainly captures Augustine’s view 
of the nature of the soul’s activity in the body and it is possible that this is an early indication 
of the direction of Augustine’s thinking on intentio and in which it will develop in Gn. litt. and 
trin. but it is more likely that Rohmer is reading back into the earlier work what was actually a 
later development in Augustine’s thinking.138  Also, arguably, to translate intentio in 
Augustine by the word ‘intentionality’ is to import back a technical term used by the 
Scholastics to describe a doctrine of intentionality, which may well have its seeds in 
Augustine’s treatment of intentio in trin., but which cannot be taken back any earlier.139  
 
The majority view is that intentio in the passage expresses volitional activity of the 
soul.  This view derives support both from Augustine’s previous use of the word intentio in 
imm. an. and from his Platonic sources.  Intentio is used several times in imm. an. of the soul’s 
volitional activity in relation to the movement of the body:  
 
The intentio to act lies in the present (intentio ad agendum praesentis est  temporis).140  
 
The intentio that is present of bringing something to an end (intentio peragendi quae 
                                                          
137 Rohmer 1954: 494. ‘Il a forgé lui-même l’une des pièces maîtresses de l’épistémologie médiévale, en mettant 
à jour l’acte intentionnel de l’âme.’ 
138 Martino 2000: 185 thinks Rohmer is being anachronistic in this.  
139 Spiegelberg says that, until the beginning of the High Scholastic period, intentio had been used in the ordinary 
practical sense and it was only when the word intentio was used to translate the Arabic words ma’nā and ma’qūl, 
(‘meaning’ or ‘concept,’) in a Latin translation of Arabic philosophy that intentio also came to assume a technical 
meaning.  This gave rise, he says, to the development of various theories of intentionality, see Spiegelberg 1976: 
114. Caston 2001 disputes ‘the standard narrative’ that intentionality dates back only as far as the Latin 
translation, and assimilation, of the Arabic tradition in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.  Instead he argues that 
the concept of intentionality (that feature in virtue of which our mental states are of or about something or more 
generally possess content) has its origins much further back in ancient history, that Augustine is the bridge 
between the ancient and modern traditions and that many of the elements of the concept of intentionality and the 
terminology used to express the concept, including the term intentio can already be seen in Augustine.  It is 
Caston’s  examination of the role of intentio in trin. which convinces him that, as intentio is responsible for 
selecting the objects of the mind’s attention, it is also responsible for the content of our mental state and, in this 
sense, should justifiably be included as part of the history of intentionality.   
140 imm. an. 3:3. 
  
48 
praesens est).141  
 
 The intentio of the mover is led towards the end that it wants for the soul which it 
moves (moventis intentio perducendi ad finem quem volet corpus quod movet)142  
 
That intentio to complete which evidently remains unchanged (illa intentio perficiendi 
quam immutatam manere manifestum est).143   
 
Imm. an. 3:4 is particularly apposite because there Augustine makes the point that it is 
intentio that moves the members of the workman and the wood or stone that he uses: the same 
illustration that he uses in mus.144  It is clear from these passages in imm. an. that Augustine 
was using intentio similarly in mus. of the soul’s volitional activity in which it acted in the 
body for a desired purpose.145  What though does it mean to speak of the volitional power of 
the soul’s animating presence of the body?  Does it mean any more than that the general 
nature of the soul’s activity in the body is intentional and directive?  The real significance of 
describing this, the lowest power of the soul as intentional, is first, the emphasis that it places 
on the unity of the soul, for volitional activity is rational activity and it therefore affirms that it 
is the rational soul that animates the body, not a separate lower animating principle.  It also 
suggests that the soul has a natural inclination and will towards the body, a view which later 
Augustine expressly affirms146 and one for which he found support in Neoplatonism.147  
                                                          
141 Ibid. 
142 imm. an. 3:4. 
143 Ibid. 
144 mus. 6:5:8. 
145 The passages in imm. an. will be considered again in chapter 3 in relation to overcoming the distentio of time 
and memory with regard to the soul’s activity of sense perception and intentio as purposed end is discussed in 
chapter 4.  
146 Gn. litt. 3:16:25; 7:27:38. Also Gn. litt. 12:35:68 ‘there is ingrained in the soul a kind of natural appetite for 
administering the body, and that as long as it does not have a body at its disposal, it is somehow or other held 
back by this unsatisfied appetite from pressing on with undivided attention to that highest heaven.’  
147 Porphyry sent. 3 (ὅταν βούληται) and 27 (ὅπου βούλεται καὶ ώς θέλει and ὅπου βούλεται). Brisson 2005: 385 
says, the idea of will is completely foreign to Plotinus in this context: Re Plotinus: Enn. 4:3:9:21-3’If it (soul) 
intends to go forth (optative indicating a wish), it will produce a place for itself, and so a body. But this 
is not voluntary, more of an irresistible impulse for, at Enn. 4:3:13:17-21, Plotinus says that the souls go neither 
willingly nor because they are sent nor is the voluntary element in their going like deliberate choice but like a 
spontaneous jumping or a passionate natural desire of sexual union or as some men are moved unreasoningly to 
noble deeds: However the idea of inclination towards the body, which is represented by cognates of ῥέπεινis 
common to Porphyry and Plotinus.  For references in Sent. and in Plotinus see Brisson 2005: 588.  The 
expression τῇ πρός τι ῥοπῇ is also used by Plato and Aristotle and comes from Plato Phaedo 247 b4 (Dörrie 
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Gn. litt. 
It is not until Gn. litt. that Augustine uses the term intentio, to mean concentration as 
opposed to diffusion, to describe the way in which the soul is present to the body.148  Gn. litt. 
was Augustine’s fourth attempt at a literal149 interpretation of the creation narrative of 
Genesis, and is a thorough literal commentary in twelve books of Gen. 1-3.150  The first 3 
books deal with the works of creation and God’s rest on the seventh day as set out in the first 
creation myth in Gen. 1:1-31.  The fourth book deals with God’s rest on the seventh day.  The 
fifth book explains the meaning and difference of the two accounts of creation in Genesis.  
Books 6-11 deal with the second creation myth and book 12 is a treatise on different kinds of 
vision.151  Books 6 and 7 concern the meaning of the words in Gen. 2:7 ‘and the man was 
made into a living soul.’  Book 6 is about the creation of the human body and book 7 is about 
the creation of the human soul.  
 
In book 7, Augustine adduces arguments from the Catholic faith, from medical science 
and from an examination of human nature to show that the soul is something different from 
the body and is incorporeal.  He first of all repudiates the idea held by some, including the 
Manichees, that because God breathed into man, the soul is to be regarded as part of the 
substance of God; repudiating it on the grounds that the soul is mutable and God is immutable.  
He argues by drawing an analogy with the way the human soul moves the body to enable it to 
breathe though, like all analogies, there is dissimilarity, for God is not in the world as its 
                                                          
1959: 88).  
148 O’Daly 1987: 85 says of intentio in mus. 6:5:9 that it means ‘concentration’ but he had previously noted (44) 
that intentio is being used in this passage in a volitional sense, which he contrasts with its tensional sense in 
orig.an. 2:4 (see infra).   
149 By literal, he meant historical, Gn. litt. 1:1; retr. 1:18:17; 2:24. In his first attempt, Gn. adu. Man., written 
expressly against the Manichees, and in defence of the Old Testament (retr. 1:10:1; Gn. litt. 8:2:5), he lapsed into 
an allegorical interpretation because, at that time, he could not see how all of Genesis could be understood in a 
literal sense (Gn. litt. 8:2:5) and he did not dare to expound such great mysteries literally (retr. 1:18:17). In 393-4 
he had another go in Gn. litt. inp., but again gave up the task as being too difficult Ibid. Then in conf. 12 he 
undertook the fairly limited task of the literal interpretation of Gen. 1:1. 
150 Written and revised over a lengthy period from, at the earliest 399 to, at the latest, 416 when the work was 
published. On dating see WSA 1/13, 164. It was begun after trin. but finished sooner retr. 2:24.  
151 Details of each book taken from WSA 1/13, 164.  
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animating principle, like the soul is, in the body, but is removed from it.152  He then considers 
what kind of material the soul is made from during which he repudiates the doctrine of 
transmigration of souls from animals to humans, and vice versa, which was held by some 
philosophers153 and by the Manichees.154  Augustine confirms that the soul is not made out of 
any one of the elements of which bodies are made but that it rules and governs the body by 
means of the finer of these elements-light and air.155  He concludes that the meaning of the 
passage ‘the man was made into a live soul’ is that ‘he began to have sensation in the body, 
which is in fact the surest sign of flesh being animated and alive.’156   
 
Book 8 is about the nature of paradise, the command given to Adam and how God 
governs His Creation.  Augustine discussed the question of how the body moves in Gn. litt. to 
illustrate the twofold working of Divine Providence: by natural and voluntary activity.157  In 
order to understand how God is not contained in place but the whole of Him is present 
everywhere at the same time, Augustine, in accordance with his normal practice, refers the 
reader to an examination of their own human nature to consider how the soul governs the 
body.  Although it might look as though the soul moves with the body, because we are unable 
to distinguish the two, in fact it doesn’t and Augustine explains how the will (voluntas) moves 
the body, while remaining itself, unmoving.  In the course of this explanation, he says: 
 
The soul is not a corporeal substance and does not fill the body in space as water does 
a skin bottle or a sponge, but in a mysterious way by its incorporeal command it is 
united to the body which it vivifies, and by this command it rules the body through 
quadam intentio, not a corporeal mass (cum anima non sit natura corporea, nec locali 
spatio corpus impleat, sicut aqua utrum sive spongiam; sed miris modis ipso 
incorporeo nutu commixta sit vivificando corpori, quo et imperat corpori, quadam 
intentione non mole).158 
                                                          
152 Gn. litt. 7:3:4-7:4:6; 7:12:19. 
153 Ibid. 7:9:13-7:10:15. 
154 Ibid. 7:11:16. 
155 Ibid. 7:15:21; 7:19:25; 7:20:26. 
156 See next chapter. 
157 Gn. litt. 8:19:38; 8:9:17-8. On how the soul moves body see Gn. litt. 8:21:41-2. Also an. quant. 22:38; Gn. 
litt. 7:18:24.  
158 Ibid. 8:21:42. Nutus literally means ‘nod’ but was also used by Cicero to mean both ‘a downward tendency, or 
motion in the sense of gravity and command, will or pleasure, see Lewis and Short for references.  This is 
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He affirms that the soul is not present to the body, as in a place and, therefore, the familiar 
analogies used to describe the conjunction of two bodily substances - that of liquid in a 
container159 and water permeating a sponge160- are inadequate.  Instead the soul is united to 
the body ipso incorporeo nutu, by which it also governs the body.  It carries out its rule of the 
body quadam intentione, which is contrasted with bodily mass (mole).  How, therefore, should 
we understand intentio in this passage?  Hill translates quadam intentione as ‘with a kind of 
concentration’ noting that Augustine clearly lacked the words to say how the soul moves the 
body.161  Burnell also translates it as ‘a certain concentration’ and says that by intentio here 
Augustine means a conscious act of willing.162  Hammond-Taylor translates it as ‘through an 
influence,’ likening its use here to that in orig. an 2:4 (quaedam vitali intentione); meaning 
that activity by which the soul vivifies the body and distinguishing this use from intentio in 
Gn. litt. 7:19:25 and Gn. litt. 12:13:27 where, he says, it means ‘attention.’163  O’Daly does 
not translate intentio, when he quotes this passage, pointing up the fact that, in his view, it is 
difficult, in this instance, to distinguish the tensional and volitional components of intentio.164  
In our view the volitional component is taken care of by Augustine’s use of the word nutus165 
and what he meant to convey by the word intentio here was concentration as opposed to 
diffusion.  Intentio in this sense conveys the cohesive nature of the soul’s activity at this level 
where its job is to unify the parts of the body and keep it together as one.   
 
Augustine was likely to have been influenced by the Stoics in this use of intentio for 
intentio is the Latin translation of the Greek word τόνος, which, in Stoic philosophy, meant 
                                                          
therefore the perfect word for Augustine to convey both the voluntary and commanding nature of the soul’s 
inclination towards the body.  
159utrem impleat an. quant. 5:7; Enn. 4:3:20; Porphyry has a rather graphic example, ‘nor is it contained in body 
in the same way as a bladder contains something liquid, or wind’ sent. 28. 
160 Remember that this is one of the ways Augustine himself used to imagine the relationship of God and creation 
as a huge sea soaking a sponge in all its parts conf. 7:5:7. 
161 WSA 1/13, 370 n. 48. 
162 Burnell. 2005: 28. 
163 Hammond Taylor ACW 42, 261 n. 100 and 248 n. 46. See chapter 2 n. 93 for comment. 
164 O’Daly 1987: 44. 
165 See n. 158 supra. 
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the vital tensional movement through which pneuma held each individual thing together and 
made the universe cohere as a whole.  It was τόνος which gave each thing its form, shape and 
unity.166  Augustine may also have been influenced by Aristoxenes, a pupil of Aristotle, 
reported by Cicero as believing the soul ‘to be a special tuning up, an intentionem quondam of 
the natural body analogous to that which is called harmony in vocal and instrumental 
music.’167  Although Augustine rejected the theory that the soul was the harmony of the 
body,168 its function was still to maintain the harmony of the body.   
 
orig. an. 
The clearest statement of how the soul is present to the body by a kind of intentio, in 
contrast to diffusion, is to be found in orig. an., Augustine’s book-length letter to Jerome on 
the origin of the soul.169  Augustine tells us he wrote this book to Jerome to consult him on the 
question of the origin of the soul and that he did not resolve the matter170 but, at the end of the 
day, he did not regard such lack of knowledge as a danger to salvation.171  The important thing 
was the doctrine of original sin and any teaching on the origin of the soul which conflicted 
with this must be incorrect.172  This was partly why he decided to publish his letter to Jerome; 
to advise the reader either not to ask questions about the soul’s origin or, if they must, to allow 
for a resolution of the question in accordance with catholic teaching on original sin in 
                                                          
166 Hahm 1977: 165-7. In ciu. 13:18 this has become God’s will that holds everything together on a cosmic level 
and prevents disintegration. For Stoic influences on Augustine see Colish 1985/2.  
167 Tusc. 1:10:20. Aristoxenes’ view also mentioned by Lact., one of Augustine’s forbears in the African Church 
inst. diu.7:13; op. dei. 16:13.  Augustine though may have become familiar with Aristoxenus’ views through 
Aristides see Colish 1978.  
168 imm. an. 2:2. The view that the soul’s function was to preserve the body’s harmony must be distinguished from the 
view that the soul was the harmony of the body.  If it was the harmony of the body then it wouldn’t be able to withdraw 
in introspection imm. an. 10:17.  The view of the soul as the harmony of the body had also been rejected by Plato 
(Phaedo), Aristotle (de anima) and Plotinus Enn. 4:7:8.  
169 orig. an written 415 at about the same time, therefore, as Gn. litt. was published.  Augustine called it a book 
when he came to review his work, retr. 2:45.  
170 retr. 2:45; Augustine never resolved the question of the origin of the soul, retr. 1:1:3.  There was no clear 
scriptural authority to assist in deciding which of the four theories traditionally put forward was correct and 
therefore Augustine is unable to endorse any particular one ep. 148:7.  The four traditional theories of origin are 
discussed in lib. arb. 3.20.56-3.21.59. In fact, the origin of the soul was such a great mystery that it was better 
always to be in pursuit of this question as long as we are in this life than at some point to presume we have 
discovered an answer ep. 140:12:32. 
171 c. Iul. 5:4:17. 
172 c. ep. Pel. 3:10:26. 
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infants.173  What Augustine wanted from Jerome was an answer to the question: Where does 
the soul, even the soul of an infant, contract the guilt that requires baptism?  Augustine 
complained that Jerome was sending him people to instruct but he didn’t know how to instruct 
them with regard to the soul’s origin and this is what he wanted Jerome’s help with.  The 
question of origin had become more pressing during the Pelagian controversy when Augustine 
was forced to confront and justify the catholic doctrine of original sin.174  He found the 
doctrine hard to square with the theory that individual souls were created at the time of birth, 
which he knew was Jerome’s view, and so he sought Jerome’s advice on which of the four 
traditional theories of embodiment was consistent with the catholic teaching on original sin.175   
 
Before setting out the question he wanted answered, he sought to reassure Jerome that 
he wasn’t entirely ignorant on matters regarding the soul but that he knew certain things: that 
it was immortal, in the sense that it was always life of some kind, even though it suffered a 
kind of death by turning away from God;  that it was not a part of God because, if it were, it 
would be immutable and incorruptible whereas anyone can see, from examining himself, that 
it is mutable and corruptible; that it was incorporeal.  It is in setting out his argument for the 
incorporeal nature of the soul (not because Jerome doesn’t believe it but to show how he, 
Augustine, came to believe it) that we find the following passage with regard to the soul: 
 
It is of course stretched out through the whole body that it animates, not by a local 
diffusion but by a certain vital intentione. For it is at the same time present as a whole 
through all the body’s parts, not smaller in smaller parts and larger in larger parts, but 
more intensely in one place and less intensely in another, both whole in all parts and 
whole in the individual parts (Per totum quippe corpus quod animat, non locali 
diffusione, sed quadam vitali intentione porrigitur: nam per omnes eius particulas tota 
simul adest, nec minor in minoribus, et in maioribus maior; sed alicubi intentius, alicubi 
remissius, et in omnibus tota, et in singulis tota est.)176  
 
Here is a very clear statement from Augustine that the soul is present in the body quadam 
                                                          
173 retr. 2:45(72). 
174 All four traditional theories had equally well suited his fight against the Manichees’ conception of the 
existence of an evil substance in opposition to God, orig. an. 3:7 and 7:19. 
175 orig. an 4.10.   
176 Ibid. 2.4.   
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vitali intentione as opposed to being stretched out through the body by diffusion.  This is how 
it is able to be simultaneously present in the whole of the body and whole in each of the 
body’s parts.  If the soul were a body, then if it were to sense something in one part, only that 
part would be affected.  So it is clear, says Augustine, that it is the same soul present 
throughout.  It is also clear that the soul can sense a touch on part of the body without leaving 
the rest of the body: this is proved by the fact that those other parts of the soul continue to 
live.177  The argument from the sense of touch does not prove that the soul was diffused 
through the body like blood, as Euodius sought to argue in an. quant.178 but can be used, as 
here, to prove the incorporeal soul’s animation by intentio, whatever that might mean.  Teske 
says it is clear what Augustine means by diffusion but less clear what he means by intentio in 
this context.  There have been various suggestions: It means ‘a kind of tension on the basis 
that Augustine is evoking the Stoic doctrine of τόνος;’179 or ‘a certain vital influence’ simply 
meaning that activity by which the soul vivifies the body and to be distinguished from intentio 
in the sense of attention;180 or conversely, that it does mean ‘a kind of vital attention.’181  
Teske himself translates it as ‘a certain vital intention,’ by which he says he means ‘a kind of 
vital attention.’  He first notes the link of intentio with incorporeality in conf. 7:1:2, where it is 
clear that Augustine is referring to an activity through which images are formed.  Teske then 
refers to imm. an. 10:17 where Augustine refers to the mind withdrawing intentio from the 
senses and suggests this is a withdrawal of attention.  Finally he refers to the passage from 
mus. which he regards as particularly apposite because, like orig.an. 2:4, intentio occurs in the 
context of a discussion of the soul’s activities of animation and sensation.  Although he 
regards the meaning of intentio in mus. as ambiguous, he concludes that it refers to the soul’s 
presence to the body for the purpose of action and in the case of the activity of sensation this 
action amounts to a heightened attention to the body.  He therefore supports Gilson’s view of 
sensation as an intensification of animation and reaches his conclusion of the meaning of 
                                                          
177 Teske 2008: 212 says Augustine’s argument in imm an 16:25 that part of body reacting to hurt toe proves that 
part of soul in toe is also in part that reacts does not prove that parts of soul in parts of body that do not react are 
same as parts in hurt toe however what it does prove is that soul is not extended as a body would be.  
178 an. quant. 30:61. 
179 O’Daly 1987: 44. 
180 ACW 2, 248 n. 46.  
181 Gilson 1961: 48; FOTC 4, 210 n. 75.  
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intentio here on that basis.182  
 
In coming to a view of the meaning of intentio in orig. an 2:4, we note that, as in Gn. 
litt., we find intentio contrasted with diffusion and the suggestion that Augustine meant to 
convey a sense of tension is supported by the further contrast in the passage between intentius 
and remissius.  Therefore, whatever else intentio might mean, it certainly suggests that the 
soul is present, animating the body by means of varying degrees of tension, or when applied to 
the mind this translates as varying degrees of mental effort.183  As to whether or not intentio 
also means attention in this passage we will reserve judgement pending a closer look at 
sensation in the next chapter.   
 
Conclusion 
 
In the wake of his revolutionary discovery of the Platonic notion of incorporeal 
existence, Augustine’s early works see him busily working out the implications, both in terms 
of the relationship between the body and soul and also in terms of the nature of God.  One of 
his preoccupations, made explicit at the beginning of conf., was how God could be 
simultaneously whole everywhere and in each part of his creation, regardless of its size.184  
The Manicheaen view of a corporeal God, which Augustine was engaged in refuting, meant 
that God could be split into an infinite number of particles and different parts of his creation 
would have different and unequal parts of Him depending on their physical magnitude.185  
Augustine came to describe God as a light, but a different kind of light, not a light diffused in 
the air, but a light which no space could contain.186  God does not fill a smaller part of the 
                                                          
182 Gilson 1961: 48. See chapter 2 infra. 
183In addition to the Stoic doctrine of τόνος which we have already noted underlies Augustine’s thought here, it is 
worth noting Cic. Tusc 2:23:’For the soul has certain analogies to the body: weights are more easily carried by 
straining every nerve of the body: relax the strain and the weights are too heavy; quite similarly the soul by its 
intense effort (animus intentione sua) throws off all the pressure of burdens, but by relaxation of effort 
(remissione) is so weighed down that it cannot recover itself.’  A passage Augustine certainly knew. 
184 conf. 1:3:3. See O’Donnell conf. 1:3:3 for other references in Augustine’s works; for sources and other fourth 
century Christian parallels. 
185 c. ep. Man. 19:21; ep. 236.2.  
186 conf. 7:10:16; 10:6:8 as opposed to conf.  7:1:2 where he thought of God as light diffused through air.  
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world with a smaller part of himself and a larger part with a larger part of himself.  ‘He is able 
to be whole everywhere and to be contained in no place; he is able to come without leaving 
where he was and is able to go away without abandoning where he came from.187  That this is 
so is clear from the soul’s presence in the body which is everywhere whole and whole in each 
part.  In this chapter we have seen how Augustine has struggled to understand and express 
this; how he has played with the analogy of the sound of a word and its meaning; how he has 
dismissed all analogies which would suggest the soul is present by place or diffusion, finally 
settling on the word intentio. Intentio did not provide the answer to the question of how to 
regard the conjunction of the soul and body to produce a living soul, which Augustine 
continued to regard as ‘utterly amazing and beyond our powers of comprehension,’188 but it 
was a term which allowed Augustine to express the idea of how an incorporeal soul could be 
present in a body and act in relation to that body and also showed that this presence is by 
varying degrees of tension or attention; that there is a volitional element and that it has a 
unifying function.  This function of colligit in unum; maintaining a harmony between the 
body’s parts, both in health and appearance, where intentio acts at the psychological level to 
achieve what God’s will does on a cosmic level, namely holds everything together and 
prevents disintegration, will be a constant at each stage of ascent: intentio collects together the 
components of sense perception; overcomes the distentio of time; gathers together images 
and/or ideas to form a thought process189 and finally gathers together Augustine from the 
multiplicity in which he is lost and returns him to the unity which he has lost.190 
 
 
                                                          
187 ep. 137:4-5. 
188 ciu. 21:10:1. 
189 conf. 10:11:18. 
190 conf. 2:1:1; 10:29:40;  11:29:39;  12:16:23. 
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Chapter Two: Sensus  
 
The unified process of drawing and shooting was divided into sections: grasping the 
bow, nocking the arrow, raising the bow, drawing and remaining at the point of highest 
tension, loosing the shot.1 
 
So, go up another level and see what power the soul has in the senses, where life is 
understood more clearly and obviously. ….Look at what power the soul has in the 
senses and in that mobility which belongs to things that are therefore more evidently 
alive, by reason of which we can have nothing in common with those living things 
which are fixed by roots.  The soul directs itself (intendit se) to the sense of touch and 
through it feels and distinguishes hot and cold, rough and smooth, hard and soft, light 
and heavy.  Then again, it distinguishes countless varieties of savors, odors, sounds, 
and shapes, by tasting, smelling, hearing and seeing.  And in all these the soul seeks 
and selects whatever suits the nature of its own body; it rejects and shuns what is 
unsuited.  At certain intervals it withdraws itself from the senses, and giving them time 
off, so to say, gives their activities an opportunity to recuperate their strength, the 
while it lumps together in manifold combinations, and mulls over, the images of 
realities it has taken in through the senses; and all this constitutes sleep and dreams. 
Frequently too, it takes advantage of the mobility present to delight in making gestures 
and unusual motions and without effort it sets the parts of the body in harmony (et sine 
labore ordinat membrorum concordiam.)  For sexual union it does what it can, and by 
companionship and love it strives to forge two natures into one.  It cooperates not 
merely to beget offspring, but also to foster it, to protect and nourish it.  It attaches 
itself by habit to things among which the body acts and by which it sustains the body, 
and from these, as if they were of its own constitution, it is reluctant to be separated; 
and this force of habit which is not terminated even by separation from the realities 
themselves and by the passing of time, is called memory.  But again, no one denies 
that the soul can produce all these effects even in brute animals.2  
 
The second stage of ascent, and the second power of the soul in an. quant., 
corresponds to the second degree of soul identified by Varro, which brings with it, sensibility.3  
This degree of soul is shared with other animals, but not with plants, although some people 
with ‘a certain kind of utterly crude perversion which is more wooden than the very trees it 
takes under its wing,’ believe ‘that the vine suffers pain when a grape is plucked and such 
things not only feel it when cut, but even that they see and hear.’4  This comment was clearly 
                                                          
1 Herrigel 1976:35. 
2 an. quant. 33.71.  
3 ciu. 7:23.  
4 an. quant. 33:71. 
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aimed at the Manichees who believed in the sensibility of the plant soul.5  Augustine begins to 
use the word ‘soul’ (anima) at this stage because it has sensation and it is the spontaneous 
movement of the body which proves, above all, that the body is animated and alive6 and so 
life is more obvious.7 
 
The soul’s second stage functions 
Some of the soul’s functions are similar to those at the first stage except that, now, 
there is a feeling element involved.  So reproduction isn’t mechanical but occurs as a result of 
lovemaking, and the soul is not only concerned with the growth and nourishment of its own 
body or with reproduction per se but also with the care for those it reproduces. As at the first 
stage, the soul is concerned with the harmony of the body but, at this stage, it is not just a 
question of preserving the health and harmony of a stationary body but of effortlessly setting 
in harmony the parts of a body in motion (et sine labore ordinat membrorum concordiam.)8  
The second stage also includes several activities of the soul, which are dependent on, what 
Augustine calls, sensus: sensation; a non-rational judging of sense data; dreaming9 and 
memory of the kind we share with beasts, ‘for swallows come back to their nests the next 
year, and it is very truly said of goats: “And even goats remembering return to their sheds.” 
“And a dog is said to have recognized the hero, his master, already forgotten by men.’’’10  
                                                          
5 mor. 2:15:36f; Gn. litt. inp. 5:24; conf. 3:10:18; haer. 46:12. They also believed that plants had rationality mor. 
2:17:55. 
6 imm. an. 3:3; Gn. adu. Man. 2:8:10; Gn. litt. 7:16:22; Io. eu. tr. 19:12.  At the first level where there is no 
power of perception, the soul is normally just called ‘life Gn. litt. inp. 5:24.  Augustine explains that sometimes 
when we use the word ‘anima’ we should understand it to include the mind (mens) and at other times ‘mind’ is 
excluded from it in which case it applies to those activities we share with the lower animals, diu. qu. 83:7.  
Generally, he observes that Latin writers use the word animus to distinguish rational soul from anima as being 
those activities we share in common with animals, trin. 15:1:1.  For more on anima/animus terminology, see 
O’Daly 1987:7-9. 
7 an. quant. 33:71. 
8 Augustine’s choice of vocabulary is significant.  There is a close relationship between order and peace 
(ordinat… concordiam). If bodily peace is lacking it has a knock-on effect, affecting the peace of the soul; the 
whole human being; communal peace and our peace with God, ciu. 19:14. In keeping the body in order, the soul 
emulates its Creator who imposes order on everything by His law, conf. 1:7:12.   
9 The soul dreams when it withdraws from the senses to give them a rest. Augustine suggests that sleep (what he 
calls the semblance of death) is necessary because the body is corruptible i.e. it wouldn’t have been necessary 
before the Fall.  People who regularly make a practice of staying awake at night are learning how to live like 
angels and he regards this practice of keeping vigil (of which he is a strong advocate) as a spiritual exercise in 
which we flex our spiritual muscles, s. 221:3.  
10 mus. 1.4.8 containing quotes from Vergil Georgics 3:316 and Homer Odyssey 17:291; Homer’s story of the 
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This is a memory of bodily things and acquired through force of habit.11  
 
The process of sensation (awareness of pleasure and pain) which occurs in the body 
and the process of sense perception (interpretation of pleasure and pain) which occurs in the 
soul are different and yet early Greek thinkers did not always distinguish them clearly; there 
was only one term αἴσθησις which covered both processes.  Plotinus was the first to 
distinguish clearly between the two,12 and Augustine followed suit.  In Augustine’s view, 
awareness through the senses could be believed, perceived and assessed and, if assessed 
correctly, would count as knowledge.13  Hence, with the right attitude towards them, the 
senses can act as a first level of perception and stepping-stone on the ascent to God.14  
However, to convert sensations into knowledge requires the exercise of higher powers of the 
soul.15  If we don’t utilize these, then we are no better than beasts or children, for whom the 
activity of sensation is an end in itself.16  The problem for the human soul is that the habit of 
paying attention to the senses increases our attachment to them: our desire to seek pleasure 
through them and our anxiety to avoid pain.  It also increases our tendency to think only in 
material terms.17  
 
                                                          
dog remembering his master after twenty years is also referred to in an. quant. 26:50; 28:54.  
11 Also conf. 10:17:26. 
12 Blumenthal 1971a: 67-8. 
13 doctr. chr. 2:27, 41. 
14 sol. 1:4:9. We gather things from many sources through our senses and commit them to memory, these are 
things we believe ‘But to know that is something else….I rather employed the senses in this matter as I use a 
ship. For when they had carried me to the place to which I was going and I had there dismissed them and when I 
had began to turn these things over in my thought..one can more easily navigate a ship on dry land than one can 
perceive mathematics by means of the senses though they do seem to help a bit those who are beginning to 
learn.’ Also uid. deo 3, 8 ‘Our knowledge is made up of things seen and things believed..knowledge of course is 
attributed to the mind if it retains something perceived and known, whether through the senses of the body or 
through the mind itself;’ trin. 15:12:21 ‘Far be it from us to doubt the truth of things we have learnt through the 
senses of the body.’ 
15 uid. deo.16, 38 ‘those things that are seen through the body cannot be held as knowledge unless the mind is 
present to receive such things reported to it;’ uid. deo 17,41 ‘interior eyes judge what is seen by the exterior 
eyes.’ 
16 an. quant. 28:54; Io. eu. tr. 15:21; diu. qu. 83:64:7; ciu. 22:24.  
17 Augustine affirms the liveliness, usefulness and necessity of sensation provided it is not accompanied by 
sensual desire at the expense of the love of wisdom c. Iul. 4:14:65. 
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In an. quant, and following Aristotle and Varro, Augustine separated the animating 
and sensing powers of the soul, yet he regarded them as being very closely related and, indeed 
elsewhere, he talks about them as one power: ‘the lower power by which it (the soul) holds the 
body together and has sensation in the body.’18  We saw in the last chapter when we 
considered the problem of how the soul can be present to the body if it is not extended in 
space, that Augustine had recourse to the facts of sensation in order to help him to his 
conclusion that the soul was present by a kind of intentio.  Gilson’s view was that this meant 
‘a kind of attention’ because this was the nature of the soul’s activity in sensation; sensation 
being an intensification of its animating activity.19  We withheld judgement on this question, 
pending consideration of Augustine’s account of sensation, to see whether the facts support 
Gilson’s interpretation of quadam intentione as a ‘kind of attention,’ in addition to the other 
meanings it bears.  We will consider Augustine’s use of intentio in sensation, mainly using the 
same works as in chapter 1: an. quant., imm. an., mus., Gn. litt. and with the addition of  trin.  
 
an. quant. 
The discussion in an. quant. about what sensation is, and how it occurs, arose from 
Euodius’ question as to how it is that the soul can sense wherever the body is touched, if it 
doesn’t have a spatial magnitude commensurate with the body.20  Augustine followed Plotinus 
in describing sensation as an activity in which the soul makes use of the body (sensus quo 
anima per corpus utitur.)21  Our activity of sensation is fivefold: seeing is sensing through the 
eyes; hearing is sensing through the ears; and so on through the senses of smelling, tasting, 
and touching: a classification, which Augustine says, is very ancient.22  Ever mindful of the 
need to stress the soul’s superiority by asserting its activity on the body, he describes the 
                                                          
18 c. ep. Man. 16:20. Gilson 1961: 61 notes that life and sensation in Augustine are inseparable. 
19 Gilson 1961: 61-3. 
20 an. quant. 22:40. 
21 Ibid. 23:41; 28:54.  Plotinus Enn. 4.7.8. ‘Using’ the body does not necessarily imply a negative view of the 
body; ‘For since they are temporal, we will be rid of these rhythms, as of a plank in the waves, not by throwing 
them away away as a burden, nor by embracing them as something well anchored, but by using them well,’ mus. 
6:14:46. Such a statement plays into Augustine’s distinction between use and enjoyment through which 
everything is be given its proper value and used for its proper end: love of God. This distinction inspires 
Augustine’s ethical teaching especially in doctr. chr., see WSA 1/11, 17. 
22 an. quant. 23:41. The classification into five senses seems to go back to Democritus (460-370 BC) fragment 
11: Jűtte 2005: 33.  
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senses as the soul’s instruments23 or messengers.24 ‘It is not the eyes and ears that perceive, 
but something or other that perceives through the eyes.’ 25  Augustine’s prime concern in his 
account of sensation in an. quant. is to demonstrate that sensation is an activity of the soul, 
which is not acted upon in any way by the body.   
 
He formulates a provisional definition of sensation in an. quant. as follows:  
Whatever the soul is not unaware of which is experienced by the body (non 
latere animam quod patitur corpus.)26   
 
He then tests it, first of all, by a consideration of sensing through the eyes: sight.  Sight is the 
change that the body undergoes when it sees an object.27 In sol. Augustine had simply said 
that ‘in the eyes, what is called ‘seeing’ consists of the sense itself and the thing sensed, either 
of which being withdrawn, nothing can be seen.’28  In an. quant. he explores the process of 
sensing through the eyes in more detail.  While we may not see everything that we sense, we 
sense everything we see and Augustine, in his roundabout way, initially seeks Euodius’ 
agreement that we are acted upon by the object we see,29 leading him on to see that it is  
impossible for one body (Augustine’s body) to act on another (Euodius’ eyes) when they are 
in different locations.  Euodius suggests that it is not the eyes but sight that has the sensation 
(nisi forte illud, quod oculi nostri sentiunt cum videmus: visus namque ipse forsitan sentit.)30 
He has got there and Augustine proffers the following explanation of how the soul senses 
through the eyes: 
 
Sight extends itself outward (se foras porrigit) and through the eyes darts forth far in 
every possible direction to light up what we see.  Hence it happens that it sees rather in 
the place where the object seen is present, not in the place from which it goes out to 
                                                          
23 mus. 6:5:10; ep.137:2,5; trin. 11:2:2. 
24 ord. 2:11:32 and 34; util. cred. 1:1; Gn. litt. 7:14: 20; 7:19:25; 12:24:51; a metaphor found in Cicero: ACW 42, 
247 n. 35.  
25 ord. 2:2:6. Poetically ‘The eyes are .. the windows of the mind’ en. Ps. 41.7. 
26 an. quant. 23:41. Gilson 1961: 277 says non latere is based on the μἠ λαθεῖν of Plotinus Enn. 4:4:19. 
27 an. quant. 23:42. 
28 sol. 1:6:13.  
29 an. quant. 23:42. 
30 Ibid. 23:43. 
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see.31 
 
There follows, between the two of them, a discussion of, what is known as, the ray 
theory of vision, which had been common to all philosophical schools since Plato’s Timaeus 
and which can be traced back to Democritus.32  Euodius, echoing Augustine’s vocabulary of 
se foras porrigit with porrecto in eum locum in quo es, explains that he can see Augustine 
because his sight reaches out to that place where he is and, in this way, sight is like touching 
someone with a stick.33  Augustine agrees the sight of the eyes is like a stick and it is this ray 
of light which causes the eyes to be acted upon by the sense object to produce sight.34  The 
key thing that Augustine wishes to emphasize about sensing through the eyes is that the eyes 
are acted upon by the sense object in a place where they are not present and this will become 
crucial to his argument that the soul can act upon the body, despite not being spatially present.   
 
Before he gets to the raison d’être of this account of sensation, the conversation returns 
to the provisional definition to see if it holds water.  In fact, the definition proves not to be 
narrow enough to limit sensation to what is experienced through the five senses, for it could 
also cover processes like growth or ageing, of which the soul is not unaware, though its 
awareness has not come directly through sensation but by inference (a reasoning process).35  
This would be the case, for example, where we see smoke (sensation) and infer that there is 
‘no smoke without fire.’  This latter rational inference, or judgement, has been made on the 
basis of a sensation, but is not itself a sensation, because it is the smoke, not the fire which has 
affected the sense organ.36  Augustine therefore amends the definition by adding ‘through 
itself’ (per seipsam) so that it covers only what is immediately experienced through one of the 
five senses; though he still formulates it, using the double negative:  
 
                                                          
31 Ibid.  
32 O’Daly 1987: 82. Other references to ray theory in Augustine: s. 277:10; Gn. litt. 1:16:31; 4:34:54; 7:13:20; 
7:15:21; 12:16:32; trin. 9:3:3; 11:1:4. 
33 an quant 23:43. The metaphor of the stick is Stoic: O’Daly 1987: 83. 
34 an. quant.. 23:44. 
35 Ibid. 24:46; 25:48.  
36 Ibid. 24:45.  
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Sensation is an undergoing by the body through itself, which is not hidden 
from the soul (sensus est corporis passio per seipsam non latens animam.)37 
 
It is not apparent from the description of sensation in an. quant. why Augustine would 
phrase the definition using a double negative and the rationale for this only becomes clear 
from mus.  It is clearly significant though for ‘although sensation and knowledge are two 
different things, the element of ‘not being unaware’ is common to both.…for whatever is 
apparent to the soul, either through the body’s organism or through pure intelligence, of that it 
is not unaware.’ (Quia quamquam sit aliud sensus, aliud scientia, illud tamen non latere 
utrique commune est; …Non latet enim quidquid animae apparet, sive per temperationem 
corporis, sive per intellegentiae puritatem.)’38   
 
Having reached a final definition of sensation which satisfies both interlocutors, they 
return to the question which prompted the discussion of sensation in the first place: how it is 
that if the soul has no spatial magnitude, it can sense a touch on any part of the body.  Euodius 
advanced this argument originally as part of an armoury of arguments designed to argue that 
the soul was extended spatially to the same extent as the body.  But Augustine’s intention, by 
using the ray theory of vision, has been to show that if the body doesn’t need to be present in 
order for it to be acted upon but instead can be acted upon through a certain mixture of soul 
(propter quamdam cum anima contemperationem),39 then all the more reason to think that the 
soul, being superior to the body, does not need to be present where the body is touched in 
order to feel that touch but could be present by some kind of contemperatio.  What is more, 
says Augustine, the activity of sensing through the eyes actually proves that the soul is not 
extended in space because the eyes can only see where they not and this means that they can 
only see in a place where the soul is not present.40  We have already seen, in the previous 
chapter, that Euodius was not fully convinced that this proved the soul wasn’t diffused 
                                                          
37 Ibid. 30:59.  There is an extensive discussion of the definition of sensation stressing its unsatisfactory nature 
and Plotinian sources in ACW 9, 208 n. 72. Gannon 1956 too in her consideration of the development of 
Augustine’s thought on sense perception, draws out parallels with Plotinus and Plato: both of whom stress there 
is no sensing without attention. 
38 an. quant. 30:58. 
39 Also trin. 11:2:3 ex corpore sentientis animantis, cui anima suo quodam miro modo contemperatur. 
40 an. quant. 30:60. 
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through the body like blood41 forcing Augustine to resort to analogy (the sound of a word and 
its meaning).42   
 
There is, in all this, no sign of the term intentio but what is clear is the tensional and 
attentional nature of the soul’s activity towards the body in both its animating and sensation 
functions.  The idea that the soul works the body through a tensional working and stretching is 
conveyed by porrigat, porrecto and propter quamdam cum anima contemperationem.  The 
attention of the soul towards the body (as indeed to itself) is expressed by the formula ‘non 
latet.’ There is however, a nod in the direction of intentio in the stages of ascent where the 
soul is described as directing itself to the sense of touch (Intendit se anima in tactum).43  
 
mus. 
Gilson reflected upon Augustine’s use of the double negative in an. quant., noting 
Augustine’s keenness to stress the soul’s activity on the body and, to this end, his concern to 
separate the activity of the soul from the sense object.44  In Gilson’s view, this creates a 
problem because, on the one hand, the activity of sense perception requires the presence of an 
external object which has affected the body but, on the other hand, the sense object cannot be 
thought of as affecting the soul in any way.  He notes, ‘the problem can thus be reduced to this 
paradox: how are we to conceive sense knowledge, if it is true that sense knowledge depends 
on a condition of the body and the action of body on soul is inconceivable?’45  Gilson turns 
then to mus. to show how Augustine resolves this problem and concludes that the reason why 
Augustine uses the phrase non latet is because he wishes to make sensation an activity of the 
soul within the soul itself; ‘the phrase non latet indicates precisely that the soul is a spiritual 
force, ever-watchful and attentive.’46   
 
                                                          
41 Ibid. 30:61. 
42 Ibid. 32:65-68. 
43 Ibid. 33:71. 
44 Gilson 1961: 57. 
45 Ibid.  
46 Ibid. 63. 
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Augustine’s account of sensation in mus. is formulated in terms of attention (attentio) 
and non latet as the following extracts make clear:   
 
It (the soul) becomes more attentive to its activity because of the difficulty, and when 
this difficulty is not concealed to it due to its attention, it is said to have sensation, and 
this is called pain or labour (fit attentior ex difficultate in actionem; quae difficultas 
propter attentionem, cum eam non latet, sentire dicitur et hoc vocatur dolor aut 
labor.) (28, 3) 
 
This activity of the soul, through which it joins its own body to a convenient body 
from the outside, is not hidden since it is performed more attentively because of 
something extraneous, but due to the convenience it is perceived with pleasure.  (Et 
ista eius actio qua suum corpus convenienti extrinsecus corpori adiungit, quoniam 
propter quiddam adventitium attentius agitur, non latet; sed propter convenientiam, 
cum voluptate sentitur.) (28, 8) 
 
When the soul is made more attentive through the difficulty of this activity and this 
activity is not hidden to it, this is called hunger or thirst or something similar.  (et hac 
actionis difficultate cum fit attentior, et talis eius operatio non eam latet, fames aut 
sitis, aut tale aliquid appellatur.) (28, 11)  
 
This as well does not happen without attention and when such an activity is not 
hidden, indigestion is experienced (neque hoc sine attentione fit; et cum talis actio non 
latet, cruditas sentitur.) (28, 13) 
 
The soul also takes care of a sickly disturbance of the body with attention, trying to 
help it when it is failing and becoming faint, and when this activity is not hidden, it is 
said to experience illnesses and diseases (Morbidam quoque perturbationem corporis 
attente agit, succurrere appetens labenti atque diffluenti; et hac actione non latente 
morbos et aegrotationes sentire dicitur.) (28, 17)  
 
I think that the soul, when it perceives in the body, is not in any way acted upon by it 
but acts more attentively in the reactions of the body, and that these activities, be they 
easy because of a convenience or difficult because of an inconvenience are not hidden 
to it, and this whole process is called perceiving.  (videtur mihi anima cum sentit in 
corpore, non ab illo aliquid pati, sed in eius passionibus attentius agere, has actiones 
sive faciles propter convenientiam, sive difficiles propter inconvenientiam, non eam 
latere: et hoc totum est quod sentire dicitur) (28, 22).47 
 
We are not completely misguided in believing that its own motions or activities or acts 
or whatever they can be called, are not hidden from the soul when it perceives (Non 
igitur absurde credimus motus suos animam, vel actiones, vel operationes, vel si quo 
                                                          
47 mus. 6:5:10. The references are to Jacobsson’s text. 
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alio nomine commodius significari possunt, non latere cum sentit.) (32, 5).48 
 
These passages demonstrate very clearly, without the need for further explanation, 
how Augustine understands sensation as an activity of increased attention and they therefore 
bear out Gilson’s view that sensation is an intensification of the soul’s ordinary animating 
activity, which is an activity of attention and which, unless interrupted, the soul carries on 
peacefully49 and in silence.50  It is only when objects come within the ambit of its attention 
that the soul must alter the tensional arrangement with the body in order to deal with the 
object in one way or another: either to embrace it, if it is for the body’s good or to reject it, if 
it would harm the body.   
 
In mus. Augustine’s account of the activity of sensation as an activity of attention 
abounds with cognates of attentio.  However, he does use the term intentio.  We have already 
considered exhaustively the phrase nisi intentione facientis in connection with the soul’s 
animating activity in mus., which is closely linked with the account of sensation.51  But 
intentio also occurs in connection with cases, where potentially there could be a failure of 
perception due to what appears to be a lack, or redirection, of attention which causes a failure 
of memory.  In ord. Licentius,52 working on the traditional assumption that memory was only 
necessary for ‘the things that are transitory and, so to speak, fugitive,’ had argued that the wise 
man did not need to make use of his memory because everything was present to him in the 
same way as ‘in sensation itself we do not call memory to our aid with regard to that which is 
before our eyes.’53  How wrong he was, it seems, to assume that memory was not required for 
acts of sense perception!  
 
                                                          
48 Ibid. 6:5:11. 
49 Ibid. 6:5:10. 
50 Ibid. 6:5:11. 
51 Ibid. 6:5:9. 
52 Licentius was with Augustine at Cassiciacum as his pupil beata u. 1:6 and was the son of Romanianus (ep. 
27:6), Augustine’s financial patron (Acad. 2:2:3).  For Augustine’s expansion of the traditional idea of memory 
as custodian of the past to being also a memory of the present see chapter 7 n.143.  
53 ord. 2:2:6-7. 
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Before considering the passages in mus., we turn to imm. an. where Augustine first 
reflects upon the problem.  He was clear that, because a body is made up of parts, all its parts 
cannot be moved at the same time but only in stages.  It is the same when we hear a syllable 
sounding: even the shortest syllable has a beginning, middle and end and we cannot hear its 
end while we are still listening to its beginning.  In order for us to complete an intended 
movement of the body or for us to hear the whole syllable that is sounding, we must have an 
expectation that the act can be carried through and a memory ‘so that it can be bound together 
as much as possible’ (et memoria ut comprehendi queat quantum potest.)  The intentio to act 
(meaning intention or direction towards purposed end)54 lies in the present and our expectation 
depends on our memory because we will not hold any expectation as to completion of an act 
that we do not remember having started.  When we intend to perform an act, we unify in our 
intention, the past, present and future of the act, even if the act itself can only be performed in 
stages.55  Whenever the soul senses through the body, it must therefore keep its intentio 
unchanged in the sense that the same purposed end must be kept in mind, if the act of 
sensation is to be completed.56  
 
This problem of temporal successiveness or partial perception emerges in mus. in the 
context of our ability to judge sensations.  This is not a rational judging but a judging that 
enables us uncritically to take pleasure in, or disapprove of, the sensation.57  The occurring 
(i.e. sensed) rhythms are to be presented to the judicial rhythms for judgement but can only be 
judged to the extent that we have a picture of the whole and therefore the memory needs to be 
able to retain the temporal intervals of which any rhythm consists.  The problem, as we have 
already encountered it in imm. an. in relation to the act of sensation itself, is that, no matter 
how short a syllable is, we are not able to hear it all at once because it is extended in time and, 
                                                          
54 This meaning of intentio will be more fully considered in chapter 4 infra. 
55 imm. an. 3:3. 
56 Ibid. 3:4. See Augustine’s interpretation of the two faces of Ianus in ciu. 7:7: ‘Would it not be a far more 
elegant interpretation of his two faces to say that Ianus and Terminus are actually the same, and to assign one 
face to beginnings and the other to endings? For anyone who acts should pay attention to both (debet intendere), 
and anyone who does not look back to the beginning at every point in his action does not look forward to its 
ending.  Thus it is necessary for the intention that looks forward to be linked (connectatur intentio) to the 
memory that looks back, for anyone who forgets what he has begun will not find any way to finish it.’   
57 mus. 6:9:23.  For discussion of ways in which Augustine accounts for this aspect of sense perception see 
O’Daly 1987: 88-92.   
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unless our memory helps us so that we remember the beginning of the syllable while the end 
is sounding, we won’t remember having heard it.  This failure of memory is the reason why 
we don’t hear what someone is saying to us: it is because we are not paying attention to them, 
not because they are not speaking to us.  It is this failure to pay attention to what is present 
caused by a failure of memory to the past that Augustine describes using the term intentio.  
The sound reached the ears and the soul, which because it cannot help but be engaged in its 
activity of paying attention (non latet), creates the sensation but ‘because the impetus of the 
motion is immediately extinguished through the intentio towards something else’ (sed quia 
intentione in aliud subinde extinguitur motionis impetus),58 in other words, because the soul 
directs its attention to something else, it does not remember what has occurred to enable it to 
make a judgement on the whole.  A similar problem occurs when we are trying to judge or 
perceive three-dimensional objects with our eyes; we cannot perceive all dimensions at once 
and, unless our memory can help us to get a picture of the whole, ‘the intentio of the judging 
person is completely fruitless (frustratur omnino iudicantis intentio).’ 59  
 
In Augustine’s emphasis on the ability of the mind to perceive the whole, as opposed 
to the partial, nature of the body’s movement, he not only draws attention to the distinctions 
between the body and the soul, but also to the dependency of the body on the soul for the body 
cannot move except for the soul’s ability to move it and this depends on the soul’s ability to 
perceive and keep the whole of the action in mind.  It also points up the closeness of the 
body/soul relationship in service of the unity of the person.  However, for the health of the 
soul, this cannot be too close.  The body’s partial perception is natural and belongs to it as 
created60 but the soul’s inability to see the whole and over focusing in on a part belongs to its 
fallen nature.61  The soul must therefore be careful not to over identify with the body; 
restricting its perception to a part in favour of the whole, for the body’s efficient working 
depends on the soul acting according to its true nature, which includes its ability to see the 
                                                          
58 mus. 6:8:21. 
59 Ibid.  
60 conf. 4:10:15. 
61 mus. 6:11:30; conf. 4:11:17. 
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whole simultaneously.62  The fact that Augustine’s favourite illustration is a linguistic one - 
syllables63 - should alert us to the liklihood that his preoccupation with this aspect of sensation 
is not simply anthropological.  Augustine likes the linguistic example because of the 
comparison it allows him to draw with God’s eternal Word which never ends and therefore 
never gives way to allow another word to be pronounced;64 his prime concern being, ‘how the 
eternal, immutable, incorporeal Creator is heard by His temporal, mutable, corporeal 
creation.’ 65   
 
To sum up Augustine’s use of intentio in mus. in connection with sensation, it is our 
observation that Augustine’s account of sensation is dominated by attentio meaning attention 
but that intentio is used when Augustine is making a point about the direction, and specifically 
the change of direction, of that attention.66 
 
Gn. litt. 
In Gn. litt., Augustine’s account of sensation is dominated by intentio. In Gn. litt., he 
discusses sense perception in several places and for various reasons.  In book 1, he argues 
there is no reason why day and night should be understood as a diffusion and contraction of 
light.  He explains that there is no support for this to be gained through resorting to the 
analogy of sensing through the eyes.  He uses here the ray theory of vision, which is a 
tensional theory, to explain that the light, which is directed out through the eyes, does not 
provide sufficient light with which to see the object without the help of an external source of 
light and it is difficult to distinguish the two sources of light.67  In book 3, he reaffirms that 
sensation is not an activity of the body but an activity of the soul through the body.  He 
                                                          
62 conf. 12:13:16 ‘the intelligence’s knowing is a matter of simultaneity…this knowing is not of one thing at one 
moment and of another thing at another moment but is concurrent without any temporal successiveness.’ 
63. O’Donnell conf. 11: 26:33 says ‘Syllables as a measure, symptom, and symbol of the passing of time, often 
came to A.'s pen’ egs. ord. 2:12:36; imm. an. 3:3; uera rel. 22:42; lib. arb. 1:14:38; ep. 137:7, c. ep. Man. 41.47; 
nat. b. 8; conf. 11 passim; en. Ps. 76:8.  
64 en. Ps. 44:5 and 6. 
65 Harrison 2010: 429.  
66 In addition to the two passages already noted in mus. 6:8:21 see also mus. 6:5:14 in aliud intenditur animus; 
mus. 6:13:37 in aliud intentus animus; mus. 6:8:22 post alias intentiones . 
67 Gn. litt. 1:16:31.  
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discusses the relationship of the four elements and the five senses and describes how the soul 
uses the elements in its activity of sensation, emphasizing the difference between the 
incorporeal soul and the corporeal elements it uses.68  In book 4, he draws attention to the 
speed of the rays of material light darting out from the eyes and covering great distances, in 
order to point up the even greater powers of the superior intellectual vision.69  In book 7, he 
gives a detailed physiological description of sensation and movement, and points to the ability 
of intentio to withdraw from the senses, in order to establish the incorporeal nature of the 
human soul, distinguishing again between its incorporeal nature and the corporeal elements 
which it uses to carry out its activities towards the body.70  In book 8, he looks at how the 
soul, which does not move through space, can move the body through space, in order to help 
his readers to understand how God, who is immoveable in time and space, moves his creation 
through time and space.71  In book 12, he discusses sense perception in connection with his 
presentation of three different kinds of vision or perception: corporeal, spiritual, and 
intellectual.  These are arranged in a hierarchy72 and his expressed aim is to consider them one 
by one so that reason can ascend from the lower to the higher.73   
 
What we are going to be concerned with is Augustine’s presentation of a physiological 
account of sense perception because it is formulated in terms of the activity of intentio.  In 
formulating his account, Augustine is influenced generally by the philosophical tradition 
                                                          
68 Ibid. 3:4:6-5:7. In mus. 6:5:10 Augustine had already alluded to a connection between the elements and the act 
of sensation ‘When the soul acts in this way, it activates ‘something having to do with light in the eyes, 
something having to do with very clear and quick air in the ears, something misty in the nostrils, something 
humid in the mouth and something earthy and almost muddy in the touch.’ 
69 Gn litt. 4:34:54 and 5. 
70 Ibid. 7:12:19-7:20:26. 
71 Ibid. 8:21:40f. See previous chapter for discussion on intentio in this passage.  
72 Ibid.12:6:15—7:16; 12:24:50. see c. Adim. 28.2 (393/6) where three different kinds of vision were first listed. 
73 Gn. litt. 12:11:22. O’Donnell conf. 7:10:16 says that, with regard to the ascents in conf., it is possible to see the 
ascent of conf. 4 as a corporal vision of the first type; the ascents of conf. 7 as spiritual visions and the ascent of 
Ostia in conf. 9 as  an intellectual vision. 
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(linking of the senses and the elements); 74 specifically by the Stoics,75 the Neoplatonists76 and 
also by medical theory.77  He reiterates that sensation belongs not to the body but to the soul 
acting through the body (sentire non est corporis, sed animae per corpus)78 by means of a 
more subtle body (per subtilius corpus agitat).79  The more subtle body that Augustine is 
referring to turns out to be ‘fire, or rather light and air (ignis, vel potius lux et aer).’80  The 
soul first acts on these elements and then uses these elements to carry out its activity in the 
body.81  The light and air mix was what the Stoics called pneuma (Latin spiritus) which they 
identified with the corporeal soul.  They explained sense perception (as well as bodily 
coherence) by means of the activity of spiritus.  For the Neoplatonist, Porphyry, spiritus was 
also corporeal; being the thin corporeal covering, which acted as a necessary intermediary 
between the immaterial soul and the fleshly body and in Plotinus too, the concept of spiritus 
had not yet been liberated from matter.82  What is apparent is that for Augustine in this 
context, spiritual means non-bodily.83  He makes it clear several times throughout his account 
                                                          
74 In Gn. litt. 3, he refers to the theories of writers who related the five senses to the four elements. This 
connection goes back to the Old Academy: O’Daly 1987: 82 n. 8.  
75 Colish 1985/2: 143 f. has demonstrated how thoroughly Stoic, Augustine’s theory of sense perception is.  
76 Gannon 1956: 176f. 
77 Gn. litt. 7:13:20. See BA 48: 710-14 for the most accessible account of Augustine’s medical knowledge and its 
sources and for references to other secondary sources on the topic.  
78 Gn. litt. 3.5.7. 
79 Ibid.  Rather than how he used to think, namely that the soul was the ‘more subtle body’ that ruled the body 
conf. 5:10:20. 
80 Gn. litt. 7:15:21. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Verbeke 1945: 495. Verbeke points out that, although before his conversion Augustine understood God as 
Spirit, this spiritus was a corporeal substance diffused through the body of the world like light is diffused in air, 
which is the Stoic doctrine of cosmic pneuma Ibid. 492. Pneuma was identified as God by the Stoics Ibid. 55f; 
61f. After his conversion, Augustine still identified God as spirit but spirit now meant an incorporeal substance, 
which was absolutely simple and immutable and which therefore could not be dispersed in space or time: Ibid. 
493-4.  Likewise with regard to the human soul; before his conversion, he had regarded this as corporeal, 
extended as bodies are, but it is not made of light and air; instead it is spirit, in a similar way to God, that is, it is 
simple and indivisible and unable to be extended in space: Ibid. 498-501.  What Verbeke shows is that it is only 
with Augustine that the Stoic doctrine of pneuma became spiritualized. Until Augustine corporeal pneuma had 
either been identified as the soul (Stoics) or as the corporeal instrument of the soul (Aristotle and Neoplatonists). 
Ibid. 508. 
83Gn. litt. 3.4.7. Augustine discusses the different meanings of the word spiritus based on its occurrences in 
scripture, and it does not necessarily denote an incorporeal substance: Mind is spirit; God is spirit; our faculty of 
imagination is spirit; the life force which we share in common with beasts is spirit; soul (anima) is spirit; wind is 
spirit (and is corporeal); resurrection body is spirit but corporeal see, trin. 14:16:22; Gn. litt.12:7:18 and 12:9:20; 
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of sensation that the soul (which is spiritual and non-bodily) is not itself the light/air mix 
which the Stoics called spiritus but that it carries out its activity by means of this corporeal 
mix.84  He transfers the word spiritus from the light/air mix to the incorporeal soul where it 
becomes ‘that part of the soul lower than the mind in which likenesses of bodily things are 
pressed.’85  It is not the body which makes its own image in spiritus but spiritus (as a faculty 
of soul) which makes it in itself; the image being made on spiritus at the same time as the 
external object is sensed.  In fact, unless this was the case, an act of sensation could not be 
judged because there would be nothing registered in the memory to carry forward to 
completion.86  It is then the image made in spiritus or memory which enables the soul to view 
the whole picture; thus showing its dependency on sense perception (nonetheless itself an 
activity of the soul).  There is no specific suggestion though here that the imprinting of the 
image occurs through an act of intentio.  
 
Although Augustine persistently emphasizes the distinction of the soul from the 
corporeal instruments it uses, he also points up the soul’s dependence on those instruments in 
order to carry out its activity through the body.  If these instruments fail in any way, then the 
soul’s intentio is disturbed (turbatur eius intentio) and its running of the body no longer goes 
according to plan (intention or desire).87  Augustine goes on to reiterate that if a person is not 
paying attention to what is before their eyes because they are so wrapped up in their thoughts, 
then they won’t see what is in front of their eyes.  In fact, a person can be so withdrawn from 
sense reality that they stop in their tracks or, if not quite so preoccupied, they may carry on 
walking but without being consciously aware of what they are doing.  Monnica’s observation 
of Trygetius’ failure at Cassiciacum to notice which breakfast bowl he was using and to pay 
attention to what he was eating because his mind was elsewhere, was a case in point.88 All of 
                                                          
an. et. or. 4:23:37; s. 128:9.  
84 Gn. litt. 3:4:7; 3:5:7; 7:18:24; 7:19:25; 7:20:26.   
85 Ibid. 12:9:20. Also Ibid. 12:23:49; ciu.10:9; trin. 14:16:22.  The idea of a spiritual element of the soul has 
possibly come from Porphyry see ciu. 10:9; ciu. 10:27 and ciu. 10:32.  We will look further at this spiritual 
element in connection with spiritual vision in the next chapter. 
86 Gn. litt. 12:16:33. 12:24:51. 
87 Gn. litt. 7:19:25. 
88 beata u. 2:8. She was, though, only partly remonstrating because the soul was fed by its thoughts, provided 
those thoughts were such that they led to knowledge. 
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this proves that the soul is distinct from the body but not only does the body need the soul, the 
soul also needs the cooperation of the body, if it is to perform its activities successfully 
through the body.89  
 
What prevents a person paying attention to what is in front of them is paying attention 
instead to their thoughts (cogitationis intentione.)  Augustine does not make any judgement of 
value here but he does express some ambivalence in his writings about whether or not this is a 
good thing.  Personally (and perhaps this is his own failing), he is a man who becomes 
frustrated when things outside himself, distract him from his own thoughts90 and yet he 
exhorts his congregation not to have their eyes open to no purpose because, if our mind is 
turned away, then we are looking at creation like beasts; not seeing the beauty of creation for 
what it is and therefore not able to do what we were created to do: praise and honour the 
Creator for his creation.91  Obviously, there are degrees and all things are relative, but there is 
no doubt that excessive preoccupation of thought is abnormal and, whatever the cause, it leads 
a person to lose touch with everyday reality to some extent, either because they are having 
such vivid spiritual visions that they are unable to tell whether what they are experiencing is a 
corporeal or spiritual vision or because they are completely detached from everyday reality in 
an experience of ecstasy.92  Again, this is not necessarily a good experience because such an 
experience may be caused by fear just as much as by contemplation of heavenly realities 93 
                                                          
89 Ibid. 7:20:26.  Ibid. 7:18:24 he explains physiologically why the soul’s failure of attention has the effect that it 
does on the person’s ability to function.  
90 conf. 10:35:57. 
91 s. 126:3; en. Ps. 41:6. 
92 Gn. litt. 12:12:25. ‘ Ecstasy’ is a Greek word meaning literally ‘standing outside’ and used of being’out of 
one’s mind’ or ‘being beside oneself en. Ps. 30:2:2. Hammond Taylor distinguishes between the ‘vital impulse 
(quadam vitali intentione) in orig. an. 2:4 through which the soul animates the body and the attention of the soul 
through which it causes sensations and says that ‘in the case of a soul in ecstasy the vitalis intentio continues 
while the other is inoperative, ACW 42, 303 n. 19.  However this comment and distinction into two different 
intentiones in relation to the powers of animation and sensation is problematic. We have already found 
Augustine’s view of sensation to be intensification in one area of the same activity through which the soul 
animates the body.  By ignoring the tensional nature of this activity, Hammond-Taylor’s comment does not take 
this into account nor indeed does this take account of the incorporeal nature of the soul, which is able to act in 
one area without abandoning the rest of the body.  Clearly the body doesn’t die in ecstasy but perhaps it is better 
to explain it by keeping to Augustine’s vocabulary: he distinguishes between the lower power anima which 
continues to give life to the body while the mens is torn away in ecstasy, Gn. litt. 12:4:14.   
93 en. Ps. 30:2:2. 
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and even when it is caused through the latter, this is not something that should be allowed to 
disrupt, or interfere too much with, ordinary life and our social obligations but is considered 
good only to the extent that it enhances both.94   
 
Sometimes, such abnormalities are caused by a failure of the corporeal instruments 
that the soul uses for its activity through the body.  Augustine reiterates in book 12 this same 
point that he made in book 7, but specifically in book 12 he focuses on problems with the 
vessels of the nervous system which, the Stoics had explained, carried the spiritus from the 
brain to the various organs of sense by means of a tensional movement (τόνος; Latin 
intentio),95 which operated more effectively, the tighter it was.96  Augustine affirms that the 
soul makes use of the body’s nervous system to carry out its activity of sensation.  The action 
begins in the liver where the element of fire is situated and this fire then travels to the brain as 
the source of the rays of light which rays are then directed through the eyes for seeing and to 
the other senses for the other sensing activities.97  He explains that because the attention which 
governs the soul’s activity of sensation is directed from the brain (cerebri, unde ipsa dirigitur 
intentio sentiendi) through the vessels of the nervous system, if these vessels which are the 
route of attention from the brain (itinere intentionis a cerebro) are stilled or disturbed or even 
blocked off, then the body prevents the soul from sensing as it wants or directing the force of 
its attention where it wants (quia per corpus non sinitur, vel non plene sinitur corporalia 
sentire, vel ad corporalia vim suae intentionis dirigere).98  But the energy has to go 
somewhere and this is one of the reasons why abnormal spiritual visions can occur.99  This 
happens naturally when we are asleep and the energy channelled into our waking attention is 
diverted into our dream life.100  In the blind, the attention is directed from the brain along the 
                                                          
94 Ibid; s 78:6. 
95 Hahm 1977: 166f.  
96 Lapidge 1978: 172.  
97 Gn. litt. 7:13:20. 
98 Ibid. 12:20:42. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. It seems that the frail body would not be able to tolerate the unremitting attention (intentionem 
perpetuam) of the soul activating its senses without the soul’s periodic withdrawal in sleep which repairs the 
body and enables it to endure the activity s.362:28. 29.  The soul has no control over this, nor indeed over the 
activity of intentio in dreams so that the things that we dream about, which would be sins, if we were awake, are 
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vessels to the eyes but the eyes themselves prevent the attention being directed out onto a 
sense object; and, in this case, the soul’s attention is impeded without being diverted.101 
 
With his physiological account of sense perception in Gn. litt., in which the attentio of 
mus. has disappeared to be replaced very clearly by intentio, Augustine does two, seemingly 
contradictory, things: he binds the body and soul closer together in the service of the unity of 
the person and at the same time safeguards the distinction between the body and soul.  He 
achieves a closer connection between the body and soul by transferring words – intentio and 
spiritus- that have hitherto been applied to corporeal substance, to incorporeal substance and 
by making the same act (not yet described clearly as an act of intentio), the link between two 
kinds of vision: corporeal and spiritual.  The connection between the body and soul is also 
made closer by virtue of the fact that the dematerialized intentio is still said to be led through 
the same tubes through which the corporeal pneuma was thought to travel.  He safeguards the 
distinction between the body and soul by expressly reiterating the distinction between the soul 
and the corporeal elements it uses and by drawing attention to the soul’s ability to withdraw 
its intentio from the senses.  This physiological account of the activity of intentio not only 
confirms that the activity of intentio is an activity of attention but it also gives great weight to 
its tensional aspect of intentio, as well as indicating its volitional nature.  Despite the fact that 
the soul is not always able to direct its attention as it wishes, it is not through want of trying.   
 
trin. 
Augustine felt called to write trin. to share his provisional understanding of the Trinity 
in response to peoples’endless questions.  There wasn’t much written in Latin on the subject 
that people could read and, apart from hoping that he himself would learn from what he 
                                                          
not sins because we have no power (non habent in potestate) over the provenance of these visions. Gn. litt. 
12:15:31. 
101 Ibid. 12:20:42.  For Augustine’s use of the physiology of sensation as an analogy for improper desire 
(cupiditas) see b. uid. 21:26 ‘For, as, in the senses themselves of the body, they who see not hear more keenly, 
and discern many things by touch, nor have such as have the use of their eyes so great life in their touch; and in 
this instance it is understood that, when the exertion of the power of attention (intentione ) hath been restrained in 
one approach, that is, of the eyes, it puts itself forth into other senses, more ready with keenness to distinguish, as 
though it essayed to supply from the one what was denied in the other; thus also often carnal lust, being 
restrained from pleasure of sensual intercourse, with greater strength reaches itself forth to desire money, and 
when turned away from the one, turns itself with more glow of passion to the other.’ 
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discussed and wrote,102 he was anxious to counter the various false opinions of God that 
people held as a result of a literalistic, or incorrect, interpretation of scriptural passages.  He 
also wanted to stress that understanding of the Trinity must begin from faith103 and required 
participation in God’s life (we cannot really understand what The Good is unless we are good 
ourselves).104 Augustine’s aim was to establish the faith from scripture and then demonstrate 
how one could move on from there through the training of one’s powers of reasoning.105  Just 
as in Gn. litt. 12, where he had presented a hierarchy of three different kinds of vision: 
corporeal, spiritual, and intellectual with the express intention that reason should ascend from 
the lower to the higher;106 so in trin., the training of reason is undertaken by an examination of 
the soul’s powers of perception: corporeal, spiritual and intellectual; the first two belonging to 
the outer man and the third, which is divided into two levels (scientia and sapientia), 
belonging to the inner man.107  In trin., each power of perception is presented as a threefold 
composite and Augustine’s aim is to train people to see the workings of the three components; 
their relationship and their distinctions, in the hope that this will bring them to some lived 
insight about that ‘Trinity which God is.’108  His struggle to engage with the demands of 
Trinitarian theology and to present it in terms of a psychological analysis, finds in intentio a 
ready helpmate.   
 
Intentio becomes the common component at each level of perception: not only is the 
exercise of each of the soul’s powers of perception dependent on intentio, but also the extent 
to which reason can ascend through the levels is similarly dependent.  This is the context in 
which we find an account of sense perception in trin., which is couched in terms of the 
activity of corporeal vision.  Augustine followed the philosophical tradition in drawing an 
                                                          
102 trin. 1:5: 8 and trin. 3:1.1.  
103 trin. 1:2:4; 9:1:1. 
104 trin. 8:3:4. 
105 trin. 1:2:4. 
106 Gn. litt. 12:11:22. 
107 There is no comparable stage of ascent in trin. to animatio in an. quant. 
108 trin 9.1. 1 ‘A trinity is certainly what we are looking for, and not any kind of trinity either but the one that 
God is, trinitatem certe quaerimus, non quamlibet sed illam trinitatem quae deus est.’  
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analogy between physical sight and intellectual knowledge;109 reasoning that, just as the eyes 
are the organ of the body with which we perceive light, so the soul’s faculty of understanding 
(intellectus) alone admits light to our minds, with God being the light which enlightens the 
mind.110  In trin., Augustine reiterates that the sense of sight is the most excellent of the 
body’s senses111 and, of all the senses, has the most to teach us regarding spiritual things.112   
 
Augustine explains that the three components required for the activity of corporeal 
vision are the sense object, our sight and our intentio animi which is ‘that which holds the 
sense of the eyes on the thing being seen, as long as it is being seen (quod in ea re quae 
videtur, quamdiu videtur sensum detinet oculorum, id est animi intentio.)’113  Sight is the 
sense informed by the thing which is capable of being seen (Ipsaque visio quae quid aliud, 
quam sensus ex ea re quae sentitur informatus apparet).114  The three components are clearly 
distinguishable because they are different in nature.115  The sense object is bodily; the 
informed sense is partly body (the eyes), partly non-bodily (image of object imprinted on 
sense) and the third element: intentio animi is pure consciousness.116  Augustine then goes on 
to describe the act of sense perception as the imprint of a form on the sense organ.  All three 
components must be present for an act of sense perception, which means that there must be a 
seeing subject to provide the sense of the eyes and the intentio animi and there must also be a 
corporeal object which can be imprinted on the sense (a solo imprimatur corpore quod 
                                                          
109 Early egs include ord. 2:3:10 ‘unwisdom is the darkness of the mind just as blindness is the darkness of the 
eyes.’ Also sol. 1:6:12 ‘The senses of the soul are, as it were, the mind’s own eyes (Nam mentis quasi sui sunt 
oculi sensus animae)… I –Reason—am in minds as the act of looking is in the eyes.’  Plato had been the first to 
use the metaphor of vision and he was followed by Plotinus, see Blumenthal 1971a: 69.  Augustine may also 
have been influenced by Ambrose see Gannon 1956: 175.  For an exploration of this metaphor and its 
significance in Augustine, see Miles 1983.  The metaphor of sight can be misleading as a description of human 
knowledge and understanding, because we may fail to see its metaphorical character, see Lash 1986: 93 n. 16.  
110 Io. eu. tr. 15:19.  
111 Greek thinkers had always regarded sight as the superior sense, see Blumenthal 1971a: 69.  Also Cic., orat. 
2.87.357 (a passage Augustine would undoubtedly have known), reports that Simonides of Ceos called the sense 
of sight `the most keen of all the senses acerrimum autem ex omnibus nostris sensibus.'   
112 trin. 11:1:1. 
113 trin. 11:2:2.   
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 
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videtur).117  When the object is removed, the sense goes back to being as it was before and 
Augustine draws an analogy with water retaining a trace of a body: when the body is taken 
away, the water bears no trace of it.  So when we sense something by seeing it, we see 
because a form, which is a likeness of the body, is imprinted on the sense.  Therefore what we 
are seeing in an act of sight is not the object itself but the likeness of the corporeal object 
which has been impressed.  We cannot, however, distinguish between the form of the body 
and the form in the sense which is its image and derived from it, while the object is present, 
except by reason.118  Augustine gives the example of the imprint of a signet ring in wax. 119  
As soon as the signet ring is impressed in the wax, the imprint is made even though it cannot 
be seen while the signet ring is still in the wax.  But, actually, the imprint of a ring in water is 
a better analogy because, like the imprint on the sense, the image in the water, which was 
derived from the ring, does not remain when the ring is taken away, even though the form 
remains in the ring.120  After spending time proving the distinctions involved in the activity of 
sense perception, Augustine stresses that the three distinct things which differ in nature: the 
form of the body, its image imprinted on to sense and the intentio animi are compounded into 
a kind of unity,121 which is so close that it is very difficult to distinguish between them.122  
Augustine has set the task which must be overcome if we are to make any progress in 
understanding, through reason, the trinitarian nature of our faith.   
 
In trin., Augustine expressly identifies intentio animi with the will (Tertium vero solius 
                                                          
117 trin. 11:2:3. 
118 Ibid. The significance of the distinction between the form in the object and the form imprinted on the sense 
will become clear in chapter 7. 
119 Augustine was using traditional imagery here; that of memory as a wax tablet upon which images were 
stamped like a seal on the wax.  Both Plato and Aristotle described memory as involving images which had been 
imprinted as if with signet-rings, though the metaphor predates Plato.  Cicero, who described the structure of 
memory like a wax tablet which ‘employs places and in these gathers together images like letters,’ developed the 
model in detail. It is through Cicero that Augustine would have become familiar with it and he would have been 
encouraged to continue using it through its appearance in scripture, ‘Let not mercy and truth forsake thee: bind 
them about thy neck; write them upon the table of thine heart. (Prov. 3:3)’ see Carruthers 1990, chapter 1 passim. 
conf. 9:4:12 shows Augustine’s familiarity with writing on wax tablets: he asked his friends to pray for him by 
writing on a wax tablet when his toothache became so bad that he couldn’t speak.  
120 trin. 11:2:3. 
121 Ibid. 11:2:5. 
122 Ibid. 
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animae est, quia voluntas est)123 and draws attention to the fact that the will is not 
disinterested in this activity of sense perception:  
And the will exerts such force in coupling the two together that it applies the 
sense to be formed to the thing that is being looked at and holds it there once 
formed.  And if it is violent enough to be called love or covetousness or lust, it 
will deeply affect the rest of the living being’s body. 124  
 
We had, in fact, already concluded that intentio embraced the sense of volitional 
activity, both at the level of sense perception and at the more basic level of animation of the 
body but in trin., we find explicit confirmation of this: that it is the will which is responsible 
for our acts of sensation and that the will does not act disinterestedly but through the impulse 
of some form of desire which can be so strong that it affects the appearance of the body.125  
Augustine goes on to examine the merits of the will’s love towards an object of sense, 
explaining why it would be mad for the will to derive its enjoyment from a bodily form, 
namely because the will is more spiritual than either of the other two components in the 
production of the sight of a visible object.  But, in any event, it has more in common with the 
formed sense, which is at least partly spiritual, than with the unspiritual body.126  
 
Summary and Conclusion  
We have seen that the activity of sensation, which when forming the first level of 
knowledge we may call sense perception, is part and parcel of the soul’s activity of paying 
attention (first designated attentio and then solely intentio) to the body, requiring it to 
intensify that attention as part of the body’s response to external stimuli.  That activity has 
three aspects: tensional; volitional and directional and is the activity through which we 
                                                          
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid. trin. 3:8:15.  It might be fear rather than desire that motivates the will to stretch out its attention 
(intenditur) to what is sensed, but, whichever it is, the greater the passion, the deeper the impression made,  Ibid. 
11:4:7. 
125 trin. 11:2:5. Augustine liked the biblical example of Jacob’s coloured sheep in Gen. 30:37. See also trin. 
3:8:15. For intentio as the will and desire see chapter 5 infra. 
126 trin. 11:5:9 amended by retr. 2:15: 2 to clarify that it was fine to enjoy it as long as the enjoyment was 
referred to the praise of the Creator and a person did not think that enjoying it would bring him true happiness. 
See chapter 4 infra. 
  
80 
connect with outside reality, including other people.  If, for example, we are preoccupied with 
our own thoughts instead of listening to someone speaking to us, then we will not hear what 
they are saying or (one of Augustine’s favourites), if we are reading but at the same time 
thinking about something else then we won’t take in anything we have read, despite our eyes 
scanning the page.127  In fact we are not able to function in the ordinary everyday world, if 
there is a failure of attention (intentio) because as creatures naturally distended in time and 
space, we rely on the conscious element of the three elements involved in sense perception, to 
hold on to the image of the completed act of sense perception.  This is not solely in order to 
give us a unified perspective from which to judge whether we like something or not, but also 
because intentio is one of the components without which an act of sensation cannot be 
completed.  The soul’s activity at the previous stage of gathering the body into one spatially in 
order to keep it in existence is replicated here by the activity of gathering it into one 
temporally.  Distentio in time is the natural condition of creatures and yet by intentio we can 
transcend the limitations of our creaturely existence.128  This condition of distentio and 
solution of intentio will be replicated at each stage of ascent.  For example, at the next stage, 
we can look forward to creating a unified narrative of our life through acts of recollection, 
which are acts of intentio.  The act of human knowing itself, like the act of sensation has to 
proceed in stages from sense perception to scientia to sapientia; and if we seek to convert a 
sensation into the first step to knowledge of God, intentio will provide the link between the 
levels of perception thus harmonizing them and bringing the soul glimmers of how we fallen 
beings might begin to move towards a perception of God Himself.  The fact that intentio 
allows Augustine to say something about the activity of sense perception, which looks like a 
single activity but involves three things therefore sets up a frame which will eventually enable 
him to talk about the Trinity and how the image of God can be found in the human activities 
of memory, understanding and will, all belonging to the one rational mind. 
                                                          
127 trin. 11:8:15. 
128 BA 14, 590 “le temps est une intention distendue et une distension intentionalisée”.  See conf. 11.23.30; 
11:28:37 – 38. See O’Daly 1977 for distentio of time in Augustine. 
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Chapter Three: Ars  
The first step along this road had already been taken.  It had led to a loosening of the 
body, without which the bow cannot be properly drawn.  If the shot is to be loosed 
right, the physical loosening must now be continual in a mental and spiritual 
loosening.1 
 
Advance, then, to the third level, which belongs to man exclusively.  Think of 
memory, not of things that have become habituated by repeated acts, but of the 
countless things that have been attained and retained by observation and illustration 
(animadversione atque signis commendatarum ac retentarum rerum innumerabilium) 
all the arts of craftsmen, the tilling of the soil, the building of cities, the thousand-and-
one marvels of various buildings and undertakings, the invention of so many symbols 
in letters, in words (inventiones tot signorum in litteris, in verbis), in gesture, in sound 
of various kinds, in paintings and statues; the languages of so many peoples, their 
many institutions, some new and some revived; the great number of books and records 
of every sort for the preservation of memory and the great concern shown for 
posterity; the gradations of duties, prerogatives, honors, and dignities, in family life 
and in public life-whether civilian or military-in profane and sacred institutions; the 
power of reason and thought (vim ratiocinandi et excogitandi), the floods of eloquence 
(fluvios eloquentiae,) the varieties of poetry, the thousand forms of mimicries for the 
purpose of entertainment and jest, the art of music (modulandi peritiam), the accuracy 
of surveying (dimetiendi subtilitatem), the science of arithmetic (disciplinam 
numerandi), the interpretation of the past and future from the present (praeteritorum 
ac futurorum ex praesentibus coniecturam).  These things bear the mark of greatness 
and they are characteristically human.  But here we still have a capacity shared by both 
the learned and the unlearned, by both the good and the wicked.2  
 
The third stage of ascent, and the third power of the soul in an. quant., is the first of 
five rational levels which, together, correspond to the third degree of soul identified by Varro.3  
This third stage power is both the first stage that belongs only to human beings4 and the last 
stage that is common to all human beings.  Augustine calls this stage, ars.5  In uera rel. he 
                                                          
1 Herrigel 1976: 51. 
2 an. quant. 33:72. 
3 ciu. 7:23. O’Daly 1987: 13. 
4 Our rational capacity is what distinguishes us from beasts an. quant. 26:49; ord. 2:11:31; 2:19:49; trin. 12:1:2; 
trin. 15:1:1. Also called mind or spirit (mens; spiritus) lib. arb. 1:8:18. 
5 an. quant. 35:79. O’Daly 1987: 13-14 says this stage amounts to discursive reason which is manifest in memory 
and skill applied to various arts and sciences, in aesthetic, social and political behavior; Neil 1999: 202 says it is 
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distinguished two meanings of ars: something which is not observed by experience but found 
out by reason and ars in the popular sense, meaning ‘nothing but the memory of things we 
have experienced and which have given us pleasure, with the addition of some skilled bodily 
activity.’6  This latter meaning is the one applicable to this stage of ascent in an. quant. It 
would include the development of skills in the arts: the art of public speaking, the art of 
debate, playing a musical instrument, all of which are physical, practical manifestations of the 
artes liberales ‘for all the liberal arts are learned partly for practical use and partly for 
knowledge and contemplation.’7  There are in fact discernible references in the passage to the 
liberal arts8 but in such a way as to suggest that this is a reference to the practical skills 
acquired through the liberal arts.9  Progress beyond the practical could only be made by 
developing skill in reasoning once there was some measure of detachment from the senses at 
the next stage of ascent.10  At this stage, the soul’s activity is still very much bound up with 
the senses and, although reason is manifest to some degree, it is only insofar as it appears to 
the senses in what is reasonable: in actions directed towards an end, in discourse and in 
pleasure.11 
 
The power of the soul at the third stage 
The power of the soul considered at this stage in an. quant. is the power of memory ‘of 
                                                          
about the soul encouraging development of arts and sciences; Nash 2003: 61 and 135 n. 4 following Bourke 
1993: 103 calls this level ‘ratiocination.’  
6 uera rel. 30:54.   
7 ord. 2:16:44. mus. 1:4:6f on the distinction between the art and science of music and esp. mus. 1:4:8 ‘All who 
follow sense and what is pleasing in it commit to memory, and in this way, by moving their body, acquire a 
certain power of imitation; and that they do not have science even if they seem to do many things cleverly and 
skilfully unless they possess in the purity and truth of the intellect the very thing they profess or exhibit.’  
8 Discernible in the following references: the discipline of grammar ‘in words in gesture, in sound of various 
kinds (inventiones tot signorum in litteris, in verbis);’ dialectic ‘the power of reason and thought (vim 
ratiocinandi et excogitandi);’ rhetoric ‘the floods of eloquence (fluvios eloquentiae);’ music ‘the art of music’ 
(modulandi peritiam); geometry ‘the accuracy of surveying (dimetiendi subtilitatem);’ ‘the science of arithmetic 
(disciplinam numerandi)’ and astrology ‘the interpretation of the past and future from the present (praeteritorum 
ac futurorum ex praesentibus coniecturam).’  See Shanzer 2007: 72 n. 8. 
9 conf. 10.9.16.  These are present in themselves, not through images. 
10 The fact that there is no reference to the innumerable principles and laws of numbers and dimensions, which 
have not been impressed on the memory through any bodily sense-perception but are nonetheless contents of all 
rational minds (conf. 10.12.19) confirms that Augustine is only concerned here with memory of sense perception 
and experience.  
11 ord. 2:12:35. 
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the countless things that have been attained and retained by observation and illustration.’12  It 
is not the kind of memory that we share with beasts that becomes habituated by repeated acts; 
the kind of memory that enables ‘swallows to come back to their nests the next year.’13 
Neither is it the so-called learning by rote or reciting from memory which was required, for 
example, of those who were to be received into the Catholic Church (Catechumens), who, 
prior to their baptism, were expected to recite the Creed and the Lord’s Prayer by heart.14  
What Augustine is concerned with at this stage, is memory as a repository of sense experience 
and the vastness, and seemingly unending nature, of this repository.  An ancient metaphor 
described memory as a treasury or storehouse15 but it is clear from many of the Latin words 
traditionally used to express this metaphor - cella (granary, animal stall, bees’ cells and small 
cabin), cellula (small store room), arca (box, chest, safe), sacculus (little sack or bag), 
scrinium (case, chest, box) and peristereon (pigeon- holes) – that the type of store envisaged 
was not one that could be walked around.16  Augustine, on the other hand, enlarged the space 
of memory, describing it as ‘a vast hall of memory;’17 ‘broad plains and caves and caverns of 
memory ‘18 and ‘fields and vast palaces of memory.’19  The more spacious the memory was 
shown to be, the more its powers of retention could be wondered at.  It is really the memory’s 
seemingly infinite power of retention which, for Augustine, proved how great the soul was 
and which also proved its incorporeality.20   
 
In an. quant. he is not concerned with how the images are made in the memory 
although his reference to signis which can mean ‘an image or device on a seal-ring, a seal or 
                                                          
12 an. quant. 33:72. 
13 Vergil Georgics 3.316. This kind of memory belongs to stage 2. 
14 To learn by rote means to reproduce something exactly.  A full discussion of the derivation of the word ‘rote’ 
can be found in Carruthers 1990: 252.  On catechumens reciting the Lord’s Prayer see ss. 56-59 and on reciting 
the Creed see ss. 212-215. On Augustine and the Catechumenate see Harmless 1995. 
15 Carruthers 1990: 33.  
16 For the various expressions: Ibid. 34f.  
17 conf. 10:8:14. 
18 Ibid.10:17:26. 
19 Ibid. 10:8:12. See Cary 2000: chapter 10 for Augustine as the originator of the soul and memory as inner 
spaces. 
20 an. quant. 5:9; 14:23. 
  
84 
signet,’21 does allude to the process of image-making for it evokes another ancient metaphor: 
memory as a wax tablet on which our sense perceptions leave their impressions.22  Augustine 
often uses this analogy when explaining the process of images being imprinted on the 
memory.  He also draws out the scriptural imagery of God imprinting His image on us.23  He 
is not particularly concerned either, in an. quant., with the process of recollection of the 
images retained in the memory.  In the chapter of an. quant. dealing with memory he does 
raise the question briefly when he asks Euodius whether he remembers Milan and goes on to 
equate this remembering with a seeing in the mind as opposed to a seeing with the eyes24 but 
there is no further discussion.  In the well-known account of memory in conf. 10 where 
Augustine, similarly, extols the vastness and seemingly infinite capacity of memory, he again 
distinguishes between seeing an object with the eyes and seeing its image inwardly in the 
memory, once the image has been imprinted on the mind through the bodily sense.  Although 
he does describe this as recalling an image to thought,25 there is no clear distinction drawn 
between the image recalled to thought and the image in the memory and he does not deal 
either with the mechanics of the image-making process (instead musing ‘who can say how 
images are created?’)26 or with the mechanics of the process of recall, simply commenting that 
we recall them to mind in an amazing way.27  It is not until Gn. litt. that Augustine considers 
how the image is made and it is only at this stage that intentio really enters the picture.28 
                                                          
21 Lewis and Short. 
22 See chapter 2 n. 120 supra. 
23 The idea of God imprinting his image on us stems from Ps. 4:7 ‘The light of your countenance is stamped upon 
us O Lord’ The light is Christ (conf. 9:4:10) and it is through the Word that the image was both originally 
stamped and then comes to be reformed after having been defaced through sin (en. Ps. 32:3:16).  Augustine 
describes us as God’s coin for we bear his imprint as money bears Caesar’s imprint (s. 9:9; en. Ps. 4:8; en. Ps. 
138:14; en. Ps. 63:11; Io. eu. tr. 40:9.) We were created in God’s image and likeness but it can only be restored 
and preserved in us to the extent to which we are turned towards Him from whom the impression is received 
(trin. 12:12:16). ‘If any one of us wants to be so truly like God; we must not distance ourselves from him but 
cling to him so closely that his likeness is stamped upon us as wax is stamped by a signet-ring.’ en. Ps. 70:2:6 .  
24 an. quant. 5:8. 
25 conf. 10:8:13. 
26 Ibid. His discussion on cogitation in Ibid. 10:11:18 relates to notions where we do not draw images through 
our senses and will therefore be considered in chapter 7 where we look at the understanding of eternal truths.  
27 Ibid. 10:9:16. 
28 Although note Ibid. 7:1:2 Augustine distinguishes between intentio as the incorporeal image- making power 
and the images formed by it in what is undeniably a technical use of the word and  Ibid. 10:11:18 iam familiari 
intentioni facile occurrant. 
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Gn. litt. 
We saw in the last chapter that in Gn. litt. Augustine came to designate the part of the 
memory onto which images of sense objects were imprinted as spiritus,29 and that the image 
of the form of the body is imprinted by an act of soul (not explicitly by intentio), 
simultaneously with its imprint on the sense, thus overcoming the problem of temporal 
successiveness and enabling an act of sensation to be completed and judged.30  This image 
imprinted onto spiritus, itself derived from the form of the body, becomes the image from 
which our spiritual vision is derived and it is thus that two levels of perception are linked by 
the one act of intentio, deriving from the form in the corporeal object.  Spiritual vision is the 
second level of the three levels of perception and is described by Augustine as ‘taking place 
through the human spirit when, for example, you think about your neighbour who isn’t 
there’31 and ‘as absent bodies being thought about.32  It is rightly called spiritual because, 
although it derives from a body, the image is not bodily and neither is the glance or gaze by 
which it is perceived.33   
 
In the same way as we saw in the last chapter that the form in the sense was 
indistinguishable from the form in the body and the fact of there being two had to be inferred 
by reason, so here the form imprinted onto spiritus is indistinguishable from both the form in 
the sense and the form in the object until the object is removed from sight and its image on 
spiritus remains.34  This image which has been imprinted on spiritus must, however, be 
                                                          
29 For development of meaning of word spiritus in Augustine see chapter 2 n. 82 supra. For Augustine’s 
discussion of various meanings of spiritus chapter 2 n. 83 supra. 
30 Gn. litt. 12:16:33; 12:24:51.  
31 Ibid. 12:6:15.  
32 Ibid.. NB CSEL has ‘quo absentia corpora corporalia cogitantur.’ See n. 10 WSA I/13 (2002), 470 n. 10 for 
comment on this. Also Gn. litt. 12:9:20 spiritale nunc appellavimus tale genus visorum, quali etiam corporum 
absentium imagines cogitamus..  
33 Ibid. 12:7:16. It is rightly called spiritual because this is how scripture designates it. Augustine refers to the 
authority of Paul in 1 Cor. 14:2; 14-16 both for labelling and for inferiority of this kind of vision to intellectual 
vision see Gn. litt. 12:8:19-9:20. See chapter 2 n. 85 for possible Porphyrian influence.  Augustine referred to 
spiritual vision in an. quant. 5:8 as a vision in animo and in Gn. litt. he sometimes refers to it in this way (Gn. 
litt. 12:6:15; 12:11:22).    
34 Ibid. 12:11:22. In this case, the analogy of the imprint of a seal in wax works better than the imprint of a ring 
in water because of the fact that the image remains. 
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distinguished from the image which may well remain in our thoughts after the body has 
disappeared from our actual sight.  It is this latter image which is a spiritual vision and, if it 
was not in our thoughts, it would no longer be being seen.35  When we are in a state of bodily 
vision i.e.  awake and in full possession of our senses then we are able to distinguish this 
bodily vision from various types of spiritual vision in which we think about absent bodies in 
images either ‘by recalling in the memory bodies we know, or by picturing ones which we do 
not know but which all the same are somehow or other there in the working (cogitatione) of 
the spirit, or by fashioning ad lib. and by guesswork the images of bodies that simply do not 
exist anywhere.’36  This distinction between three different kinds of spiritual vision 
corresponds to an earlier distinction that Augustine made between three kinds of images: those 
impressed by sense (recalling the face of a friend), those impressed by things we think of 
(imagining the face of Aeneas) and those impressed by things we reason to (geometrical 
shapes; musical rhythms, numbers).37  It is also the same distinction as Augustine later drew 
between three different acts of thinking when writing in response to the Manichee, Faustus: 
‘there is a great difference between the act of thinking by which I think of your land of light, 
which does not exist at all, and the act of thinking by which I think of Alexandria, which I 
have never seen but still exists, and there is, again, a great difference between this latter act of 
thinking by which I think of Alexandria, which I do not know, and the act of thinking by 
which I think of Carthage, which I do know.’38  There are therefore grades of unreality with 
regard to spiritual visions,39 yet all images are to be viewed cautiously; not because they are 
bad in themselves but because we can easily fail to see that they are images and mistake them 
for the truth itself.  If we do this, we are ‘standing on the very threshold of error’40 because 
                                                          
35 Ibid. 12:11:23. Augustine chooses his words carefully when he describes how the image of the hand writing on 
the wall which has been imprinted on King Belshazzar’s spirit remains in his thoughts and thus was being seen in 
spirit. cf trin. 11:9:16 Mediam vero nolui, quia non ibi solet visio dici, cum memoriae commendatur forma, quae 
fit in sensu cernentis.  
36 Ibid. 12:12:25; 12:23:49.  
37 ep. 7:2:3. This last category is illuminated by the discussion in sol. 2:20:35 where we may picture in our 
thought squares of varying sizes without being able to picture squareness itself. 
38 c. Faust. 20:7. He likes the comparison of Alexandria and Carthage to illustrate the different types of spiritual 
vision-memory and imagination. See Gn. litt. 12:6:15; trin. 8:6:9; 9:6:10. 
39 Augustine had distinguished acts of memory φαντασίαι and acts of imagination (images of images) as 
φαντασματα,mus. 6:11:32. 
40mus. 6:11:32; uera rel. 39:73; 49:95; sol. 2:20:35 (we mustn’t confuse squares of differing sizes that appear in 
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‘who hasn’t experienced that his understanding of things became more adequate to the extent 
of his ability to withdraw and remove his intentionem mentis from the senses of the body?’41  
 
Acts of thinking about incorporeal truths ‘by which I understand justice, chastity, faith, 
truth, love, companionship, and anything else of this sort’ are vastly superior to acts of 
thinking involving images and thinking about God is vastly superior to thinking about those 
other incorporeal truths.42  Augustine had previously thought that ‘seeing’ meant a physical 
act of looking with the eyes and of forming an image in the mind and this had prevented him 
from realizing that God was (incorporeal) Spirit.43  This was the Manichees’ problem.  They 
thought that to understand the truth was to think in bodily forms and so instead of thinking of 
God as the uncreated light, they thought of him as created light which, as a corporeal 
substance, they were then able to divide so that His power was located in the sun and His 
wisdom in the moon.44  
 
Because of the context in which the discussion of spiritual vision arises in Gn. litt., 
namely Paul’s account of a vision in 2 Cor.  12:2-4 and particularly his comment that he did 
not know whether it was in the body or out of the body,45 Augustine’s interest in Gn. litt.  is, 
primarily, in the kind of spiritual visions that just appear, unwilled, to our thought: ‘those that 
intentio runs into, so to speak’ (animi intentio quadam necessitate incurrat in eas quae 
occurrunt imagines).46  Intentio tends therefore to be discussed in connection with these rather 
than in connection with the ordinary process of cognition, though it is clearly assumed to be 
involved in the ordinary process, for an abnormally vivid vision may be caused by an 
excessive intentio of thought (nimia cogitationis intentio) such that a person may be unable to 
                                                          
our thought with squareness itself); Gn. litt. 12:25:52. 
41 imm. an. 10:17. We will return to this passage in chapter 5 when we reflect upon the withdrawal of intentio 
from the senses.  
42 c. Faust. 20:7.  Even though thinking about God has its limitations see chapter 7. 
43 conf. 3:7:12. 
44 c. Faust. 20:7. (A reference to 1 Cor. 1:24). See Introduction n. 62 and chapter 4 n. 93 for significance of 
quotation. 
45 Gn. litt. 12:1:1-2. 
46 trin. 11:4:7. 
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say whether it is spiritual or bodily47 and, in cases where divination is involved, Augustine 
wonders whether the process is the same as that of ordinary cognition such that the external 
spirit, which is somehow mixed in (commixtio) with our spirit (for better or worse) enables the 
work of intentio by loosening the soul from the body  and thereby letting ‘its intentio scout 
around until it comes to where it can see in itself significant likenesses that were already there 
but were not being seen, just as we have many things in the memory which we are not always 
looking at.’48  
 
trin. 
There is some overlap between the accounts of spiritual visions in Gn. litt. and trin., in 
particular with regard to spiritual visions that occur other than by willed conscious activity.49  
However, the emphasis in trin. is on the ordinary process of cognition and the threefold nature 
of the act of thought.  It is this which brings to the fore the role of intentio in ordinary acts of 
thinking which, as intentio is an act of the will, also raises the question of the element of 
choice we have with regard to the images we imprint, recall or otherwise think about in 
spiritual vision.  Augustine speaks, in allegorical terms, of the image as only being imprinted 
in our memory in the first place because the will, instead of referring our enjoyment of what 
we sense to God, rests in the enjoyment of the object and becomes attached to it to such an 
extent that it retains its likeness in the memory so that it can think about it again, as and when 
it pleases.50  In this subsequent act of thought in which our attention is directed back to the 
image in the memory, there is a trinity comprising the memory, internal sight and the will 
which couples them together (Atque ita fit illa trinitas ex memoria, et interna visione, et quae 
utrumque copulat voluntate.)51  The act of thought therefore like an act of sense perception, 
may look like a single act, but it is made up of three components which are brought together 
(coagitated) into a unity and from this process the word cogitatio ‘thought’ is derived (Quae 
                                                          
47 Gn. litt. 12:12:25. 
48 Ibid. 12:13:27.  
49 c.f. trin. 11:4:7 with Gn. litt. 12:12:25. 
50 trin. 11:3:6. 
51 Ibid 
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tria cum in unum coguntur, ab ipso coactu cogitatio dicitur.)52  Instead of the sense object, 
there is the image of the sense object which the memory has retained; instead of the sense, 
there is the mind’s thinking attention and coupling the two together is the same intentio of the 
will (hoc est eadem voluntatis intentio) which originally coupled together the sense object and 
the sense.53  This time the will’s coupling together informs the mind’s thought to produce in it 
a sight of the image recollected from memory whereas before, it had informed the sense to 
produce sight of the physical object.54  The point that Augustine wishes to make is that, 
although the image produced in thought and the image held in the memory appear to be one 
single image, as the form in the body and the form impressed on the sense appeared to be the 
same form, they are in fact two different images only distinguishable by our reason.  What 
enables us to make the distinction is the realization that the image remains in our memory, 
even when we think about something else and that we can go back to it at will and recall it to 
the sight of our thinking mind again.55  This kind of spiritual vision, which is a seeing of 
sensed images by recollecting them from memory and thinking about them, could therefore 
not occur if there was no image in the memory to go back to or, alternatively, if there was an 
image but the act of recollection was not performed.  When the mind turns its attention away 
from the image and turns it to something else, no trace of the first image will remain in its 
thought but, instead, its thought will be formed by another image, just as is the case with sense 
perception where the form does not remain in the sense once the object disappears from 
sight.56  The will moves the attention of the mind through the memory and, once it finds what 
it wants, it keeps the mind’s attention joined to the image in the memory.57  The will’s intentio 
therefore directs the mind’s thinking attention to the image; connects its attention to the image 
and maintains the connection for as long as the image is seen.  Augustine makes the same 
point that he made in Gn. litt., that if the mind concentrates its whole energy on the image in 
the memory withdrawing the mind’s attention completely from the senses, then such a great 
                                                          
52 Ibid. For cogitatio in connection with process of learning incorporeal truth see chapter 7 infra.  
53 trin. 11:4:7. 
54 trin. 11:3:6. 
55 trin. 11:7:12. 
56 trin. 11:3:6. 
57 trin. 11:4:7. 
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likeness to a bodily image is poured out into thought that reason cannot tell whether it is a 
corporeal vision which is being seen externally or a spiritual vision which is being seen 
inwardly in thought.58  Again, as before, the intensity of the coupling of the image in memory 
and the mind’s thinking attention by the will may be so strong as to affect the body.59  The 
image in the memory to which the will is drawn and the intensity with which it is driven to 
couple it to the mind’s thinking attention, will depend on its emotional state:  desire or fear 
can equally well be the motivating force.60   
 
After establishing the trinity to be found in an act of recollection of a sense object, 
Augustine goes on to consider the other kind of spiritual vision which belongs to a willed act 
of thought: a creative act of imagination.  He notes that we have a power to fabricate images 
of things we have forgotten or, indeed, things never sensed or experienced; we can compose 
them out of things that have not dropped out of the memory by increasing, diminishing, 
altering and putting them together as we please.61  This kind of manipulation of images is still 
an act of memory because no one can think about anything bodily, unless he has first sensed it 
and remembered it and in this sense ‘the limits of thinking are set by the memory (sic in 
memoria est cogitandi modus.)’62  This means that even our acts of imagination are really acts 
of recall because what the will is doing is leading our thinking attention through the stores of 
memory taking things from here and there to form one composite image that appears to our 
thought.  This will not be of something we have specifically sensed, but something completely 
manufactured, though completely dependent on things previously sensed.63  It is with acts of 
                                                          
58 Ibid. cf. nimia cogitationis intentio in Gn. litt. 12:12:25. 
59 trin. 11:4:7 as we saw that the intensity of its coupling of the sense and sense object was also capable of 
affecting the body trin. 11:2:5.  
60 trin. 11:4:7.  For the fears and inordinate desires of the soul (perturbationes animi ) as acts of will and for the 
purification of the will see chapter five infra. 
61 trin. 11:5:8. 
62 trin. 11:8:14. 
63 trin. 11:10:17. In conf. 10:8:13 Augustine describes how, for the purposes of easy recall, memory preserves ‘in 
distinct particulars and general categories’ what it receives through each sense and it is as though each sense had 
its own storeroom because memories relating to images imprinted through one sense don’t interfere with our 
ability to recall images which have come in through another. Yates 1966: 59-62 says Augustine’s excursus on 
memory in conf. indicates a trained memory though he is not advocating the practice of the arts of memory; 
merely using the imagery of places (loci) and images (imagines) to construct a language for speaking about the 
natural memory-its powers of retention and recall. But O’Donnell (conf. 10.8 Excursus: Memory in Augustine) 
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memory leading to spiritual vision, rather than with visions that appear unwilled that 
Augustine is really concerned with in trin., for he is on the search for the image that God has 
directly imprinted on the mind, which he will only find where there is no nature interposed 
(nulla interiecta natura est) between Him and itself.64  He has already found it in trin. 10, in 
the mental activities of memory, understanding and will, but he will not find it where those 
acts relate solely to corporeal objects, without the will referring its enjoyment of these objects 
to their proper end: this requires them to be judged in their true light (scientia) and for God to 
be praised for them (sapientia).   
 
Augustine has already stressed in trin. 10, the distinction between the mind knowing 
itself and thinking about itself and the emphasis on the distinction between the image retained 
and the image printed off from memory is made with an eye to that: something we will return 
to in the later chapters of this thesis.  When the will turns the mind’s attention to the images of 
memory, it is turning it to something that was in the memory before it started thinking about 
it.  What the will turns onto memory is the mind’s unformed conscious attention.65  This is 
significant, because it means that for the mind to come back to itself is to come back to itself 
as unformed conscious attention.66  But Augustine is seeking to train the mind to reason by 
stages and at this stage his concern is to demonstrate that there are distinctions between the 
three components of thought, even though they are all of the same incorporeal nature and even 
though they are so closely compounded that they seem to be one thing.67  The act of 
recollection can only take place if what we want to recollect is in our memory and we know it 
is there because if we didn’t at least have a vague recollection of it, or something related to it, 
which prompts us to search, then the will to remember it more fully would not arise.68   
 
When we engage in an act of recollection, it is a process involving more than one 
                                                          
does not believe there is any evidence that Augustine knew of the ancient technique.   
64 trin. 11:5:8. 
65 trin. 11:7:11. 
66 See chapter 5 infra. 
67 trin. 11:7:12. 
68 Ibid. How can we love what we do not know?  The short answer given in trin. 8 is faith but the kind of 
knowledge that prompts us to seek further is considered in trin. 9 and 10.  
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thought:  whether it is a matter of sewing bits together to create composite images (hinc atque 
inde recordata quaelibet sumendo et quasi assuendo)69 or weaving several images together to 
form a narrative of our past lives that we can remember in the present, upon which we can 
then base our future actions.70  Augustine had considered whether the whole process could be 
regarded as a single unity, but he dismissed it on the basis that the conscious attention cannot 
look at everything in the memory at one glance; we are left instead with a trinity of thoughts 
in succession.71  We are therefore faced once again with the problem of temporal 
successiveness which, although it has been solved by intentio with regard to an act of sense 
perception, still remains with regard to the thinking process.72  
 
Summary and Conclusion  
 
Corporeal and spiritual vision is closely linked, and reliant upon an act of intentio of 
the will.  An act of intentio connects the sense object and sense of the seeing subject to 
produce sight and the same act of intentio simultaneously imprints an image onto the memory 
which, in Gn. litt., Augustine calls spiritus.  Unless this image is imprinted and there is some 
vague recollection of this, then the will to recall it to mind more completely does not arise.  It 
is recalled and forms our thought (spiritual vision) by an act of intentio coupling the mind’s 
thinking attention and the image in the memory.  If the will fails at any stage to perform its 
coupling activity, then the chain of perception will break.73  
Images formed in spiritus are essential to our normal functioning and communicating 
in the world of sense: any bodily activity requires previous arrangement of thought and 
planning and as we saw in chapter 2, the image imprinted onto spiritus is necessary to enable 
completion of an act of sense perception as well as enabling our judgement of it.  Images are 
not harmful, provided we don’t deceive ourselves, or others, into thinking that they are the 
                                                          
69 trin. 12:2:2. 
70 conf. 10.8.14.  
71 trin. 11:7:12. 
72 We will return to this in chapter 7. 
73 trin. 11:8:15. 
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true reality and they don’t block us from seeking the truth  and provided we don’t become 
overly emotionally attached and distracted by the life of the senses and the images it produces 
in us.  Augustine shows that the activity of thought is parallel to, overlapping with and derived 
from, the activity of sense perception and that the link between the two is furnished by an act 
of intentio.   
In addition to developing a certain skill in reasoning which will enable us to see that 
the seemingly unified activity of spiritual vision can be distinguished into three components, 
we need also to understand that what looks like one image is actually two.  In the activity of 
sense perception, the imprint of the image onto spiritus cannot be seen until the sense object 
has been removed from sight and, with spiritual vision, the imprint of the image onto our 
conscious attention is indistinguishable from the image that was retrieved from memory.  In 
both cases, although there are two images, they overlap so completely that, until the activity 
has been completed in each case, this is something we can only know by an incorporeal act of 
reasoning.  In the case of spiritual vision, Augustine seeks to persuade his readers of this by 
arguing that, if the two were not distinguishable, then once the image was printed off in our 
thought, it would have disappeared forever from the memory but in fact, when we go back to 
our memory, we find it is still there.74  Unlike sense perception, which involves three different 
natures and substances, spiritual vision involves the same natures and substances, which are 
all incorporeal and it therefore requires a bit more training and skill to see the distinctions 
between them.75   
 
In this chapter, we have begun to unpack, and give credence to, the bald statement 
made by Hayen that, in Augustine, memory is in effect explained by intentio (‘la mémoire, en 
effet, s’explique par l’intentio’)76 though the full weight of that statement is yet to be felt.  At 
this stage three, we are still in the realm of everyman, our minds turned towards the outside 
world which we allow to fill our heads with desires, fears and wild imaginings; without 
retaining any sense of proportion or worth.  It is significant that Augustine has selected 
                                                          
74 trin. 11:3:6. 
75 trin. 11:7:12. 
76 Hayen 1954: 40. 
  
94 
intentio; an aspect of will as that through which the soul takes in the outside world to make its 
own reality, because this raises the question of choice and how free we are to choose our own 
reality.77  We are microcosms of creation and our memory’s capacity is equivalent to the 
formless stage of creation, waiting to receive the form that is given through the images 
impressed on it by intentio. Our conscious attention similarly is formless until formed by what 
intentio joins with it from memory.  What will become evident is that the will’s intentio is like 
a pivot upon which the mind’s conscious attention can turn either out towards the world or in 
towards God.  If our attention is directed towards the outside world and its multiplicity of 
concerns which are then brought back inside the soul in the form of images, the risk is that 
they dominate our thoughts and prevent us from seeing the truth.  It is up to intentio to order 
our thinking; to gather together each thought and the multiplicity of thoughts into a single 
coherent narrative of who we are.  It is only thus can we derive meaning and in the light of 
faith, this allows us to see ourselves in relation to God, for if we don’t see ourselves in God’s 
light, we don’t really see ourselves at all.  This requires a conversion for unless we turn 
towards God, we cannot receive his imprint.  Up until now all of the soul’s activity has been a 
potential source of distraction from contemplation of God and what is needed is for the soul to 
develop the art of paying attention to God.  This may mean initially turning away from the 
world but only temporarily and in order to turn back to look at it in a different way.  The 
question, ‘why do these things give me pleasure?’ is the beginning of the process of reasoning, 
which will eventually lead us towards an understanding of the truth, provided we first reorient 
ourselves through faith.   
                                                          
77 For intentio as aspect of will see chapter 5. 
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Chapter Four: virtus 
 
Archery can in no circumstances mean accomplishing anything outwardly with bow 
and arrow, but only inwardly, with oneself.1 
 
Steep is the way to mastery. Often nothing keeps the pupil on the move but his faith 
in his teacher.2 
 
Take hold now and swing yourself onto the fourth level, where goodness and all true 
worth begins.  Here it is that the soul ventures to take precedence not only over its 
own body, acting some part in the universe, but even over the whole body of the 
universe itself.  The goods of the world it does not account its own, and comparing 
them with its own power and beauty, it keeps aloof from them and despises them 
(bonaque eius bona sua non putare, atque potentiae pulchritudinique suae 
comparata discernere atque contemnere.)  Hence, the more the soul turns to itself for 
its own pleasure, the more does it withdraw from sordid things and cleanse itself and 
make itself immaculately clean through and through (et inde quo magis se delectat, 
eo magis sese abstrahere a sordibus, totamque emaculare ac mundissimam reddere 
et comptissimam).  It steels itself against every effort (roborare se adversus omnia) to 
lure it away from its purpose and resolve.  It shows high consideration for human 
society and desires nothing to happen to another which it does not wish to happen to 
itself (societatem humanam magni pendere, nihilque velle alteri quod sibi nolit 
accidere).  It submits to the authority and the bidding of wise men and is convinced 
that through them God speaks to itself (sequi auctoritatem ac praecepta sapientium, 
et per haec loqui sibi Deum credere.). Yet, this performance of the soul, noble as it 
is, still requires strenuous effort and the annoyances and allurements of this world 
engage it in a mighty struggle, bitterly contested.  In this work of purification there is 
an underlying fear of death, sometimes not strong, but sometimes all-pervading.  It is 
scarcely present when one has a very vigorous faith that-and to see the truth of this is 
granted only to the purified soul-all things are so governed by the great providence 
and justice of God that death cannot come as an evil to anyone, even though someone 
may inflict it with evil intentions.  But on this level there is a great fear of death, 
when, on the one hand, confidence in God’s justice is so much the weaker the more 
anxiously one seeks for it; and when, on the other hand, corresponding to the lack of 
tranquillity in the presence of fear, there is a greater lack of understanding; for 
tranquillity is absolutely necessary for the study of matters shrouded in mystery. 
 
Further, as the soul in the course of its progress realizes more and more, what great 
difference there is between its state of purity, and its state of defilement, the greater is 
its apprehension that when it has sloughed off this body, God may find it less 
endurable than it finds itself when defiled.  There is, moreover, nothing more difficult 
than to fear death and to refrain from the allurements of this world in a degree 
                                                          
1 Herrigel 1976:18. 
2 Ibid. 66. 
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commensurate with the jeopardies involved.  Yet, so great is the soul that it can do 
even this, by the help, of course, of the goodness of the supreme and true God-that 
goodness which sustains and rules the universe, that goodness by which it has been 
brought about not only that all things exist, but that they exist in such a way that they 
cannot be any better than they are.  It is to this divine goodness that the soul most 
dutifully and confidently commits itself for help and success in the difficult task of 
self-purification.3 
 
The fourth stage of ascent, and the fourth power of the soul in an. quant., is the second of 
the five rational levels which, together, correspond to the third degree of soul identified by 
Varro4 and is the first stage that is not common to all human beings.  Augustine describes it as 
virtue (virtus) and it involves acts of the soul ‘toward itself (ad seipsam.)’5  O’Daly says of 
this stage that it is ‘characteristically, if not exclusively ethical,’ and is concerned with ‘moral 
struggle and progress through purification, with belief and authority.’6  There are clearly 
discernible references in the passage to the four classical virtues: prudence (prudentia), 
temperance (temperantia), fortitude (fortitude) and justice (iustitia).7  At this stage, Augustine 
says that true religion purifies the soul (religio uera …purgat in quarto).8  It does this by the 
soul taking a firm stand (fortiter agens) in faith and by living virtuously, as it seeks to 
understand the truths ‘scattered through the many writings of the Church.’9 
 
The meaning of virtue 
                                                          
3 an. quant. 33.73. 
4 ciu. 7:23.   
5 an. quant. 35:79.  
6 O’Daly 1987: 13 and 14. 
7 Du Roy 1966: 259 n. 2 referred to and identified in Neil 1999: 208.  Prudence in ‘The goods of the world it 
does not account its own, and comparing them with its own power and beauty, it keeps aloof from them and 
despises them (bonaque eius bona sua non putare, atque potentiae pulchritudinique suae comparata discernere 
atque contemnere); Temperance in ‘The more the soul turns to itself for its own pleasure, the more does it 
withdraw from sordid things and cleanse itself and make itself immaculately clean through and through (et inde 
quo magis se delectat, eo magis sese abstrahere a sordibus, totamque emaculare ac mundissimam reddere et 
comptissimam); Fortitude in ‘It steels itself against every effort (roborare se adversus omnia)’ and Justice in ‘It 
shows high consideration for human society and desires nothing to happen to another which it does not wish to 
happen to itself (societatem humanam magni pendere, nihilque velle alteri quod sibi nolit accidere.)’ Augustine 
notes retr. 1:7:3 and en. Ps. 83:11 that these virtues are described by many writers and are also found in 
scripture. 
8 an quant. 36:80. 
9 Ibid. 34:78.  The same four virtues can be identified here says Neil 1990: 208. 
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Augustine discussed the meaning of virtue with Euodius, proposing that virtue be defined 
as ‘a sort of equality of life in harmony with reason (utrum tibi videatur virtus aequalitas 
quaedam esse vitae, rationi undique consentientis).’ He approved Euodius’ equation of reason 
with truth and his definition of a virtuous person as one whose life is, in all respects, in 
harmony with the truth.10  In Augustine’s view, there was nothing among the treasures of the 
soul that showed greater all-round balance than virtue and, therefore, the state of virtue 
excelled all other states of the soul.11  He demonstrates this to Euodius by getting him first to 
see that geometric figures with the greatest equality are to be preferred to others less equal and 
then by suggesting that he think of virtue as comparable to a circle: the geometric figure 
which has equality in the highest degree.12   
 
If we can live faithfully and virtuously in this life, then, after the life of this body, 
‘virtue’s and piety’s reward is God Himself, that is, Truth itself, (et virtuti pietatique sit Deus 
ipse, id est veritas ipsa, praemium).’ 13  Not only does this statement make it clear that God 
will not be fully possessed in this life14 and that there is a link between how we live now and 
the nature of our afterlife, but it also makes it clear that virtue, for Augustine, is a means to an 
end; not an end in itself.15  In mor., a work which he was writing at the same time as an. 
quant.,16 Augustine made the point that the soul must pursue something in order to attain 
virtue and ‘our highest desire when we are in pursuit of something is that we may attain what 
                                                          
10 an. quant. 16:27.  Augustine defines virtue in various ways throughout his works egs. ‘correct and perfect 
reason’ sol. 1:6:13; ‘a perfectly correct disposition of mind’ mor. 1:11:19; ‘rightly ordered love’ ciu. 15:22; ‘a 
habit of the soul conformable to the ways of nature and to reason’ c. Iul. 4:3:19 (here he was quoting with 
approval Cicero’s definition of virtue which had been included as diu. qu. 83:31). 
11 an. quant. 16:27. 
12 Ibid.  
13 an. quant. 36:81. Also see trin. 14:8:11.    
14 There are two statements in the Cassiciacum dialogues indicating that he thought it was possible to attain the 
Happy Life in this life; statements which he later felt obliged to correct, (sol. 1:7:14 corrected by retr. 1:4:3 and 
beata u. 4:25 corrected by retr. 1:2).  
15 See similar early statements in sol. 1:6:13, ‘After this life virtue is perfected when it is followed by the Happy 
Life’ and ord. 1:8:23 ‘What else is the process of conversion but to uplift oneself wholeheartedly by virtue and 
temperance from the excess of vices? And what else is the face of God than the truth for which we yearn and for 
which as the object of our love we make ourselves clean and beautiful?’ 
16 On the period of time over which mor. was written (probably completed after Gn. adu. Man.) see Coyle 1978: 
66-98, esp. 74-9; 93-4. 
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we are pursuing’ (Summa sunt autem vota sequentium, ut id quod sequimur, assequamur.)17  
That something is God and ‘if we pursue Him, we live well; if we attain Him, we live not 
merely well but also happily’ (Deus igitur restat quem si sequimur, bene, si assequimur, non 
tantum bene sed etiam beate vivimus.)18  Cicero had begun Hortensius, the book that had 
converted Augustine to a life of philosophy,19 by stating as a universal truth that ‘We all 
certainly want to be happy’ (Beati certe, inquit, omnes esse volumus.)20  The philosophical 
schools had agreed that ‘we all certainly want to be happy’ and, accordingly, moral 
philosophy was concerned with the search for our Summum Bonum (Greatest Good), being 
that which would bring us The Happy Life.21  But they were not agreed as to where happiness 
might be found: some finding it in the body, some in the soul and others in a combination of 
the two.22   Only the Platonists sought the Summum Bonum in God, rather than in the mind or 
the body.23  The Stoics defined the Summum Bonum as virtue and Colish writes: 
 
The definition of the Summum Bonum as virtue alone, as an end in itself, as attainable 
by correct intellectual judgements and the exercise of a rationally instructed will, as 
the sole and sufficient possession of the sage, and as a good within man’s power that 
can never be lost, is a constellation of Stoic ideas which Augustine expressly attributes 
to that school and toward which he shows a marked partiality in his earliest works.  
His sympathy with this ethical position continues, on the whole, into the mid-390s.  
When he modifies any of these themes up to that point he is more likely to do so under 
the influence of Neoplatonism, or to a far lesser extent, Aristotelianism, rather than 
Christianizing them.24 
 
                                                          
17 mor. 1:6:9. 
18 mor. 1:6:10. 
19 Augustine describes this conversion in conf. 3:4:7. Cic.’s Hortensius, which was an exhortation to study 
philosophy, is no longer extant but the most important remaining fragments are contained in Augustine’s works. 
For a list of passages in which Hort. is quoted by Augustine, see Gibb and Montgomery 58 n. 4.  
20 trin. 13:4:7. This had been stated at the beginning of Acad. (Acad. 1:2:5) not surprisingly because Hortensius 
had not only won Augustine over to philosophy but also purportedly, for the most part, had won over 
Augustine’s pupils, Licentius and Trygetius Acad. 1:1:4.  In trin. 13:8:11 Augustine’s explanation for this 
universal truth is that this is a desire naturally implanted in us by our Creator trin. 13:8:11. Hence our restless 
hearts conf. 1:1. 
21 ciu. 8:8. This system of ethics was called ‘eudaemonism,’ from the Greek for happiness, εὐδαιμονία. 
22 Ibid. Augustine looked at the various views in ciu. 19 taking the information from Varro’s De Philosophia 
where he noted 288 different schools of thought on the matter.  
23 ciu. 8:8.  
24 Colish 1985/2: 213. 
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Wetzel takes issue with Colish over her premature attempt ‘to divorce Augustine from Stoic 
ethics’ in the 390s, arguing that ‘the reversal of perspective that introduces divine agency into 
the very heart of human willing is still years away.’25  However, on the contrary, we would 
argue that Augustine held an identifiably Christian view of the Summum Bonum from the 
outset, even if he struggled to find a way of expressing this, through the inherited amalgam of 
ideas.  It is true that he does make one or two statements supporting a Stoic view of virtue as 
an end in itself,26 but, already in beata u, his first complete work written after his 
conversion,27 he had equated the Happy Life with possession of God,28 and specifically with 
knowledge of a Trinitarian God, for the Happy life is ‘to recognize piously and completely the 
one through whom you are led into the truth, the nature of the truth you enjoy and the bond 
that connects you with the supreme measure’ (hoc est beata vita, pie perfecteque cognoscere a 
quo inducaris in veritatem, qua veritate perfruaris, per quid connectaris summo modo.)29  He 
also regarded it as a gift, rather than attainable by one’s own efforts, and commented that, 
therefore, the name of the dedicatee of the dialogue (Theodore meaning ‘gift of God’) was 
particularly apposite.30   
                                                          
25 Wetzel 1992: 72. 
26 In Acad. 1:2:5 he had unambiguously stated the Stoic view, which he felt obliged to correct in retr. 1:1:2 as 
follows: ‘Again I said “What else do you think it is to live happily if not to live in accordance with what is best in 
man?”  And a little later I explained what I meant by “what is best in man” when I said, “Who would doubt that 
there is nothing else that is best in man than the part of the soul to whose dominion whatever other parts there are 
in man should submit?  Should you seek another definition, however, this part can be called mind or reason.”  
This is certainly true, for, as far as the nature of man is concerned, there is nothing in him that is better than the 
mind and reason.  But the person who wishes to live happily must not live in accordance with that, or else he is 
living in accordance with man when he should be living in accordance with God, so that he may be able to attain 
happiness.  In pursuit of that our mind should not be satisfied with itself but must submit to God.’ Another 
unambiguously Stoic statement can be found in Acad. 3:12:27, which he amended in retr. 1:1:4 as follows: In the 
third book I said, “If you are looking for my opinion, I think that man’s highest good is in the mind.”  It would 
have been more correct if I had said “in God,” for it is he himself, as its highest good, that the mind enjoys so 
that it may be happy.” 
27 See Introduction n. 57.   
28 beata u. 2:11. Once this conclusion had been reached in beata u. 2:11, the question, who possesses God? was 
discussed. Various opinions were put forward in beata u. 2:12: that a person possess God if lives well; if he does 
what God wants; if he has a spirit free from uncleanness.  In beata u. 3:18, Augustine concludes all three 
opinions are a single opinion because living well is nothing other than doing what God wills and a spirit free 
from uncleanness means a person who has cleaned his soul from all vices and sins and the one is pure who 
attends to God and devoted himself to him alone.  
29 Ibid. 4:35. Also in sol. 1:6:13 he distinguishes between virtue and the Happy Life which follows.  
30 beata u. 1:5. The question of virtue being ‘attainable by correct intellectual judgements and the exercise of a 
rationally instructed will,’ belongs to chapter 5 where we engage with Augustine’s growing emphasis on the will 
not necessarily following the dictates of reason.  
  
100 
 
Equivalent stage in trin 
Stage four an. quant. corresponds to the first stage of the inner man (homo interior) in 
trin., which Augustine calls ‘knowledge’ (scientia).  Although, in trin., he demarcated the 
inner from the outer man at this stage on the grounds that this is where reason begins and 
therefore it is the point at which man differs from beast,31 he did acknowledge that the lower 
activities of conscious recall and imagination, in relation to sense images in the memory, were 
not without their share in reason.32  The difference, though, is that it is only at this first stage 
of the inner man that, what is taken in through the senses, can be used to foster knowledge 
(scientia) where it is the work of a ‘loftier reason to make judgements on these bodily things 
according to non-bodily and everlasting meanings (Sed sublimioris rationis est iudicare de 
istis corporalibus secundum rationes incorporales et sempiternas).’33  Scientia simply means 
‘knowledge’34 but Augustine gives it a specialized meaning in trin. and distinguishes it from 
wisdom (sapientia) on the grounds that they are two distinct gifts of the Spirit in 1 Cor.  
12:8.35  It is not, however, until Augustine reflects on a passage from Job that he claims to 
have any insight as to what the distinction means.  From Job 28:28, ‘Behold piety is wisdom, 
while to abstain from evil things is knowledge (Ecce pietas est sapientia; abstinere autem a 
malis scientia est),’ he understood the distinction between scientia and sapientia to be a 
distinction between action and contemplation: scientia was the activity of avoiding evil and 
doing good in relation to temporal realities by acting virtuously; sapientia was the 
contemplation of eternal realities because pietas was the Latin translation of the Greek 
θεοσέβεια (worship of God).36  The stage of scientia corresponds to stage four an. quant. 
                                                          
31 trin. 12:8:13.   
32 trin. 12:1:2. 
33 Ibid; trin. 13:1:4.  
34 By ‘knowledge’ Augustine means ‘grasping reality with certain reason:’ an. quant. 26:49; 30:58; lib. arb. 1:16; 
retr. 1:14:3. He may have originally come across the idea of knowledge as a grasping, which is both Stoic and 
Platonic, in Nicomachus, see Solignac 1958: 135.   
35 1 Cor. 12:28. Again, another source may have been Nicomachus, see Solignac 1958: 134-5 and n. 59 though it 
was clearly more politic for Augustine to be able to find scriptural authority for ideas he had originally come 
across elsewhere. 
36 trin. 12:14:22.  This distinction had previously been made by Augustine in Simpl. 2:2:3.  With his distinction 
into scientia and sapientia, Augustine had simply dichotomised the traditional definition of wisdom ‘the 
knowledge of things human and divine’ (given by him in Acad. 1:6:16); NB beata u. 2:8 where Monnica had 
already made a distinction between knowledge and understanding ‘I believe that the soul is not nourished except 
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because both are concerned, primarily, with an ethical approach to knowledge and, 
specifically, from the perspective of the Christian faith: scientia being described in trin. as 
anything that ‘breeds, feeds, defends and strengthens the saving faith which leads to true 
happiness.’37  The saving faith is our faith in the life and work of the incarnate Christ; this 
being the standard (regula) against which we are to assess both how we ought to behave as 
human beings and how we do, in fact, behave as the individual human being that we are.  The 
move towards self-knowledge that scientia fosters, corresponds to the first part of the 
traditional twofold goal of the philosophic quest: to know the soul and God38 and, whether 
Augustine calls it virtue (virtus), as in an. quant, or knowledge (scientia), as in trin., this stage 
is about growing towards self-knowledge, which is primarily ethical knowledge based on the 
life of the incarnate Christ.   
 
Power of the soul involved at this stage 
Augustine calls the work that the soul carries out at this stage, ‘a work of purification 
(purgationis negotio)’39 which ‘calls for action than which none is more laborious, none that is 
more akin to inaction, for it is such as the soul cannot begin or complete except with the help 
of Him to whom it yields itself’ (Hac autem actione nihil mihi videtur operosius, et nihil est 
cessationi similius: neque tamen eam suscipere aut implere animus potest, nisi eo ipso 
adiuvante cui redditur.)40  
 
The work of purification referred to is a purification by faith of the reasoning power of 
the soul, which is also a purification of love on the grounds that the true faith ‘is that which 
works through love (Ipsa autem fides definita est, quae per dilectionem operatur.)’41  In order 
                                                          
by the understanding and knowledge of things (intellectu rerum atque scientia.) 
37 trin. 14:1:3.  In trin. Augustine also stresses historical knowledge because of his emphasis on the incarnation 
see Studer 1997. 
38 ord. 2:18:47.  
39 an. quant. 33:73. 
40 Ibid. 28:55. This gives the lie to Wetzel’s comment with regard to the contemporary mor., ‘The reversal of 
perspective that introduces divine agency into the very heart of human willing is still years away.’ See n. 25 for 
reference. 
41 s. 53:11. Augustine tied together two scriptural quotations ‘the just man lives on faith ‘(Rom. 1:17) and ‘faith 
works through love’ (Gal. 5:6) trin. 13:20:26; ep. 55:2; en. Ps. 32:2:4 and 9; en. Ps. 118:3:3; en. Ps. 118:7:1; c. 
ep. Pel. 3:3:5; 3:5:14. Knowing without loving (scientia sine caritate) is not an option. St Paul says in 1 Cor. 8:1 
  
102 
to live virtuously, the soul has to develop its ability to judge and evaluate the life of the senses 
and this ability belongs to its power of reasoning (sed iudicare de corporibus non sentientis 
tantum vitae, sed etiam ratiocinantis est; qua illae carent, nos excellimus.)42  Although 
Augustine is not always consistent in his terminology, he does distinguish between the activity 
of reasoning and the faculty of reason to which the activity belongs.  Reasoning is a 
‘movement of the mind, capable of distinguishing and connecting the things that are learned 
(Ratio est mentis motio, ea quae discuntur distinguendi et connectendi potens.)’43  It is a 
search for knowledge that begins from knowledge because ‘reason proceeds from a basis in 
something known and leads us to something unknown (quod cognito aliquo nititur, dum nos 
ratio ad incognitum ducit).44  It is not something which the mind is always engaged in and, if 
it is, it is not necessarily very good at it and so does not always arrive at knowledge.45  The 
faculty of reason (ratio), on the other hand, is always present in those who are of sound mind 
and Augustine defines it in an. quant. as ‘the mind’s act of looking’ (ratio sit quidam mentis 
aspectus).46  Elsewhere, and influenced by scripture, Augustine equates reason with mind and 
spirit but, whatever it is called, this faculty is our ruling element, differentiating us from 
beasts47 and which, if it directs our emotions as it should, will ensure that we lead a well-
ordered life.48   
                                                          
that ‘knowledge puffs up, love builds up’ (Scientia inflat, caritas vero aedificat) and Augustine says this means 
that scientia is only valuable when caritas informs it. Without caritas a man becomes arrogant like a demon 
(whose Greek name means ‘knowing’) arrogating to themselves the praise due to God, ciu. 9:20.  
42 uera rel. 29:53; conf. 7:17:23.  
43 ord. 2:11:30. 
44 an. quant. 27:53.  
45 an. quant. 27:53. A correct judgement amounts to an understanding of the truth. If we judge something to be 
other than it is, then we have not reached understanding Gn. litt. 12:14:29.The more skilled at reasoning we are, 
the better we judge and our skill in reasoning is ‘in proportion to reason’s participation in some art, discipline or 
wisdom.’ uera rel. 30:54.  
46 an. quant. 27:53; 14:24; sol. 1:6:12.  In imm. an. 6:10, Augustine considered three possible definitions of 
reason: the mind’s own act of looking, the act of contemplation of the truth or the truth itself Ratio est aspectus 
animi, quo per seipsum, non per corpus verum intuetur; aut ipsa veri contemplatio, non per corpus; aut ipsum 
verum quod contemplator; in other words the act of looking, the act of sight of the truth and the true object of 
sight.  
47 an. quant. 26:49; ord. 2:11:31 ‘By the one term ‘rational’ man is distinguished from brute animals.’ NB the 
appropriateness of the definition of soul in an. quant.13:22 as ‘substantia quaedam rationis particeps, regendo 
corpori accommodata.’ 
48 lib. arb. 1:8:18.  
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Image and likeness of God 
In his earliest writings, Augustine said that our rational mind was ‘that in us which is 
divine’49 and was that to which we must hold fast, if we want to be divine.50  With these 
statements, he was attempting to articulate the view, which relied upon ‘the authority of the 
apostle as well as plain reason,’ to interpret Gen.  1:26 (that man was made in the image of 
God) as applying to man, not as regards the shape of his body but as regards his rational 
mind.51  It is the rational mind, which is in the image of God because it is closest to Him 
‘without the interposition of any other nature (nulla natura interposita formetur).’52  With 
regard to our rational mind, we were created in His image and likeness,53 which means that we 
were created with a capacity to share in God’s life.54  We have remained in His image, despite 
the Fall, but we have lost our participation in His life,55 which means we have preferred our 
individual selves over the common interest.56  If we are to come to fully share in God’s life, 
we must, first of all, discover His image in ourselves and then work on improving its 
likeness.57  This means improving the functioning of our rational mind, through ‘the faith that 
works through love’ and, specifically, it means developing our ability to make judgements in 
relation to the life of the senses in the light of our faith so that we can thereby live virtuously.  
This will also have a beneficial effect on the body, which the soul will then rule ‘in a better 
                                                          
49 Acad. 1:1:3. 
50 ord. 2:11:31. 
51 trin. 12:7:12. 
52 diu. qu. 83:51:2. 
53 ‘Then God said “Let us make humankind in our image, according to our likeness,’ Gen. 1:26. In LXX εἰκων is 
image and ὁμοίωσις is likeness. Ladner 1959: 58 says that Paul did not know of a distinction between the two 
terms and modern exegetes of Gen, also regard the two terms as expressing the same idea. Ladner goes on (ibid. 
83) that ὁμοίωσις had a history, before being selected as the word to translate ‘likeness’ and it imports the activity 
of assimilation. A distinction, and even antithesis, then developed between the two words. Augustine’s view was 
that we were created in the full image and likeness of God though we had lost the likeness through the Fall but we 
retained the image. The Greek view was that we were created in the image and moved to the full likeness.  
54 trin. 14:12:15. 
55 trin. 14:8:11. Augustine is keen to stress that the image has not been completely lost and in retr. 1:26 clarified 
an earlier statement in diu. qu. 83:67 which might have suggested otherwise, because if the image had been lost 
there would be nothing that could be reformed.  
56 trin. 12:9:14. 
57 trin. 14:8:11.   
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and more honourable way.’58  Just as our physical strength is achieved by a harmonious 
development of the body’s limbs, so the soul has greater power to act when it is trained than 
when it is untrained.’59  Our ability to reason must therefore be trained to be in harmony with 
the truth.60  As the soul makes progress in virtue, it will grow in constancy (constantiae),61 
until it comes to a state of tranquillity (tranquillitas) in itself (in seipsa); the fifth level of soul 
or stage of ascent,62 from which it is able to move upwards towards God at stages six and 
seven.   
 
Intentio at stage four 
The training of our rational mind must begin, then, with a conversion to the true 
faith.63  Our exploration of intentio in this chapter will look at intentio as an act of conversion 
and as direction towards a purposed end.  This will involve an analysis of Philippians 3:14; the 
primary biblical source for Augustine’s use of intentio.  From Augustine’s reflections on this 
scriptural text, we will establish the connection of intentio with the end aimed at and also use 
the text as a springboard to reflect on Augustine’s stipulation that intentio must set out from 
the true faith, if it is to attain the end aimed at: the divinity of Christ.   
 
An act of intentio as an act of conversio  
Hayen gave conversio as one of the meanings of intentio in Augustine (‘the application 
of the mind towards the object of its contemplation, God, for instance where it can be 
                                                          
58 mor. 1:5:8. 
59 an. quant. 19:33. 
60 Ibid. 21:36. 
61 Ibid. 16:28. 
62 Ibid. 35:79. 
63 Augustine made a point of arguing the importance of faith as a prerequisite for the acquisition of true virtue 
against the Manichees who duped people by their great displays of continence conf. 6:7:12.  mor. was written to 
ensure that the unwary were not led astray by the image that the Manichees’ gave out, of a chaste life and 
remarkable continence.  Augustine introduces mor. thus, ‘in it you will perhaps understand how easy it is to 
pretend to have virtue and how difficult it is to actually have it.’ (mor. 1:1:2).  No one in fact can have true virtue 
without true piety that is the true worship of the true God ciu. 5:19. Without faith, what looks like the virtue of 
continence is not true continence cont. 26.  In fact, all the virtues will only be true virtues, if they are related to 
the true faith trin. 14:1:3.  
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regarded as a synonym for conversio’) but did not explain why.64  Madec, who also linked the 
two, was more forthcoming.  He identified conversion, interiority and intentionality: 
‘L’intentionnalité réclame l’intériorité, autrement dit la conversion,’ defining Augustinian 
interiority ‘comme une tension, un movement, un esse ad et donc une intentionnalité’ 65 on the 
basis of Augustine’s well-known ‘definition’ of God: He is ‘closer to me than I am to myself 
and higher than my highest element (interior intimo meo et superior summo meo).’66  We will 
look first at conversion, then at interiority and finally at intentionality in order to see why an 
act of conversion might be regarded as an act of intentio.   
 
conversio 
An act of conversion has been defined by Nock as, ‘the reorientation of the soul of an 
individual, his deliberate turning from indifference or from an earlier form of piety to another, 
a turning which implies a consciousness that a great change is involved, that the old was 
wrong and the new is right.’67  It might be a turn away from worldly interests and pursuits to 
follow the radically different and disciplined life of philosophy68 or it might be a religious 
conversion.  With regards to Christianity, Nock observes that conversion takes one of two 
forms, ‘the turning back to a tradition generally held and characteristic of society as a whole, a 
tradition in which the convert was himself reared but which he has left in scepticism or 
indifference or violent self-assertion; and the turning away to an unfamiliar form of piety 
either from a familiar form or from indifference.’69  Whether it is philosophical or religious, 
conversion is at heart a reorientation of our whole selves away from a subjective, individual 
standpoint to an objective, universal one, which enables us to contemplate the whole and to 
                                                          
64 Hayen 1954: 38-40; I have been unable to consult Vannier 1991.  
65 Madec 1994b: 151. 
66 conf. 3:6:11. Also uera rel. 20:38; conf. 9:1:1; en. Ps. 130:12; trin. 8:9:13; 12:3:3. Madec 1994b: 155 says that 
the two metaphors signify the same tension, which is part of the human spirit’s relationship with God. 
67 Nock, 1961: 7. 
68 Nock 1961: 179.  Nock ibid. 184 uses Augustine’s conversion, consequent upon reading Cic. Hort. as an 
example of a philosophic conversion.   
69 Nock 1961: 266 regards Augustine’s conversion to Christianity as an example of the former.  We can see this 
from Acad. 2.2.5 ‘Swiftly did I begin to return to myself.  Actually, all that I did-let me admit it-was to look back 
from the end of a journey, as it were, to that religion which is implanted in us in our childhood days and bound 
up in the marrow of our bones.’ 
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see ourselves as part of it.70  It can be sudden or a more gradual process71 though, even in a 
gradual transformation, there are always ‘critical points here at which the movement forward 
seems much more rapid.’72   
 
Augustine used the language of conversio/aversio for the turning towards and turning 
away from God73 and regarded the effects of conversio/aversio as not simply moral but also 
ontological and epistemological.74  God is Being and, if we turn towards God, we tend 
towards being which orders us and, conversely, if we are turned away from God, we tend 
towards non-being and this brings disorder.75  For Augustine, the spiritual creation, to which 
the human soul belonged, was a two-stage process: the creation of formless matter and its 
subsequent formation.  The soul remained in an unformed state, unless it turned towards God 
to be illuminated and thus formed and perfected.  In turning towards God, we are imitating 
Christ, who became the perfect creature by turning to be united to the Father, so when we turn 
and are formed, we are imitating his conversion and, conversely, we do not imitate him if we 
turn away from God.76  God through His Word never stops speaking to his creature and 
calling it, by ‘some hidden inspiration’ to return to Him to be formed and perfected.77  
 
Interiority 
For Augustine, conversion towards God means a return inwards and this is initiated by 
an admonitio, which is something that is designed to attract our attention (normally) in the 
outside world and act as a reminder to turn inwards.78  Augustine himself had famously been 
                                                          
70 Hadot 1995: 91 and see ord. 1:1:1 which shows this is how Augustine viewed it. 
71 James 1985: 189. 
72 Ibid. 206. 
73 egs. sol. 2:19:33; Gn. litt. 1:4:9; 1:5:10; 12:21; ep. 140:23; en. Ps. 84:8; en. Ps. 118:5:3. Hammond Taylor 
ACW 41, 225 n. 16 notes similarity with Plotinus Enn language of conversion, light and calling back.,  
74 Bourke 1993: 226. 
75 mor. 2:6:8. 
76 Gn. litt. 1:1:2; 1:1:3; 1.3.7-1.4.9; 1.9.15-17; 1.17.32 See Armstrong 1954 on the use made by Augustine of 
Plotinus’ concept of ‘an unformed or potential element in derived spiritual or intellectual being.’ 
77 Gn. litt. 1:5:10. The hidden inspiration is the admonitio referred to the next paragraph. 
78 Madec AL 95-99. Normally but not exclusively because in Simpl. 1:2:2, Augustine envisages that the 
admonition may also be through spiritual or intellectual visions.    
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admonished to return to himself by the Platonic books (et inde admonitus redire ad memet 
ipsum).79  When Augustine said that no one could seek God unless admonished ‘(Deus 
…quem nemo quaerit, nisi admonitus)’80 he was referring to God’s attempts throughout 
history to attract our attention through the temporal, visible world in which we have become 
unduly immersed through sin, in order to call us to conversion to the true faith and return to 
Him.81  This is how Augustine explained the Old and New Testament theophanies and signs 82  
which, as he saw it, culminated in the Incarnation.83  In the Incarnation, God has supremely 
lowered himself to our propensity to understand only what is visible and temporal, and 
became flesh so that He could draw us back to Himself by teaching us, through his life and 
work, to understand the invisible through the visible.84  Christ, during his life, admonished 
through miracles,85 and now, His Spirit admonishes through the human words of scripture to 
arouse us to turn our attention inwards.86   
 
Augustine exhorts Euodius to conversion with these words:  
The soul is admonished (admonetur) not to pour itself (refundat87) into the 
senses more than is necessary but rather to collect itself into itself (ad seipsam 
colligat), and become a child of God again.  This is what it means to become a 
                                                          
79 conf. 7:10:16. As to what the Platonic books were see chapter 1 n. 22. 
80 sol. 1:1:3; See as early as beata u. 4. 35 Admonitio autem quaedam, quae nobiscum agit, ut Deum recordemur, 
ut eum quaeramus, ut eum pulso omni fastidio sitiamus, de ipso ad nos fonte veritatis emanat.   
81 trin. 4:18:24. 
82 trin. 2:5:10 (This was the purpose of sending the Holy Spirit as a dove and as tongues of fire at Pentecost); 
trin. 3:5:11; 4:1:2 (Old and New Testament miracles). 
83 As against his Homoian opponents for whom ‘the visible and material existence of the Son which requires 
them to deny his full divinity is discovered not so much in the Incarnation but as is well-known in the 
theophanies of the Old Testament.’ See Barnes 1999: 48. 
84 lib. arb. 3:10:30.  
85 util. cred. 14:32- 16:34. 
86 Gn. adu. Man. 2:5:6 ‘Instead of being watered by an interior fountain we stand in need of rain from clouds, 
that is, of teaching by human words.’  Also s. 264:4 ‘Can Christ enter the heart in the flesh and with the flesh? 
It’s in his divinity that he possesses the heart (in the flesh he speaks to the heart through the eyes, and instructs it 
from outside).’ As Augustine pithily put it, ‘foris admonet, intus docet,’ lib. arb. 2:14:38. Augustine also 
distinguishes between Christ as Beginning and Word in Gn. litt. 1:4:9-5:10. As the Beginning, He is the origin of 
created being in its imperfect and formless state and as the Word he perfects creation. It is as the Beginning that 
Christ unceasingly admonishes the creature to turn to the First Cause to be completed through the Word. He 
begins to inwardly teach us from our conversion, trin. 14:15:21. 
87 There are hints of Plotinus’ doctrine of emanation here. See chapter 6 infra for Augustine’s use of this 
language in relation to the Fall. 
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new man by putting off the old.88 
 
Here we have all the essentials of a religious conversion: the admonitio, the soul’s collecting 
together of itself towards itself (ad seipsam); becoming a child of God again (reconciliation 
with God); and the Pauline terminology of becoming a new man by putting off the old.  In the 
paragraph from which the passage is extracted, Augustine stresses to Euodius the 
epistemological effects of conversion: if the soul is going to use its instruments of reason and 
knowledge, which are superior to the senses and the soul’s primary source of enjoyment, then 
it must keep a distance from the senses because the more the human soul deviates into the 
senses, the more beastlike and unreasoning it becomes.  Augustine also emphasizes that, 
theologically, for the soul to collect itself together towards itself, is for the soul to return to it 
self (redderer mihi),89 and this is a step towards being reformed in the image of God.90   
 
In trin., Christ is portrayed, following the authority of scripture (Col.  2:3), as holding 
in Himself, the key to scientia (through the life and work of the incarnate Christ) and to 
sapientia (the divinity of Christ, reached through scientia).91 Although this distinction is not 
developed by an. quant., nor is the role of the incarnate Christ as mediator very visible, yet 
there is a definite foreshadowing of the later distinction detected in Augustine’s reference to 
coming ‘by God’s Power and Wisdom to that supreme cause’ (perventuros per Virtutem Dei 
atque Sapientiam ad summam illam causam).92  Christ is described in scripture as the Virtue 
and Wisdom of God (Dei Virtutem atque Sapientiam 1 Cor.  1:24) in a pairing that correlates 
with the scientia/sapientia distinction: ‘virtus is understood to have to do with action while 
sapientia is understood to have to do with teaching’ (virtus ad operationem, sapientia vero ad 
disciplinam pertinere intelligatur).93  The two pairings also correspond to the distinction in 
                                                          
88 an. quant. 28:55.  
89 For egs of ‘Return to self’ language see Acad. 2.2.5 totus in me cursim redibam; ord. 1:2:3. Ita enim animus 
sibi redditus; uera rel. 39:72 Noli foras ire, in teipsum redi; uera rel. 43. 80. Redeamus ad nos.  
90 In retr. 1:8:3, Augustine amended an. quant. 28:55 to make it clear that the return to self was the first step to 
return to God rather than to be desired for its own sake though Madec 1994 b: 160 notes that it is in any event 
one and the same movement noverim me noverim te.  
91 trin. 13:19:24 (Col. 2:1).  
92 an. quant. 33:76.  
93 mor. 1:16:27. O’Donnell conf. 1:1:1 notes that 1 Cor. 1:24 was the first scriptural text ever cited by Augustine 
in Acad. 2:1:1. Here Augustine can be found praying to the virtue and wisdom of God.  Augustine explores 1 
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John.  1:14 that Augustine points out between grace and truth and ‘if we refer grace to 
knowledge and truth to wisdom, I think we shall not be inconsistent with the distinction 
between these two things which we have been recommending.’94  The movement of our 
attention is therefore from foris to intus and inwards on upwards as we move with grace 
through scientia/virtus/gratia to sapientia/veritas, with our attention firmly fixed on Christ.95  
 
Intentionality 
We can see, then, why Madec identifies conversion and interiority and so we now turn 
to consider why he identifies these two with intentionality, thus making an act of conversion 
an act of intentio.  Madec describes a human being as an intentional being (‘un être 
intentionnel’).96   To speak of a human being as intentional is to recognize that, unlike other 
creatures, a human being is capable of striving forward and deliberately aiming at something 
beyond his immediate act.  Augustine, indeed, recognized that ‘a purposeful act is the 
characteristic of a rational animal (id autem est rationalis animantis factum propter aliquem 
finem);’97 and by purposeful act, he meant an act referred, to some end (factis ad aliquem 
finem relatis).98  It is this manifestation of reason that admonishes us not to do anything 
without a purpose (nos admonet nihil temere facere), and it is concerned with right living (In 
moribus)99 or use (moralis propter usum).100  We are said to use something when we seek it 
                                                          
Cor. 1:24 in connection with the relationship between the Father and Son in answer to the Arians in trin. 6 and 7.  
On this provision in the Arian controversy see Barnes 2007.  The double meaning of virtus in Latin as power and 
virtue allows Augustine to make this correlation.  In fact, virtus translates the Greek dunamis which means power 
and not virtue. 
94 trin. 13:19:24. 
95 Ibid.  
96 Madec 1994b: 158.  
97 ord. 2:11:33. 
98 ord. 2:12:35. relatis comes from refero and  Referre aliquid ad aliquid means to trace back, ascribe, refer a 
thing to any thing and therefore evokes Augustine’s doctrine of use and enjoyment. It can also mean to give up, 
return, restore, to relate and therefore links well with the idea of return to self and to the God who gave all in the 
first place and in all this is true relationship. Augustine said that true wisdom required the mind to direct all its 
attention towards God and, in this life, this meant to make decisions and to act in relation to oneself and to others 
with this end in view, ciu. 21:20. 
99 ord. 2:12:35. moralis is the word Latin authors used for that part of philosophy called ‘ethics’ (from ἔθος 
meaning ‘custom’ or ‘habit’) ciu. 8:8.  
100 ciu. 11:25. 
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for some other purpose, as opposed to enjoying it for its own sake (quod ea re frui dicimur, 
quae nos non ad aliud referenda per se ipsa delectat; uti vero ea re, quam propter aliud 
quaerimus)101 and the responsibility to use and enjoy appropriately is that of the will.102  The 
only thing which we should enjoy for its own sake and for which everything else should be 
used; in other words, that to which all our actions should be referred, is that which will make 
us happy, namely our Ultimate Good (Summum Bonum).  
 
Intentio as direction to a purpose . 
This striving forward and aiming at something beyond the act itself is the ordinary 
sense of intentio. It is what the word intentio meant up to the beginning of the high Scholastic 
period and it is how Thomas Aquinas defined it.103  That this is one of the meanings of the 
term in Augustine is clear from his exegesis of Phil.  3:14.  This is a key text for Augustine.  
He quotes or alludes to this verse, or part of it, many times, particularly in his commentaries 
on the Psalms (en. Pss.) and in his sermons.104  It has been suggested that it is from an Old 
Latin105 version of this text that Augustine took the word intentio106 and also that the presence 
of intentio in Phil.  3:14 is one of the reasons why Augustine alludes to the passage so 
often.107  It is, therefore, worth looking at the text in some detail to see what light it sheds on 
Augustine’s use of intentio and I set out below, for ease of reference, the Greek text, the Old 
Latin version that Augustine used and the English (leaving secundum intentionem 
untranslated) of Phil.  3:13 b and 14: 
 
ἓν δέ, τὰ μὲν ὀπίσω ἐπιλανθανόμενος τοῖς δὲ ἔμπροσθεν ἐπεκτεινόμενος κατὰ 
σκοπὸν διώκω εἰς τὸ βραβεῖον τῆς ἄνω κλήσεως του θεοῦ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. 
                                                          
101 ciu. 11:25. Also diu. qu. 83:30 Something useful is something which is directed to something else (utile autem 
quod ad aliud aliquid referendum est). 
102 trin. 10:11:17.  
103 Spiegelberg 1976: 109.  
104 Over 50 times according to LLT. 
105 The Old Latin Bible (Vetus Latina) is the generally accepted term for all the Latin translations which predated 
Jerome’s vulgate, see Burton 2000: 5. 
106 BA 16, 589.  
107 O'Daly 1977:271.  
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unum autem, inquit, quae retro sunt oblitus, in ea quae ante sunt extentus, secundum 
intentionem sequor ad palmam supernae uocationis dei in christo iesu. 
 
This one thing I do: forgetting108 what lies behind and straining forward to what lies 
ahead, I press on secundum intentionem for the prize of the heavenly call of God in 
Christ Jesus. 
 
Augustine made use of this passage for several reasons:  as evidence of the importance 
of single-mindedness;109 to show that the state of perfection in this life consisted simply in 
knowing we are not perfect; to show that the activity of this life was a continual stretching 
forward in desire; to show what we should be aiming for; to show that this end would not be 
attained, unless we began from the true faith.  It was a passage which could only be used of 
the post-baptismal life, when we were converted towards God, as Augustine himself pointed 
out, because otherwise, the instruction to pay no attention to what was behind, would be an 
instruction to pay no attention to God.110  
 
The words secundum intentionem translate the Greek κατὰ σκοπóν.  According to the 
apparatus provided by Gryson, this Greek phrase was translated in various ways in the Old 
Latin translations: secundum scopum; secundum regulam; secundum propositum; ad 
destinatum/ secundum destinationem.111  The translation secundum intentionem, appears first 
in Augustine and it is possible, therefore, that it is his own translation of κατὰ σκοπóν.  The 
question is, what did the phrase mean to Paul? And, how was Augustine interpreting it?  κατὰ 
plus the accusative can mean, among other things, ‘(of direction) towards an object or 
purpose’ or ‘according to.’112  With regard to σκοπóς, Marguerite Harl has traced the 
development of two meanings of σκοπóς  in Christian usage: ‘one who watches’ and ‘the 
                                                          
108 Although generally translated as ‘forgetting,’ ἐπιλανθανόμενος, according to Fee 1995: 347, is more likely to 
mean ‘to pay no attention to.’ 
109 See chapter 6. 
110 en. Ps. 113:1:7. 
111 See Gryson for references.  
112 There are in fact three prepositions of direction, two ‘κατὰ and ‘εἰς’ indicating an onward movement and one 
‘ἄνω’ indicating an upward movement. 
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object on which one fixes the eye, a mark.’113  In this chapter, we will be concerned with the 
meaning of σκοπóς  as ‘the object on which one fixes the eye’ and in chapter 6 we will 
consider the meaning of σκοπóς  as ‘the one who watches.’  From meaning, ‘the object on 
which one fixes the eye or a mark,’ σκοπόs, metaphorically, came to mean ‘an aim, end, 
object of an action.’114  It was already being used metaphorically, in this way, by Plato for 
whom σκοπός was the goal which a person must have constantly before their eyes in order to 
direct their life properly.  For Aristotle too, σκοπός was a rule of life against which to measure 
one’s behavior and acquisition of virtue.  Already in Plato the expression ὀρθὸς σκοπός 
appears, meaning ‘the right aim or direction’ and in Aristotle, there is a glimpse of a 
distinction between σκοπός and τέλος which is developed by the Stoics into the distinction 
between the ideal aimed at and the attainment of the ideal.  This distinction was ignored by the 
New Testament, where the word τέλος is used to cover all the senses previously covered by 
σκοπός, except in Phil.  3:14.  According to Abbott- Smith, this is the only instance of σκοπóς 
in the New Testament, where it is used metaphorically to mean aim or object.  The question is 
whether Paul was using it in the sense of the ideal aimed at (σκοπός as opposed to τέλος) or 
the attainment of the ideal (σκοπός synonymous with τέλος).  It is true that Paul does not use 
the word τέλος but he does distinguish between the σκοπός and the end prize, which is ‘the 
heavenly call of God in Christ Jesus.’  One modern commentator on the Greek text suggests 
that the prize is the ‘one thing,’ Paul is running the race for and the σκοπóς, which has to be 
attained in order to win the prize, is the eschatological conclusion of the present life.115  In this 
sense, and in keeping with the athletic imagery, the σκοπóς is the finishing line which the 
athlete must keep in view, if he is to run a straight race with singleness of purpose and 
maximum concentration and may be best thought of as goal or target. 
 
What then does Augustine make of the passage?  He could look not only to the 
philosophical tradition which underlay the text, but also to the Patristic tradition of 
                                                          
113 Harl 1961.  
114 Liddell/Scott/Jones. The word σκοπός was used of the aim of a literary text and the conscious intention of the 
author and, not unlike the understanding of τόνος in Stoic philosophy, gave to the different elements of a work, 
the quality of cohesion and unity, see Heine 1995: 20-29. Augustine uses it in this sense to mean the aim of a 
book or writer c. Adim.14.2; ench. 6.18; nupt. et. conc.1:1.  
115 Fee 1995: 341. 
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interpreting the text, for guidance in understanding it.  In the Latin Patristic tradition, σκοπóν 
had been translated as scopum meaning target or goal, propositum and destinationem both 
meaning intention or purpose and regulam meaning rule or model.116  Most light is shed by 
Augustine on his use of the phrase secundum intentionem in en. Ps. 38.  This is a Psalm 
entitled ‘To the end.  Idithun’s song for David himself (titulus est: In finem pro Idithun, 
Canticum ipsi David.)  Idithun means ‘one who leaps across’117 and Augustine says that 
‘leaping across’ is another way of saying ‘an inward ascent, where ‘within ourselves feet and 
ladders and wings are all the loving impulses of a good will’ (Intus autem et pedes, et scalae, 
et pennae affectus sunt bonae voluntatis).118  He exhorts his listeners to identify with Idithun 
and leap across everything that could keep them weighed down in this world.  He then turns to 
comment on the words in verse 5, ‘make known to me my end, O Lord’ saying, ‘Make known 
to me my end, show me the goal still far away, not the race immediately in front of me.’ 
(Finem meum notum mihi fac: finem qui mihi deest, non cursum qui mihi adest.)119  He 
observed that ‘the end was what the Apostle was looking towards as he ran and confessed 
from the standpoint of his own imperfection; it being one thing to see it within oneself and 
another thing to seek elsewhere (Finem illum dicit, quem currens intuebatur Apostolus, et de 
sua imperfectione confitebatur, aliud in se intuens, aliud alibi quaerens.)’120  In other words, 
despite not being perfect, Paul at least knows what his end is and where to find it, because he 
can see it within himself and is pursuing it directly as he runs towards it.  Augustine draws 
attention to the distinction that Paul makes between the activity required during this life to 
reach the end and the end.  This is the distinction between scopos and telos: the ideal aimed at 
and the attainment of the ideal.  And, as if to emphasize the distinction, he contrasts secundum 
                                                          
116 Although there is no suggestion that Augustine was influenced by Cassian, he was familiar with the practice 
of prayer of the monks in the desert and as an example of the way in which scopos and telos were being 
distinguished in the tradition in conjunction with Phil. 3:14 we cite Cassian conl. 1:5: ‘The scopos is purity of 
heart, which he rightly terms “holiness,” without which eternal life cannot be won.  It is as though he said, having 
your scopos in purity of heart, and your telos eternal life.  And significantly he uses the very word scopos to 
describe it-“forgetting those things which are behind, and reaching forth unto those things which are before, I 
press forward toward the mark for the prize of the high calling of God.”  In Greek the words for “press forward 
to the mark” are kata scopon dioko and really mean press forward according to the mark.”  It is as if he said: 
“With this aim, whereby I forget what is behind-the sins of the old man-I strive to attain to the prize of heaven.’ 
117 en. Ps. 38:1. 
118 en. Ps. 38:2. 
119 en. Ps. 38:5. 
120 en. Ps. 38:6. 
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intentionem with nondum secundum perventionem nondum secundum apprehensionem 
‘according to intentio, not yet having arrived at our goal or reached understanding.’ 121  Christ 
is ‘the one thing’ and the end prize (‘the heavenly call of God in Christ Jesus’) referred to by 
Paul and sought by the Apostles.122  By quoting Philip’s plea to’show us the Father’ in John 
14:8, Augustine makes it clear that by ‘Christ,’ he understands Paul to be referring to Christ in 
his divinity.123  Christ is called ‘the end’ because whatever we do is referred to him and, when 
we have reached him, we shall have nothing further to seek (Intentio ergo dirigatur in finem, 
dirigatur in Christum. Quare finis dicitur? Quoniam quidquid agimus, ad illum referimus; et 
cum ad eum pervenerimus, ultra quod quaeramus non habebimus.)124  We can take it then that 
by secundum intentionem, Augustine understood that all our activity in this life (measured 
according to Christ in His humanity) was to be referred to the end of Christ in his divinity and 
that this end would not be attained until after this life.125  
 
The right intentio must begin from faith 
 
But the right intentio is that which sets out from faith.  For a true faith lays the 
foundation of all knowledge (Sed ea recta intentio est, quae proficiscitur a fide.  
Certa enim fides utcumque inchoat cognitionem)126 
 
My question was my intentio; their response was their beauty (Interrogatio 
mea, intentio mea; et responsio eorum, species eorum.)127 
 
 
The direction and movement of our attention must be governed by our faith in the 
incarnate Christ,128 if it is to lead us to our goal of full participation in the life of God.129  Faith 
gives us direction for it shows us where to look and what to find.  In fact, faith brings with it a 
                                                          
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid.  For Christ in his divinity as our end see en. Ps. 54:1; en. Ps.12:1; en. Ps. 56:2; s. 347:3; en. Ps. 38:6. 
124 en. Ps. 54:1.  
125 sol. 1.14.25; doctr. chr. 1; diu. qu. 83:30; ciu. 11:25. 
126 trin 9:1:1; Also s. 4:1; en. Ps. 31:2:4; s. 8:1; lib. arb. 3:21:59.   
127 conf. 10:6:9. 
128 doctr. chr. 1:34:38. 
129 en. Ps. 54:1. 
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kind of knowledge for ‘faith has eyes of its own by which it somehow sees that what it does 
not yet see is true.130  Faith is a matter of grace131 and is brought about ‘by some secret 
admonition through visions of the mind or spirit or by more open admonitions, reaching us 
through the bodily senses.’132  Quite apart from the fact that faith followed by reason is the 
God given order,133 it is also the natural order, for when we learn anything, faith in authority 
precedes reason.134  When, therefore, Augustine seemingly presents Euodius, at the start of an. 
quant., with the option of proceeding either by faith or by reason,135 we should be wary of 
taking him at face value.  Augustine presents the faith alone (believing in authority) route as 
‘an excellent shortcut and eliminating toil.’136  It is also the safest route for the less learned, 
provided that the authority they are relying upon is trustworthy, for they might, otherwise, be 
easily led astray by specious reasoning.137  Euodius decides, however, to go by the reason 
route138 and that is how the dialogue proceeds.  But towards the end of it, Augustine warns 
him ‘not to run headlong and heedlessly to the writings or discussions of spellbinders 
                                                          
130 ep. 120:2:8.  
131 Augustine changed his mind between writing an. quant. and trin. on the question of faith. He came to see it as 
a gift. This is a case in which Augustine changed his mind because of his later understanding of scripture retr. 
1:23:2 amending exp. prop. Rm. 60 and the statement ‘What we believe, therefore, is ours, but the good that we 
do is his who gives the Holy Spirit to those who believe.’ Augustine says ‘I would certainly not have said this if I 
knew then that even faith itself is among God’s gifts that are given in the same Spirit.’  Also retr. 1:23:3 
amending exp. prop. Rm. 61 and the statement ‘For believing and willing are ours, but it is his to give to those 
who believe and who will the ability to do good through the Holy Spirit, by whom charity is poured into our 
hearts.’ This change of mind came about in Simpl. 1:2.  In retr. 2:1:1 explaining his change of mind in Simpl, he 
says ‘I in fact strove on behalf of the free choice of the human will, but God’s grace conquered.’ 
132 Simpl. 1:2:2.   
133 Isa. 7:14 (LXX) See Introduction n. 28. 
134 mor. 1:2:3. See Acad. 3:19:42; ord. 2:5:16; 2:8:25-:9: 27 for his view that authority must precede reason.  
135 an. quant. 8:12. 
136 Ibid. Obviously the highest authority is divine and especially the authority of the incarnate Christ as human 
authority can often be deceiving ord. 2:9:27. Augustine affirmed the necessity of taking things on trust from 
other people trin. 15:4:21. For example we might not think it reasonable to trust those who do not practise what 
they preach ord. 2:9:27; Those who are further along the way than we are will be good authority: men who have 
reached the full use of reason establish themselves in tranquillity (stage 5 an. quant) and provide a shining 
example to others who are enticed to join them beata u. 1:2; en Ps. 113:2:12. See chapter 7 infra for human 
teachers of wisdom. On reasonableness of Catholic faith - some of the criteria that should influence our decision 
are set out in uera rel. 24:46 and 47; what convinced Augustine to trust the authority of the Catholic Church was 
the apostolic succession and its wide acceptance among nations and communities, indeed, it is acknowledged by 
the whole human race and because of its unanimity and antiquity (c. ep. Man. 4:5; Util cred. 7:19; 14:31 and 
17:35). 
137 Ibid.; ord. 2.5.15; 2.9.26; 2.11.30.  
138 an. quant. 8:12. 
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(loquacissimorum hominum);139 people who rely too much on the senses of the body: you 
must first140 set straight and steady the steps (vestigia)141 which lead the soul to God’s 
presence.  Otherwise your studies and efforts will accomplish only that they will divert you 
more readily than will static ignorance, from that peaceful sanctum of the mind to which the 
soul in its present life is a stranger.’142  In other words, the reason route is fine, provided it 
begins from a sure basis in faith, because our faith will keep us on track when our reasoning 
fails.143 
 
Augustine says that we should all be able to see, just by looking at the ordered nature 
and the beauty of the world, that it has a Creator144 and, indeed, St Paul in Rom. 1:20 bears 
witness to the fact that God, the invisible Creator, can, and has, been found through his visible 
creation ‘for ever since the creation of the world, his eternal power and divine nature, invisible 
though they are, have been understood and seen through the things he has made.’  Augustine 
tells his congregation that even Pagan philosophers have arrived at knowledge of the invisible 
God through the visible things He has made, but that because they assumed they had done so 
through their own ability and because they engaged in idol worship, rather than the worship of 
God, their knowledge did not bring them wisdom.145  The philosophers who attained 
                                                          
139 O’Donnell conf. 3:6:10  notes that Loquax was a derogatory term he particularly applied to the Manichees as 
people who had lots to say but nothing they could tell him about God; conf. 1:4:4; 3:6:10; 5:7:12; 7:2:3. 
Augustine also used the term to disparage his former colleagues, rhetoricians, who were more interested in words 
than meaning, conf. 4:2:2; 8:5:10; 9:2:2. 
140 donec. The warning is only a warning to postpone engaging with such material, until Euodius has developed 
his ability to judge it in the light of faith. 
141 Vestigia are the traces of reason we follow from the senses back to their source, ‘And since music issuing 
forth from the most secret sanctuaries leaves traces vestigia in our very senses or in the things sensed by us, 
mustn’t we follow through those traces to reach without fail, if we can, those very places I have called 
sanctuaries?’ mus. 1.13.28. 
142 an. quant. 31:63. 
143 egs. mor. 1:7:11; conf. 4:15:24- 4:16:31; conf. 6:5:8; trin. 7:4:12; ep. 120:2:7.  
144 Io. eu. tr. 106:4 ‘For this name of God, by which He is called, could not but be known in some way to the 
whole creation, and so to every nation, before they believed in Christ. For such is the energy of true Godhead, 
that it cannot be altogether and utterly hidden from any rational creature, so long as it makes use of its reason. 
For, with the exception of a few in whom nature has become outrageously depraved, the whole race of man 
acknowledges God as the maker of this world. In respect, therefore, of His being the maker of this world that is 
visible in heaven and earth around us, God was known unto all nations even before they were indoctrinated into 
the faith of Christ.’  
145 s. 241:2. The tradition that God can be seen through the order and regularity of the workings of the cosmos 
and the fact that order implies intelligent design goes back to Plato, see Festugière 1954: 46-48.  All 
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knowledge of God, but not wisdom, through their failure of humility, were actually in no 
better position than those human beings who were incapable of seeing ‘the invisible through 
the visible’ at all: those who take things for granted because they are so familiar;146 those who 
are unable to find beauty in something because they are unable to see it in its true light (like 
the parts of a flea for example);147 those who fail to see the overall harmony of the whole;148 
those who fail to see this life in the context of eternity;149 those who are so captivated by 
created things that they are not interested in seeking beyond the senses.150   
 
However, provided we begin from faith, we can follow the traces of invisible things, 
manifest in the visible, back to the invisible God himself.  The idea that there are traces of the 
ultimate reality in everything and that these can be traced back from the senses to their source 
is an idea which Augustine found in Plotinus for whom everything that exists retains a trace of 
the One which is the source of all and this creates a desire to return to it;151 everything longs 
for its parent and loves it152 and ‘we go back everywhere to one.  And in each and everything 
there is someone to which you will trace it back, and this in every case to the one before it, 
which is not simply one, until we come to the simply one but this cannot be traced back to 
something else.’153 Augustine follows Plotinus, arguing that such traces exist in the objects we 
sense, as well as in our reactions to the objects.  These traces are what give an object its 
beauty and, in us, they are what inspire our pleasure or delight at an object and inspire our 
                                                          
philosophical schools practised contemplation of nature but it meant different things to them, see Hadot 1995: 
101.  Contemplation through the cosmos is also a tradition found in the Wisdom literature of the Old Testament 
and it is this tradition which underlies Rom 1:20. 
146Typified by Augustine’s comment that the process of imprinting an image filled him with greater wonder than 
visions seen in dreams or even ecstasies Gn. litt. 12:18:40 and that it’s a greater miracle to exist at all than to be 
resurrected Io. eu. tr. 8:1. See also s. 126:3:4; Io. eu. tr. 9:1; 24:1; 8:1; ep. 102:5; conf. 10:8:15.   
147 Augustine likes this example en. Ps. 148:10; ord. 1:1:2; duab. an. 4:4. 
148 ord. 1:7:18. This had been one of Augustine’s major blocks. 
149 ord. 2:4:11. 
150 en. Ps.. 39.8. ‘Learn to love the Creator in the creature, the Maker in what is made.  Do not let something he 
has made so captivate you that you lose him by whom you were made yourself.’  
151 Enn. 3.8.11, 5.5.10. 
152 Enn. 5.1.6. 
153 Enn. 3.8.9. 
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longing to search for the source of that beauty.154  But learning to reason (following the traces) 
will not lead to the Source, unless our attention is directed and moved from the standpoint of 
faith, as Augustine’s own ascents described in conf. show.   
 
Augustine describes both his ascents at Milan in conf. 7 in such a way as to show that 
he had glimpsed the unchangeable truth, but he had not yet discovered the way to living in the 
truth, because he had not yet discovered the true mediator, the incarnate Christ, who must be 
the starting-point of a successful ascent.  Prior to his first ascent, 155 Augustine had been 
unable to shift his attention away from exterior things and move it inwards (At ego 
intendebam in ea, quae locis continentur, et non ibi inveniebam locum ad requiescendum, nec 
recipiebant me ista, ut dicerem: ‘Sat est’, et: ‘Bene est’, nec dimittebant redire, ubi mihi satis 
esset bene.)156  This was because he was unable to distinguish his power of intentio, as an 
incorporeal reality, from the images of material objects that he formed with (nec videbam 
hanc eandem intentionem qua illas ipsas imagines formabam non esse tale aliquid, quae 
tamen ipsas non formaret nisi esset magnum aliquid.)157  As a consequence, he was unable to 
see the invisible in the visible at all, prior to his first ascent, because he had not known that he 
could go beyond the senses.  He had to turn away from the sensible world in order to begin an 
                                                          
154 One of the ways in which reason manifests itself to the senses is the pleasure which admonishes us to find 
delight in contemplation, ord. 2:12:35. The traces are the admonitio to us to seek for that source uera rel. 45:84.  
Augustine also calls them traces of unity en. Ps. 99.5; conf. 1.20.31; traces of supernal justice Simpl. 1.2:16 
traces of wisdom’s operations lib. arb. 2:16:41; traces of number; primal numbers and dimensions uera rel. 
42:79; 40:75; ord. 2:15:43; traces of beauty uera rel. 22:42 and traces of spiritual things trin. 12:2:5.    
155 There is some scholarly argument as to exactly how many ascents there were, the majority have settled for 
two and O’Donnell’s reasoning for this is persuasive; he says that there are two ascents because the first ascent 
begins with turning away from the exterior world in order to find God whereas the second ascent is able to begin 
the ascent from contemplation of the cosmos because Augustine discovered in the first ascent the standard 
against which he could judge exterior things as creatures. O’Donnell conf. 7.17.23 notes ‘the ascent through 
contemplation of creation (made possible now by an accurate appreciation of the nature of evil, and hence of 
created being: thus this narrative is most sharply distinguished from that of 7.10.16),’.Not all scholars accept that 
there were two ascents. Courcelle saw three separate unsuccessful ascents at 7.10.16; 7.17.23 and 7.20.26. Most 
scholars including O’Donnell see two in 7.10.16 and 7.17.23. A minority sees one ascent that in 7.10.16 which is 
described again in different terms in 7.17.23. The argument of this part of the chapter is based on O’Donnell’s 
opinion that there are two ascents. 
156 conf. 7:7:11. 
157 conf. 7:1:2. I am repeating this quotation, already given in chapter 1, to draw attention to the fact that 
Augustine is recognizing at a significant turning-point in his own journey, that it is his inability to distinguish his 
incorporeal power of intentio (that volitional power to direct his attention) from the things it is paying attention to 
that stops him from making any progress on the ascent. 
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inwards ascent; the outcome of which was the discovery that the invisible things of God could 
indeed be seen through the visible: ‘I heard in the way one hears within the heart and all doubt 
left me.  I would have found it easier to doubt whether I myself was alive than that there is no 
truth understood from the things that are made’ (Et audivi, sicut auditur in corde, et non erat 
prorsus, unde dubitarem faciliusque dubitarem vivere me quam non esse veritatem, quae per 
ea, quae facta sunt, intellecta conspicitur).158   
 
In order to progress beyond what is apparent to the senses, we must ask questions:  Are 
things beautiful because they give pleasure or give pleasure because they are beautiful?  Why 
beautiful?  Is it because parts correspond and form a harmonious whole?  Do they achieve the 
unity they aim at?  Where is that unity?  What is its source? 159  The very word ‘question’ 
implies an intention to seek on the part of the questioner (nomen tamen quaestio non ex 
omnibus accipit, sed ut sese habuerit quaerentis intentio) and also implies a judgement 
because the mere fact that we ask whether something exists, implies three separate questions 
including an exercise of judgement: whether something exists; what it is; what quality it is.  
This last question involves an evaluation.160  Because, as a result of the first ascent, Augustine 
now had an unchangeable incorporeal standard of truth against which to judge what was 
presented to the senses, it was with exactly this kind of questioning that he began the second 
ascent described in conf: 
 
I asked myself why I approved of the beauty of bodies, whether celestial or 
terrestrial, and what justification I had for giving an unqualified judgement on 
mutable things, saying, “This ought to be thus, and that ought not to be thus.”  
In the course of this inquiry why I made such value judgements as I was 
making, I found the unchangeable and authentic eternity of truth to transcend 
my mutable mind.161 
 
                                                          
158 conf. 7:10:16. 
159 uera rel. 32:59 and 60; en. Ps. 99:5.  
160 ep. 11:4. In this paragraph of this letter Augustine uses the three questions contained in the one question 
which takes its name from the questioner as an analogy of the three persons in the one Trinity. See Ayres 2000: 
39-82 for discussion of ep. 11, as containing Augustine’s earliest Trinitarian theology. 
161 conf. 7:17:23.  
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The questioning, however, is rather aimless and not specifically directed at God and, as 
Monnica had said, ‘if you want to find God, it is God you must specifically seek (Sed nemo, 
inquit, potest pervenire ad Deum, nisi Deum quaesierit.)’162  Nonetheless, Augustine’s 
questioning and reasoning did lead him to another momentary glimpse of ‘the unchangeable 
and authentic eternity of truth’ that transcended his mind: an experience that he described 
once again in the words of Rom. 1:20 as ‘seeing God’s invisible nature through the things that 
are made.’163  However, even the second ascent was not completely satisfactory and his 
attention kept slipping back, which he understood as being because he had not yet discovered 
the true mediator ‘between God and man, the man Christ Jesus.’164  
The kind of ascent through creation, which Augustine was concerned with, was not just 
to prove the existence of unchangeable substance but was an ascent made in the ‘faith that 
works through love’ in that by cultivating our sense of awe and wonder at what we see around 
us, we can use creation as a step to the love and praise of the Creator who we do not see.165  
By the time Augustine embarked on his joint ascent with his mother, Monnica, at Ostia he had 
discovered, and committed himself to following, the true mediator, the incarnate Christ.  He 
had received instruction in the faith from Bishop Ambrose and been baptized;166  he had 
studied the scriptures and altered the nature of his prayers.167  He was specifically seeking 
God through Christ and the questioning is directed, rather than aimless, as Augustine and 
Monnica muse on the nature of eternal life and Augustine acknowledges that they are in the 
presence of the Truth Himself, as they reflect.168  Augustine knows what he is looking for and 
he begins from a sense of wonder at God’s works (Et adhuc ascendebamus interius cogitando 
et loquendo et mirando opera tua) and also from a proper evaluation of their worth that, 
                                                          
162 beata u. 3:19. 
163 conf. 7:17:23. 
164 conf. 7:18:24. 
165 On this attitude to creation see egs. en. Ps. 144; en. Ps. 148; en. Ps. 41; s. 126; en. Ps. 128.5; en. Ps. 68:1:5; 
en. Ps. 44:4; en. Ps. 99:6.  
166 conf. 9:5:13. 
167 See chapter 1 n. 24 for alteration in nature of his prayers. 
168 There is even an allusion to Phil. 3:13 praeterita obliviscentes in ea quae ante sunt extenti, at conf. 9:10:23. 
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however delightful they are, they are nothing in comparison with eternal life.169  He knows, 
before he begins the ascent, that the visible world is the creation of an invisible God; he is no 
longer questioning himself as to where the source of its beauty comes from.  Although the 
ascent at Ostia was no more lasting than the Milan ascents, it was at least on the right lines 
because if it could last, then it would be the beatific vision; in other words, it was a real 
foretaste of the kingdom of heaven.   
 
When, then, he reprises the theme of ascent in conf. 10 as a paradigm and begins by 
questioning everything in his external environment, he knows he is looking for God and that it 
is God he desires.  Augustine begins the description of an ascent in conf. 10 with some 
questions to everything in the created world ‘that existed outside the bounds of his own flesh’ 
He asked them: ‘What is the object of my love?’ Everything confessed ‘It is not I.  We are not 
your God, look beyond us’: and so he then asked, ‘Tell me of my God who you are not, tell 
me something about him.  And with a great voice they cried out: ‘He made us.’170  Augustine 
continues ‘my questioning was my intentio and their response was their beauty’ (‘interrogatio 
mea intentio mea et responsio eorum species eorum.)’171  The question is what does Augustine 
mean to convey here by the word intentio?  It cannot simply mean attention because 
Augustine was paying attention to created things before and they were blocking his return.172  
Solignac says it means rather more than attention: 
 
Intentio dit plus qu’attention il s’agit d’une tension vers Dieu, dans la ligne du    
fecisti nos ad te (conf 1.1) et qui ne peut trouver son terme qu’en Dieu.173 
 
It is our attention to the visible, not for its own sake, but so that we can be drawn up 
from the visible to the invisible in love and praise of God for his works and in so doing 
recover our natural intentionality.  Augustine’s use of the word species meaning ‘intelligible 
form’ is significant for, if their response is their species, then we are paying attention to the 
                                                          
169 The ascent is described at conf. 9:10:23-25. 
170 In his meditation on the ascent at Ostia, Augustine begins by listening to creation and receiving a similar 
response ‘We did not make ourselves, we were made by him who abides for eternity.’ Also conf. 11:4:6. 
171 conf. 10:6:9.  
172 conf. 7:6:11. 
173 Solignac 1986: 16.  
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invisible through the visible.  This is the significance of intentio; it is the movement of 
attention from, and through, the visible to the invisible. 
 
What changes between an. quant. and trin. is the emphasis on the trinitarian nature of 
the traces of God to be found in creation174 and this accentuates the necessity of beginning 
from the true faith.  Although this is not the first time that Augustine has suggested that God’s 
Trinitarian nature is reflected in creation, there is nothing comparable to it in an. quant.175 
However, already in ord. Augustine had stated that the Trinitarian nature of God was 
something that we could learn from scripture;176 in other words, it was not something that 
could be learnt through a reasoned ascent, which at best could only provide a glimpse of the 
unchangeable nature of Truth and not its Trinitarian nature; all the more reason then for 
intentio and our reasoning to begin from the true faith.177  False reasoning could lead to false 
beliefs as it had led some to a belief that the Trinity consists of God the Father, God the Son, 
who is not coeternal, or who is of another substance and the Holy Spirit, who is unlike and 
inferior and as it had led others to the belief that, although the Father and Son are of the same 
substance, the Holy Spirit is of a different substance.178   All that we need in order to be 
reformed is faith in Christ and to live according to that faith; there is no need to understand 
that faith intellectually though there will be those, like Augustine, with the ability and desire 
to do so and in this case, lest we fall into false reasoning, we must begin from a knowledge of 
the contents of faith so that we know which ideas are true and which false.179  For this reason, 
Augustine meticulously establishes the Trinitarian nature of faith from scripture in part 1 trin. 
                                                          
174 trin. 6:10:12 ‘Any one of them you like is both some one thing, like the various kinds of bodies and 
temperaments of souls; and it is fashioned in some form, like the shapes and qualities of bodies and the sciences 
or skills of souls; and it seeks or maintains some order, like the weights or proper places of bodies, and the loves 
or pleasures of souls. So then, as direct our gaze at the Creator by understanding the things that are made, we 
should understand him as triad, whose traces appear in creation in a way that is fitting.’  
175 It is not until the late 390s that this idea begins to be mooted in his works, notably in nat. b. see O’Donnell 
conf. 1:7:12 for details. See chapter 1 n. 49 for other references. 
176 ord. 2:5:16. 
177 trin. 13:9:12 Likewise people could come to knowledge of the soul’s immortality through reason but not the 
resurrection of the body which was a matter of faith to be believed on authority. 
178 ep. 120:6. He is referring in the first case to the Arians haer. 49 and, in the second case, to the Macedonians 
haer. 52. 
179 ep. 120:8. trin. 4:18:24. 
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concluding this part with Isaiah 7:14 LXX,180 before going on, in books 8-15, to guide his 
readers through a reasoned ascent, beginning from faith and moving towards understanding by 
degrees.   
 
Summary and conclusion 
 
Stage four of the ascent is in many ways the sine qua non of the ascent because, unless 
there is a conversion to the true faith, the ascent to God will fail.  Augustine saw the nature of 
the relationship between faith and reason as a grace-filled, dialectical process; that as our 
understanding develops, we are able ‘to grasp more firmly the truths we have believed and 
that our faith grows to believe more firmly what we have begun to understand.  By its very act 
of understanding, the mind develops and thus penetrates the truths of faith more deeply.  This 
process occurs not through our natural powers but by the help and gracious gift of God.’181 
What is important is how one lives after coming to faith and this is the remit of virtus (an. 
quant.) or scientia (trin).  Virtuous living demands the reasonable use of temporal things,182 
which requires us to refer them to the highest God, our highest good,183 if we are not to enjoy 
them with a kind of illusory happiness (si bene, ut eam notitiam referat ad finem summi Boni; 
si autem male, ut eis fruatur tamquam bonis talibus in quibus falsa beatitudine 
conquiescat.)184  The standard against which we must judge our use and make our moral 
assessments, Augustine calls the standard of usefulness,185 and it is, of course, the life of the 
incarnate Christ.  It is the life of the incarnate Christ then that may be thought of as the regula, 
scopos, intentio, destinatio as opposed to the finis or telos in Phil.  3:14 in the sense of the 
object that one keeps in the mind’s eye as a benchmark whilst one runs the course of this life 
towards sanctification and the kingdom of God.  However, even with theoretical knowledge of 
the goal that faith brings, it is possible to make a bad use of things so that we are enjoying 
                                                          
180 trin. 7:6:12.  
181 en. Ps. 118:18:3. 
182 trin. 12:14: 22.  
183 trin. 13:20:25. 
184 trin. 12:12:17.  
185 diu. qu. 83:30.  
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what we ought to be using and using what we ought to be enjoying and that is because an act 
of usus is an act of will and the will does not automatically follow the intellect: just because 
we know what is right, does not mean we will do what is right.186  Acting virtuously is, then, 
choosing to use temporal things well when we could use them badly187 and to choose to use 
them well means desiring them for the sake of Christ, who is the goal or end of our intentio. 
Through prudence, we discern how we should act; through temperance, we learn the self-
control that causes us to act appropriately;188 through fortitude, we develop the strength to 
bear temporal loss and affliction with equanimity for the sake of a greater good 189 and 
through justice, we do everything appropriately for the love of God and our neighbour and our 
own well-ordered self.190  If we acted in this way, we would be acting in accordance with, 
what Madec called, our natural intentionality towards God and it is this natural intentionality 
which begins to be recovered through an act of conversion inwards.  It is only in an act of 
interiority, conversion or intentio that we become aware of the distinguishing quality of our 
spiritual activity, which is our intentionality.191  Without this act of interiority or conversion, 
we are unable to see the visible world as the creation of an invisible God because, if we cannot 
distinguish our own spiritual activity, we will be unable to distinguish between the Creator 
and his creation, which is the sole purpose of all instruction in wisdom.192  Recovering our 
natural intentionality through the ‘faith that works through love’ to purify the heart therefore 
will allow us to look upon the material world as God’s creation and begin to be healed through 
our experience of temporal things while directing our attention towards our Creator.193  This is 
the significance of intentio. Its presence points inwards and upwards to the unchangeable 
truths, according to which judgements on bodily things are made, which enable us to move 
                                                          
186 See chapter 5 for Augustine’s departure from the philosophical tradition in this respect. 
187 trin.10:10:13; lib. arb. 2:19:50 
188 ciu. 19:4 
189 mor. 1:15:25; mor.1:22:40; mus. 6:15:50; ep. 155:3; en Ps. 83:11; ciu. 19:4; s. 150. 
190 diu. qu. 83:61; mor. 1:15:25; mus. 6:15:50. 
191 Madec 1994b: 157.  
192 diu. qu. 83:81:1; ‘the divinely inspired and categorical teaching of the Catholic Church that no creature was to 
be adored by the soul (I prefer to use the very words by which these things were taught me) but that He alone is 
to be adored who is the Creator of all things that are.’ an. quant.  34:77. 
193 trin. 4:18:24; 13:20:25. 
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forwards towards our goal.  Intentio has taken us all the way from ordering our sense 
experience and enabling us to derive meaning from it, by means of our questioning of the 
exterior, visible creation and our consequent recognition of the spiritual and volitional nature 
of the power behind the activities of corporeal; spiritual and intellectual vision.  But if we do 
not begin from faith, we can only go so far.   
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Chapter Five: Tranquillitas  
 
Archery is still a matter of life and death to the extent that it is a contest of the 
archer with himself; and this kind of contest is not a paltry substitute, but the 
foundation of all contests outwardly directed.1 
 
When this has been accomplished, that is, when the soul will be free from all 
corruption and purified of all its stains, then at last it possesses itself in utter 
joy (in seipsa laetissime tenet) and has no fears whatever for itself nor any 
anxiety for any reason.  This then is the fifth level.  For it is one thing to effect 
purity, another to maintain it (aliud est enim efficere, aliud tenere puritatem;) 
and the act by which the soul restores its sullied state to purity and that by 
which it does not suffer itself to be defiled again are two entirely different 
things (et alia prorsus actio qua se inquinatam redintegrat, alia qua non 
patitur se rursus inquinari.).  On this level it conceives in every way how great 
it is in every respect; and when it has understood that, then with unbounded and 
wondrous confidence it advances toward God, that is, to the immediate 
contemplation of truth; and it attains that supreme and transcendent reward for 
which it has worked so hard.2 
 
The fifth stage of ascent in an. quant. is the third of the five rational levels which, 
together, correspond to the third degree of soul identified by Varro.3  Augustine says of the 
soul, at this stage, that it is reformed (reformat) into the image of God by true religion.4  He 
describes stage five of an. quant. as tranquillity (tranquillitas).’5  The acts of the soul at stage 
five are acts ‘in itself’ (in seipsa).6  It is important to remember that what Augustine is 
referring to are acts;7 he is not suggesting that the soul has reached a state of tranquillity at this 
stage, on the contrary, having directed the attention inwards, keeping it so directed, requires 
continuing acts of attention, for, to use Augustine’s sea imagery, we are still only in the port 
and have not yet proceeded to the hinterland of the Happy Life; we are still at risk of being 
                                                          
1 Herrigel 1976: 15. 
2 an. quant. 33:74. 
3 ciu. 7:23. O’Daly 1987: 13. 
4 an. quant. 36:80.   
5 Also in uera rel. 26:49 ‘In the fifth stage he has peace and tranquillity on all sides.  He lives among the 
abundant resources of the unchangeable realm of supreme ineffable wisdom.’ 
6 an. quant. 35:79. 
7 Ibid. 35:78. 
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enticed out of the port by the mountain of pride.8  For this reason, we must keep constant 
watch on ourselves for even when the effort required to maintain tranquillitas is minimal, it is 
never not required because ‘this whole life is temptation and if we think we are in peace, we 
will be caught unawares.’9 Our state of tranquillitas is not, therefore, comparable to the state 
of passionlessness or immoveability (apatheia) which became the Stoic sage and about which 
we will say more in due course.  Augustine had stressed at stage 4, the importance of 
acquiring a tranquil mind for the study of matters ‘shrouded in mystery;’10 that stage being 
characterized, and hampered, by a lack of tranquillity caused by the mind’s fears and 
inordinate desires,11   particularly by the underlying fear of death, which is always present to 
some degree until, by virtue of our faith, comes the realization that death cannot come as an 
evil to anyone,12 and then it can be positively desired,13  even though in the face of death itself, 
the old fear may come back.14 
 
                                                          
8 beata u. 1:3.  
9 en. Ps. 30:2:10. 
10 an. quant. 33:73; s. 126:6:8 (Tranquillo corde opus est, pia et devota fide, intentione religiosa) is a good 
example of the need to keep calm, in the sense of thinking non materially, when seeking to penetrate the 
mysteries of a passage of scripture. The passage in question on this occasion was ‘The Son cannot do anything of 
himself, except what he sees the Father doing.’ This passage could easily be misunderstood (and had been by the 
Arians) to mean that the Son is less than the Father. This is a classic case where reasoning and dialectic without 
faith would lead to error but, beginning from faith, a trained reason can lead to insight. 
11 diu. qu. 83:34 absence of fear is a quality that the perfectly happy man possesses by the tranquillity of his 
mind. Also diu. qu. 83:35 tranquillity is also present where desire is in accord with mind and reason. 
12 an. quant. 33:73. Augustine notes that neither Ambrose (sol. 2:14:26 because he believes in immortality) nor 
Monnica (ord. 1:11:32 because she had made such advances in the faith) feared death. They have therefore 
attained the status of the Stoic sage who is immoveable in the face of suffering or death beata u. 4:25.  NB also 
pecc. mer. 2:31:51’the fact that believers conquer the fear of death belongs to the combat of faith.’  diu. qu. 83:25 
Part of Christ’s work was to show us that death was not to be feared. Augustine notes in diu. qu. 83:70 that 
sometimes where scripture refers to death, it might be referring to the death of carnal habit. This is certainly a 
death to be desired.  But it was also a death which we feared and in this respect, the soul’s difficulty in letting go 
of its carnal habits is comparable to the fear of facing physical death, conf. 8:7:8.  Pursuing the path of 
philosophy through spiritual exercises that are designed to convert a person from a subjective to objective 
viewpoint is training for death, see Hadot 1995: 94f. But see Miles 1979: 123 who notes that Augustine’s views 
on fearing death changed so that he regarded it as a normal fear, even for Christians, including Peter and Paul.  
13 an. quant. 33:76.  
14 Io. eu. tr. 60:4-5. Here, Augustine was reconciling two passages of scripture-Paul’s desire expressed in Phil. 
1:23 ‘to die and be with Christ and Jesus’ words in Matt. 26:38, ‘My soul is sorrowful, even unto death.’ ‘What 
else, then, does His being troubled signify, but that, by voluntarily assuming the likeness of their weakness, He 
comforted the weak members in His own body, that is, in His Church; to the end that, if any of His own are still 
troubled at the approach of death, they may fix their gaze upon Him, and so be kept from thinking themselves 
castaways on this account, and being swallowed up in the more grievous death of despair?’  
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Augustine, following tradition, classified the fears and inordinate desires of the soul 
(perturbationes animi)15 under four main types of disturbance:16 cupidity (cupiditas);17 
gladness (laetitia), fear (metus or timor); sadness (tristitia).18  They are appropriately called 
‘movements of the mind’ because they each cause the mind to move in a particular way: 
happiness causes the mind to expand (elation or being in an expansive mood); sadness causes 
it to recoil (depression); desire causes it to stretch forth (in yearning) and fear causes it to flee 
(laetitia, animi diffusio; tristitia, animi contractio; cupiditas, animi progressio; timor, animi 
fuga est.)19  These movements are part of the evidence for the mutability of the soul which, 
though immortal, is not immutable,20 and they may be regarded as the origin of all sins and 
cover the whole range of moral failings.21  Prelapsarian man did not suffer from perturbations 
                                                          
15 These movements contrary to reason, which we would call emotions, and which the Greeks called pathê 
(πάθη) (ciu. 8:17), Cicero called perturbationes, some called affectiones or affectus and others, for example 
Apuleius, called passiones, ciu 9:4.  Augustine used all the various Latin terms for these movements, see conf. 
10:14:21-2 where he uses the terms interchangeably.  
16 conf. 10:14:22; trin. 6:6:8; ciu. 14:3; Io. eu. tr. 60:3. He finds them in Vergil’s Aeneid 6:733 ‘Gaudium vero 
eos et in malo posuisse ille ipse Vergilianus testis est versus, ubi has quattuor perturbationes summa brevitate 
complexus est: Hinc metuunt cupiuntque, dolent gaudentque’ quoted at ciu. 14:8; 14:9; 21:3; 21:13. Hagendhal 
1967/ 2: 405 says of this line from Vergil, ‘Augustine makes it, as Jerome before him, a leitmotif in his 
exposition of the four passions.’ Cicero makes the point that there are numerous sub categories to each category 
fin. 3:35;Tusc. 3:11. He treats the subject of the emotions fully in books 3 and 4 of Tusc.  
17  Augustine noted that it is established use that when cupiditas or concupiscentia is used without specifying an 
object it can only be understood in a bad sense: ciu. 14:7:2. He preferred cupiditas to libido because, although 
they are effectively synonyms, (lib. arb. 1:4:9 scis ne etiam istam libidinem alio nomine cupiditatem uocari? 
mor. 1:22:41 cupiditas uel libido nominetur), Augustine said that when libido is mentioned without an object 
people tend to think immediately of sexual lust, which is a particularly virulent form of lust, ciu. 14:15 - 16. But 
as one of the disordered passions, cupiditas has a wider application to anything that is immoderately desired in a 
bad sense.  
18 Augustine explained that he preferred to use the word tristitia where Cicero uses aegritudo and Vergil uses 
dolor, because these two words tend to be used of physical sensations: ciu. 14:7 and the pains of the flesh are 
really pains of the soul ciu. 14:15. See also en. Ps. 42:6 ‘The pain of the soul is called sorrow; the body’s distress 
may be called pain, but not sorrow.’  
19 Io. eu. tr. 46:8. Also pat. 24:21 ‘hurried on by lust, … called back by fear… expanded by gladness 
…contracted by sadness..’  
20 imm. an. 5:7 ‘For the mind is changed so to speak either according to the passions of the body or its own 
passions; according to the passions of the body, by age, sickness, pain, work, injury and carnal desire; according 
to its own passions, in turn, through desire, joy, fear, worry, zeal; and study.’Also see uera rel. 10:18 ‘As for the 
soul’s being subject to alteration by time, this is indeed obvious to us from the great variety of its moods.’ Also 
see Gn. adu. Man. 2:6:7 the Fall and subsequent renewal are evidence of mutability. In lib. arb. 2:6:14 and Gn. 
adu. Man. 2:8:11 Augustine emphasized that it wasn’t just the part of the soul subject to affections which was 
changeable but even the spirit; the highest part was subject to both wrong and right ideas. He was keen here to 
argue against those (the Manichees again) who believed that the spirit was part of the divine substance. 
21 ciu. 14:3 and 5. But see diu. qu. 83:77 on the extent to which perturbatio is sin. 
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of body or mind but instead, lived a life of health and tranquillity;22 such perturbations only 
arising afterwards as part of our penal state.23  It is not difficult to see allusions to the four 
passions (perturbationes animi) in the first sentence of Augustine’s description of stage 5 an. 
quant., particularly as they occur in the same traditional order: to cupiditas in Quod cum 
effectum erit, id est, cum fuerit ab omni tabe anima libera maculisque diluta; to laetitia in tum 
se denique in seipsa laetissime tenet; to metus in nec omnino aliquid metuit sibi and to tristitia 
in aut ulla sua causa quidquam angitur.  
 
aliud est enim efficere, aliud tenere puritatem  
After references to the four perturbationes animi, Augustine goes on to distinguish 
between the activity by which the soul restores itself to purity and the activity by which it 
works to maintain itself in a state of purity, thus providing further confirmation that 
purification is an ongoing process.24   
 
In hoc gradu omnifariam concipit quanta sit 
He continues with the description of the fifth stage with, ‘at this stage (the soul) 
conceives how great (quanta sit) it could be in all respects and with remarkable and 
extraordinary trust, it goes forward into God.’25  This picks up one of Euodius’ initial 
questions and the one which the dialogue has really concentrated on answering: How great is 
the soul (quanta sit)?26  The dialogue has been primarily about proving the incorporeal nature 
of the soul and demonstrating its greatness in terms of its powers, rather than its physical 
extent.27  This is what Augustine proceeds to demonstrate to Euodius; by describing an ascent 
                                                          
22 ciu. 14:10.  
23 ciu. 14:15 f; lib. arb. 1:10:22; pecc. mer. 1:16:21. 
24 f. et op. was written against those who asserted that faith was enough without continuing purification retr. 
2:38. 
25 (This is my translation.) Colleran’s translation in ACW 9 quoted at the head of this chapter, does not convey 
the sense of utter dependence on God that the soul has come to at this stage but instead suggests all its confidence 
is in itself and its self-achievable greatness. The subjunctive quanta sit he has translated as a present tense, again 
conveying a sense of completed self-fulfilment, rather than potential which can only be fulfilled in God and this 
diminishes our profound sense of unknowing. 
26 an. quant. 1:1. 
27 Ibid. 3:4. 
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through the powers that the soul has in relation to the body, to itself and to God, he shows him 
what the soul is capable of and, in the process, he hopes to experience what he himself is 
capable of.28  Augustine was very aware that, though we may know in theory what powers the 
soul possesses, we cannot know the effectiveness of those powers in our own case, until faced 
with a situation which requires the exercise of a particular power.29   
 
At one point, Euodius had said to Augustine: ‘who can take away from me, the fact 
that I myself am a living being? (Quis enim mihi eripit, quod ego ipse anima sum?)’30  
Augustine responds that ‘a thought and consideration such as this invites us to enter into 
ourselves and to the extent that is possible, separates us from the body (Ista enim cogitatio et 
consideratio ad nosmetipsos nos invitat, et quantum licet avellit a corpore.)’31  Euodius’ 
question is redolent of those other times when Augustine seeks to establish the baseline of 
certain self-knowledge as the certainty of being alive,32 from which he argued it is possible to 
reason to other certainties about the self,33 discovering ourselves as essentially one mind, 
                                                          
28 an. quant. 33:70.   
29 As he later said: ‘Observe now, while we are, while we live, while we know that we live, while we are certain 
that we possess memory, understanding, and will; who boast of ourselves as having a great knowledge of our 
own nature;—observe, I say, how entirely ignorant we are of what avail to us is our memory, or our 
understanding, or our will.’ an. et or. 4:9:7. He goes on to illustrate the point with the vivid and well-known 
example of the astonishing feats of memory of his friend, Simplicius, who was able to recite the last line but one 
of all the books of Vergil and then each preceding line and who could perform the same feat with the works of 
Cicero but who had no idea that he possessed such abilities until called upon to exercise them ibid. 4:9:7.  This 
was a case of a remarkable exercise of a power but our ignorance works both ways and we do not know when our 
powers will fail us. For example, with regard to our ignorance of our understanding, we may think we understand 
a problem, which is submitted to us, but when thinking it over we don’t and vice versa ibid. 4:7:10 and 11. Also 
with regard to the will, we do not know how strong it is, what temptations it will yield to and what temptations it 
will resist conf. 10:5:7; 10:37:60.  Even the Apostle Peter was ignorant of the effectiveness of his will, for he said 
he would lay down his life for the Lord and yet, when it came to it, he betrayed him, an. et or. 4:7: 11. In relation 
to himself, Augustine writes, ‘That is how I see myself, but perhaps I am deceived.  For there are those 
deplorable blind spots where the capacity that lies in me is concealed from me.  My mind on examining myself 
about its strengths does not regard its findings as easy to trust.  What lies within is for the most part hidden unless 
experience reveals it’ conf. 10:32:48.  Also ‘The Lord, however, laughed at me, and was pleased to show me by 
actual experience what I am’ ep. 21:2.  
30 an. quant. 30:61.  
31 Ibid. 
32 In  lib. arb. 1:7:16  Augustine had asked Euodius this very question, ‘tell me whether you are quite certain that 
you are alive.’ 
33 sol. 2:1:1; beata u. 2:7; lib. arb. 1:7:16; 2:3:7; ciu. 11:26; trin. 15:12:21. This is ostensibly Descartes, ‘I think 
therefore I am’ but as is clear from ciu. 11:26 and trin. 10:10:14, Augustine is not concerned to prove that he 
exists but to prove against the Academics that there is knowledge that one can be certain of. On this difference in 
purpose see O’Daly 1987: 171 and Williams 1993.   
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which is acting through a variety of powers34 and enabling us to fulfil the Delphic 
commandment ‘to know thyself’ for, ‘the whole point of it (the mind) 35 being commanded to 
know itself comes to this: it should be certain that it is none of the things about which it is 
uncertain, and it should be certain that it is that alone it is certain that it is.’36 This is the stage 
reached now, with the mind’s awareness of itself but, although this is the most basic 
knowledge we can have of ourselves, Augustine comments that ‘to few people, however, is it 
permitted to perceive the soul by means of the soul itself, that is, in such a way that the soul 
sees itself (Sed paucis licet ipso animo animum cernere, id est ut ipse se animus videat.)’37 
This we can do through intellectual vision, which Augustine here calls both intelligentia and 
ratio, describing the mind’s act as ‘a finding of itself’ (literally ‘a coming into itself’ se 
invenire).38 
 
Although we have entered into the very seat of memory where the mind remembers 
itself, we will discover that God is not there.39  In other words, knowing oneself as a rational 
being is not the same as understanding oneself as a relational being and seeing what one is, is 
not the same as seeing what one could be.  There is a hint of irony, therefore, right at the 
beginning of an. quant. where Euodius says he is well aware that Augustine in the past has 
advised him, in the words of an old Greek proverb, not to seek what was beyond our powers 
but that he did not think that we ourselves were beyond our own powers and he wanted to be 
told what we might be.40  Of course, that is precisely what we are; beyond ourselves and our 
self-knowledge is therefore limited by mystery for we are bound by the limitations of our 
                                                          
34 ‘I who act through these diverse functions am one mind’conf. 10:7:11; ‘And this is mind (animus), this is I 
myself’ Ibid.10:6:9;  ‘It is I who remember, I who am mind. It is hardly surprising if what I am not is distant 
from me.  But what is nearer to me than myself?’ Ibid. 10:16:25 (The answer he is inviting is clearly, God). 
35 Augustine follows Cicero in assuming that the Delphic command relates to the mind. See Cic. Tusc. 1:22:52 
‘our selves are not bodies.When then Apollo says, “Know thyself,” he says “know thy soul (animum).”  For the 
body is as it were a vessel or a sort of shelter for the soul: every act of your soul is an act of yours.’ 
36 trin. 10:10:16. See infra. 
37 an. quant. 14:24. 
38 Ibid. Augustine noted in trin. that invenire was literally ‘in + venire’ trin. 10:7:10 and therefore it is highly 
appropriate for him to suggest as an alternative description of this stage ‘acts in itself’ (in seipsa). 
39 conf. 10:25:36. 
40 an. quant. 1:1. 
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condition of being created ex nihilo and under the constraints of time and memory.41  
Augustine emphasizes constantly throughout his writings, the deep unknowingness in man 
and the mystery that he is to himself.42  It is part of our self-knowledge to become aware of 
our limitations;43 that awareness becoming more painful, the more that progress is made in 
purification and the more we see the difference between what we are and what we could be.  
The effect of such knowledge is to foster an awareness of our dependence on God’s mercy in 
the matter of reforming ourselves in His image, which ‘the soul cannot begin or complete 
except with the help of Him to whom it yields itself.’44   
 
Self-knowledge, then, is about discovering our potential and limitations; it is about 
discovering both what we are as human beings and who we are, in our particularity and 
                                                          
41 conf. 10:8:14. It is through remembering and reflecting on our past experience that we can assess our future 
course of action even though, when it comes to it we cannot be sure that we will act in the way we want but for 
Augustine, memory only begins when he begins to speak (conf. 1:8:13) . He cannot therefore remember being in 
the womb or infancy and has to rely on what others tell him and also from watching other infants to assess how 
he might have been (conf. 1:6:7 -1:7:12). He certainly does not know where he came from (conf. 1:6:7). He was 
challenged over his professed ignorance of himself (with particular reference to the origin of the soul) by a young 
ex-Donatist, Vincentius Victor, who believed it ‘excessively absurd and unreasonable that a man should be a 
stranger to himself; or that a person who is supposed to have acquired the knowledge of all things, should regard 
himself as unknown to his very self. For what difference is there between a man and a brute beast, if he knows 
not how to discuss and determine his own quality and nature?’ an. et or. 4:2:2.  
42 Ibid. 4:4:8 ‘It is our own selves that we are incapable of comprehending; it is our own selves, who, in our too 
great height and strength, transcend the humble limits of our own knowledge; it is our own selves, whom we are 
incapable of embracing, although we are certainly not beside ourselves.’ See also ciu. 21:10 the conjunction of 
body and soul ‘is utterly amazing and beyond our powers of comprehension;’ conf. 4:14:22 'Man is a vast deep ` 
…it is easier to count his hairs than the passions and emotions of his heart;’ conf. 10:8: 1 ‘This power of memory 
is great, very great, my God.  It is a vast and infinite profundity.  Who has plumbed its bottom?  This power is 
that of my mind and is a natural endowment, but I myself cannot grasp the totality of what I am.  Is the mind, 
then, too restricted to compass itself, so that we have to ask what is that element of itself which it fails to grasp?  
Surely that cannot be external to itself; it must be within the mind.  How then can it fail to grasp it?  This 
question moves me to great astonishment.  Amazement grips me;’ en. Ps. 41.13 ‘If “deep” signifies profundity, 
surely the human heart is a deep abyss?  Could anything be more profound?  The profundity of a human being is 
surely referred to in a saying we find elsewhere: A mortal will draw near to the heart’s depths, and God will be 
exalted (Ps. 63:7-8(64:6))….what a depth of human weakness lay hidden in Peter.  He did not know what was 
going on within him when he kept promising so rashly that he would die with the Lord or for the Lord.  What a 
deep abyss he was!’ See also n. 29. 
43 The Delphic commandment, ‘Know thyself (γνῶθι σεαυτόν),’ was also effectively knowledge of one’s own 
limitations, Dihle 1982: 45. On the evolution of the meaning of the Delphic oracle, see Courcelle 1974. 
44 an. quant. 33:73; 28:55. Augustine says such knowledge causes ‘the sorrow of the exile stirred by longing for 
his true country and its founder, his blissful God’ trin. 4:1:1; knowledge is the discovery of oneself as tied up in 
love of this world and far removed from the love of God and neighbour. We mourn for ourselves and pray for 
help doctr. chr. 2:7:10.     
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individuality.45  It is about the soul discovering itself in a median position;46 an incorporeal, 
yet created, and therefore, mutable substance, midway between the body, which is changeable 
in time and space, and God, who is unchangeable; it is about knowing that turning to what is 
superior, will bring order and health to its whole being: body and soul and that turning to the 
inferior, will bring about deficiency.47  Such a welter of self-knowledge will enable a person 
to move forward in the appropriate spirit of humility ‘transcending himself as a reasoning 
soul,’48 as it were, towards God.49  It may only be ‘the few’ who come to even a modicum of 
self-knowledge50 but ‘the few’ are not necessarily the most intellectually able, instead they are 
those who, whether learned or not, seek knowledge out of a divinely inspired love for the 
truth, rather than out of vainglory and who seek the truth with faith and endurance.51 
 
Equivalent stage in trin. 
In trin. the same distinction is drawn as in an. quant. between the initial restoration to 
purity and ongoing purification:  
 
But it is one thing to throw off a fever, another to recover from the weakness 
which the fever leaves behind it; it is one thing to remove from the body a 
                                                          
45 Augustine distinguishes between particular knowledge as knowledge which is only available to the person 
concerned and general knowledge which is common truth available to everyone ‘from which we define as 
perfectly as we can, not what kind of thing any particular man’s mind is, but what kind of thing by everlasting 
ideas it ought to be,’ trin. 9:6:9.  In ep. 14 written at about the same time as an. quant. Augustine distinguishes 
between the idea of man generally, which was an idea in the mind of God and the idea of each individual person, 
which, in the cycle of time, lives in the pure truth. He explained this in geometrical terms as the difference 
between the idea of an angle and the idea of a quadrangle which can only be described by focusing on all four 
angles at once ep. 14:4. 
46 see under section ‘conversion of intentio voluntatis’ infra  
47 mus. 6:5:13. 
48 sed memento cum te transcendis, ratiocinantem animam te transcendere (uera rel. 29:72).   
49 ‘It is the chief cause of error that a man doesn’t know himself’ (ord. 1:1:3).     
50an. quant. 14:24; Also ord. 2:11:30, ‘only a rare class of men is capable of using it (reason) as a guide to the 
knowledge of God or of the soul.’ 
51 an. quant. 14:24; Also an. quant. 36:80, ‘But to see these things as they should be seen is given to only a few, 
and no one is rendered fit for this except by true religion.’ NB also trin. 5:1:2; ep. 120:1:4 ‘For certain people, 
even the simplest who, nonetheless, walk with great perseverance in the path of faith, come to that most blessed 
contemplation.  But there are those who somehow already know what the invisible, immutable, incorporeal 
nature is and refuse to hold onto the way that leads to so great an abode of happiness, because it seems foolish to 
them. That way is Christ crucified.’ The unlearned Monnica was constantly portrayed as the true philosopher 
because she was directly instructed by God himself (ord. 1:11:32; beata u. 2:10; ord.2:1:1).  It is the uneducated 
Monnica’s temperance that lifts up her mind to great heights, not her intellectual knowledge ord. 2:17:45. 
  
134 
missile stuck in it, another to heal the wound it made with a complete cure.  
The first stage of the cure is to remove the cause of the debility and this is done 
by pardoning all sins; the second stage is curing the debility itself and this is 
done gradually by making steady progress in the renewal of the image.52 
 
Scriptural authority (Ps.  103:3) is given for the two-stage distinction, from which it is 
clear that the first stage relates to baptism53 and the second stage to the daily advances we 
make thereafter.54  In trin., as in an. quant., then, reform into the full likeness of the image of 
God, which began on conversion to faith,55 continues.  The challenge for the fallen soul, 
having reached this stage, is to live life turned towards self and God, which is to be turned ad 
interiora and ab exteriora, as both an. quant. and trin. recognize and, in this way, to continue 
the progress in purification that has brought the person as far as conversion and commitment 
to the true faith as evidenced by their baptism.   
 
Withdrawal of intentio from the senses: the value of the body 
The work of purification that the soul has been engaged in since its conversion 
requires it to maintain a measure of detachment from the senses.  Before examining the role of 
intentio at this stage in detail, we must therefore consider first what such a withdrawal says 
about Augustine’s view of the body.  In an. quant., at stage four, Augustine had spoken in 
seemingly pejorative terms about ‘getting rid of the body’ (deposito isto corpore); ‘despising 
(contemnere) the things of the body’ and of the soul ‘withdrawing itself from sordid things 
                                                          
52 trin. 14:17:23.   
53 Bonner 2007:101 notes ‘As late as 401/2 in De Baptismo, Augustine had been prepared to entertain Ambrose’s 
view that faith and conversion of the heart might supply what baptism conveys, but this was clearly impossible to 
reconcile with belief in the absolute necessity of the reception of the sacrament for salvation, and by the time of 
his consecration in 395, it may be guessed that he had effectively discarded it.” The fact that faith is not enough 
without baptism is shown by the example of Cornelius in Simpl. 1:2:2. In bapt. 4:22:30 Augustine was prepared 
to accept that faith and conversion was sufficient for salvation without baptism in circumstances where there 
hadn’t been time to baptize.  The one exception to the requirement of baptism that he continued to countenance 
was martyrdom an. et or. 1:9:10.  In both the Pelagian and Donatist controversies, Augustine maintained the 
importance of baptism into the one true body of Christ. For the particular importance of the issue of baptism in 
Africa see Bonner 1970.  
54 Elsewhere, the Apostle Paul’s words ‘Even if our outer man is being corrupted, our inner man is renewed from 
day to day’ ((2 Cor. 4:16) are relied upon for the requirement that the purification be ongoing see mor. 1:34:80. 
And in ciu. 21:25:1 Gal. 5:19f is cited to show the purification must be ongoing and that baptism itself is not 
enough regardless of their subsequent lifestyle. Augustine’s reason for insisting on continuing purification was 
that ‘The guilt of this concupiscence is absolved in baptism, but the weakness remains.’ retr. 1:15:2.  
55 trin. 14:16:22. 
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(sese abstrahere a sordibus).’56  Porphyry’s view, which Augustine encountered when reading 
Regr. an.,57 was that one must escape from every kind of body (omne corpus est fugiendum) in 
order to dwell with God.  Although this was a view which Augustine later said was therefore 
one to be vehemently resisted,58 such derogatory statements early on in his career might 
suggest that, at least at this stage, he held a Porphyrian view of the body.  But this would be to 
misunderstand his meaning.  For, by the time he wrote an. quant. he had been baptized and 
was well aware of the doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body.  Furthermore, in an. quant., he 
referred to the Christian mysteries as authority for the proposition that: ‘whoever desires to 
restore himself to the state in which he was made by God, that is, like God, should contemn 
(contemnat) all corporeal things and renounce this whole world, which as we see, is corporeal.  
There simply is no other way of saving the soul or of renewing it, or of reconciling it with its 
Maker.’59  It is not surprising, then, that we find him still using the word contemnere of 
despising mortal things in trin.,60 if the Christian mysteries authorized it and we should not 
think of him as holding a Porphyrian view of the body in an. quant. Even in his earlier works, 
where some of his statements about the body are a bit more ambivalent and were later 
corrected,61 we should see him rather as a man struggling to find a language to integrate 
                                                          
56 an. quant. 33:73. More moderate is ibid. 14:24 atque ab omni corporum consuetudine, quantum in hac vita 
permittitur, semet avertunt and ibid. 28:55 quo admonetur anima, ne se ultra quam necessitas cogit, refundat in 
sensus.  
57 ciu. 10:29:2. Augustine described Porphyry as ‘the most renowed of the pagan philosophers’ ciu. 22:3; his 
reputation was widespread retr. 2:31; He had written a tract Against the Christians, which was still galvanizing 
antichristian feeling among pagans and therefore Augustine spends time in ciu. engaging with his views see 
Courcelle 1969: 209.  Augustine responds to Porph.’s view of Christ in his Philosophy from Oracles in ciu. 19:23 
and on several occasions repudiates his view that ‘everything bodily must be fled from.’ 
58 ciu.10:29; 13:17; 22:26-7.  
59 an. quant. 3:4.  
60 trin. 8:7:10. 
61 In the Cassiciacum dialogues, he certainly made statements in relation to the body that he later regretted, egs, 
‘these things of sense must be forsaken entirely (Penitus esse ista sensibilia fugienda,)’ retr. 1:4:3 regretting sol. 
1:14:24. He did not tamper with the further statement there which described the body as a cavea nor did he need 
to for, despite the FOTC translation of ‘prison,’ cavea is less negative than that, meaning ‘an animal enclosure.’ 
Acad. 1:3:9 he does speak of the body as a prison (cum hoc corpus, hoc est tenebrosum carcerem,) but this is 
Licentius in dialogue and he tends to recite views that Augustine has left behind (e.g. ord. 2:2:7). This statement 
was not corrected which suggests perhaps that it was not to be taken as representing Augustine’s own view.  
Neither did he alter an equally derogatory statement made by Licentius in ord. 2:2:6 ‘certain soiled and cast-off 
garments, so to speak-of which he has divested himself and from which he has, as it were, withdrawn into 
himself ita dicam, sordes atque exuviae quibus se ille mundavit et quasi subtraxit in seipsum.’ Augustine’s view 
about the body at Cassiciacum is probably best summed up by himself in sol. where he admitted that he didn’t 
know much about the usefulness of his mortal body but, until he did, he would commit it to God and pray for it 
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inherited views on the inferiority of the body with the Christian doctrines of Incarnation and 
Resurrection, which placed value on the body, and all at a time when Christian doctrine had 
not yet been established.  The difference he sought to draw was between the body as created 
by God and the corruptible body after the Fall, which weighed down the soul with its fragility, 
mortality and neediness.62  The corruptible body is certainly a problem for the soul to deal 
with, but ultimately, according to Augustine, it is our thoughts that imprison us. 
 
Withdrawal of intentio: from intentio mentis to intentio voluntatis  
In imm. an., Augustine speaks of the withdrawal of an intentio mentis from the senses 
of the body for the purposes of reasoning and understanding63 and in trin., he speaks of the 
turning of an intentio voluntatis onto oneself in order to come to self-knowledge.64  Although 
Augustine is never rigid in his use of terminology he had, what has been described as ‘an 
almost oppressive awareness of the moral and theological implications of his own words and 
of the use of language more generally, which deepened throughout his life.’65  Therefore, in 
the context of his developing understanding of the significance of the will, it is not 
unreasonable to think that the transfer of intentio from mens to voluntas is deliberate.66  We 
will use a passage from imm. an. as a springboard for discussion about the withdrawal of 
intentio mentis, as imm. an. is close in time to an. quant.,67 and an. quant. does not, itself, 
provide us with a suitable equivalent.  Then we will use a passage from trin. as a springboard 
for discussion about intentio voluntatis.  Finally, given the limited nature of our ability, as 
fallen human beings, to direct our desire towards God, we will consider the meaning of 
intentio voluntatis as an act of prayer.   
 
                                                          
sol. 1:1:6. 
62 en. Ps. 141:17-19. 
63 imm. an. 10:17.  
64 trin. 10:8:11. 
65 Conybeare 2006: 11-12. On the other hand Augustine says that when one is dealing with the thing about which 
words are spoken, one shouldn’t argue about words Acad. 3:13:29. 
66 intentio mentis is still used in trin. but only in circumstances where it is clear that the energy is volitional. (See 
trin. 12:12:17 and trin. 11 passim, where it is used interchangeably with intentio voluntatis).  
67 Although close in time, the two works are like chalk and cheese; imm. an. being completely philosophical and 
an. quant. being completely Christian. 
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Withdrawal of intentio mentis in imm an: act of intentio as an act of inward attention 
For who, looking into himself well, has not experienced that he understands 
(intellexisse) something more clearly, the more he is able to remove and 
withdraw his mental intentio from the senses of the body (quanto removere 
atque subducere intentionem mentis a corporis sensibus potuit?)68 
Imm. an. seems to be a kind of philosophical exercise and it has been suggested that 
Augustine wrote it as a model exercise for his pupils to imitate because this would tie in with 
his instruction to his pupils at Cassiciacum that ‘they should train their minds to be at home 
with their own thoughts’ (et apud sese habitare consuefacerent animum).69  He had told his 
pupils in ord. that it was the chief cause of error that man did not know himself.  If they 
wanted to attain self-knowledge, they had to develop a habit of withdrawing from the things 
of sense and concentrating their thought on themselves and holding it there (animum in 
seipsum colligendi atque in seipso retinendi.)70  He mentions two ways of doing this: either in 
solitude71 or by an education in the liberal arts.72  Ord. itself, as with his other early works,73 is 
in the nature of a philosophical dialogue and shows the way in which teaching in the liberal 
arts would have proceeded.74  In fact, Augustine regarded the time at Cassiciacum, where 
some of the dialogues took place, as a school of philosophy in which he was the master.75  He 
                                                          
68  imm. an. 10.17.  
69 ord. 1:3:6. Penaskovic 1980.  Imm. an. was written as a reminder to himself to finish the unfinished sol. but 
was itself unfinished and published prematurely and this, according to Augustine, accounts for its brevity and 
complicated reasoning retr. 1:5:1.  It may also account for its complete absence of religious tone and content; no 
prayers, no scriptural references and no religious expressions, unlike his previously written works; the 
Cassiciacum dialogues, see Mourant 1971.  
70 ord. 1:1:3. 
71 sol. is an example of withdrawal in solitude where Augustine communes with his own reason.  Also ep. 3:1 
Augustinus ipse cum Augustino. 
72 ord. 1:1:3. For Augustine and the liberal arts, see Introduction n. 29 and for liberal arts as being a recognized 
exercise of this kind, see chapter 1 n. 110.  
73 Acad.; beata u.; sol. (a dialogue with himself); an. quant.; lib. arb.; mus.; mag.  
74 In ord. Augustine presents a complete programme of education in the liberal arts. The programme consisted of 
proceeding orderly, first through the literary disciplinae: grammar, dialectics and rhetoric, then moving on to the 
mathematical disciplinae: music, geometry, astrology and philosophy. If the complete programme is too 
demanding, then instead, a person should try to master the essentials of at least either one of dialectics and 
number (preferably both) or, if even this is too much, he should at least try to grasp what unity in numbers is 
(ord. 2:18:47). 
75 Acad. 3:4:7; ord. 1:3:7. 
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had withdrawn from the world after his conversion (and after he had given up his job as a 
rhetor but before he had been baptized),76 to a country farm and estate at Cassiciacum ‘where 
we rested in you from the heat of the world.’77  Augustine’s temperament inclined him to 
withdrawal into a contemplative life and he had once even contemplated living a hermit’s life 
(though it is clear that this would have been more of an attempt to escape himself, rather than 
an attempt to return to himself).78  Plotinus was similarly inclined and would retire to the 
country estate of a friend, where he hoped to set up a school of philosophy; a plan which never 
materialized.79  Other philosophically inclined individuals, like Marcus Aurelius and Seneca, 
had longed to retire physically but public duties made this impossible, (as they did eventually 
for Augustine),80 and thus developed the idea that the important withdrawal was the ability to 
withdraw into oneself in the midst of the turmoil; the corollary of that being the realization 
that physical withdrawal is, in fact, ineffective without this spiritual withdrawal.81   
 
Festugière traced the development of the Greek word for withdrawal or retirement 
‘anachoresis’ (ἀχναώρησις) and noted that the expression ‘to retire into oneself’ anachoresis 
eis eauton (ἀναχωρεῖν εἰς ἑαυτόν),’ translated into Latin as animum enim cogo sibi intentum 
esse82 but, more significantly, that the expression described the same state as the expression 
‘turning his attention inward upon himself (ἑαυτῷ πως προσέχοντα τὸν νοῦν),’ which had 
                                                          
76 conf. 9:4:7. 
77 Ibid. 9:3:5. 
78 Ibid. 10:43:70. 
79 Festugière 1954: 65. On similar plans of Augustine which were later abandoned see conf. 6.14.24. 
80 ‘I took upon myself the responsibility of a bishop.  But no one can outdo me in matters concerning the life that 
is entirely free, without any pastoral concerns; nothing is better, nothing is sweeter than exploring the divine 
treasury, without disturbance around one.  That is sweet, that is good.’ (s. 339:4).  After carrying out his pastoral 
duties by day, he would become a contemplative at night see Possidius vita 24. Despite his inclination to regard 
the contemplative life as essential, if one was to have enough quiet to overcome the fear of death (ep. 10:2), he 
recognized that, practically speaking, this might not be possible and yet tranquillity of mind in action could still 
be achieved by withdrawal into the sanctum of the mind (ep. 10:3.) Also he had already made it clear that what 
was important was stillness of thought, not leisure (non otium desidiae, sed otium cogitationis) uera rel. 35:65.  
81 Festugière 1954: 60.  
82 Ibid. 64 says that Plotinus himself uses anachoresis twice in the sense of the soul’s need to withdraw from the 
body in Enn 1:1:12:18 and Enn 2:3:4:14 f and, in the absence of Victorinus’ Latin translation, one can only 
speculate as to whether this was translated by intentio, and, if so, whether Augustine had read these parts of Enn. 
to be influenced in his choice of vocabulary. 
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been used much earlier of a habit that Socrates used to engage in.83  ‘Return to self’ and 
‘collecting oneself together into oneself;’ expressions which we encountered in the last 
chapter, also express the same idea of turning the attention onto oneself and Augustine can be 
found using both expressions when he exhorts Licentius to muster up all his powers of thought 
in order to enter into dialogue.84   
 
What Augustine was seeking to do by means of the philosophical dialogue, both at 
Cassiciacum and subsequently, was not to inform the minds of the participants to the dialogue 
but to transform them.   This was designed to effect nothing less than a conversion in their 
attitude away from self-interest and self-complacency towards dissatisfaction with themselves 
and a desire for objective truth; allowing them to come to the knowledge of themselves, 
namely, of their shortcomings with the objective of overcoming the passions.85  Augustine’s 
particular concern was to encourage Licentius to turn his attention away from poetry towards 
philosophy86 and, to this end, he sought (successfully)87 to inflame Licentius’ love for 
                                                          
83 Festugière 1954:154 n. 13. Porphyry extols Plotinus’ continual attention to himself (πρὀς έαυτὀν προσοχήν) in 
vita 8;20-21. 
84 ord. 1:10:28  ‘Now Licentius if you please concentrate every power within you (collige in te) sharpen 
whatever acumen you have and then express by a definition what order is.’ Acad. 2:7:18 ‘Come gather your 
forces again (in vires tuas redi.)’  
85 Acad. 1:3:8 Dialoguing is not about giving childish display of intelligence but about the desire to find truth. 
It’s about formation and instruction of pupils by their master and Licentius confirms there is great progress in 
philosophy when a disputant thinks little of victory compared to discovery of what is just and true. Also 
Ibid.1:9:25 Augustine treats Acad. as an exercise to test their capacities and tastes (exercere vos) to encourage 
them in the quest for truth and to ask them how much importance they attached to it. Also Ibid. 2:7:17 ‘this 
discussion between us has been undertaken to train you and to incite you to cultivate your mind (haec inter nos 
disputatio suscepta sit exercendi tui causa, et ad elimandum animum provocandi.)’ Ibid. 2:9:22 ‘I do not want 
this discussion to be undertaken merely for the sake of discussing….we are concerned with life, with morality 
with the spirit-that spirit which hopes to overcome the antagonism of every kind of illusion and possessing itself 
of truth to return in triumph over the passions.’ 
86 Ibid. 3:1:1 ‘It is high time that philosophy should take up and hold a greater part in his (Licentius’) mind than 
poetry or any other subject (disciplina).’ Ibid. 3:4:7 Augustine is constantly trying to rouse Licentius towards 
greater desire for philosophy. ord. 1:3:8 Augustine feared that Licentius’ passion for poetry would take him away 
from philosophy. Ibid. 1:3:9 ‘perhaps today I shall find myself..why may I not be admonished by your voice to 
study philosophy rather than compose poems? For philosophy –as I have begun to believe you as you prove it 
day by day-is our true and tranquil abode.  Wherefore if it is not a burden to you and if you think it fitting, ask 
whatever questions you will.’ 
87 Ibid. 1:5:12. Also Ibid. 1:8:21 and 22.  By questioning, Augustine forced Licentius to give up talk about 
Pyramus and Thisbe. Ibid. 1:5:14 we witness Licentius’ conversion from poetry to philosophy as he praises God 
for creation and Ibid. 1:8:21 he gives voice to his conversion by singing repeatedly a verse from Ps. 79, ‘O God 
of hosts convert us and show us your face and we shall be saved.’ But it subsequently becomes clear that 
Licentius’ conversion is short lived, Ep. 26. 
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philosophy;88 he allowed him to see what strength of mind he needed to seek the truth and 
where he fell short89 and to see where he was more concerned with praising himself than 
God.90  Augustine, in his hopes and aspirations for his pupils, was fully in keeping with the 
philosophic (and particularly Socratic) tradition of treating the philosophical dialogue as a 
communal spiritual exercise; where the journey was more important than arrival and the 
participants more in question than the subject-matter of the dialogue.91   
 
The most significant aspect to draw out from the point of view of intentio is Hadot’s 
observation that the communal dialogue and solitary meditation, together with all other types 
of philosophical exercise in antiquity, which were designed to effect a conversion from the 
subjective to the objective view-point, were all exercises of authentic presence to oneself and 
others.92  Hadot shows that attention, or prosoche, was the fundamental attitude underlying all 
such exercises; that this was a particularly Stoic attitude and that its characteristic was tonos or 
tension (Latin intentio) which manifested itself as a constant watchfulness to the present 
moment to ensure that a person acted in accordance with reason (rather than the passions) in 
respect of each situation that they found themselves in.93  This philosophic tradition of 
attentiveness and self-examination was designed to keep a person in a state of constant self- 
awareness and awareness of themselves in relation to God and to act accordingly.  It had 
already found its way into the Christian tradition before Augustine and it is quite likely that 
Augustine had come across it in a Christian form.  He was certainly aware of the importance 
placed by the desert fathers on attentiveness (which he called intentio) in, and as, prayer.94   
He was also familiar with the writings of Basil of Caesarea95 and is likely to have read 
                                                          
88 Ibid. 1:10:28. 
89 Ibid. 1:7:20. 
90 ord. 1:10:29 and 30. 
91 Hadot 1995: 90-91. For the genre of the Cassiciacum dialogues see Coneybeare 2006.  
92 Hadot 1995: 91. For lists of exercises found in Philo see Ibid. 84. This was essentially what philosophy was, 
for both the ancient Stoics and the Platonists: the practice of spiritual exercises with a view to transformation 
Ibid. chapter 3 passim. From the beginning, Christianity presented itself as a philosophia in the sense of 
incorporating the traditional practices of spiritual exercises Ibid. 107. 
93 Ibid. 84. Also Hadot 1986: 34.  
94 ep. 130:10: 20. Further on this see intentio as an act of prayer infra. 
95 Courcelle 1969: 202-4. 
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Rufinus’ Latin translation of Basil’s homily ‘On the words, ‘Give heed to yourself’ eis to 
prosoche seatou (In Illud attende tibi ipsi ) based on Deut.  15:9 LXX ‘Give heed to yourself 
lest there be a hidden word in your heart;’ a homily in which, according to Hadot, Basil 
‘develops an entire theory of prosoche, strongly influenced by the Stoic and Platonic 
traditions.’96   
 
Imm. an. is purely in the Platonic philosophic tradition of withdrawal where the body 
is seen as obstructing the soul in its attainment of truth and the mind therefore has to turn 
away from the body, if it wants to develop its reasoning ability and come to an understanding 
of the truth.97  Imm. an. seems to be specifically an intellectual exercise to prove the 
immortality of the soul by reason98 and, if it had been finished, the suggestion has been made 
that it might well have been couched in dialogical form.99  When Augustine speaks of the 
withdrawal of intentio mentis in imm. an., bearing in mind that all exercises were regarded as 
being about the payment of attention to oneself, it is clear that what he is describing is an act 
of inward attention.   
 
Withdrawal of intentio voluntatis in trin.  
 
Let the mind then recognize itself and not go looking for itself as if it were 
absent, but rather turn on to itself the intentio of its will which had it straying 
about through other things and think about itself.  (Cognoscat ergo 
semetipsam, nec quasi absentem se quaerat, sed intentionem voluntatis qua per 
alia vagabatur statuat in se ipsa et se cogitet.)100  
                                                          
96 Hadot 1995: 130. Although Augustine was familiar with the story of the Life of Anthony (conf. 8:6:14), which 
Hadot 1995: 131 notes also contains the admonition to pay heed to oneself. Augustine would have read it in the 
Latin translation by Evagrius says Courcelle 1969: 201 though there doesn’t seem to be any evidence that he did. 
In that version by Evagrius the word prosoche had disappeared, see Sheridan 2012: 454. 
97 Penaskovic 1980. Penaskovic first compares imm. an. with Plato’s Phaedo and then with Enn. 4:7. The body’s 
hindrance to the soul is noted by Augustine in imm. an. 1:1. For Augustine’s minimal knowledge of Phaedo see 
Courcelle 1969:170.   
98 A reasoned ascent could lead a person to knowledge that the soul was immortal, it could not lead a person to 
belief in the resurrection of the body; this is the promise of the Christian faith: that the whole man, not just the 
soul, is going to be immortal. s. 241:4; trin. 13:10.  On Augustine’s change from philosophical to Christian 
immortality see Mourant 1969. 
99 Mourant 1971: 214. 
100 trin. 10:8:11. 
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In terms of the traditional threefold distinction into which philosophy was divided: 
moral, natural and rational,101 the intellectual exercise in the unfinished imm. an. could be said 
to pertain to that branch of philosophy, which the Latins called, ‘rational philosophy,’and the 
Greeks called ‘logic,’102 whereas the emphasis in trin. is on ethics or moral philosophy, which 
is concerned with how we live, responsibility for which (as we saw in the last chapter) belongs 
to the will.103  Although the overriding importance of the will was recognized and 
acknowledged by Augustine from his earliest writings, his thinking on it developed and 
different facets of it were explored as the need arose;104 first, against the determinism of the 
Manichees, when he stressed the freedom of the will in prelapsarian man105 and then, against 
the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians, when he stressed the need, post the Fall, for grace, 
additional to the grace conferred on us by reason of our creation, before the will could be 
freely exercised for good.106   
 
He had acknowledged the importance of the ethical dimension in the Cassiciacum 
dialogues107 though this did not, of itself, distinguish him from his philosophical forbears, who 
would have done as much, for he does not address the question specifically as to whether right 
living will follow automatically from right understanding, or whether the will will decide not 
to act in accord with reason.108  As Dihle points out, the various philosophical schools were in 
                                                          
101 Plato was the first to make this distinction according to Augustine, ciu. 11:25; 8:4f. 
102 Ibid. 11:25. 
103 trin. 10:11:17. 
104 He makes this point himself in retr. 1:9(8):4 where he confirmed that lib. arb. was written against the 
Manichees and that not much was said about grace because that wasn’t an issue at the time. He was responding 
here to the use that the Pelagians had made of this work to argue that Augustine was Pelagian in the matter of not 
insisting upon the need for grace before the fallen will could be exercised for good.   
105 Thus an. quant. 36:80: ‘the soul, it is true, has received free will, and those who try to discredit that by 
baseless arguments are so blind that they do not even realize that it is by their own free will that they are uttering 
such inanities and impieties.  Yet, the gift of free will is such that no matter what the soul undertakes with it, it 
does not disturb any part of the divine order and law.  It is a gift coming from the Lord of all creation, who is 
wise and whose power cannot be made to yield.’ Augustine had once held the Manichaean view that it was an 
alien nature in us which caused us to sin, rather than our own free will (conf. 5:10:18) and then he began to listen 
to Ambrose preaching that the free choice of the will is the reason why we do wrong conf. 7:3:5.  
106 There are good clear recent discussions in Bonner 2007 and Harrison 2006.  
107 ord. 2:8:25; Acad 2:9:22; ord. 2:19:50. 
108 However this does not mean he wasn’t thinking along these lines for in his prayer in sol. he prays sol. 1:1:5 
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agreement in adopting an intellectualistic approach to the moral life; according to which 
coming to a true knowledge of reality would automatically lead to right conduct and any 
failure in conduct was explained as a failure of understanding.109  Because there was no 
separate faculty of will, this meant that the Stoic notion of tonos which, as we have seen, is 
one of the main sources of Augustine’s use of intentio, applied to the strength of the intellect’s 
control over the passions, with any inability to exercise control being put down to a failure of 
reason (described as having insufficient tonos,) but tonos was never applied to volitional 
energy, as we are see it in Augustine.110  
 
Signs of a split between the intellect and the will began to appear more obviously in 
the works written immediately following Cassiciacum.  In imm. an., Augustine pointed out 
that the will was responsible for leading the mind astray, ‘the mind by its own will may be 
separated from reason (restat ut aut ipsa ratio a se ipsum separet, aut ipse animus ab ea 
uoluntate separetur).’111  In mag. he affirms that only so much of the truth will be manifested 
to a person ‘as he is capable of receiving because of his own good or bad will (sed tantum 
cuique panditur, quantum capere propter propriam, sive malam sive bonam voluntatem 
potest)’112 and in mus. he says ‘temperance is powerful against the fall that is in the free will 
(Sed ut temperantia contra lapsum qui est in libera voluntate).’113  These are all inklings of 
the importance that the will comes to assume in trin. By the time he completed trin. in the 
420s, all the elements of Augustine’s mature thinking on the will had been thought through 
and so what we see in trin., is the end of that trajectory which began with Augustine’s 
recognition that the will does not necessarily act in accordance with reason; that the Fall was 
                                                          
Nihil aliud habeo quam voluntatem (I have nothing other than will).  
109 See Dihle 1982.  Wisdom for the philosophers involved an understanding of the structure of the world and an 
adaptation to it rather than obedience to the will of God which was as demanded by the prophetic tradition. It is 
by looking at both traditions, that Dihle traces the development of the notion of will as an independent faculty of 
mind from ancient Greek thought through to Augustine. 
110 Ibid. 62. 
111 imm. an. 6:11. Also lib. arb. 1:11:21 (388) ‘nothing makes the mind a companion of cupidity, except its own 
will and free choice (nulla res alia mentem cupiditatis comitem faciat quam propria voluntas et liberum 
arbitrium).’ Also, another early reference mus. 6:11:30, ‘He was made disgraceful by his own will when he lost 
perspective of the whole that he possessed.’  
112 mag. 11:38; lib. arb. 1:12:26.  
113 mus. 6:16:54. 
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occasioned by the free choice of our will and that the direction of the will becomes the 
determining factor in the search for God.  What trin. represents, is Augustine’s fully 
developed, integrated and expressed understanding of the centrality of the will in the act of 
knowing God and our utter dependence on God for the exercise of our will for the good.   
 
Augustine’s attachment of intentio to voluntas in trin. and away from mens is thus 
evidence of his parting company with his philosophical forbears, in making will a faculty of 
the mind, which operated interdependently with the intellect, rather than necessarily following 
the dictates of reason.  The close association of voluntas and intentio was made clear by 
Augustine when he put the blame for the Fall, fairly and squarely, on the will’s choosing 
freely to direct the mind’s attention away from God.  He had defined ‘will’ in duab. an. as ‘a 
movement of the mind with nothing forcing it either not to lose something or to acquire 
something (Voluntas est animi motus, cogente nullo, ad aliquid vel non amittendum, vel 
adipiscendum)’114 and later explained ‘this was said for the purpose of drawing a distinction 
between willing and not willing.  Thus intentio would be attributed to those who, as the first 
ones in paradise, were the source of evil for the human race.  They were under no compulsion 
to sin, that is, to sin by free will, for they knowingly acted against the precept, and the tempter 
persuaded them to do this but did not compel them.’115  This not only defeated Manichee 
determinism by putting the blame on the free choice of the will for its own direction but also, 
against the philosophers, it makes clear that it was not a lack of understanding which had 
caused the moral failure because Adam and Eve had acted, knowing the precept.   
 
The Will (voluntas) as desire 
For Augustine, linguistically, the will was synonymous with desire; to say ‘My will is’ 
is the same as saying ‘I desire.’116  Ontologically, too, they were identical, though some 
confusion seems to have been generated through a difference in scholarly opinion on this.117 
                                                          
114 duab. an. 10:14. 
115 retr. 1:15:3. 
116 ciu. 14:8:2.  
117 This is pointed out by O’Donnell conf. 1:1:1 who says Peter Brown approaches the position of Jansen, who 
distinguished delectatio from voluntas, and made the former a determining force on the latter; against this view 
and treating the two as identical, see Gilson 1961: 321 n. 81-323 n. 84. 
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Although the same movement of mind is referred to when we speak of desire and will, 
Augustine prefers to reserve the term ‘will’ for the movement to the extent that it is a free 
movement (and that depends on the extent to which it has been freed by grace) and otherwise 
to call the will, utter cupidity, (In tantum enim libera est, in quantum liberata est, et in tantum 
appellatur voluntas. Alioquin tota cupiditas quam voluntas proprie nuncupanda est )…. ‘and 
if anyone says that this desire is nothing else than the will, although vicious and enslaved to 
sin, he ought not to be contradicted.’118  When Augustine says that, before the Fall, there was 
no opposition between desire and will (voluntati cupiditas), which only came subsequently as 
a punishment,119 he is not, then, referring to two separate movements of mind but to the single 
will which is at war with itself.120  Against the Manichees, he was particularly keen to stress 
that it was not a second and alien nature that prevented us from loving God, but the division of 
our single will into many conflicting wills.121  
 
intentio voluntatis as direction of the will 
Intentio voluntatis is, then the direction of our will.  It is this that determines where we 
place our attention.  Therefore, when in trin., Augustine exhorts the mind to turn the intentio 
voluntatis, which had been straying about through other things, to think about itself 
(Cognoscat ergo semetipsam, nec quasi absentem se quaerat, sed intentionem voluntatis qua 
per alia vagabatur statuat in se ipsa et se cogitet),122 this may well be thought of as an 
exhortation to engage in some kind of exercise of inward attention, but it is also a recognition 
that acts of inward attention require a conversion in the direction of our desire; it is in fact an 
exhortation to direct all our desire and attention to ‘coming into (invenire)’ ourselves, as a 
preliminary to discovering ourselves in God: this is about an alignment of our will with the 
Will of God.123  
                                                          
118 retr. 1:15:4.   
119 ciu. 14:12. 
120 Nor is the conflict indicative of two natures, duab. an. 13:19. He speaks movingly, and famously, about his 
experience of his own will being in a state of conflict with itself throughout conf. 8.  
121 This is the subject-matter of duab. an. 
122 trin. 10:8:11. 
123 conf. 9:1:1. ‘The nub of the problem was to reject my own will and to desire yours.’ See chapter 6 infra for 
more on this. 
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Augustine identified our will as being the thing in us most resembling the Holy Spirit 
because the Holy Spirit is the person of the Trinity which can best be described as the Love 
and Will of God: ‘If any person in the trinity is to be distinctively called the will of God, this 
name like charity124  fits the Holy Spirit more than the others.  What else after all is caritas but 
the will?’125  The Holy Spirit is that by which the other two persons of the Trinity are joined to 
each other, ‘by which the begotten is loved by the one who begets him and in turn loves the 
begetter.’126  Our will, through intentio, has a similar connecting function for it links the two 
other components in an act of vision, whether it is an act of corporeal, spiritual or intellectual 
vision though, unlike the Holy Spirit, it can break the chain at any time by failing to perform 
its fastening and separating function.127  Augustine refers to Hilary of Poitiers’ description of 
the special properties of each person in the Trinity, ‘Eternity in the Father, form in the image, 
use in the gift’ and says that by ‘use’ (being the special property of the Holy Spirit) Hilary 
meant love, delight, felicity or blessedness (dilectio,128 delectatio, felicitas vel beatitudo,) and, 
through this use, the role of the Holy Spirit is to see that all created things keep to their right 
order and rest in their right places,129 including reforming us into the image and likeness of 
God by pouring caritas into our hearts (Rom 5:5).130    
 
Caritas is the will at its best, for it is the purest, and most worthy, form of love,131 
                                                          
124 Gerber 2012: 127 says that no one before Augustine in the Latin tradition had called the Holy Spirit caritas . 
The first time Augustine does is in an. quant. 34:77.  
125 trin. 15:17:29; 15:20:38. Augustine points out that scripture does not say that the Holy Spirit is charity but 
that God is charity and he goes on to consider which of the three persons of the trinity the name is most 
appropriately applied to trin. 15:17:27 f. 
126 trin. 6:5:7. trin. 8:10:14 ‘And what is love but a kind of life coupling together or seeking to couple together 
two things namely lover and what is being loved’ (Quid est ergo amor, nisi quaedam vita duo aliqua copulans, 
vel copulari appetens, amantem scilicet, et quod amatur?) 
 
127 trin. 11:3:15-16.  
128 This is a synonym for caritas ep. 186:2; diu. qu. 83:35:2; 36:1; ep. Io. tr. 8:5; en. Ps. 9:15; s 53:11; s. 68:13; 
disc. chr. 5; trin. 8:10: 14; 15:18:32.  
129 trin. 6:10:11.  
130 mor. 1:13:23; 1:17:31; uera rel. 12:25; conf. 13:7:8 (note how early these passages are). See infra for our 
inability to transform ourselves. 
131 diu. qu. 83:35:2; diu. qu. 83:36 amended by retr. 1:26. trin. 15:7:12 also here dilectio sive voluntas (the two 
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being ‘a movement of the mind directed towards enjoyment of God for his own sake and 
loving of oneself and one’s neighbour for God’s sake.’132  To the extent that it is not caritas, 
the will is cupiditas: ‘a movement of the mind directed towards enjoying oneself and 
neighbour for their own sake.’133  Augustine observed that scripture commanded nothing but 
caritas and censured nothing but cupiditas (non autem praecipit scriptura nisi caritatem, nec 
culpat nisi cupiditatem) and that everything that we read in scripture is designed to nourish 
and fortify caritas and overcome cupiditas.134  The exhortation in trin. to change the direction 
of the will is therefore, in effect, an exhortation to the gradual transformation of the will from 
cupiditas to caritas, since we can love nothing, except through the will.   
 
Augustine speaks of the transformation of the direction of the will as ‘the transference 
of weight from cupiditas to caritas.’135  A weight is a kind of force within each thing that 
makes it strain toward its proper place (pondus enim est impetus quidam cuiusque rei, velut 
conantis ad locum suum; hoc est pondus)136 and to talk about the change in the direction of the 
will as a transference of weight is to recognize that desire (synonymous as we have seen with 
will) acts like a weight137 so that, just as it is the will that directs and coordinates the body’s 
movements from place to place, so it is the will that directs the mind’s attention, moving it ab 
exteriora ad interiora.  It is the weight of an object which draws it to its proper place of rest 
                                                          
words are used interchangeably). Also trin. 15:21:41 ‘will at its most effective is synonymous with love or 
esteem’ (vel amorem seu dilectionem quae valentior est voluntas). 
132 doctr. chr. 3:10:16. 
133 Ibid. Taking his cue from scripture (1 John 2:16), Augustine reckoned that cupiditas generally manifested 
itself in three forms: lust of the flesh, (by which he means physical/material lust); lust of the eyes (intellectual 
curiosity) and ambition of this world (idol worship). The threefold nature of temptation is exemplified by the 
temptation of Christ (uera rel. 38:71). 
134 doctr. chr. 3:10:15. Also ep. 18:2 ‘One who believes in Christ does not love the lowest, is not proud over the 
intermediate, and thus becomes fit to cling to the highest.  And this is the whole of what we are commanded, 
admonished and set afire to do..’ Also mus. 6:14:43 ‘ the holy Scriptures in so many volumes and with such 
authority and sanctity tell us nothing but this, that we shall love our God and Lord with all our heart and with all 
our soul and with all our mind and love our neighbour as ourselves.  Thus if we direct all these movements and 
rhythms of our human activity to this end we will undoubtedly be purified.’ 
135 ep. 157.2.9. ‘the mind is carried by its love as if by a weight wherever it is carried we are commanded 
therefore to take away from the weight of cupiditas what is added to the weight of caritas until the former is 
done away with and the latter made perfect.’  
136 en. Ps. 29:2:10. 
137 conf. 13:9:10; mus. 6.11.29 delectatio quippe quasi pondus est animae. delectatio ergo ordinat animam..  
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and stability (pondus omnem rem ad quietem ac stabilitatem trahit)138 and, until things are in 
their proper place, they will remain restless.139  There are two kinds of weight: weights which 
bear downwards, like the body and weights which bear upwards like oil on water; if water is 
poured onto oil, it pushes downwards until it reaches its proper place because it is heavier than 
oil and, similarly, oil will push its way upwards through water until it reaches its proper place 
on the surface.140  The weight of the body bears it downwards and the key question is what 
kind of weight is moving the soul?  Is it being weighed down by bodily desires (cupiditas) or 
buoyed up by heavenly ones (caritas)?141  The soul does not come to rest in a physical 
location, but in its love 142 and if it seeks to rest in its love of bodily things, or even in itself,143 
it will be unsatisfied and unhappy.144  We will be brought to our place of rest in communion 
with the saints in God, only by a good will,145 in other words, only by caritas or loving God.   
 
True self-knowledge requires us to love ourselves properly (and in fact Augustine 
suggests that this is true of any kind of knowledge:  it is technically possible to know 
something without loving it properly e.g.  When you have learnt mathematics you know it but 
                                                          
138 Gn. litt. 4:3:7.  Augustine suggests that the impulse of inanimate objects is something like a desire to be in 
their allotted place, `if we were stones waves wind or flame or anything of that kind lacking sense and life we 
would still show something like a desire for our own place and order, for the specific gravity of a body is in a 
manner its love whether a body tends downwards by reason of its heaviness or strives upwards because of its 
lightness.  A material body is borne along by its weight in a particular direction as a soul by its love’ ciu. 11:38.  
139 conf. 13:9:10 once ordered, they find their rest (minus ordinata inquieta sunt; ordinantur et quiescent). Here 
Augustine picks up the theme of the restless heart in conf. 1:1:1.  See also lib. arb. 3:8:23, ‘What is at rest is not 
nothing.  Indeed it has fuller being than what is restless.’ See also lib. arb. 3:7:21 we have a desire to exist and if 
we desire more being we will draw near to Him who exists supremely and complete rest is complete existence.  
140 en. Ps. 29:2:10; conf. 13:9:10; ep. 55:10:18. Though water, like the soul, can go in two directions: it can 
freeze into ice or snow or dissolve into vapour, ex. prop. Rm. 49.  
141 en. Ps. 121:1:  ‘Every love has its own force; and it cannot lie idle in the soul of the lover.  Love must draw 
the soul on.  Do you, then, wish to know the character of a love?  See where it leads.’ mus. 6.11.29, delectatio 
quippe quasi pondus est animae. delectatio ergo ordinat animam. ‘ubi enim erit thesaurus tuus, ibi erit et cor 
tuum’: ubi delectatio, ibi thesaurus: ubi autem cor, ibi beatitudo aut miseria.' 
142 en. Ps. 9:15. Amore enim movetur tamquam ad locum quo tendit. Locus autem animae non in spatio aliquo 
est, quod forma occupat corporis, sed in delectatione, quo se pervenisse per amorem laetatur: delectatio autem 
perniciosa sequitur cupiditatem, fructuosa caritatem. 
143 Loving oneself in place of God is cupiditas ep. 18:2; trin. 12:11:16 ‘over weighted with self-heaviness’; ep. 
55:10:18 ; ‘When therefore the soul finds delight in itself it does not yet find delight in an immutable reality and 
for this reason it is still proud because it regards itself as the highest, though God is higher.’  . 
144 ep. 18:2; ep. 140.2.3; Io. eu. tr. 20:11; conf. 7:7:11; Gn. adu. Man. 2:9:12; 2.15.22; mus. 6:5:13. 
145 conf. 13:9:10.  
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if it is directed towards being wealthy or pleasing men then it is not loved properly.)146  With 
regard to self-knowledge, Augustine puts it simply that  although the human mind is so 
constructed that it cannot help but remember itself, understand itself and love itself, the love 
that it loves itself with may be a twisted sort of love which really leads to self-destruction 
rather than self-fulfilment.  We only know how to love ourselves properly when we love God; 
because this serves our best interest.  For we have been so made that it is to our advantage to 
be in subjection to God and it is calamitous for us to act according to our own will and not to 
obey the will of God: turning to ourselves we become less real than when we are turned 
towards God.147   
 
Intentio voluntatis not apatheia as the key to the summit of perfection 
There is a noticeable difference between Augustine and the philosophical tradition out 
of which he emerged, about the place of emotion in the life of a wise man.  The philosophical 
tradition regarded emotion as something to be kept to an unavoidable minimum by being 
rationally controlled (Platonists) or something to be eliminated altogether (Stoics); a 
difference which Augustine following Cicero, regarded as being a matter of words rather than 
substance.148  Instead of experiencing perturbationes animi, a Stoic wise man experienced 
constant states (which the Greeks called eupatheiai and Cicero called constantiae): will, 
gladness and caution; will replacing desire in the wise man (pro cupiditate voluntatem,) and 
which would, notably, only pursue the good (Voluntas quippe, inquiunt, appetit bonum, quod 
facit sapiens.)149  This was the immoveable state in which the Stoic wise man lived, a state 
which the Greeks called apatheia (ἀπάθεια) and ‘which in Latin might be translated 
impassibilitas, if such a word existed (quae si latine posset impassibilitas diceretur).’150  One 
                                                          
146 diu. qu. 83:35; doctr. chr. 2:57. 
147 trin. 14:11:18. 
148 Ibid. 9:4. As proof of this, Augustine recounted the story told by Gellius in Noct. Att. about a philosopher who 
paled in the face of a storm at sea. In his defence, the philosopher, relying upon the Stoic, Epictetus, explained 
that images arise in our minds unbidden which provoke a knee-jerk reaction, but this does not amount to emotion 
because we haven’t had time for a rationalized response and it is this considered response, not the involuntary 
first movement, which determines the presence of emotion. 
149 ciu. 14:8:1. Gladness replaced joy and caution replaced fear. There was no constant state to replace grief 
because grief relates to evil which does not affect the wise man and so there is no need for provision of a 
disposition to meet with it. See also c. Faust. 22:18. 
150 ciu. 14:9:4. Jerome used it to translate apatheia in ep. 133:3 according to Lewis and Short, who do not record 
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of the possible meanings of impassibilitas was a life without experiencing perturbationes in 
defiance of reason.  In this sense of the word, Augustine didn’t accept that it was a state 
achievable in this life, however desirable it might be151 because the battle of the flesh and 
spirit continues throughout life.152   
 
However, it was possible to reach a state where, although the emotions occurred, they 
were completely controlled by reason.153  In this respect, Augustine linked impassibilitas with 
fortitude, ‘the disposition of the soul, through which it fears no adversities or death,’154 which 
is a certain kind of steady and, so to speak, impassible power which rightly, unless you would 
like to object, is called fortitude.155  In our journey from cupiditas to caritas, the lessening of 
fear is the sign of our progress and the absence of fear is the sign of its perfection for the root 
of all evils is cupiditas and love made perfect casts out fear.156  It is in this sense perhaps that 
Augustine approves Vergil’s characterization of the wise man that ‘of the wise man only can it 
be truly said “calmly he stands, like a motionless rock in the turbulent sea-surge,’’’157   
 
Augustine did hold out those leading the hermit life, as exemplary Christians, able to 
                                                          
any other instances.  
151 ciu. 14:9:4. impassibilitas was something reserved for the next life en. Ps. 83:17 and for God qu. 2:158 Deus, 
semper atque omni modo incommutabilis atque tranquillus NB n. 153 infra on God’s anger not being a 
perturbation. 
152 He doesn’t actually admit that he changed his mind on this but he did admit that a statement early on 
suggesting that a person could reach a state where there was no rebellious movement against reason was 
problematic s. dom. m. 1:4:11 and he therefore later explained that this was to be understood in the sense that 
some people managed to overcome the desires which were still present, rather than succumb to them retr. 1:19:1.  
Similarly, when he said in the next paragraph s. dom. m. 1:4:12 that these things could be realized in this life as 
they were realized by the apostles, he did not mean to imply that the apostles experienced no movement contrary 
to reason but that it was possible to overcome them to the extent that apostles managed to.  
153 ciu. 9:3. Speaking of demons, Augustine says, ‘And therefore they are not worthy of comparison with wise 
men who, even under the conditions of their present life, offer the resistance of an undisturbed mind to those 
disturbances of the soul from which human weakness cannot be exempt.’  
154 mus. 6:15:50.  
155 mus. 6:16:54. 
156 diu. qu. 83:36:1. However, this is inordinate fear. Fear of God must last a lifetime. s. 205:1 the Christian 
ought to hang on the cross continually throughout the whole of his life which is spent amid trials and temptations.  
The time doesn’t come for pulling out the nails in this life. Flesh means lusts of the flesh and the nails are the 
commandments of justice and we are transfixed with by the fear of the Lord. On the difference between the two 
kinds of fear see exp. Gal 53.   
157 Aeneid 7:585 quoted ord. 2:20:54. 
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cling unswervingly to God and, in a sense, leading a life beyond normal human limits; one 
that most people would not tolerate.158  And he did observe that Christian monastics living in 
community also live a life entirely directed towards God (intentissimam in Deum).159  But he 
did not mean by this that they had reached a state of apatheia, on the contrary they had 
reached a point where their love was entirely directed towards God.  Neither did he mean to 
imply that this was a perfected state of love which, as he later clarified in respect of another 
part of mor., could only be achieved after this life, but they were doing the best that could be 
achieved during this life.160  
 
Vergil’s characterization of the wise man as a motionless rock hardly describes the 
kind of rock (the Apostle Peter) upon which the Church was built. Quite the contrary of being 
apathetic, as O’Donnell has noted, Augustine’s Christian is an emotional person.161  This 
brings us to the other meaning of impassibilitas that Augustine mooted: apatheia as a life 
untouched by emotion characterized by Vergil’s comment on Aeneas, ‘Unmoved his mind, 
the tears roll down in vain.’162  Augustine said that such insensitivity was undesirable and the 
worst of all moral defects,163 ‘a man’s mind, like the limbs of his body, is only the more 
hopelessly diseased when it has lost even the feeling of pain.’164  To have a mind untouched 
by emotion is to be inhuman rather than tranquil and, unless a person is stirred by fellow-
feeling, they are unlikely to be moved merely out of a sense of duty.165  A Christian may have 
good reason to experience an emotion, just as God has good reason to be angry.166  Augustine 
                                                          
158 mor. 1:31:65-6. 
159 mor. 1:31:67. See also n. 156 supra. 
160 retr. 1:7:5 clarifying mor. 1:30:64.  This is not evidence of a change of mind but an example of where his 
involvement in the Pelagian controversy caused him to reflect on passages he had written which were liable to 
misinterpretation. 
161 O’Donnell conf. 10:14:22. 
162 Vergil Aeneid 4:449 Quoted by Augustine ciu 9:4. The tears are Dido’s. 
163 ciu. 14:9:4. 
164 Io. eu. tr. 60:3. 
165 mor. 1: 27:54. This is Paul’s distinction between law and grace, see infra. 
166 Io. eu. tr. 60:3. On God’s anger as not being a perturbatio animi en. Ps. 2:4; qu. 1:39; 2:10; 2:158; ciu. 15:25; 
trin. 13:16:21. Colish 1985, 2: 221 notes that it was the partly the problem of explaining God’s anger which lead 
Augustine to change his mind on the possibility and desirability of achieving tranquillitas in the sense of 
apatheia in the early works. I have to disagree with Colish on this point because Augustine makes it quite clear 
what he meant by tranquillitas in the early works when he comes to revise his work and this is not a point on 
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demonstrated from scripture and from secular literature that will and the other constantiae 
were common to good and bad alike and that the perturbationes animi were also common to 
good and bad alike but that the good felt these emotions in a good way, the bad felt them in a 
bad way; 167 it all depended on the direction of the will and therefore the object to which these 
emotions related or referred.  Christians who feel fear, desire, pain and gladness in conformity 
with scripture and the teaching of the Church, experience these emotions in the proper way 
because their love is properly directed towards God.168  In fact the perturbationes animi are 
nothing other than wills (Voluntas est quippe in omnibus; immo omnes nihil aliud quam 
voluntates sunt)169 and the direction of the will thus becomes the determining factor in valuing 
the appropriateness of emotion, rather than the presence or absence of emotion.170  Spiritual 
perfection or tranquillitas for Augustine, then, is not apatheia as it was for Evagrius.171  It is 
not a question of rationally controlled emotion, in the sense of keeping emotions to minimum, 
but emotion agreeing with reason and truth; the difference being that due allowance is given to 
the presence of emotion: 
 
The emotions of the spirit, after all, are not something alien to us.  They also browse 
together with us on the knowledge of the best ideas and moral principles and of eternal 
life, as it were on seed-bearing grasses and fruit trees and green plants.  And this is 
what gives us a happy and tranquil life, when all our emotions are in tune with reason 
and truth, and we call them joys and loves that are holy and chaste and good.172  
 
                                                          
which he said he had changed his mind but one which required clarification in case it should be misunderstood. 
Tranquillitas here did not equate to impassibilitas there. 
167 ciu. 14:8:3. en. Ps. 79:13 all sins spring from desire or fear and love and fear lead us to every right action 
O’Donnell notes that conf. 6 and 7 both end with expressions of fear, but by the quality of the fear in each case 
the difference may be measured. There, fear of death and the void; here, holy fear in the presence of God.  
168 ciu. 14:9:1. 
169 ciu. 14:6. Although I agree with Wetzel 1992: 101 n. 26 that to translate voluntates by ‘forms of will’ is 
preferable to ‘acts of will’ which would imply a distinction between the passions and the will, I think even his 
translation obscures the fact that we are talking about one will which has been split into many (conf. 8:10:24 tota 
voluntas una, quae in plures dividebatur).  
170 ciu. 14:6. 
171 Hadot 1995: 136f. 
172 Gn. adu. Man. 1:20,31. 
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Conversion of intentio voluntatis through prayer. 
 
Ingrained nature of the weakness of the will 
Augustine stressed the importance of ongoing purification,173 due to the fact that 
scripture and tradition (he relied on the Apostle Paul and the Fathers: Cyprian, Hilary, 
Ambrose, Gregory of Nazianzus) regarded the guilt of the original sin as having been removed 
in baptism but a residual weakness as residing in the will.174  This was due to the effects of the 
original sin compounded by our own bad habits.175  Those effects can be summed up in the 
one word ‘mortality:’176 physical in the case of the body; spiritual in the case of the soul, due 
to the soul’s inclinations away from God.  This is now our second nature.177  Augustine 
explains, very insightfully, the process by which the habit of living according to the flesh 
(consuetudo carnalis)178 becomes ingrained in a human being.179  Reflecting on his own 
experience and his inability to let go of his sexual habit, he observed that his will had become 
imprisoned by a chain, the links of which had been formed from desire, consent, habit, 
unresistance and necessity so that, although he desired to enjoy God, this desire was not strong 
enough to conquer his old desire which had the strength of long existence.180  Augustine 
understood this conflict of desires to be the state of inner conflict Paul referred to, which led 
                                                          
173 See n. 24 supra. 
174 c. Iul. 2:3:5; 2:8:30; ep. 185:9:39 This is why we say daily-‘forgive us our trespasses’-we wouldn’t need to 
say this if all our sins had been forgiven in baptism. .   
175 exp. Gal.  48; diu. qu. 83:66:5; Simpl. 1:1:10 and 11; c. Fel. 2:8. On the development of the idea of ‘habit’ in 
Augustine see Prendiville 1972.  
176 exp. Gal. 48; lib. arb. 3:19:54; Gn. litt. 6:22:33; Gn. adu. Man. 2:7:8; pecc. mer. 1:2:2. This is of course the 
mortality of the body but he also regarded the soul that was constrained by carnal habit as in a dead condition 
conf. 9:1:1.  
177 exp. Gal.  48; f. et symb. 10:23 Evil inclinations of this sort, contrary to nature, are in keeping with our mortal 
birth because of the sin of the first human being (also lib. arb. 3:18:52.)  The idea of habit as having become our 
second nature had come to Augustine through Cicero from Aristotle, see Prendiville 1972:77. NB In f. et symb. 
10:23 (written in 393) Augustine resorts to a tripartite division of human being spirit, soul and body to explain 
the continuing experience of the spirit warring against the flesh and he explains that soul is slower than spirit to 
come under control.  
178 The context may show this consuetudo carnalis to be either a fleshbound habit of thought as in trin. 8:1:2 or a 
behavioural habit as in conf. 7:17:23 where Augustine is referring to his sexual habit. ciu. 14:13:1 God sheds 
light for us to see and fire to love and, turned away from Him, we become chilled in loving and blind in 
ignorance.  
179 s. dom. m. 1:12:34. 
180 conf. 8:5.10. 
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him to say, ‘I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do.’181  Paul 
described it as a conflict between the law of God, which Augustine interpreted as meaning 
‘You shall not covert’ i.e.  desire inordinately (Condelector enim, inquit, legi Dei secundum 
interiorem hominem, ei utique legi quae dicit: Non concupisces)182 and the law of sin which, 
Augustine said, was ‘the violence of habit (lex enim peccati est violentia consuetudinis).183  
This resembles the distinction that Paul also makes between the spirit and the flesh sarx-
pneuma (σάρξ - πνεῦμα) in Gal. 5:17 which Augustine, following Ambrose,184 again 
interpreted as the tension between conflicting desires, rather than a distinction between the 
body and soul.185   
 
Although, when Augustine was describing his conflict of wills in conf. 8, he was 
referring to his pre-baptismal state, he continues to allude to his ongoing struggle to control 
the various ways in which cupiditas manifested itself in his life after baptism.186  Although he 
had originally understood Paul in Rom. 7:15 f to be referring to a person who had not yet 
received the grace of baptism, he later admitted that he had been wrong and that it did apply to 
people who were already under grace.187   A baptized person would continue to experience 
tension throughout his life between the call of the Spirit and the tug of the flesh: ‘the spirit 
calls him upwards, the weight of the flesh pulls him downwards again; the tension between 
                                                          
181 Rom. 7:15; 7:19. 
182 Simpl. 1:Q1:13 and 16. This is Rom. 7:22, a verse which Augustine quotes extensively throughout his corpus 
from Simpl. onwards. 
183 conf. 8:5:12. 
184 For Ambrose’s view see Colish 2005: 36-7; 80. For Ambrose detachment from the body and withdrawal 
inwards means moderation rather than flight from the body Ibid. 90-1 and 96.  Ambrose’s four patriarch treatises 
Abr., Isaac, Iacob and Ioseph were based on sermons he gave during pre-baptismal catechesis in which he 
imparted ethical teaching for the ordinary Christian, Colish Ibid. 2. Augustine would therefore have had this 
teaching from Ambrose. 
185 doctr. chr. 1:24:25.  This was by no means a universal interpretation of the Pauline distinction. See Jewett 
1971 for history of interpretation of Paul’s σάρξ - πνεῦμα distinction. Jewett shows that, unlike Augustine who  
interpreted σάρξ in Paul as man in revolt from God,  the Greek Fathers, Cyril of Alexandria and Theodore of 
Mopsuestia had identified σάρξ with σῶμα and therefore with material sensuality. 
186 conf. 10:28:39 f.  
187 retr. 1:24:.2 corrects exp. Gal. 47.1; retr. 2:1:1 corrects Simpl. 1:1:10; retr. 1:23:1 corrects exp. prop. Rom. 41 
and retr. 1:26:1 corrects diu. qu. 83:66. Augustine’s view only changed in the Pelagian controversy see c. ep. 
Pel. 1:10:17- 1:11:24; s. 154. Also c. Iul. 2:3:5; In gr. et pecc. or. 43 Pelagius argued that Augustine’s view ran 
counter to the Catholic tradition. In c. Iul. 2:4:9 Augustine quotes Cyprian, Ambrose and Gregory of Nazianzen 
as three Catholic voices in support of his view. For a good account of the Pelagian controversy see Bonner 2002. 
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these two - the upward pull and the dragging weight - is a struggle, and struggle is 
characteristic of the pressing-out process  (spiritus sursum uocat, pondus carnis deorsum 
reuocat; inter duos conatus suspensionis et ponderis colluctatio quaedam est. et ipsa 
colluctatio ad pressuram pertinet torcularis.)’188  
 
However, what the words, ‘I do not do what I want’ mean in the case of a person under 
grace is that they are still subject to desires of the flesh that they do not want; it does not mean 
that they consent to them.189  Consent was the third step in the commission of a sin (the other 
two being suggestion and pleasure) and there can be no sin unless all three steps are present.190 
Each potential commission of sin is always a replay of the scene in Eden with the suggestion 
being made, as it were, by the serpent through our senses or to our thought through memory 
and the carnal pleasure we experience at the suggestion representing Eve.  The question is 
whether, this time, Adam can withhold his consent so that ‘we can become like a married 
couple in ourselves’ where the spirit (Adam) can control the flesh (Eve).191  The difficulty that 
the weakened soul has in this respect can be appreciated by Augustine’s likening of it to 
Lazarus rotting in the tomb.192 
 
Our will has in fact been left so weakened by the effects of original sin that, although 
the gift of faith and our regeneration in baptism, removed the guilt of the original sin, it was 
not enough to lessen the force of our ingrained habits towards the flesh193 which, instead, must 
be counteracted by developing the opposite habit of withdrawing inwards away from the 
senses (Qui tamen ut se noscat, magna opus habet consuetudine recedendi a sensibus, et 
                                                          
188 en. Ps. 83:9.  
189 retr. 1:24:2. This change of understanding of the relevant provisions of Rom. does not mean that Augustine 
changed his mind on whether or not a person continued to be disturbed by passions after baptism. He didn’t –he 
had always understood that a person would continue to be disturbed but that with grace he was given the strength 
to withhold his consent. The difference between a person under the law and under grace was that the person 
under the law did not have this strength and therefore would succumb, even though knowing it was wrong and 
not wanting to.  
190 s. dom. m. 1:12:34.  
191 Gn. adu. Man. 2:12:16; 2:14:20-21; s. dom. m. 1:12:34; trin. 12:12:17 on the steps of commission of sin being 
personified by characters in Eden.  
192 s. dom. m. 1:12:35; diu. qu. 83:65; Io. eu. tr. 49; s. 125. 
193 c. Iul. 2:5:10. 
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animum in seipsum colligendi atque in seipso retinendi.)194  This was the advice given by 
Augustine to his pupils in the ‘School of Philosophy’ at Cassiciacum and was clearly advice 
both of an intellectual and ethical nature; designed to train their intellects and wills.  However, 
it was not specifically an exhortation to prayer but instead to engage in communal 
philosophical dialogue; solitary meditation; some reading (possibly of the scriptures) and 
perhaps other forms of spiritual exercises.  By the time Augustine wrote trin., or at least by the 
time he completed it in 420, he was clear that, although we can exercise our will freely for 
good, it must first be prepared by God (praeparatur uoluntas a domino)195 pouring sufficient 
caritas into our hearts.196 This means that for a person of faith, the habit that must be 
developed is the habit of prayer.197  Prayer is therefore given as our post-baptismal remedy198 
to enable us, still struggling with cupiditas, to pray for strength not to consent to inordinate 
desire on the basis that prayer is the only avenue we have left; 199 and, even then, our ability to 
pray is dependent on the Holy Spirit moving in us to turn our groanings into prayers.200  
 
In the light of our continuing weakness of will and our inability to exercise our will for 
good, without it first being prepared by God, the exhortation in trin. to change the direction of 
                                                          
194 ord. 1:1:3. Prendiville 1972: 47. 
195 ‘The will is prepared by God’ Prov. 8:35 LXX. Augustine relies upon this provision from 411 onwards (see 
Sage 1964) and also on Phil. 2:13 ‘For it is God who is at work in you, enabling you both to will and to work for 
his good pleasure.’ (Deus enim est qui operatur in nobis et velle et operari pro bona voluntate) for his view that 
we can do nothing without God e.g.s where both are cited see c. ep. Pel. 1:18:36 and c. Iul. 4:3:15. He also relies 
on 1 Cor. 4:7 ‘what have we got that we have not received.’ This provision is the ultimate antidote to pride, 
praed. sanct 5:10 where Augustine distinguishes between the capacity to have faith which, like the capacity to 
love, belongs to our nature and therefore is common to all and actually having faith or proper love which belongs 
to the grace of believers. He always held the view that God had to prepare the will before we could will for good, 
but he hadn’t made the point early on because it wasn’t pertinent to discussion, therefore he made amendments to 
various early writings to clarify this retr. 1:10:2 clarifying Gn. adu. Man. 1:3:6; retr. 1:22:4 clarifying c. Adim. 
26:1 and 27:1. 
196 We are praying for power to exercise our will because we need rescuing en. Ps. 16:6; c. ep. Pel. 4:9:26; util. 
cred. 15. 33; ep. 218:3; not simply for the purpose of showing men what to desire and love, as the Pelagians 
thought gr. et pecc. or. 6:32 . 
197 For how this works in practice see ep 2*:passim to Firmus for an extremely clear statement of Augustine’s 
view on the workings of providence working externally and internally.  
198 s. 131:7. 
199 retr. 1:15:4. Also s. 75:4 When all human efforts and endeavours have been tried and found unavailing, then 
all that’s left to them is the urgent pouring out of their voices to God in prayer; en. Ps. 68:1:17. ‘My orientation 
was toward you-but how did I manage that? By praying to you;’. 
200 Gn. adu. Man. 1:22:34.  
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the will begins to look very different.  Instead of thinking of it as being an exhortation to 
engage in some kind of intellectual exercise of abstraction, we might do better to think of it as 
an invitation to prayer; yet prayer for Augustine, like the philosophical exercises of antiquity, 
is very much in the tradition of philosophic or spiritual withdrawal into oneself: it is an 
exercise in paying attention, with words being used as physical things should be used, to 
admonish us to turn our attention to God;201 it is also an exercise of abstraction: letting go of 
everything that distracts us from God that is not God;202 it is an act of conversion;203 it is an 
act of interiority;204 it is an act of faith;205 it is a purifying act.206  But more than anything else, 
it is an act indicative of the direction of our desire207 for Augustine saw the Christian life 
primarily as an exercise in holy desire, because the more we can get into the habit of loving 
God, the more we can counteract our former bad habit of loving ourselves or other things 
disproportionately: ‘That is our life, to be trained by longing; and our training through the 
                                                          
201 ‘The brothers in Egypt are said to say frequent prayers, but very brief ones that are tossed off as if in a rush, so 
that a vigilant and keen attention (intentio,) which is very necessary for one who prays, may not fade away and 
grow dull over longer periods (ne illa vigilanter erecta, quae oranti plurimum necessaria est, per productiores 
moras evanescat atque hebetetur intentio.) And in this way they show that, just as this intentio should not grow 
dull if it cannot last long, so it should not be quickly broken off if it does last. Let many words, after all, be kept 
far from our prayer, but let our petitions not lack persistence, if the attention (intentio) remains fervent’ ep. 
130:10:20. Also ep. 130:9:18, mag. 1:2.  
202 Once we have shut out the distractions of the outside world, we have to contend with our thoughts which are 
primarily what distract us from God in prayer: en. Ps. 17:11; uera rel. 35:65; conf. 10:36:57; en. Ps. 34:2:3; s. 
dom. m. 2:3:11; en. Ps. 3:4; s. 8:6; en. Ps. 37 :11; en. Ps. 85:7. 
203 ‘There takes place in prayer a turning of the heart to Him who is ever ready to give if we will but accept what 
He gives. And in this turning there is effected a cleansing of the inner eye’ Fit ergo in oratione conversio cordis 
ad eum qui semper dare paratus est, si nos capiamus quod dederit, et in ipsa conversione purgatio interioris 
oculi.) s. dom. m. 2:3:14.   
204 Like Ambrose (Cain. 1:9:35; 1:9: 38) Augustine interiorized Matt. 6:6 that ‘whenever you pray, go into your 
room and shut the door and pray to your Father who is in secret.’  He interpreted ‘room’ as the ‘sanctum of the 
mind’ for, ‘what are these chambers (cubicula) but the hearts themselves which are also signified in the Psalm 
when it is said, ‘the things you say in your hearts, also be sorry for them upon your beds (cubilibus).’ And, after 
having closed the doors, He says, pray to your Father in secret.’ s. dom. m. 2:3:11; Also mag. 1:2; en. Ps 3:4.   
205 conf. 1:1 ‘calling upon you is an act of believing in you.’ Prayer and faith exist in a symbiotic relationship: 
prayer is an act of faith and it also strengthens faith; . s. 115:1 ‘If faith falters, prayer perishes.  I mean who are 
going to pray to what they don’t believe? ..faith is the fountainhead of prayer…so in order to pray, let us believe; 
and in order that the very faith by which we pray may not fail, let us pray.  Faith pours out prayer, prayer being 
poured out obtains firmness for faith’. 
206 s. dom. m. 2:3:14  ‘The very intention of prayer calms the heart, makes it clean, and renders it more capable of 
receiving the divine gifts which are poured upon us in a spiritual manner (quia ipsa orationis intentio cor 
nostrum serenat et purgat, capaciusque efficit ad excipienda divina munera, quae spiritaliter nobis 
infunduntur…..’ 
207 For Augustine paying attention to God was tantamount to loving God Deus…quem attendere, hoc est quod 
amare) sol. 1:1:3; and to call on the name of God was to exercise a rational choice for God en. Ps. 79:14. 
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holy longing advances in the measure that our longings are severed from the love of this 
world.’  (Tota vita christiani boni, sanctum desiderium est. ….Haec est vita nostra, ut 
desiderando exerceamur. Tantum autem nos exercet sanctum desiderium, quantum desideria 
nostra amputaverimus ab amore saeculi.)208  
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we have been considering the stage of ascent which Augustine calls 
tranquillitas in an. quant. and which in trin., as well as in an. quant., is the stage where we 
gain more insight into ourselves and our imperfections and instead of seeing ourselves as 
isolated individuals at the centre of our own universe, we begin to see ourselves as part of a 
whole; in relation to others and in the light of Christ.  These insights are fostered by engaging 
in various forms of spiritual exercises; the most transformative of which is prayer.  Although 
prayer, like the old intellectual exercises, is a practice of paying attention, the difference 
between an act of prayer and an intellectual exercise is the underlying attitude it is indicative 
of, which is one of acknowledging our creaturely dependence and inability to help ourselves 
and the act of intentio, (conversion, desire, attention and faith) is therefore specifically 
directed towards God.  
 
The whole process hinges on the transformation of the will.  The fact that Augustine 
took a distinct step towards establishing the notion of a will (voluntas) and the key role which 
the will plays in Augustine’s theology are both well-established.209  Cicero had defined 
voluntas as ‘one’s faculty, or exercise, of rationally-determined desire.’210  He had used the 
word to translate various Greek words βουλησις (purpose), εὔλογος (well–reasoned desire), 
προαίρεσις (choice), expressing the idea of ‘conscious, deliberate intention.’  However, he had 
                                                          
208 ep. Io. tr. 4:6. Also en. Ps. 37:14. 
209 Dihle 1982; O’Daly 1987: 6; Gilson 1961: 132f.  However, there is a dissenting view see Gauthier 1970 
referred to in Kahn 1988: 259 ‘If no one has ever defined the Augustinian conception of the will, that is simply 
because this conception does not exist: of all the traits of the “will” in Augustine, there is not a single one that is 
not found earlier in the Stoics.’ And Kahn himself says ‘Augustine's concept of the will does not get a fully 
philosophical development until it is integrated within a theoretical model for the psyche, namely, Aristotle's. 
This synthesis of Augustinian will with Aristotelian philosophy of mind is the work of Thomas Aquinas.’ Kahn 
1988. 
210 Dihle 1982:  133. 
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also used voluntas to mean ‘desire or spontaneous wish rather than deliberate intention’ and 
sometimes in the sense of ὁρμή ‘impulse arising after deliberation.’211  These meanings are all 
embraced in ‘the richness and many-sidedness of Augustine’s account of love and the will.’212  
But the key aspect of the will in the soul’s ascent to God is the direction in which it points the 
mind’s attention.   
 
In this chapter, intentio has strengthened its claim, if that were possible, as being the 
key to the ascent.  The tensional, directional, attentional and unifying qualities of intentio have 
all been noted at earlier stages of the ascent, but now it is clear that, in addition to 
physiological, anthropological and psychological implications, intentio also has moral, 
philosophical and theological ones.  Just as the will gives the impulse to move the body and its 
functioning is affected by its moods (fear and despair retard the movement and hope and 
courage intensify the movement)213 so the will’s moods affect the movement of a person 
towards God.  The will is powerless to prevent the surreptitious suggestions made to our 
thought, but it can direct the mind’s attention (intentio) to God to pray for the strength not to 
consent to the suggestion and turn it into a sin in thought.  Augustine exhorts his congregation, 
‘don’t offer your limbs and organs to sin as weapons of iniquity (Rom. 6:12-13).  God has 
given you power through his Spirit to restrain your limbs.  Lust stirs, just you restrain your 
limbs.’214  Having been given the power, through grace, to restrain our limbs, it is the 
responsibility of the will not to turn a sin of thought into a sin in deed for it is ‘intentio mentis 
which has the supreme power to move the limbs to action or restrain them from action (nisi et 
illa mentis intentio, penes quam summa potestas est membra in opus movendi, vel ab opere 
cohibendi, malae actioni cedat et servia)’215 and all our actions stem from our thoughts.216  
Not only is it the responsibility of intentio to avoid the commission of a sin in our hearts, it is 
                                                          
211 Ibid: 133-4. 
212 Rist 1994: 188. 
213 an. quant. 22:38.  
214 s. 128:10:12. 
215 trin. 12:12:17. 
216 ‘Nobody voluntarily does anything that he has not previously uttered as a word in his heart.  This word is 
conceived in love of either the creature or the Creator, that is of changeable nature or unchangeable truth; which 
means either in covetousness or in charity aut cupiditate aut caritate; trin. 9:7:12-13. 
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also the responsibility of intentio to avoid the commission of a sin in deed.  The tension 
between the spirit and the flesh continues but over time the good habits we acquire through 
prayer and other spiritual exercises serve to lessen it, as we seek to unify our will and turn our 
whole attention and desire towards God. 
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Chapter Six: Ingressio 
 
For access to the art-and the master archers of all times are agreed in this-is only 
granted to those who are ‘pure’ in heart, untroubled by subsidiary aims.1 
 
Now, this activity, namely, the ardent desire to understand (appetitio intellegendi) true 
and highest realities (ea quae vere summeque sunt),2 is the soul’s highest act of 
looking (summus aspectus est animae):3 it possesses none more perfect, none more 
noble, none more proper.  This, therefore, will be the sixth level of activity.  For it is 
one thing to clear the eye of the soul so that it will not look without purpose and 
without reason and see what is wrong; it is something else to protect and strengthen the 
health of the eye; and it is something else again, to direct your gaze calmly and 
squarely to what is to be seen (aliud iam serenum atque rectum aspectum in id quod 
videndum est, dirigere.) Those who wish to do this before they are cleansed and healed 
recoil so in the presence of that light of truth that they may think there is in it not only 
no goodness, but even great evil; indeed, they may decide it does not deserve the name 
of truth, and with an amount of zest and enthusiasm that is to be pitied, they curse the 
remedy offered and run back into the darkness engulfing them and which alone their 
diseased condition suffers them to face.  Hence the divinely inspired prophet says most 
appositely: Create a clean heart in me, O God, and renew a right spirit within my 
bowels (Cor mundum crea in me, Deus, et spiritum rectum innova in visceribus meis).’  
The spirit is ‘right,’ I believe, if it sees to it that the soul cannot lose its way and go 
astray in its quest for truth The spirit is not really ‘renewed’ in anyone unless his heart 
is first made clean, that is to say, unless he first controls his thoughts and drains off 
from them all the dregs of attachment to corruptible things (ipsa cogitatio ab omni 
cupiditate ac faece rerum mortalium sese cohibuerit et eliquaverit.)4 
 
The sixth stage of ascent in an. quant. is the fourth of the five rational levels which, 
together, correspond to the third degree of soul identified by Varro.5  Augustine says of the 
soul, at this stage, that religion initiates it (introducit in sexto)6 and hence he calls the sixth 
stage ‘initiation’ (ingressio) or ‘towards God’ (ad Deum).7  At stage six the purification of the 
soul continues to shift our attention and desire away from our own individual interests until 
                                                          
1 Herrigel 1976: 16. 
2 Colleran puts this in the singular. 
3 Colleran translates as ‘vision’ but there is no guarantee that an act of looking, even at this stage, will produce 
vision so aspectus better translated as an ‘act of looking.’  
 4 an. quant. 33:75.   
5 ciu. 7:23. O’Daly 1987: 13. 
6 an. quant. 36:80. 
7 Ibid. 35:79. 
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the soul’s gaze has become purified enough to be directed solely towards the highest objective 
truths.   
 
appetitio intellegendi 
The act of this stage is not intellectual vision as such but the desire to understand the 
highest truths (haec actio, id est, appetitio intellegendi ea quae vere summeque sunt).8  
Appetitio means literally ‘a grasping at something’ or ‘a reaching after’ and, from that, it came 
to mean ‘a passionate longing or striving for something, strong desire or inclination.’9  We 
have seen that Cicero uses it, as indeed Augustine does, to translate the Greek hormê (ὁρμή) 
meaning impulse to action.10  It is, therefore, another word for voluntas11 and, specifically, for 
the will which is seeking possession of the loved object, in other words, desire (Sed cum 
consentimus appetendo ea quae volumus, cupiditas.)12  At stage six, it is a desire which is 
rightly directed because it has been purified by faith and so the object of desire is God.  
Appetitio intellegendi in an. quant. corresponds to appetitus inueniendi in trin.,13 because to 
understand truth is to discover it.14  Appetitus is therefore an inquisitio which is a desire for 
finding out or bringing to light (appetitus inueniendi, quod idem ualet si dicas reperiendi).15  
Augustine’s definition of inquisitio, which ordinarily means seeking, searching, examination 
or investigation, as a desire to find, shows his view that desire is implicit in seeking because 
no one seeks anything unless they desire to find something and no one’s desire is satisfied 
until they find what they are looking for, when the seeker is united, through his desire, with 
the object sought (neque requiescit fine quo intenditur, nisi id quod quaeritur inventum 
quaerenti copuletur).16  In fact appetitio; the desire to seek (inquisitio), becomes love of the 
                                                          
8 See next chapter for comment on the plural form quae vere summeque sunt. 
9 Lewis and Short. 
10 ciu. 19:4:2; For Cicero’s use see Dihle 1982: 134.   
11 trin. 9:12:18.  
12 ciu. 14:6. cupiditas is a neutral word here. See previous chapter for will/desire as impulse to action. 
13 Ibid. 
14 uera rel. 29:73; 30:54; imm. an. 4:6; doctr. chr.  2:35:53. 
15 trin. 9:12:18. 
16 Ibid.  This is a reference to Matt. 7:7 ‘Ask and it will be given to you; search and you will find; knock and the 
door will be opened. Commenting on this passage in s. dom. m. Augustine was at pains to distinguish ask, search 
and knock distinguishing between asking as being restored to health in order to search, search being associated 
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object when it is found, but even as inquisitio it can still be called voluntas because everyone 
who seeks, wants to find (qui quaerit invenire vult).17  
 
aliud iam serenum atque rectum aspectum in id quod videndum est, dirigere. 
At stage five, Augustine distinguished between two activities: effecting purity and 
maintaining purity (aliud est enim efficere, aliud tenere puritatem)18 which we were able to 
understand as the distinction between conversion to faith, resulting in baptism on the one hand 
and continuing post-baptismal purification on the other.  Here, at stage six, Augustine 
distinguishes between three activities: cleansing the eye of the soul; protecting and 
strengthening it; directing it to what is to be seen (aliud est enim mundari oculum ipsum 
animae, ne frustra et temere aspiciat, et prave videat; aliud ipsam custodire atque firmare 
sanitatem; aliud iam serenum atque rectum aspectum in id quod videndum est, dirigere.)19   
The threefold distinction is reminiscent of the one he drew in sol. with regard to reason as the 
mind’s act of looking, ‘I –Reason-am in minds as the act of looking is in the eyes.  To have 
eyes is not the same as to look and to look is not the same as to see.  Therefore, the soul needs 
three distinct things: that it have eyes which it can properly use, that it look, and that it see.’20  
‘To have eyes’ means to be cleansed, first of all, through faith so that we know in which 
direction to look;  ‘to look’ means to exercise one’s reason (Aspectus animae, ratio est) and 
                                                          
with finding, and staying on, the one right road to the truth and knocking associated with arrival and possession 
of the truth in the next life but in retr. He says it was a mistake to distinguish between them and wrapped them all 
up into one urgent petition of prayer s. dom. m. 2:21:71 and 72 as amended by retr. 1:19:9. 
17Ibid. The Augustinian distinction between loving and desiring has been forever immortalised in TS Eliot’s 
words in The four Quartets: Burnt Norton:  
Desire itself is movement 
Not in itself desirable; 
Love is itself unmoving, 
Only the cause and end of movement, 
Timeless, and undesiring 
Except in the aspect of time 
Caught in the form of limitation 
Between un-being and being.   
18an. quant. 33:74. 
19This is the first reference in the stages of ascent to the eye of the soul though Augustine had earlier in an. quant. 
referred to ‘a sort of interior eye that is the intelligence (interiore quodam oculo, id est intellegentiae)’ with 
which the soul sees a line an. quant. 14:23 and the mind’s act of looking as its reason (ratio sit quidam mentis 
aspectus) an. quant. 27:53. 
20sol. 1:6:12. 
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‘to see’ means to understand.  (Ipsa autem visio, intellectus est ille qui in anima.)  The looking 
will not result in seeing unless the gaze is rectus (meaning ‘in a straight line, straight, upright, 
direct, undeviating’)21 and perfectus (meaning ‘finished, complete, perfect, excellent, 
accomplished, exquisite’  conveying the sense here of reaching its end as a light ray has to 
touch its object if we are to see);22 an exercise of reason will not result in understanding unless 
we have reached a certain standard of virtue (aspectus rectus atque perfectus, id est quem 
visio sequitur, virtus vocatur.)23  In an. quant., the eyes have been opened at stage four and the 
soul now knows where to look for its happiness.  Throughout stages four and five, the soul has 
been engaged in a purification of the will and the intellect so that it increasingly knows and 
desires to go in the right direction for its happiness.  At stage six, a person’s desire for eternal 
things has intensified to such an extent that he is concerned only to direct his attention towards 
God and, to this end, works to ensure that his aspectum is indeed rectum with no looking 
away/deviation from its intended path.24 
 
Cor mundum crea in me, Deus, et spiritum rectum innova in visceribus meis  
Augustine encapsulates the desire for total healing at the sixth stage in a verse from 
Psalm 50, ‘Create a clean heart in me, O God, and renew a right spirit within my bowels.’ 
(Cor mundum crea in me, Deus, et spiritum rectum innova in visceribus meis).25  In his 
commentary on this psalm, Augustine says that crea might suggest ‘bring something new into 
being’ but that, bearing in mind that the prayer is being made by David, a penitent sinner, the 
rest of the sentence shows that what he meant by crea was ‘implant a new and upright spirit 
                                                          
21 Lewis and Short. 
2222 an. quant. 23:43.  “Touching concludes as it were the process of getting acquainted” trin. 1:9:18.  
23sol. 1:6:13. 
24 In some people the different stages transpire quite quickly and in others more slowly according to the capacity 
and merits of each sol. 1:13:23; mor. 1:34:80; an. quant. 36:80. 
25 en. Ps. 50:15 (on Ps. 50:12). In the ascents which Augustine has based on the beatitudes, the beatitude which 
applies to stage six is ‘Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall God’ and it is linked to the sixth gift of the 
sevenfold gift of the spirit in Isaiah: understanding. s. dom. m. 1:4:11; 2:11:38; s. 347:3; ep. 171A:2; doctr. chr. 
2:7:11.  In other schemes of ascent, although there is no reference to the beatitude, the same essential purity and 
single-mindedness is expressed in other ways.  For example, in uera rel. the sixth stage is described as ‘complete 
transformation into life eternal, a total forgetfulness of temporal life passing into the perfect form which is made 
according to the image and likeness of God uera rel. 26:49.  In mus. a person is exhorted to direct all the 
‘movements and rhythms of our human activity’ to the end of loving God with all their heart and all their soul 
and all their mind in order to be purified mus. 6:13:39; 6:14:44. 
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within me’ because his former upright spirit had grown old and bent.  This is a reference to 
our condition before sin when our spirit was upright because we were stretched upwards 
towards heavenly things (erigitur in superna).26  We are now bent over under the weight of 
our sins and the burden and the needs of the body, which has become corruptible as a result of 
sin27 hence the invitation in the liturgy to lift up our hearts (sursum corda).28  It is clear that in 
his commentary Augustine is identifying spirit and heart.   
 
The heart is the inner man where the image of God is to be found29 and that is why 
Isaiah exhorts, ‘Return to your hearts, you transgressors (redite, praevaricatores, ad cor).’30  
‘Return to the heart’ is, therefore, another way of saying, ‘Return to self (redderer mihi);’ 
‘collecting oneself together into oneself (se…ad seipsam colligat);’”retire into oneself 
(animum enim cogo sibi intentum)”and “turn the attention inward upon himself” and it 
signifies spiritual withdrawal.31  This means that ‘spirit’ here is that element which 
distinguishes us from beasts and it is, therefore, identified with the rational mind (mens) rather 
than being in contradistinction to it, as we have seen it used before.32  Augustine goes on to 
                                                          
26 en. Ps. 50:15. The fact we are upright in posture is a reminder (an admonitio) to us from God that we should 
not be like beasts and so just as our bodies are raised up by nature to what is highest in bodies i.e. the heavens so 
our consciousness should be raised up to the heavens trin. 12:1:1.  Also Gn. adu. man 1:17:28; Gn. litt. imp. 
16:60; diu. qu. 83:51:3; Gn. litt. 6:12:22; ciu. 22:24. See Hammond Taylor ACW 41 266 n. 53 for this being a 
commonplace notion.  
27 See chapter 1. 
28 ep. 131; en. Ps. 37:10. 
29 Io. eu. tr. 18:10. 
30 Isa. 46:8. For a list of occurrences of the quotation in Augustine see O’Donnell conf. 4:12:18. Madec (cor AL) 
says that Augustine, in common with other Patristic writers, uses the word ‘heart’ (cor) as a lyric equivalent for 
the word ‘soul’ (anima) whenever he writes in a poetic and biblical, rather than in a philosophic style and that the 
great majority of the uses of the word cor in Augustine’s works are to be found in biblical quotations or in his 
explanations of them.  
31 This is not to suggest that only the inner man is to attain purity but as the heart is the ruler of the body, then, if 
the heart is pure, the whole body will be pure.  en. Ps. 125:8; s. 45:8.  
32 f. et symb. 10:23 ‘our principal element is the spirit…the spirit is at times called mind (principale nostrum 
spiritus est… Hic enim spiritus etiam vocatur mens); Also lib. arb. 1:8:18; Io. eu. tr. 2:14; Gn. adu. Man. 2:8:11. 
For the various meanings of spiritus and references in Augustine see chapter 2 n. 83.  For spiritualization of 
spiritus see chapter 2 and esp. n. 82. For spiritus as equivalent to lower memory and therefore in 
contradistinction and inferior to mens, see Gn. litt. 12:8:19 and chapter 3 supra.  Spiritus is so called because it is 
created by the breath of God.  However, we must be quite clear, said Augustine, that it is not the Holy Spirit that 
God is breathing into us because otherwise we would be a part of the divine substance, as the Manichees thought 
Gn. adu. Man. 2:8:11. ciu; 13:24.  
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say in an. quant. that the spirit is right, if it sees to it that the soul cannot lose its way and go 
astray in its quest for the truth (Spiritus enim rectus est, credo, quo fit ut anima in veritate 
quaerenda deviare atque errare non possit.)  This thought is echoed in lib. arb. 1 that a man 
will be perfectly ordered if the spirit (or reason or mind) dominates and rules the other parts of 
which a man is composed.33  Whether or not a person’s spirit is in control depends on the 
will34 and this means a man’s uprightness depends on his will.  Indeed, later, Augustine 
specifically identifies uprightness with a good will.35  It becomes clear that the upright of heart 
or spirit are those who direct their hearts in accordance with the will of God36 and ‘to do 
God’s will’ means to perform his work, which is to believe in the one whom he has sent (John 
6:29).37  Having faith shows a willingness to follow the incarnate Christ who unfailingly did 
God’s Will and even if we are not able to follow him in practice, we are more predisposed to 
pray, ‘yet not what I want but what you will be done.’38  It is the faithful will that initiates, not 
the clever intellect, for it is wanting to do God’s will that brings us to knowledge of God’s will 
and the more we realign and strengthen our will towards God, the more knowledge of God’s 
will we gain.39  Ultimately, what we come to understand by the complete realignment of our 
will with His is that God’s will is the cause of everything40 and that suffering and affliction are 
part of the order of divine providence and ought not to detract from our belief in the existence 
of a loving, just God.41  In fact, we will come to understand that when the prophet says, ‘The 
God of Israel is good to the upright of heart (Ps. 72:1),’ he doesn’t mean that God is only good 
to the upright, but that it is only the upright who see that God is good.42  
 
                                                          
33 lib. arb. 1:8:18. 
34 Ibid. 1:11:21. 
35 ciu. 14:11:1 Non enim rectus esset bonam non habens voluntatem; ciu. 14:27 illo primus homo, qui rectus, hoc 
est bonae voluntatis). 
36 en. Ps. 124:2; en. Ps. 96:18; en. Ps. 93:18; en. Ps. 32:2:2; en. Ps. 100:6; en. Ps. 31:2:26. 
37 Io. eu. tr. 29:6. Also en. Ps. 31:2:6 ‘faith’s work is willed love.’  
38 en. Ps. 93:18-19; en. Ps. 32:2:2; en. Ps. 100:6.   
39 en. Ps. 77:10. 
40 Gn. adu. Man. 1:2:4. 
41 en. Ps. 31:2:25-6. 
42 s. 15A. 2; en. Ps. 72:7. 
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So directing an undeviating glance towards what is to be seen (rectum aspectum in id 
quod videndum est, dirigere); in other words, being kept on the straight and narrow by our 
upright spirit, requires a realignment of our will with God’s will and this is what it is to 
become like God: through a realignment of wills so that we become one spirit with God (1 
Cor. 6:17),43 not through an assimilation of natures44 and this realignment can only come 
about through having our lives shaped by faith, hope and charity.45   
 
ipsa cogitatio ab omni cupiditate ac faece rerum mortalium sese cohibuerit et eliquaverit. 
Having identified the clean heart and upright spirit, Augustine then goes on at this 
stage of an. quant. to distinguish spirit from heart, making the uprightness of our spirit 
dependent upon the cleansing of our heart.  Conversely, in another work, he makes cleanness 
of heart dependent on uprightness.46  The discrepancy can be explained by the fact that our 
hearts are first made clean by faith, which allows a restoration of the the first fruits of our 
spirit (primitias spiritus)47 and the heart is not fully cleansed until, after a lifetime of 
purification and reaching out to the things which are above, we are fully upright.  Purity of 
heart requires us to can gain control over our thinking for the heart is the seat of our thoughts 
and feelings48 and its impurity consists in its sheer multiplicity of thoughts for a pure heart is a 
single or simple heart (Hoc est enim mundum cor quod est simplex cor)49 and uprightness too 
                                                          
43 trin. 6:3: 4 and 5; c. Max. 2:20; ep. 238:2:12 and 13; en. Ps. 31:2:25; en. Ps. 44:17; ep. 205:2:11; uid. deo 
15:37. Augustine uses 1 Cor. 6:17 to demonstrate that if human beings can be said to be one spirit with God, how 
much more can God the Son be said to be ‘One Spirit with Him,’ Io. eu. tr. 14:9; ep. 241:2. 1 Cor. 6:17 was 
especially used against the Arian, Maximinus conl. Max. 14; 15:20; c. Max. 1:10; 2:10:2; 2:20:1; 2:22:2.  
Augustine here notes that Maximinus distinguishes between unum being one in harmony (are one) and unus 
being one in Number (is one).  However, unum ‘are one’ is applied to things of one substance.  
44 See chapter 4 n. 53. 
45 Gn. adu. Man. 1:2:4. 
46 A man is upright in heart when he ‘reaches forward to those things which are before, forgetting those things 
which are behind’ so as to arrive in a right course, that is, with right faith and purpose, at the perfection where he 
may dwell clean and pure in heart. (Puto autem interesse inter rectum corde et mundum corde. Nam et rectus 
corde in ea quae ante sunt extenditur, ea quae retro sunt obliviscens, ut recto cursu, id est recta fide atque 
intentione perveniat, ubi habitet mundus corde)’ perf. iust. 15:36. NB reference to Phil. 3:14. 
47 en. Ps. 118:12:1; en. Ps. 125:2; our act of faith is the first fruits of our spirit that we offer en. Ps. 134:18; en. 
Ps. 137:13.  But also our faith gives us the first fruits of the Holy Spirit f. et symb. 10:23. 
48 There is scriptural authority. He frequently quotes 1 Cor. 4:5 with its expression cogitationes cordis and Matt. 
15:19 De corde enim exeunt cogitationes malae.  
49 Augustine links the beatitude, ‘Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall God’ with Wisd. 1:1 ‘seek Him in 
simplicity of heart,’ s. dom. m. 1:2:8. The two quotations are also linked in diu. qu. 83:68; s. 53.7. Augustine 
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is about singularity of thought:  
 
The faithful, reliable scripture says: ‘God made man upright and they themselves have 
sought out many ideas (Eccl. 7:29).’ God, he says, has made man upright and they 
themselves; how themselves if not by free will?  And they themselves have sought out 
many ideas.  He had said he was made upright and yet he didn’t go on to say ‘And 
they themselves have sought out crooked ideas,’ by way of contrast because he had 
said upright; or wicked ideas; but he just said many.  It’s from this multitude that the 
body which is perishing, weighs down the soul and the earthly habitation presses on 
the mind that thinks up many thoughts (Wisd. 9:15).   (Ait fidelis Scriptura: Fecit Deus 
hominem rectum, et ipsi exquisierunt cogitationes multas Fecit Deus, inquit, hominem 
rectum, et ipsi: unde ipsi, nisi per liberum arbitrium? Et ipsi exquisierunt cogitationes 
multas. Rectum dixerat factum, et tamen non ait: Et ipsi exquisierunt cogitationes 
pravas, quia dixerat rectum; aut cogitationes iniquas; sed dixit, multas. Ab ista 
multitudine, corpus quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam, et deprimit terrena 
inhabitatio sensum multa cogitantem.) 50  
 
The role of intentio at stage 6 
There are three different ways we can examine intentio at this stage in order to gain 
some insight into the aim of this stage which is to move from multiplicity to single-
mindedness.  We will look first at Augustine’s use of the plural intentiones, which will  help 
us to look at the Fall as a fragmentation of the will of the individual, then at his concept of the 
simplex intentio as motive and finally at the question of intentio in relation to the idea of 
communal singleness.   
 
Intentio to intentiones to intentio: from the one to the many to the one  
Augustine, with strong echoes of Plotinus,51 describes the Fall as a flowing down52 
                                                          
frequently cited the beatitude, ‘Blessed are the pure in heart,’ particularly in his sermons and expositions on the 
psalms, see e.g. s. dom. m. 2 passim and uid. Deo passim. 
50 s. 284:4. s. 96:6:6. On Wisd. 9:15 see egs. ciu. 12:15:1; en. Ps. 145:6.  In s. 284:4 Augustine went on to cite his 
favourite Phil. 3:14 as proof of the overriding importance of searching for the one thing with Paul’s exhibition of 
his single-mindedness in the words Unum sequor ‘One thing though I pursue’; and contrasted it with the quote 
from Wisd. 9:15 explaining that Paul had not achieved the one thing because he was still weighed down by the 
multitude of thoughts.  In this, Augustine has not kept to Paul’s word order but Augustine was clear that the order 
of the words was ‘One thing though I pursue’ (Ordo verborum est: Unum autem sequor) (s. 255:6:6. Also s. 
306B.2; c. ep. Pel. 3:7:22; s. 284:4) and, whether this is grammatically correct or not, it is at least right in 
conveying the single-mindedness of Paul’s intention.  
51 Enn. 4:3:32:20; 6:6:1-3;  6.9.3.  
52 conf. 13:8:9; defluxit angelus, defluxit anima hominis; c. Adim. 20:3 in natura uero humana, quae peccato in 
inferiora defluxit; trin. 4:7:11 Quia enim ab uno Deo summo et vero per impietatis iniquitatem resilientes et 
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from the one to the many and, conversely, our restoration as a return from the many to the 
one.53   For Augustine, the ‘many’ of itself is not bad because it characterizes the created 
world and God intentionally created many different things: ‘heaven, earth, sea, and all that is 
in them, how many they all are! Who could count them all, who could conceive their 
multiplicity?  Who made them?  God, all of them, and behold they are very good.’54  We 
might say that distentio is the sine qua non of the nature of reality as created; God intended it 
that way.  But, nonetheless, in keeping with his Platonic heritage, Augustine’s view was that 
‘many’ was not as good as ‘one’ ‘because ‘one’ doesn’t come from ‘many’ but ‘many’ comes 
from ‘one’ (Non enim a multis unum, sed multa ab uno.)’55  Augustine illustrated this in his 
sermons on Martha and Mary (Luke 10:38-42).  He took Martha, with her many material, 
time-bound concerns, as representative of life in this world: they were good but not as good as 
Mary’s one concern with listening to God; she was therefore representative of the world to 
come.56  ‘Many things are therefore necessary for life in this world, before we come to the one 
thing towards which we are striving’ (multa non erunt necessaria. Antequam perveniamus ad 
unum, multis indigemus).57  Hence we are given a variety of gifts or powers (1 Cor. 12:8-10) 
and we strive to practise four virtues while in pursuit of the ‘one thing’ (Christ) through 
which, we are gradually gathered up into one, moving from the many powers into the one 
power, which is Christ, the power and wisdom of God (1 Cor. 1:24)58 and from the four 
                                                          
dissonantes defluxeramus; conf. 2:10:18, `defluxi abs te ego et erravi, deus meus, (Augustine on his own fall). 
The Latin language allowed Augustine to make a fruitful connection between flowing down and sin:  Sins were 
called delinquencies and ‘to be delinquent is to be deliquescent like a liquid leaking down from the stable 
framework of virtue and righteousness; for a person sins through an appetite for what is lower.  As we are 
strengthened by caritas for what is higher than ourselves so we too drip down and are deliquescent through greed 
for things below (Delinquere est, tamquam de liquido quodam defluere a stabilitate firmamenti virtutis atque 
iustitiae. Cupiditate enim inferiorum quisque peccat: sicut roboratur caritate superiorum, sic deficit, et quasi 
liquescit cupiditate inferiorum) en. Ps. 74:6. 
53 trin. 4:7:11 ab uno Deo summo et vero per impietatis iniquitatem resilientes et dissonantes defluxeramus, et 
evanueramus in multa discissi per multa et inhaerentes in multis; conf. 2:1 1 ab uno te auersus in multa euanui. 
54 s. 104:3. Whereas Armstrong’s judgement on  Plotinus’ essentially pessimistic system with plurality 
intrinsically corrupted, says; ‘ultimately, it must be concluded according to Plotinus’ schema that it would have 
been better if nothing had ever existed-a metaphysical position irreconciliable with Christianity,’ quoted by 
Romb 2006: 19-20.  
55 s. 104:3. See n. 70. 
56 s. 103:5; s. 104:3; s. 255:6. 
57 s. 255:6. 
58 See Introduction n. 62 and chapter 4 n. 93. 
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virtues, which characterize the life of action, into the one virtue of contemplation of God.59   
 
In Eden, Adam was happy because not only was he at one in himself, enjoying 
complete tranquillity of soul and health of body, but he also lived in a faithful marriage with 
Eve, which was undisturbed by lust60 and the two of them lived in complete harmony of will 
with God showing ‘love from a pure heart, a good conscience, and a faith that was no 
pretence’ (1 Tim. 1:5).61  When he turned to his own individual interests in preference to the 
life in common and with God, he became immersed in the world’s natural multiplicity with an 
infinite variety of allurements competing for his attention and interest in which, ‘diverse sense 
impressions give rise to diverse desires in souls; diverse desires, to diverse means of getting; 
diverse means of getting to diverse habits; and diverse habits to diverse wills…even the 
choice of one soul varies with the changing time.’62  As well as being focused on a variety of 
different objects at differing times and differing from the wills of other people, the will also 
now expresses itself as different forms of emotion (as we saw in the last chapter): instead of 
being simply joy in tranquillity, the will may express itself as desire, fear, grief as well as 
joy.63   
 
So the will is now liable to act in a well and truly fragmented way and a person whose 
attention is directed towards the exterior world of multiplicity, loses sight of themselves in 
their true nature and is liable to suffer from an unnatural distentio animi.64  When, therefore, in 
sol. Augustine’s reason asks him, ‘Are you conscious of yourself as simple or composite?’ 
and Augustine replies, ‘I do not know,’65  his response is that of the fallen soul that doesn’t 
know itself for, although as a human being, he is a composite unity of body and soul, the soul 
                                                          
59 en. Ps. 83:11. 
60 ciu. 14:16 f where sex was nonetheless enjoyed (ciu. 14:21); (it must have been because the only emotion they 
experienced as a constantia was joy (ciu. 14:10) and they had already been given instruction to increase and 
multiply ciu 14:21).  But also see retr. 1:10:2, clarifying Gn. adu. Man., which confirms this. 
61 ciu. 14:10; 14:26.  
62 diu. qu. 83:40. 
63 ciu. 14:6. 
64 distentio in this sense meaning ‘tension or distraction causing anxiety’ see O’Daly 1987: 153-4 with regard to 
this meaning in connection with Augustine’s description of time in conf. 11:23:30 as distentio animi.  
65 sol. 2:1. 
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or mind to which the will belongs, is incorporeal and therefore indivisible.  As Augustine 
explained to Euodius in an. quant., the soul seemed ‘to be something essentially simple and to 
have an essence all of its own (cum simplex quiddam et propriae substantiae uideatur esse).’66  
Augustine had come to see that the soul was one mind which acts through a variety of 
different powers (quae diversa per eos ago unus ego animus)67 and this is what he was now 
training Euodius to see, for, as we have seen, he wanted to prove to him that the soul was 
incorporeal and therefore superior to the body.  The body’s nature as a composite unity,68 
means, on the basis of the principle of prior simplicity69 enunciated by Plotinus, that its unity 
is derivative, for everything composite has to be traced back to something more simple and 
ultimately to the One or absolute simplicity.70  The soul was not absolutely simple, as God 
was, because the soul was a created substance and therefore changeable, so for the soul ‘to be’ 
was not the same as for the soul ‘to be happy, wise etc.’ as it was for God.71  However, it is 
                                                          
66 an. quant. 1:2. 
67 conf. 10:7:11. 
68 See chapter 1 supra. 
69 The phrase is from O’Meara 1996: 44. 
70  ‘For there must be something simple before all things, and this must be other than all the things which come 
after it, existing by itself, not mixed with the things that derive from it, …for if it is not simple, outside all 
coincidence and composition, it could not be a first principle; and it is the most self –sufficient, because it is 
simple and the first of all: for that which is not the first needs that which is before it, and what is not simple is in 
need of simple components so that it can come into existence from them’ Enn. 5:4:5-15.  This conception of the 
One actually predates Plotinus but was expressed most coherently in him. Dodds 1928 traces its development 
from Plato’s Parmenides and its interpretations.   
71 God was not a created substance but was substance or Being Itself (Augustine notes that, in Latin, ‘being’ and 
‘substance’ are the same thing), trin. 5:9:10; trin. 7:4:7 as shown by His pronouncement in Exod. 3:14 ‘I am who 
I am…Tell the sons of Israel, He who is sent me to you.’ (trin. 5:2:3; 7:5:10; Also see the reference to Exod. 3:14 
in conf. 7:10:16 where Augustine had discovered for himself that God was Being (tu adsumpsisti me ut viderem 
esse quod viderem).  In ciu. 8:6 Augustine refers to the Platonist view of the creation of everything from the 
absolute one who is uncreated and underivative and describes him as ‘the One Who Is’ therefore associating him 
with Being in accordance with the Platonist conception of natural philosophy.  In his identification of God with 
being, he differed from Plotinus for whom the one was beyond Being.  God did not fit into Aristotle’s category of 
substance (Augustine had read Aristotle’s Categories, at a tender age conf. 4:16:28 (in the Latin translation by 
Victorinus, Courcelle 1969:168), because, unlike all created substances including the soul, which were liable to 
change and modifications (called ‘accidents’), God’s substance was unchangeable and not liable to modification 
(trin. 5:2:3.)  This means that for God ‘to be’ is the same as for God ‘to be great, good, wise, blessed, true’ etc. 
(trin. 6:7:8; 15:5:8). See also ciu. 11:10:2 ‘the reason why a nature is called simple is that it cannot lose any 
attribute it possesses, that there is no difference between what it is and what it has, as there is, for example, 
between a vessel and the liquid it contains; a body and its colour; the atmosphere and its light or heat, the soul 
and its wisdom;’ ciu. 11:10:3 ‘the epithet “simple” applies to things which are in the fullest and truest sense 
divine, because in them there is no difference between substance and quality, and their divinity, wisdom and 
blessedness is not acquired by participation in that of others.’ 
  
172 
simpler than the body, and therefore superior but in order to understand its own nature, it must 
start living according to that nature and stop acting like a body.   
 
Augustine seldom uses the plural form of intentio in relation to a single individual but 
there are two occasions of significance when he does so; in mus. and in trin., and, in each 
case, this vividly expresses the will’s tendency to fragment; its resultant lack of self-
knowledge caused by its overclose association with the body and its difficulty in 
distinguishing itself from its thoughts.  We will examine these two texts as a way of 
considering the fall and return of the individual to himself, as a step on his return to God. 
 
mus. and ‘ His tot et tantis intentionibus’ 
 
The soul being entangled in all these great intentiones, is there any wonder if it 
is distracted from the contemplation of the truth? (His tot et tantis intentionibus 
anima inplicata, quid mirum, si a contemplatione veritatis avertitur.)72   
 
We can follow the trajectory of the soul from contemplation to distraction, if we begin 
at mus. 6:13:39, where Augustine is summarizing the various activities of the soul in relation 
to the body.  He begins by saying that ‘the soul’s love of acting towards the stream of its 
bodily passions turns the soul away from contemplation of eternal realities, calling away its 
intentio by its concern for sensual pleasure’ (Amor igitur agendi adversus succedentes 
passiones corporis sui, avertit animam a contemplatione aeternorum, sensibilis voluptatis 
cura eius avocans intentionem).73  Each level of activity compounds the distraction and 
intensifies it, increasing it from mere concern (cura) to restlessness (inquietam)74 as sense 
perceptions become images embedded in the soul and fodder for the making of more illusory 
images, all of which the soul finds superficially desirable, but profoundly empty, food for its 
thought and ultimately unable to satisfy its insatiable curiosity and need for knowledge and at 
the same time blocking its return to the simplicity of truth.  In the next paragraph, Augustine 
                                                          
72 mus. 6:13:42.  
73 mus. 6:13:39. 
74 Restlessness is not a symptom of fallenness but is part of our condition as creatures and is therefore positive 
for the sense of incompleteness that it gives us alerts us to the fact that we are not ends in ourselves, but need to 
be constantly turning towards God.  Our restlessness, though, is compounded by our fallenness. See also chapter 
5 n. 139. 
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goes on to situate the problem in the context of the Fall; explaining that this general love of 
activity towards the body originated in pride which began with man’s turning away from God 
and thus was the beginning of all sin.  The meaning of ‘pride,’ says Augustine, is best 
demonstrated with a verse from scripture, ‘Why are earth and ashes proud, because they have 
thrown forth their innermost in their life (Quid superbit terra et cinis, quoniam in vita sua 
proiecit intima sua?)’75  To be inflated with pride is for the soul to turn to the exterior and 
become empty and therefore have less and less existence as it tends towards nothing, which is 
(self)-destruction (quare tendere ad nihilum, est ad interitum tendere).76  The soul’s innermost 
good is God, whose presence in the soul gives it life and so ‘to throw forth its innermost’ 
means that the soul, in turning to the exterior, has made God mentally distant from itself.77  
The proud soul tries to imitate God by acting on other souls only as God can: through itself, 
rather than through the body by means of signs, which is the only way that we can 
communicate with each other since the Fall.78  It also seeks from others for itself, the praise 
and honour due to God.79  In this activity towards other souls, it is treating other souls as 
bodies to be subjugated and this, together with its activities towards the body, is what gives 
rise to Augustine’s exclamation that it’s no wonder that the soul being entangled in so many 
and such great intentiones is distracted from contemplating the truth!  The soul began, before 
the Fall, giving God its undivided attention because God was its purposed end: the sole end of 
its intentio (attention, desire).  After the Fall, and the turning away of its intentio from God, it 
loses its single focus and becomes more and more distracted by the multitude of demands on 
its attention and thus its intentio (attention, desire, direction) becomes transferred to the many 
sensual objects and interests upon which the soul’s desire and attention is now focused: thus 
intentiones.  However, the transfer of intentio to intentiones is not simply a linguistic one; it is 
also one of substance but this is best dealt with when considering the second of our two 
passages to which I now turn.   
                                                          
75 Ecclus. 10:9 and 10. In language that is strangely redolent of this passage of scripture, intima has become 
intentio in trin. 11:1:1 foras se nostra proicit intentio. 
76 imm. an. 7:12. 
77 mus. 6:13:40. 
78 Ibid. 
79 mus. 6:13:41. 
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trin and ‘vestigia multarum intentionum’ 
 
While then mind is at the inner level, it comes out of itself in a kind of way 
when it puts out feelings of love toward these images which are like the traces 
of its many intentiones (Cum ergo sit mens interior, quodam modo exit a 
semetipsa, cum in haec quasi vestigia multarum intentionum exserit amoris 
affectum.)80 
This passage is part of Augustine’s discussion of what it means for the mind to know 
itself.  We will begin at trin. 10:5:7, which has similarities to mus. 6:13:39, for, after 
explaining that for the mind to know itself, is for the mind to think about itself and live 
according to its nature, (desiring to live subject to God and with the body subject to it), 
Augustine proceeds to describe a similar precoccupation with its own activity, and the 
pleasure it derives from these, as he did in mus. and shows thereby that the soul has forgotten 
its true nature.  He describes the soul’s attachment to the body and the sensory world in 
allegorical terms as a love affair in which the soul has beome so attached to the objects of its 
sense perception that it can’t bear to be separated from them and so, because it can’t take the 
bodies themselves back inside itself when it does return to thinking about itself, it ‘wraps up 
their images and clutches them to itself, images made in itself out of itself.  For it gives 
something of its own substance to their formation (nec se cum potest introrsus tamquam in 
regionem incorporeae naturae ipsa corpora inferre, imagines eorum convolvit et rapit factas 
in semetipsa de semetipsa. Dat enim eis formandis quiddam substantiae suae’).81  We know, 
from having examined the soul’s activity at previous levels of ascent, that what the soul gives 
to the making of these images is its attention (intentio) which, at one and the same time, 
enables sense perception and the imprint of an image on to spiritus.  In this very real sense, 
then, what it contains in its memory are the traces of its many intentiones (vestigia multarum 
intentionum) because what it contains are the countless images of its sensory experience made 
by means of countless acts of the soul’s intentio.  The problem is that, although the mind is 
still able to exercise its power of rational judgement82 and is able, under normal 
circumstances, to distinguish between a body and an image,83 it does not understand that 
                                                          
80 trin. 10:8:11. 
81 trin. 10:5:7. 
82 Ibid. 
83 trin. 10:6:8. 
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underlying these countless acts of intentio, is a single incorporeal power of intentio and that is 
because it is unable to distinguish between the different natures of the three components of an 
act of sense perception because it can only think in material terms and that means in bits so 
the soul thinks it’s a body.84 
To understand the implications of this for Augustine, we have to remember his two-
stage creation: the creation of formless matter (creatio) and its subsequent (though not in 
time) formation by its conversion to God (formatio) or, in the case of the fallen soul, 
reformatio).  When Augustine says that the soul becomes conformed to the images, not by 
being what they are but by thinking that it is what they are (Ita enim conformatur eis quodam 
modo, non id exsistendo, sed putando)85 he is using the language of Rom. 12:286 to convey his 
message that the soul’s activity and mistaken thinking about itself, devalues it and turns it 
away from God.  Instead of being conformed to the world, we should seek to be reformed in 
the newness of our minds, for this is to be reformed in the image and likeness of God by 
realigning our will with His.87  
Augustine says that in order for the mind to recognize itself, it must change the 
direction of its will and, instead of wandering about through other things, it must think about 
itself (Cognoscat ergo semetipsam, nec quasi absentem se quaerat, sed intentionem voluntatis 
qua per alia vagabatur statuat in se ipsa et se cogitet.)88  But the problem for the mind is that 
when it is told to think about something, it can only think in terms of images and ‘if they are 
told to think about something without imagining bodies, they suppose it is simply nothing 
(Sine phantasiis enim corporum quidquid iussi fuerint cogitare, nihil omnino esse 
arbitrantur.)’89  It is therefore unable to think of itself alone as a thing apart from its images 
                                                          
84 trin. 10:7:9. See conf. 7:1:2 and trin. 9:3:3 for Augustine’s own inability to distinguish between his mental 
power of intentio and the images that it made and chapter 4 n. 157 for comment on this. 
85 trin. 10:6:8. 
86 ‘Do not be conformed to this world but be reformed in the newness of your minds ((Nolite conformari huic 
saeculo sed reformamini in novitate mentis vestrae.)’ 
87 trin. 11:5:8 where Rom. 12:2 is cited and it is clear that reformation or conformation is a matter of the 
direction and appropriate use of our will. 
88 trin. 10:8:11.  
89 trin. 10:7:10. This had been Augustine’s view see chapter 1 n. 5.  
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and this is precisely its impurity (Et haec est eis immunditia, quoniam dum se solam nititur 
cogitare, hoc se putat esse sine quo se non potest cogitare).90  What Augustine advocates then 
is a process of drawing things off from itself as a way of coming to self-knowledge and, in 
that way, it will see its underlying reality, which he describes as more inward, not only than 
the outside sensible objects, but also than their images, all of which it has become mixed up 
with. (Cum igitur ei praecipitur ut se ipsam cognoscat, non se tamquam sibi detracta sit 
quaerat; sed id quod sibi addidit detrahat. Interior est enim ipsa, non solum quam ista 
sensibilia quae manifeste foris sunt, sed etiam quam imagines eorum, quae in parte quadam 
sunt animae, quam habent et bestiae, quamvis intellegentia careant, quae mentis est 
propria.)91  The underlying reality that is left, once the mind can let go of all images, is pure 
formless awareness of itself, such that the mind can be said simply to be self-presence 
(cognoscit se ipsam; nec ob aliud, quam eo quod sibi praesens est.)92  This brings us to the 
bottom line of self-awareness: if we know nothing else about ourselves, at least we know that 
we are alive.93   
Augustine identified two ways of being and of seeking one, ‘in analysing and in 
synthesizing, it is oneness that I seek; it is oneness that I love.  But when I analyse, I seek a 
homogenous unit; when I synthesize, I look for an integral unit.  In the former case, foreign 
elements are avoided; in the latter, proper elements are conjoined to form something united 
and perfect.’94  When he uses the language of colligit in unum to speak of God collecting him 
together into one from his state of disintegration,95 he is using the body’s language of integral 
unity, for the soul cannot, in reality, be collected together because the soul, in reality, cannot 
be fragmented; it is so only in our thoughts and in our attitudes.  To our materialistic mind 
however, it does seem as though we are being gathered together, but the gathering together is 
really a letting go of everything that the soul has got mixed up with and everything that it is 
                                                          
90 trin. 10:8:11.  
91 trin. 10:8:11. 
92 trin. 10:9:12.  
93 See chapter 5 and nn. 32 and 33 supra. 
94 ord. 2.18.48. 
95 conf. 2:1:1; 10:29:40; 11:29:39; 12:16:23; en. Ps. 145:6; s 52:3. 
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not.96  For the soul to turn the intentio of its will inwards, then, will mean a withdrawal of its 
interest in making images (trin. 10:6:8) and in recollecting images (trin. 10:8:11).  Once we 
have brought our attention back behind all this activity, we can look with the eye of a 
detached observer at our thoughts and our desires and see them in their specificity and know 
that we are something other than the multitude that they are.  We will be able to distinguish 
our potential from our acts and this distance gives us the possibility of choice rather than 
unreflectively reacting to what comes our way.  The space that is opened up allows us to see 
that our one desire is for God and to pray that, instead of being conformed to the world by our 
habitual patterns of acting and reacting, we may be given the means to move one step nearer 
to full reformation into His image and likeness.  
 
Of course, we live in the world of images and therefore ‘some of our rational intentio, 
that is to say, some of the same mind, has to be directed to the utilisation of changeable and 
bodily things, without which this life cannot be lived (quiddam vero rationalis intentionis 
nostrae, hoc est eiusdem mentis, in usum mutabilium corporaliumque rerum sine quo haec 
vita non agitur, dirigendum)’97 but we must live in it in such a way as not to be conformed to 
it, therefore always keeping an eye on God, our ultimate goal, to whom everything is to be 
referred and in whom everything is to be enjoyed.98  We are required to be single-mindedly in 
pursuit of God and life is to be lived virtuously to that end.  If we aim at the acquisition of 
virtue, we are either adopting a Stoic mindset allowing virtue to become an end in itself99 or 
we are allowing it to distract us from, rather than help us towards, our ultimate aim of loving 
God and we cannot be said to be single-minded.  However, it is permissible to aim at virtue 
but only if this is in service of our ultimate aim (therefore legitimate intentiones).  Augustine 
addresses this question in trin. 11:6:10 where he notes that, although the ultimate end of the 
will is happiness,100 this ultimate end can be distinguished from the end in a particular 
instance so, for example, where we want to see something for its own sake, then we must be 
                                                          
96 trin. 10:8:11. 
97 trin. 12:13:21. 
98 trin. 11:5:8. 
99 See chapter 4. 
100 trin. 11:6:10.  
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said to intend it and the end of the will is sight, for instance, to want to look through a 
window.  If the will then refers this sight to something else, perhaps to look through the 
window in order to see passers-by, then the end of the will has changed and its end is now to 
see passers-by.  This does not mean that there was not initially an intentio to see the window 
but simply that there has been another movement of the will.  The fact that there is more than 
one movement of the will does not detract from the requirement to have a single will towards 
God, provided each movement is an intermediate movement towards the final end and the 
movements are linked to provide the steps in the scale of ascent towards God. (Rectae autem 
sunt voluntates et omnes sibimet religatae, si bona est illa quo cunctae referuntur; si autem 
prava est, pravae sunt omnes. Et ideo rectarum voluntatum connexio iter est quoddam 
ascendentium ad beatitudinem).101  Therefore a will appropriately directed towards the world 
is a will with a single intentio and a will in harmony with God’s because it has God’s interests 
ultimately at heart.   
 
simplex intentio 
When Augustine spoke of purity of heart as requiring a will with a single intentio, he 
was not simply concerned to stress that all our actions are to be referred to the one end but he 
was also concerned that our inner motive match our outward act and that we could not be 
accused of the vice of doubleheartedness or dolus, which he defines as ‘when one thing is 
done and another is pretended.  When there is one thing in intentio and another in deeds 
(Dolus ergo quid est? Dolus est, quando aliud agitur et aliud simulatur. Quando itaque aliud 
est in intentione, aliud in factis, dolus dicitur)’102  The only justifiable reason for doing any 
good works was love of God because love was the fulfilling of the law and only then could 
our heart be regarded as simple (si fiant simplici corde, id est intentione in superna fine illo 
caritatis, quia et ‘plenitudo legis caritas’ (Rom. 13:10)).103  This is how we ought to 
understand Matthew’s reference to the eye as the lamp of the body (Matt. 6:22-23):  
                                                          
101 Ibid. 
102 s. 4:23; s. 133:4; s. 301A:2.  As Beckett muses: ‘The last temptation is the greatest treason: to do the right 
deed for the wrong reason’ T.S. Eliot Murder in the Cathedral.  
103 s. dom. m. 2:13:45. Also s. dom. m. 2:3:11 quod non mundat nisi una et simplex intentio in aeternam vitam 
solo et puro amore sapientiae; cat. rud. 11.16 ‘For then only is a work truly good, when the intentio of the doer 
is winged with caritas and as if returning to its own place, rests again in love.’ 
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“The eye” therefore, we ought to take as meaning in this place the intentio by 
which we do whatever we do.  If it is clean and upright and keeping in view 
what it ought to keep in view, all our works which we perform in accordance 
with it are necessarily good.  (Oculum ergo hic accipere debemus ipsam 
intentionem qua facimus quidquid facimus. Quae si munda fuerit et recta, et 
illud aspiciens quod aspiciendum est, omnia opera nostra, quae secundum eam 
operamur, necesse est bona sint).104   
What we have to keep in view therefore is not only where we are aiming but also why 
and, unless we set out from the true faith, we will not be aiming in the right direction so, no 
matter how good the works appear to be, they will not be directed towards God.105  This is 
because caritas is not something to be ‘doled out of our wallets’106 but is the love of God 
poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit through our faith.107  The love of God is the end to 
which all actions are referred by those whose lives are shaped by their faith, hope and love 
and governed by the two commandments of loving God and loving our neighbour as ourselves 
and, if this is the case, then all our actions will be good.  If good works were done for any 
other reason, they could not even be regarded as good,108 though it is possible that our motive 
may become purified in the doing of the act.109  We may purport to be acting in faith, hope 
and love and look as though we are living good lives, doing good works: giving alms to the 
poor; praying; fasting; helping others; but our reasons for doing these things may be less than 
praiseworthy and it is our reason for doing something that is brought into the reckoning 
against us, not the way it has turned out.110  The love of God being our end means that, if we 
seek anything from God other than God Himself, then we are not being singleminded, for we 
                                                          
104 s. dom. m. 2:13:45. See also similar interpretation of Matt. 6:22-3 in en. Ps. 118:12:2. 
105 en. Ps. 31:2:4; en. Ps. 77:10; bapt.1:8:10. 
106 en. Ps. 103:1:19. 
107 spir. et litt. 28:49.   
108 The question that the difference of intention makes was discussed by Augustine in connection with lying c. 
mend. 7:18; ench. 6:18. Also see nupt. et. conc. 1:4:5 and 1:12:13 and 1:14:16 for the difference that intention 
makes in relation to the act of sexual intercourse between married couples; it is a good act if it is engaged in for 
the sake of having children but not for the satisfaction of sensual pleasure. 
109 Augustine gives the example of someone who claims he wants to become a Christian for the right reasons but 
he is not being truthful; we should treat him as if he is because, in so doing, his motive may well become purified 
cat. rud. 5:9. 
110 s. dom. m. 2:13:46; ep. Io. tr. 7:7. We may not necessarily know what our reasons or motives are for acting as 
we do ‘as there is something of the human person which is unknown even to the spirit of man which is in him’ 
for we only know of ourselves what we have seen in the light of Christ (conf. 10:5:7).  
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are required to pay attention to God alone and everything else for the sake of God.111  If we 
love our neighbour for the sake of some temporal gain for ourselves, rather than for his eternal 
welfare in God, then we do not love our neighbour as ourselves and, in fact, acting like this, 
we cannot be said to love ourselves properly either, because we are acting with a divided heart 
which prevents us from seeing God.112  In short, if mixed in with our love of God, there is a 
hint of another motive for our actions:  fear of punishment, hope of reward, satisfaction of 
sensual desires then we cannot be said to have a simplex intentio or a completely pure heart 
yet.113  But, on the other hand, if our intentio is simplex, it has the effect of gathering all our 
good works into one good work, ‘for the sole work, in which all the others are comprised is 
faith working through love, which is why the Lord says in the gospel, This is the work God 
wants, that you believe in the one he has sent.’114  
anima una et cor unum in Deum 
The ascent in an. quant., being through the powers of the soul, purity of heart and 
singleness of direction is envisaged in relation to the individual soul and this is how Augustine 
thought of it in the early days.  In ord., when he advocates withdrawal from the multitude, he 
expressly says that he means the multitude of things, not men.115  However, at some stage, 
singleness of heart came to bear a collective meaning and we shall see how that was tied up 
with Augustine’s developing understanding of a collective meaning of Acts 4:32a ‘Now the 
whole group of those who believed were of one heart and soul.’ (Multitudinis autem 
credentium erat anima una et cor unum.)   
 
According to Augustine, God’s intention had always been that man should not live as a 
solitary individual but in a fellowship of unity bound by feelings of affection and to 
                                                          
111 s. 137:9. See beat. u. 3:18 where Augustine and Adeodatus discuss the meaning of chaste. . Whom do you call 
chaste (Augustine asked)’One who does not commit any sin, or one who refrains only from illicit intercourse? 
Adeodatus replied: How can someone be chaste who refrains only from illicit intercourse but does not desist 
from a steady pollution of his soul through other sins? One is truly chaste who keeps God in mind and devotes 
himself to Him alone.’ 
112 s. dom. m. 2:12:43. 
113 Ibid. 2:22:75; 2:1:1; 2:2:9; en. Ps. 120:10; ep. 140:33:77; ench. 32:121. 
114 en. Ps. 89:17. 
115 ord. 1:2:3 Multitudinem autem non hominum dico, sed omnium quae sensus attingit. 
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demonstrate His intention, He created Eve out of Adam rather than as a separate individual; 
this was to impress upon men that they should be bound together not only by the likeness of 
their nature but also by the affection of their thought.116  Two people cannot be said to be one 
just by virtue of being people but only ‘if they are of the same nature and being without any 
variance or disagreement’117  God therefore created Adam and Eve in this way as a reminder 
(admonitione)118 that unity was to be preserved among the many.119  But He foresaw that 
Adam and Eve would sin and despite his intention that by creating Eve from Adam to 
impresss upon them that harmony should be preserved, discord arose in Eden when man was 
led away from what was common interest to what was in his own individual interest alone, 
thus breaking the bond of common unity.120  However, God foresaw that his original desire 
and purpose for man to be a unity in plurality would be fulfilled by a community of godly men 
who were to be called to adoption as His sons and who would ultimately enter into fellowship 
with the angels.121  What was envisaged was a community where the effects of the Fall would 
be reversed, ‘where there was no love of a personal and private will but a love that rejoices in 
a good that is at once shared by all and unchanging-a love that makes one heart out of many; a 
love that is the whole-hearted and harmonious obedience of mutual affection.’122  This 
community not only has fellowhip with each other but also with God and part of the 
                                                          
116 ciu. 12:21- 22; 27:1; 14:1. Rist 1994: 121 notes that the idea we were all once in Adam appears from 408 and 
is increasingly emphasized as the Pelagian controversy develops.  For if we were all in Adam then this explains 
how we are all affected by Adam’s sin. ciu. 13.14. Also b. coniug. 1:1. ‘AS each man is a part of the human race, 
and human nature is something social, and hath for a great and natural good, the power also of friendship; on this 
account God willed to create all men out of one, in order that they might be held in their society not only by 
likeness of kind, but also by bond of kindred. Therefore the first natural bond of human society is man and wife. 
Nor did God create these each by himself, and join them together as alien by birth: but He created the one out of 
the other, setting a sign also of the power of the union in the side, whence she was drawn, was formed.’  
117 trin. 6:3:4 
118 That word again. 
119 ciu. 12:27:1. In relation to this first marriage, of which it was decreed that ‘there will be two in one flesh 
(Gen. 2:24),’ Augustine points to Paul’s referral of it to the union of Christ with his Church (Eph. 5:31-32) and 
develops this into his doctrine of the Totus Christus; that the whole Christ, consisting of the Word, the human 
Jesus and us constitute one perfect man. en. Ps. 138:2; en. Ps. 58:1:2. This idea is prevalent in the en. Pss. see for 
example en. Ps. 30:3:1; en. Ps. 30:2:3 and 4; en. Ps. 26:2:2; en. Ps. 37:6; en. Ps. 44:3; en. Ps. 60:1; en. Ps. 63:17; 
en. Ps. 58:1:2; en. Ps. 74:4.  The marriage between the Word and human flesh took place in the Virgin’s womb 
and it was this flesh, united with the Word, which became the head of the Church en. Ps. 44:3 
120 ciu. 12:22; trin. 12:9: 14; en. Ps. 103:2:11.  
121 ciu. 12:22 
122 ciu. 15:3. 
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community is still on pilgrimage on earth.123 
 
In the meantime, as a result of the Fall, there are many different communities but all 
encompassed within two types which, following scripture, Augustine calls two cities: a city 
that lives according to the flesh and a city that lives according to the spirit.124  Those who live 
according to the spirit are those who live according to God’s will and those who live 
according to the flesh live by human standards.  Eschatologically speaking, it is the former 
who are predestined to reign with God for all eternity and the latter who are doomed to eternal 
punishment with the devil.125  Each type of community desires their own kind of peace and, if 
they achieve their aim, then that is the kind of peace in which they live.126  In other words, 
people can be held together by bonds of love and this is a kind of oneness because they are a 
distinct group as opposed to a mob.127  But, if it is to be a community of people on the way to 
                                                          
123 ciu. 12:9:2. See also b. coniug.18 (21) ‘From a multitude of souls there is growing the one single City of the 
future, the City of all those who will have one soul and one heart tending toward God. This unity will only be 
perfect after the present sojourn abroad. (Sed quoniam ex multis animis una civitas futura est habentium animam 
unam et cor unum in Deum (quae unitatis nostrae perfectio post hanc peregrinationem futura est, ubi omnium 
cogitationes nec latebunt invicem, nec inter se in aliquo repugnabunt).’ This community Augustine identified 
with the scriptural heaven of heaven. The phrase ‘heaven of heaven’ appears in Ps. 113:16 and its nature is 
discussed fully by Augustine in conf. 12 as part of his exegesis on Gen. 1:1 ‘In the beginning God created the 
heaven and the earth.’ For a full treatment of the heaven of heaven in Augustine see Pépin 1953.  He sums up 
(228) what it means to Augustine ‘c’est ainsi que le ciel et le ciel du ciel désignent à la fois la matière spirituelle, 
première créée, d’une cité de pures intelligences (cosmologie) et la vie obscure de l’âme qui doit se tourner vers 
Dieu pour en recevoir la lumière (vie spirituelle); ils constituent le lieu des âmes saintes après leur pèlerinage 
terrestre (escatologie), mais également des apôtres encore en mission, des spirituels dans l’Ėglise, de l’esprit et 
de l’intelligence dans notre proper personne (vie spirituelle); ils réunissent dans un meme séjour les anges 
(cosmologie), les élus (eschatology) et les convertis (vie spirituelle).’ Pépin draws out the many different ways 
Augustine describes the heaven of heaven in conf. 12 alone creatura aliqua intellectualis conf. 12:9:9; mens pura 
conf. 12:11:12; caelum intellectual conf. 12:13:16; intellectualis natura conf. 12:15:20; created wisdom 
(sapientia) conf. 12:15:20; mens rationalis et intellectualis;conf 12:15:20; spiritalis vel intellectualis creatura 
conf. 12:17:24; intelligiblis creatura conf. 12:20:29 and conf. 12:28:39; caelum intelligible conf. 12:21:30 and 
conf. 12:29:40; domus Dei conf. 12:11:12; conf. 12:11:13; conf. 12:15:19; conf. 12:17:25.  This all reinforces 
Armstrong  1954: 280 who observes how naturally Augustine amalgamates scriptural and Platonic languages, 
even in the same sentence switching from caelum caeli to mens.  
124 ciu. 14:1. 
125 ciu 15:1:1. The unity of the whole Church on High is prefigured in the son of Seth who represents the earthly 
city of those who live by the spirit and are destined to be joined to the redeemed community on high on the basis 
that he was the man who who hoped to call upon the name of the Lord God which is the supreme business in this 
world ciu 15:21; the scriptures are our letters from home. (Also on this see en. Ps. 73:5)  
126 ciu. 14:1:1. 
127 s. 103:3:4.   
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God, not just any kind of bond of love will do; it must be love from a pure heart.128  The 
community that would be saved is therefore no different to the individual, for the love that 
binds a community together as one, can only be the love that is poured into our hearts by the 
Holy Spirit.  It is therefore faith in the one God that begins to make a single-hearted 
community129 and so it is true religion, through which the one true God is worshipped, that 
will lead to the fellowship of the heavenly city.130  
 
Acts 4:32a 
Acts 4:32a ‘Now the whole group of those who believed were of one heart and one 
soul (Multitudinis autem credentium erat anima una et cor unum),’ was the line from scripture 
which Augustine used as authority to develop the idea of a collective single heart.  When he 
first quoted it however, it was not to demonstrate the collective nature of the single heart but 
to show how dear singleness is to the saints and by singleness he meant a mind which, instead 
of being filled with countless images, was ‘withdrawn from the multitude and crowd of things 
which are born and die (Singulares ergo et simplices, id est, secreti a multitudine ac turba 
nascentium rerum ac morientium).’131  However, at some point, Augustine came to understand 
and stress singleness of heart in a collective sense and Verjeihen has persuasively 
demonstrated that this development can be traced back to a letter Augustine received from 
Paulinus of Nola in 394 in which Paulinus applies Acts 4:32a in precisely that way.132  
Verheijen analyses the correspondence between Augustine and Paulinus and shows how, even 
a decade later, Augustine is picking up on terminology from Paulinus and quoting it back to 
him, thus demonstrating the degree to which Augustine was affected by Paulinus’ use of Acts 
4:32a to connote a collective singleness of heart.133  This began to have an impact on 
                                                          
128 en. Ps. 140:2.    
129 en. Ps. 74:4; Also en. Ps. 103:1:2; Io. eu. tr. 110:2.   
130 ciu. 5:15. 
131 en. Ps. 4:10. That this is the first occurrence is noted by Verheijen 1979: 6 and I have accepted it although he 
gives no indication of the date of this en. Ps. and the en. Pss. generally are notoriously difficult to date, WSA 
3/15: 15.  
132 ep. 30. See Verheijen 1979.  
133 Verheijen 1979: 9-16. 
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Augustine’s thinking from about 397134 in, what was only his second use of Acts 4:32a, in s. 
308A, where he combines the individual meaning of singleness of heart with the collective 
meaning and where the collective meaning predominates.135  Within a year thereafter, 
Augustine had written his Rule in which he wrote, ‘Before all else, live together in harmony 
(Ps.  67(68:7), being of one mind and one heart on the way to God (Primum, propter quod in 
unum estis congregati, ut unianimes habitetis in domo et sit vobis anima una et cor unum in 
Deum),’136 explaining in a later sermon that this pattern of living set out in Acts 4:32a is the 
one which he desired to follow and indeed that it was the kind of community in which he lived 
with his priests, deacons and subdeacons (including his nephew Patrick).137   
 
However, when Augustine quoted Acts 4:32a to express his ideal community, he was 
not simply thinking of a monastic community, but of the kind of community that reflected the 
unity of God the Trinity and from which people could come to know and love God the 
Trinity.138  This could only be a community fused by the Holy Spirit into one bond of love; 
                                                          
134 There is no hint of the collective meaning in s. dom. m. which was written between 393-6.  
135 Verheijen 1979: 7-9. 
136 reg. 1:2.  Also in Augustine’s equivalent rule for nuns set out in ep. 211, ‘You live together in the true sense 
of the word only if you have but one heart.’ (en. Ps. 100:11) NB derivation of the word ‘monk’ in en. Ps. 132; 
psalm 132 being the psalm which he regarded as ‘giving birth to monasteries,’ (en. Ps. 132:2) Augustine 
considered the words, ‘See how good and how pleasant it is for brothers to dwell together in unity and what in 
unum might mean in that context.The name ‘monk’ comes from this psalm en. Ps. 132:3 because μόνος means 
‘one’ alone and where people live together in such unity that they form a single individual and ‘have one mind 
and one heart-many bodies but not many minds, many bodies but not many hearts-then they are rightly called 
μόνος, ‘one alone.’’ en. Ps. 132:6.   
137 s. 356:1-3; ‘Soon after his ordination as presbyter, Augustine founded a monastery within the Church, and 
began to live there among the servants of God according to the rule and custom established by the holy Apostles.  
The principal regulation of that society specified that no one should own anything, but that all things should be 
held in common and distributed according to personal needs.  Augustine had formerly done this when he returned 
home from across the sea.’ (Possidius Vita 5). Augustine had discovered the existence of monasteries from 
Ponticianus prior to his conversion in 386: ‘From there his conversation moved on to speak of the flocks in the 
monasteries and their manner of life well pleasing to you and the fertile deserts of the wilderness.  Of these we 
knew nothing. There was a monastery full of good brothers at Milan outside the city walls, fostered by Ambrose, 
and we had not known of it.’ conf. 8:6:14 and 15.  Chadwick notes (comment on conf. 6:14:24) that quietist 
groups of Neopythagoreans had similar arrangements and that as Augustine did not know about the existence of 
Christian monastic communities when he was in Milan, the contemplative community he was planning on setting 
up there with his friends would have been along the lines of a Neopythagorean group which would have been 
familiar to him. For his plans see conf. 6:14:24.  In fact he had always regarded wisdom as a communal pursuit 
sol. 1: 12: 20; 1:13:22; conf. 6.10:17; 6:16.26; ep. 258 (This letter contains a Christian interpretation of Cicero’s 
definition of friendship).  
138 Augustine, going back to the origins of the community founded in Acts, also argued by analogy that if the 
Holy Spirit could fuse together thousands of souls into one by charity as they approached God; as that charity 
comes from God how much more are the Father, Son and Holy Spirit to be regarded as One Io. eu. tr. 39:5.  Also 
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which would then be a community not only in fellowship with one another but also in 
fellowship with God;139 in other words, he was talking about ecclesial unity so that people 
could only be one if they were one in God (in Deum.)140  Augustine refers to Jesus’ words in 
John 17:21 ‘That they may all be one.  As you, Father, are in me and I am in you, may they 
also be in us’ (Ut omnes unum sint, sicut tu, Pater, in me, et ego in te, ut et ipsi in nobis unum 
sint).  There are two points that he draws out in his interpretation of these words.  First, he 
considers the words, ‘That they may all be one as we are one and explains that just as Father 
and Son are one not only through equality of substance but also through identity of will so we 
(through the mediation of Christ), might be one not only by being of the same nature as each 
other but also through being bound in the fellowship of the same love.141  Second, he notes 
that Christ wants us to be one in him because we cannot be one in ourselves due to our 
clashing wills and desires and so we need him as a mediator in order to be one in him and this 
is shown by the words in John 17:23, ‘I in them and you in me, that they may be perfected 
into one.’142   
                                                          
Io. eu. tr. 14:9; 18:4 conl. Max. 12; ep. 238. 
139 In ep. Io. tr. 1:3 Augustine commented on the opening address in I John 1:3, ‘we declare to you what we have 
seen and heard so that you also may have fellowship with us; and truly our fellowship is with the Father and with 
his Son Jesus Christ’  that it might seem to be of no great moment to have this fellowship with other men but it 
was not to be despised because of the words that John  added that ‘our fellowship was with God the Father and 
Jesus Christ His Son; These things we write to you that your joy may be full.’ That fullness of joy is in the 
fellowship, the charity, the unity itself.’ In ep. Rm. inch. 12 Augustine, referring to 1 John 1:3, says that this is 
John’s way of calling to mind the Trinity in the opening lines of a letter using the word “fellowship” instead of 
“grace and peace” to indicate the Holy Spirit. 
140 s. 71:33 The Holy Spirit only dwells in the Church.  He used this against the Donatists and all those who had 
separated themselves in schism, heresy or idolatry e.g. bapt. 1:8:10; en. Ps. 132:6 and to urge Donatists to enter 
into communion since the Christian emperors had passed laws ordering them to transfer their property to 
Catholic Church correct. 9.  The Church is one human soul made from many en. Ps. 103:1:4; ‘We are one in 
Christ, we are the body of Christ, we who want that one thing, we who ask for that one thing, we who are one in 
one (Unus sumus in Christo, corpus Christi sumus, qui unam illam desideramus, qui unam illam petimus,, …(qui 
unus in uno sumus). …’ en. Ps. 26:2:23; ‘Did he ascend alone? Yes, in a way, but not without us, as long as we 
are so closely united with him that we are members of his body.  He is alone, yet he is with us, forming one 
person, and one for ever.  Unity binds us to the one Lord. The only people who do not ascend are those who have 
refused to be one with him’ en. Ps. 122:1; ‘All of us will be one in the one (Christ), and all of us will be intent 
upon him who is one, for nevermore shall we be a crowd of scattered individuals (omnes unus in uno ad unum 
erimus; quia deinceps multi dispersi non erimus) en. Ps. 147:28; the prayer of the Church is the prayer of a single 
person as well as of each individual en. Ps. 122:2; Bread and wine are signs of unity that we are called too; bread 
being made from many grains collected together and made into dough with water and many grapes being 
pounded together into wine s. 227; s. 229; s. 228B; s. 229A.  
141 trin. 4:9:12.  
142 Ibid. Also Io. eu. tr. 110:2.  Of Jesus’ words I pray ‘that they also may be one in us;’Augustine says ‘he added 
the words ‘in us’ in order that we may know that our being made one in that love of unchanging faithfulness is to 
be attributed to the grace of God, and not to ourselves just as the apostle, after saying, ‘For ye were at one time 
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Augustine recognizes that oneness is only achievable in God by adding in Deum to 
Acts 4:32a whenever he quotes it.143  ‘In Deum’ literally means ‘into God’ or ‘up to’ or 
‘towards;’ the Latin ‘in’ with the accusative being dynamic and indicating direction, aim or 
purpose and thus this phrase expresses the same ‘theocentric dynamism’144 that intentio might 
otherwise convey for ‘à propos du passage des Actes, in Deum est bien intentionnel.’.145   
 
Communal intentio: The Church as the watching community 
Reflecting upon the analogy of vision which has really come to the fore at this stage of 
ascent as an analogy for seeking understanding, we can regard intentio as the very raison 
d’être of the Church on pilgrimage, as it is of the individual soul at this stage whose sole 
concern is ‘to direct his gaze calmly and squarely to what is to be seen (serenum atque rectum 
aspectum in id quod videndum est, dirigere’).  There were two names for the ancient city of 
Jerusalem: Sion and Jersualem.  Sion means ‘watching’ and Jerusalem means ‘vision of 
peace.’  The Church being the New Jerusalem, Augustine therefore applied the name Sion to 
that part of the Church which was still on pilgrimage here below and Jerusalem to the Church 
on High on the grounds that watching comes before seeing,146 ‘But as for Sion, if it means 
observation, as some translate it, we should understand it as nothing other than the Church, 
whose attention is daily lifted with longing toward the contemplation of God’s glory (Sion 
autem, si speculationem, ut quidam interpretantur, significat, nihil magis quam Ecclesiam 
                                                          
darkness, but now are ye light,’ that none might attribute the doing of this to themselves, added, ‘in the Lord 
(Eph. 5:8).  See Io. eu. tr. 110 on the difference between ‘one in’ and ‘one with’ and the difference between ‘One 
with’ and ‘communion with.’  Also see s. 71:18 ‘So by what is common to them both (the Holy Spirit) the Father 
and the Son wished us to have communion both with them and among ourselves; by this gift which they both 
possess as one, they wished to gather us together and make us one, that is to say, by the Holy Spirit who is God 
and the gift of God.’(Quod ergo commune est Patri et Filio, per hoc nos voluerunt habere communionem et inter 
nos et secum, et per illud donum nos colligere in unum, quod ambo habent unum, hoc est, per Spiritum Sanctum 
Deum et donum Dei.)  
143 Verheijen 1979 :15 again thinks that Paulinus is responsible for, in the letter he wrote to Augustine, he adds in 
domino to Acts 4:32a and in other places he adds in Christo and in uno deo.  For Augustine’s addition of in 
Deum to Acts 4:32a see Bavel 1958.  
144 For this phrase see Verheijen 1979: 16. 
145 Bavel 1958: 164   
146 en. Ps. 9:12; en. Ps. 50:22; en. Ps. 98:4; en. Ps. 131:21; en. Ps. 134:26; en. Ps. 147:8; Gn. adu. Man. 2:10:13. 
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debemus accipere, ubi quotidie intentio erigitur speculandae claritatis Dei).’ 147   
 
If the Church is speculatio, then its clergy, especially the bishops, are the speculatores 
or watchers, though their job is to watch the people, rather than to act as a focus through 
which their community contemplates God.148  Speculatio and speculator are Latin translations 
of the Greek word scopos (σκόπος) meaning, in this context, one that watches, one that looks 
after things, or a lookout-man or watchman stationed in a watchtower (specula or skopia) to 
warn of oncoming danger.149  Although Augustine consistently uses speculatio/speculator to 
translate scopos, when he is seeking to explain the Latin word for bishop (episcopus) and the 
Greek episkopos (ἐπίσκοπος from) he expressly states that ‘scopos is intentio (skopos quippe 
‘intentio’ est)’ so that on the basis that ἐπί means over, and σκοπεῖν, to see, ἐπίσκοπεῖν 
meaning ‘to oversee’ translates as superintendere, because a bishop is a man who oversees, 
watches or ‘superintends’ others.150  In LXX the word scopos is applied by the prophets to 
themselves, particularly by Ezekiel, for one of their roles is to be God’s lookout man to warn 
the people of the impending danger they are in because of their sins, ‘And you son of man, I 
have given you as a watchman for the people of Israel (et tu fili hominis speculatorem dedi te 
domui Israhel.)’151  In later Christian texts, the priest or bishop becomes the scopos or 
speculator.152  Augustine, indeed, applied Ezekiel’s words to the clergy and bishops and took 
this watchman’s role of keeping an eye on the people extremely seriously, including justifying 
his speaking out against the Donatists and other heretics.153  The whole Church in fact has this 
role of watchman against the Donatists to try to stop them leaving the unity of the Church154 
but the Church’s role of watchman is broader than that.  The real reason why the Church on 
pilgrimage has the name of Sion, is because from her lookout post, she is stretching out, not to 
                                                          
147 en. Ps. 2:5. 
148 This would be for the bishops to act as mediators which Augustine expressly denied for Christ is our only 
mediator.  
149 Lampe. See chapter four supra for scopos in its alternative meaning. 
150 ciu. 19:19; en. Ps. 126:3; s. 94; s. 162C:2. 
151 Ezek. 33:7. 
152 Harl 1961. 
153 s. 46:20; spec. 21; s. 88:23; s. 313E:7; s. 339; s. 350; ciu. 1:9. 
154 s. 137:12:15 
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the present, but toward the future (to the age to come) and ‘every watchman keeps his eyes on 
the distant prospect’ (extendentes nos non ad praesens quod est, sed ad id quod futurum est. 
Ideo speculatio. Omnis enim speculator longe prospicit.)155  
 
In fact, every individual soul is also Sion, if it focuses its gaze in order to see the light 
which it is meant to see (Est autem Sion omnis anima, si intendit videre lucem quae videnda 
est).156  But the community takes priority over the individual and Augustine uses the analogy 
of sight and intentio to make this point.  He wants to emphasize that the Church is one body 
with one heart and mind in the bond of love, even though the members do not know one 
another and he uses the example of the eyes, which cannot see themselves.  But as proof that 
they know each other and love each other in the context of the whole body, Augustine points 
to the fact that they cannot but work together so that, when both eyes are open, if one focuses 
on an object they both do: 
 
You cannot turn one upon its object without the other: They go together and turn 
together; they have one direction, though their positions are separate (our physical eyes 
in our body)  If then all who love God with you share with you a single direction, do 
not think of your bodily separation from them in space: together you have set your 
heart’s eye upon the light of truth (Dirige radium dextrum sine altero, si potes.  Simul 
coeunt, simul diriguntur; intentio una est, loca diversa sunt. Si ergo omnes qui tecum 
diligunt Deum, unam intentionem tecum habent, noli attendere quia corpore in loco 
separatus es; aciem cordis simul fixistis in lumine veritatis.)’157  
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we have been considering the sixth stage of ascent which Augustine 
calls ingressio in an. quant.  It has been about increasing purity of heart and single-
                                                          
155 en. Ps. 101:2:4 Also ciu. 17:16:2 ‘The name Sion means contemplation; for she contemplates the great 
blessing of the age to come since all her attention is directed to that end (Ipsa est Sion spiritaliter; quod nomen 
latine interpretatum Speculatio est; speculatur enim futuri saeculi magnum bonum, quoniam illuc dirigitur eius 
intentio).’ 
156 en. Ps. 98:4. 
157 ep. Io. tr.  6:10. Also s. dom. m. 1:13:37 Quamquam enim ad videndum isti oculi corporis communiter 
intendantur et,si ambo intendantur, aequaliter possint, amplius tamen formidant homines dexterum amittere. For 
in order to see these eyes of ours are turned to their object at the same time and if both are turned they have equal 
power yet men are more concerned over losing their right eye.’ 
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mindedness of desire to see God and we have noticed that somewhere between the writing of 
an. quant. and trin., Augustine has developed the notion of collective singleheartedness and 
the notion of uprightness as singularity of will.  We have examined the way in which he uses 
the plural intentiones, both in the early text mus. and in the later text trin., in connection with 
the increasing fragmentation of the will and the way in which he has transferred intentio to 
connote the divers objects of the mind’s attention and desire which has the effect of vividly 
expressing the way in which the will has become overidentified with them, losing itself in the 
process and the difficulty it has in subsequently distinguishing itself as the ground of 
awareness both from the images of the objects it senses and from its thinking about them.  
However, if it can distinguish itself, there arises the awareness, in the space that has opened 
up, that the mind has a choice as to how to respond to the images that it senses rather than 
reacting to them according to its habitual mindlessness.  It is this recognition of the freedom of 
choice that offers a glimpse into the realization of the person we were created to become; 
which can only be fulfilled in, and by, God.  This coming to self-knowledge is a process of the 
mind reclaiming its intentio from the many objects, which lay claim to it, so that it operates in 
relation to the world with a single intentio focused on God.  Provided it has redirected its will 
through the true faith, so that its ultimate intentio is God and everything that a person does in 
the world is referred to that end, it is perfectly legitimate to have more than one intentio with 
respect to individual instances, provided that each instance is then referred to the ultimate end.  
In this case, there is no degeneration into intentiones because all other intentiones are 
intermediate and go towards the ultimate single intentio.   
 
In connection with our examination of simplex intentio as the antidote to dolus or 
doublemindedness and in relation to communal singleness, what is striking in each case is the 
extent to which intentio is related to vision and the appropriateness of vision as an analogy for 
understanding.  The heart’s singleness and purity is completely dependent on the intentio of its 
will and Augustine interprets the scriptural expression ‘eye of the heart’ as this intentio.  The 
rectum spiritum is the morally upright will appropriately directed towards God and the rectum 
aspectum is the look which is directed straight towards the object it wishes to see.  In both 
cases, unless our attention is pointed in the right direction, we will fail to find what we are 
looking for.  The analogy of vision allows Augustine to make the point that understanding is a 
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communal enterprise and, although he does not make a great deal of use of intentio with 
regard to the Church’s role as a watching community, preferring speculatio, he was very much 
aware that the underlying Greek word for both was scopos and it is clear that this is one of the 
prime sources supporting his use of intentio as the centrepiece of cognition in trin., which is 
couched in the traditional analogy of vision.   
 
From this chapter it has become clear that intentio is indeed the key to the whole 
ascent and to its success; it can make or break it because each stage of the ascent is a 
movement of the will towards God.  If it makes it, then it has the effect of gathering all our 
good works into one good work: ‘all our good works are reducible to one work only: the work 
of charity; for charity is the perfect fulfilment of the law…all works are one work; that is to 
say, they are all directed to this one.  Works are right and straight when directed to this end.  
“The end of the commandment is charity welling up from a pure heart, and from a good 
conscience and from genuine faith (1 Tim. 1:5).”  Thus the sole work, in which all others are 
comprised, is faith working through love, which is why the Lord says in the gospel, “This is 
the work God wants, that you believe in the one he has sent.”(John 6:29)’158  In the process, 
each individual member of the ecclesial community, as well as the community itself, 
continues to live in a state of tension for on high are the first fruits of the spirit of each 
member of the faithful community through their baptism, their hearts are in Sion in faith, hope 
and love and their bodies are in Babylon.159  
                                                          
158 en. Ps. 89:17. 
159 en. Ps. 64:3. 
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Chapter Seven: Contemplatio  
 
One day the Master cried out the moment my shot was loosed: “It is there!  Bow down 
to the goal!”1 
 
There are different grades of mastery, and only when you have made the last grade will 
you be sure of not missing the goal.2 
 
Now at last we are in the very vision and contemplation of truth (contemplatio ueritatis), 
which is the seventh and last level of the soul; and here we no longer have a level but in 
reality a home at which one arrives via those levels.  What shall I say are the delights, 
what the enjoyment, of the supreme and true Goodness, what the everlasting peace it 
breathes upon us?  Great and peerless souls-and we believe that they have actually seen 
and are still seeing these things -have told us this so far as they deemed it should be 
spoken of.  This would I tell you now: if we hold most faithfully to the course which 
God enjoins on us and which we have undertaken to follow, we shall come by God’s 
power and wisdom to that supreme Cause or that supreme Author or supreme Principle 
of all things, or whatever other more appropriate appellative there may be for so great a 
reality.  And when we understand that (quo intellecto), we shall see truly how all things 
under the sun are the vanity of the vain.  For ‘vanity is deceit; and ‘the vain’ are to be 
understood as persons who are deceived, or persons who deceive, or both.  Further one 
may discern how great a difference there is between these and the things that truly exist 
(ea quae uere sunt); and yet, since all the other things have also been created and have 
God as their maker, they are wonderful and beautiful when considered by themselves 
although in comparison with the things that truly exist, they are nothing.  Then shall we 
acknowledge how true are the things (uera) we have been commanded to believe, and 
how excellently we have been nourished in perfect health by Mother Church, and how 
nourishing is that milk which the Apostle Paul declared he gave as drink to children.  To 
take such food when one is fed by a mother is most proper; to do so when one is already 
grown would be shameful; to refuse it when needed would be regrettable; to find fault 
with it at any time or dislike it would be wicked and impious; but to discuss it and 
communicate it in kindness betokens a wealth of goodness and charity….And that the 
soul may not be impeded from giving full allegiance to the fullness of truth, death- 
meaning complete escape and acquittal from this body- which previously was feared, is 
now desired as the greatest boon.3  
 
The seventh stage of ascent in an. quant. is the last of the five rational levels which, 
together, correspond to the third degree of soul identified by Varro.4  Augustine says of the 
                                                          
1 Herrigel 1976:79. 
2 Herrigel 1976: 84 
3 an. quant. 33:76. 
4 ciu. 7:23. O’Daly 1987: 13. 
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soul, at this stage, that religion nurtures it (pascit in septimo),5 and he calls the seventh stage 
‘contemplation’ (contemplatio) or ‘with God’ (apud Deum);6 thus finally imitating the Word 
who in principio erat apud Deum (John 1:1).  Although Augustine calls this stage ‘a home’ 
(mansio), he also makes it clear that there are degrees of contemplation and that the home 
does not become a permanent dwelling-place until the soul is separated from the body in death 
which, therefore, rather than being the thing most feared as at stage four, is now the thing that 
is most desired because, while we are still embodied in this life, the soul is prevented from 
seeing God fully.7   
 
ueritas/ ea quae uere sunt/uera 
At stage 7 an. quant., Augustine speaks not only of the vision of truth (ueritas) in the 
singular; but also of ‘the things that truly exist (ea quae uere sunt)’ in the plural, as opposed to 
the vanity of ‘all things under the sun’ (i.e. the visible creation) and of the truths (uera) that 
we will come to recognize, which we have hitherto believed on authority (i.e. the truths of 
faith).  The ueritas Augustine goes on to identify is that ‘supreme Cause or that supreme 
Author or supreme Principle of all things;’ the name is not important but the reality is for this 
is God, the ultimate reality.8  The reference to plural truths (ea quae uere sunt) evokes what 
Plato called the ‘ideas’ which translate literally into Latin as formae or species.  Augustine 
prefers to call them rationes because, while this is not a strictly correct translation, it expresses 
the underlying reality that these ideas are the ‘certain original and principal forms of things, 
i.e.  reasons, fixed and unchangeable, which are not themselves formed, and being thus eternal 
                                                          
5 an. quant. 36:80.  Augustine often uses feeding imagery for our understanding egs. conf. 7:10:16;’I am  the 
food of the fully grown; grow and you will feed on me;’ conf. 7:13:24 ‘The food which I was too weak to accept 
he mingled with flesh, in that The Word became flesh so that our infant condition might come to suck milk from 
your wisdom by which you created all things; conf. 9:10:24 the region of inexhaustible abundance where you 
feed Israel eternally with truth for food;’ en. Ps. 113:2:12 ‘they draw the genuine richly nourishing quality of 
their wisdom not from any man or woman nor from any human source but from God himself.’ beata u. 2:8 
Monnica as usual has got there first ‘Obviously I believe that the soul is not nourished except by understanding 
and knowledge.’ 
6 an. quant. 35:79.  
7 Brown 2000: 143 quotes a previous sentence of this same passage ‘What shall I say are the delights, what the 
enjoyment, of the supreme and true Goodness, what the everlasting peace it breathes upon us?’ to show that 
Augustine once held the view that complete enjoyment of this state was possible in this life but this last sentence 
clearly shows this was not his view.  On fear of death and Augustine’s changing attitude see chapter 5 n. 12 
supra. 
8 an. quant. 33:76.  
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and existing always in the same state, are contained in the Divine Intelligence.’9  Everything is 
created in accordance with these ideas, which the purified rational soul has the ability to 
contemplate.10  Even if we are not able to contemplate them, Augustine says, we must believe 
that they exist because to deny their existence would be to deny that God had a rational plan 
for creation.11  The reason for the plural form of ratio is because each type of thing that is 
created, is created in accordance with a reason unique to it.12  This doesn’t mean that each 
human being has its own ratio but that humankind is created according to a different ratio to 
that of a horse.13  The word rationes is, more accurately, a translation of the Greek logoi 
‘meanings’ which is essentially what the rationes are14 but when it comes to translating the 
word logos in John 1:1, Augustine prefers to translate it as verbum rather than ratio because 
verbum not only indicates a relation between God the Father and God the Son ‘but also the 
efficacious power with respect to those things which are made by the Word.  Reason, 
however, is correctly called reason even if nothing is made by it.’15  Nonetheless, he does 
identify immutable eternal reason with the Word;16 singular because God only speaks one 
Word but contained within that one Word are all His utterances or rationes.17  Augustine is 
happy to adhere to Plato’s notion of the two worlds: the intelligible world of ideas according 
to which the sensible world of images is formed, because he finds scriptural authority for it, 
                                                          
9 diu. qu. 83:46:2.  See Solignac 1954 for the variety of Platonic sources which have furnished the elements of 
Augustine’s otherwise original synthesis presented here.  These eternal rationes must not be confused with the 
created rationes used by Augustine as a kind of creation in potentia; a way of bridging the gap between God’s 
once and for all act of creation and the appearance of different species at different points of time, see Gilson 
1961: 206.  
10 diu. qu. 83:46:2. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid.  
13 ep. 14:4. This has to be the case of course, if Augustine is to be able to argue that we were all in the first 
human being when he sinned. 
14 diu. qu. 83:46:2. 
15 Ibid. 63. 
16 conf. 11:8:10.  NB Of the three meanings of ratio in imm. an. 6:10 the third is ‘the true itself which it 
contemplates’  ratio est.. aut ipsum verum quod contemplator’ so for example in imm. an. 2:2 Est autem ista 
ratio immutabilis (rather than the ratio mutabilis which is the human mind). 
17 Gn. litt. 1:18:36; 4:24:41. NB Ibid. 2:6:13 which shows that the plural is a concession to our fleshbound 
thinking and being for ‘God said one word in which he said all things before they were made singly but the 
scriptural style comes down to the little ones and adjusts itself to their capacity by putting before them each 
single kind of creature one by one and then looking back at the eternal formula of each kind in the Word of God.’  
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though he departs from Plato’s terminology.18  According to Augustine, the rationes act as 
laws which govern our perception of reality and they include the unchangeable laws of 
number for ‘seven and three make ten not only now but always.’ 19  These laws of number 
may be thought of as laws of beauty because they are responsible for why we find something 
attractive at the level of sense.20  According to Augustine, the rationes also act as rules which 
govern our behavior and they include ‘the rules and guiding lights of the virtues’ which 
belong to wisdom.21  In other words, he regarded the rationes as the law of God ‘which, ever 
abiding fixed and unshaken with Him, is transcribed, so to speak, on the souls of the wise, so 
that they know they live a better and more sublime life in proportion as they contemplate it 
more perfectly with their understanding and observe it more diligently in their manner of 
living.’22 
 
Stage 7 an. quant., by its reference to the singular ueritas and the plurals ea quae uere 
sunt and uera, therefore encompasses the full epistemological range from knowledge of the 
true meaning of a word to knowledge of that which gives meaning to all.  In terms of the 
analogy of vision, for us to see (know) anything requires the object we see to be enlightened 
by an external light the same kind as the object seen in order to be seen: the earth cannot be 
seen unless it is illumined by the visible sun and the intelligible scientific truths cannot be 
seen unless they are illumined by something else ‘as by their own sun.’23  God is the light of 
the mind by which we understand and observe all that we see in our mind and the soul is 
                                                          
18 In retr. 1:3:2 Augustine changes the scriptural authority he uses for the existence of the distinction between the 
two worlds from, ‘My kingdom is not of this world (John 18:36)’ to ‘there will be a new heaven and a new earth 
(Rev. 21:1) and ‘thy kingdom come’ (Matt. 6:10). The emphasis seems to be on the intelligible as eschatological 
fulfilment, rather than where we have come from and perhaps this is designed to avoid messy questions about the 
soul’s origin. 
19 lib. arb. 2:8:20-21; ord. 2:19:50; imm. an. 2.2; conf. 10:12:19.   
20 lib. arb. 2:16:41. 
21 Ibid. 2:10:29; 2:18:52. 2:19. The rules include the rule that a man ought to live justly; the worse ought to be 
subjected to the better; like is to be compared with like; each man should be given his due; the incorrupt is better 
than the corrupt; the eternal better than the temporal and the inviolable better than the violable.  Augustine 
pointed out to Euodius in lib. arb. that, in scripture (Eccl. 7:25), the laws of number were connected with the 
rules of wisdom lib. arb. 2:8:27 and, whether or not they were the same thing, they at least both belonged to the 
realm of the unchangeably true, lib. arb. 2:11:32.   
22 ord. 2:8:25.  spir. et litt. 28:48 what was impressed at creation was God’s law; trin. 14:15:21 we received 
God’s justice when we were created.  
23 sol. 1:8:15; Gn. litt. inp. 5:20; trin. 12:15:24. 
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capable of seeing the light itself. 24  It is possible though to reach understanding of intellectual 
truths, without knowing that God is the light in which we see them and therefore we might 
become learned without becoming wise for wisdom demands that everything that we know is 
turned to the love and praise of God.25  It is also possible to come to contemplation of God 
without understanding intellectual truths and, in comparison with contemplation of the Truth, 
no matter how brief, any other kind of intellectual knowledge pales into insignificance.26  
Contemplation of God is the real aim of this stage and our ultimate goal.  It is something given 
to those who persevere in faith27 and, as we have already noted, these will not necessarily be 
the most intellectually able.28  However, what the intellectually inclined individual (like 
Augustine) will be keen to do, is to engage more deeply and critically with their faith.29  
 
tractare autem ac dispensare commode, laudis et caritatis plenissimum est. 
Stage 7 an. quant. recognizes that there are those who have ascended to learn directly 
from God Himself30 and that these people have a responsibility for nourishing others so 
becoming the wise men to whose authority and bidding, others submit at stage four, being 
‘convinced that through them God speaks to itself.’31  This teaching obligation is part of our 
                                                          
24 Gn. litt. 12:31:59; trin. 15:27:50.  
25 doctr. chr. 2:38:57. In the ascents based on the gifts of the spirit in Isaiah there are two different stages of 
ascent corresponding to the two separate gifts conferred understanding (intellectus) and wisdom (sapientia): s. 
dom. m. 1:4:11. Here in an. quant. these two stages are together in one but understanding does not, even so, 
connote wisdom. 
26 an. quant. 33:76.  Also sol. 1:5:11.  Augustine himself had attained a degree of contemplation on many 
occasions and so when he speaks of the delight in the truth and certainty of the truth that even a small glimpse of 
the truth brings, and equally of the difficulty in maintaining the contemplative gaze, he is speaking from 
experience conf.10:40:65; ep. 4:2; en. Ps. 134: 6 ‘Perhaps you were straining to see the good of all good things, 
the good from which all things derive their goodness, the good without which nothing is good, yet which is itself 
good without any of them.  You were straining to see him and perhaps, as you stretched the highest part of your 
mind, you fell back through weakness.  I am guessing, from my own painful experience.  But there may be 
someone-indeed, it is more than likely that there is someone-whose fine intelligence is stronger than mine, who 
has fixed the contemplation of his heart for a long time on HIM WHO IS. Let such a person praise the Lord as he 
can, praise him as we cannot.’ 
27 an. quant. 14:24; 33:76; 36:80; ep. 120:1:4; trin. 14:17:23. 
28 trin. 15:25:44. 
29 an. quant. 34:77; ep. 120.  
30 conf. 13:22:32 the person who contemplates and understands truth needs no human to prove it but such a 
person now has capacity to be taught by God to see the Trinity (et doces eum iam capacem videre trinitatem 
unitatis vel unitatem trinitatis.) Also ciu. 11:2; en. Ps. 113:2:11-12.  
31 an. quant. 33:73. On the obligation of wise men to teach others see also ord. 2:2:7. Though we have this 
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compassion and care for human society, and ensures that we don’t get overly caught up in 
desire for ecstastic experiences:  
 
If we choose to do nothing else, and simply contemplate what we see when we 
are beside ourselves, we would not be available to you, but would be so rapt in 
heavenly things as to seem uncaring about you.  And when you with your 
uncertain steps tried to follow us to those higher, heavenly realms, would we 
not still seem uncaring, but for the fact that the charity of Christ constrains us, 
so that we consider ourselves your servants? And so out of gratitude to Him 
who had granted us higher graces we would not disdain lower needs for the 
sake of the weak, and would accommodate ourselves to people who could not 
join us in the vision of heavenly realities, like Christ, who ‘being in the form of 
God, deemed it no robbery to be God’s equal, yet emptied himself and took on 
the form of a slave’ (Phil. 2:6-7).32 
 
We imitate the Word when we learn directly from God himself and we imitate the 
incarnate Christ when we teach others from the Wisdom we have received.  Paul is seen by 
Augustine as one of the ‘great and peerless souls’ who has ascended to learn from God 
                                                          
responsibility and an. quant. 33:76 states ‘to discuss it and communicate it in kindness betokens a wealth of 
goodness and charity, this is subject to what Augustine says in en. Ps. 139:15 that we should desire as far as 
possible not to be obliged to speak, preach or teach.  It is far better if everyone already knew what we know so 
that we could all just listen to God because it is constant listening to God that brings joy.  This is what our love of 
neighbour demands that we desire everyone to be as well-instructed as ourselves so that we have no need to 
teach. ‘Let your enjoyment be in listening to God and your speaking be prompted only by necessity.…your 
teacher is within. When you teach you go out to those who are outside.  It is inside we listen to the truth and after 
listening we speak to people who are outside our own heart.’ Colleran says (ACW 9, 213 n. 94) that the stress 
Augustine places on the concern for others, distinguishes him from Plotinus who emphasizes the escape of the 
soul for an encounter alone with the Alone.  Winkler 1954: 517 says although Plotinus in his personal life took 
seriously his obligations to teach, in his system the role is less important. O’Meara points out 1996: 108-110 that 
although Plotinus was not concerned with politics as Plato was, he did make some provision for the 
communication to others through teaching and example of the wisdom received on ascent and his escape ethics 
shouldn’t be separated from his ethics of return to the world. See O’Meara 2003 for reappraisal of the thought of 
Plotinus and other Platonist philosophers of late antiquity in this whole area. 
32 This is Augustine’s interpretation of 2 Cor. 5:13-14 (‘Whether we are beside ourselves, for God, or in our right 
mind, for you, the charity of Christ constrains us’) en. Ps. 30:2:2.  In Augustine’s view there was a place in the 
Church for the contemplative life, lived in such a way that the whole body of the Church benefitted ep. 48:1. But 
whether or not a particular person was called to it was a matter of discernment and one’s response to a calling 
had to be closely monitored for signs of egoism ep. 48:2.  The contemplative life was not a life of rest, as it 
would be hereafter, but a life of activity- including prayer, fasting, almsgiving, forgiveness, vigilance against the 
devil; learning to love one another and praising God; in short purification of body and soul.  It is not to be 
confused with the contemplative life of rest hereafter ‘Come down, Peter.  You were eager to go on resting on the 
mountain; come down…Peter didn’t understand this yet, when he was eager to live with Christ on the mountain.  
He was keeping that for you, Peter, after death’ s. 78:6.  We saw in the last chapter that Augustine uses Mary and 
Martha as representatives of the two lives: ‘In these two women two kinds of life are represented: present life and 
future life, toilsome and restful, miserable and beatific, temporal and eternal life.’ s. 104:4.  Also trin. 1:10:20; s. 
103.  He also similarly uses Peter and John Io. eu. tr. 124:5 5 and Leah and Rachel c. Faust. 22:54. 
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Himself and then descended in order to teach others from the wisdom he has received.33  
Isaiah is another and it is his descent that provides the model of ascent that Christians can 
follow, ‘it was to exercise us in successive steps of doctrine that Isaiah came down from 
wisdom to fear, from the place, that is, of everlasting peace to the vale of time-bound tears so 
that we, by grieving, groaning, weeping in penitent confession, might not remain grieving, 
groaning, weeping, but might climb up from this vale to the spiritual mountain, on which the 
holy city Jerusalem, our eternal mother, is built, and might there enjoy undisturbed 
happiness.’34  The person who has learnt from God himself has a duty to teach such things to 
others, despite the inadequacy of human speech to convey an experience of God or indeed its 
inadequacy to communicate one’s own understanding of meaning of any kind,35 being 
inadequate both in the length of time it takes to articulate the words in comparison with the 
speed of the initial insight and in the difficulty of finding the right words to match up with our 
understanding.36  Augustine allegorised the story of Rachel and Leah to explain that, rather 
than shirk the duty to teach through difficulty of communication, Wisdom chooses to teach the 
things of God through bodily images and likenesses37 hence it is a basic principle of 
Augustine’s spirituality that the things of sense are not to be turned away from but to be used 
as a first step in the ascent towards knowledge of God.38   
 
Power of the soul involved at this stage 
 
To learn directly from God Himself is one of the metaphorical ways in which 
                                                          
33 Io. eu. tr. 7:23. Paul in 2 Cor. 12:2 says ‘I know a person in Christ who fourteen years ago was caught up to the 
third heaven’ though it is clear from what he goes on to say in 2 Cor. 12:6-7 that he is referring to himself.  In 
Gn. litt. 12 Augustine uses the question of the nature of Paul’s vision as a starting-point for a discussion of the 
different kinds of vision.  Colleran suggests that as Augustine still had a high opinion at this stage that the 
Platonist philosophy did not conflict with Christianity, he was possibly also thinking of Plotinus see ACW 9, 214 
n. 101.  
34 s. 347:2. 
35 This is made clear in lib. arb. 2:11:30 where knowledge has been received about number. Acad. 1:5:15 
(Trygetius says )‘once the notion itself leaves as it were the harbour of our mind and spreads the sails of words, 
immediately it is menaced a thousand times with the shipwreck of misrepresentation.’ In fact it is better to 
maintain a respectful silence with regard to the ineffable godhead c. Adim. 13:2. 
36 cat. rud. 2:3.   
37 c. Faust. 22:54.  
38 e.g. Gn. litt. 4:32:49. 
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Augustine refers to our act of understanding.39  The understanding (intellegentia) of 
intellectual, unchangeable and eternal truths is the highest activity that the soul is capable of 
and it belongs to the rational faculty of the soul which Augustine calls ratio, mens, spiritus, 
cor, intellectus or intelligentia.  Intellectus like ratio can mean the faculty of understanding 
which distinguishes us from beasts40 or it can mean the vision of the soul (in the sense of an 
act of understanding).41  It is the kind of vision with which we judge other visions to produce 
scientia and includes the vision of things like the mind itself, the virtues or vices present in the 
soul, ‘charity, joy, peace, long-suffering, faithfulness, gentleness, restraint and the rest by 
which one draws near to God and God himself.’42  Intellectual vision does not stand in need of 
any other kind of vision to authenticate it, as spiritual and physical visions do, for it is either 
true or it is not intellectual vision.43  Augustine said we could think of Intellectus as the Latin 
equivalent of what the Greeks call νοῦς; 44  it is similarly an intuitive knowledge, ‘I heard as 
one hears in the heart and all doubt left me (audivi, sicut auditur in corde, et non erat prorsus 
unde dubitarem)’45 and may be thought of as a revelation, recognition, prophecy or teaching.46  
Although these formulations emphasize the passive receipt of knowledge rather than the 
active acquisition of it, it is, nonetheless, to be thought of as an act of understanding in 
accordance with Augustine’s observation in an. quant. that each level of ascent is an act.47  In 
trin., this act has become expressly an act of intentio.  As an activity, intellectus is the higher 
of two activities of the rational or intellectual faculty: discursive reasoning and 
understanding.48  Augustine stresses in trin. that the two activities both belonged to the same 
                                                          
39 Io. eu. tr. 15:19 hence Augustine interprets ‘call your husband ‘in the story of the Woman at the Well in John 
4:16; as ‘summon the intelligence by which you can be taught, can be directed – (adhibe intellectum per quem 
docearis, quo regaris.) en. Ps. 118:17:3 God teaches us knowledge by empowering us from within to understand. 
(Docet ergo Deus, docet scientiam insinuando cognitionem.) 
40 lib. arb. 2:5:12; trin. 15:1:1; en. Ps. 42:6.  
41 sol. 1:6:13; s. 53A:12 (haec mens uocatur, intelligentia uocatur); Gn. litt. 12:6:15 and 16 intellectual vision is 
sight of incorporeal objects through the gaze of the mind per contuitum mentis. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Gn. litt. 12:25:51-52; Gn. litt. 12:14:29. 
44 trin. 4:21:31; cons. eu. 1:23:35.  
45 conf. 7:10:16.   
46 Gn. litt. 12:8:19. 
47 an. quant. 34:78.  
48 Gn. adu. Man. 1:17:28; ciu. 11:2; s. 43:3. 
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rational faculty but that it is only in relation to the higher activity, where a person is 
contemplating eternal truths, that he can be said to be in the image of God.49   
 
The role of intentio at stage 7: Intellegentia hominis, quae per intentionem cogitationis 
inde formatur)’ 
It is true that man’s understanding, which is formed from memory through the 
intentio of thought on it when what is known is uttered, and which is an inner 
word (cordis verbum) of no particular language, has in its enormous inequality 
some kind of likeness to the Son.50 
 
In this chapter, discussion of intentio will be focused around the above quotation from 
trin.  We will look, first, at the nature of that understanding as actualized knowledge, then at 
how the intentio cogitationis is trained to retrieve and actualize latent knowledge and finally at 
the inadequate nature of the understanding reached per intentionem cogitationis when it 
comes to understanding God, concluding that the safest intentio is the one that goes on 
seeking in this life until it comes to rest in the next, fixing and maintaining the soul’s attention 
eternally on God.   
Understanding as actualized knowledge 
In the second half of trin., Augustine was concerned to train people to discover 
themselves as trinitarian images of God.  The place to begin was with love, he said, because, 
even if we can’t see it, there is a trinity present in love;51 love being a kind of coupling of two 
things together, namely, the lover and what is being loved.52  He continued his quest for the 
trinitarian image by first examining the trinity of mind, its knowledge and its love of itself in 
trin. 9 and then settling on the three mental acts: memory, understanding and will of self in 
trin. 10. as the best way of exploring the mind’s knowing and loving of itself, in the hope that 
this would shed light on the way in which the mind can come to reflect the Trinitarian nature 
of God.  The distinctions between these three mental acts are not easily discernible when they 
relate to the mind itself because the mind is always remembering, understanding and loving 
                                                          
49 Gn. litt. 3:22:34; trin. 12:4:4.  
50 trin. 15:23:43.  
51 trin. 8:8:12. 
52 trin. 8:10:14.  
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itself, though it does not always think about itself.53  It is only when it thinks about itself that 
it knows that it remembers, understands and loves itself, hence the Delphic oracle ‘Know 
thyself’ is a command to the mind to think about itself and also to live according to its 
nature.54  There is, therefore, a distinction between knowledge which is latent in the mind and 
the knowledge that the mind has of itself when it thinks about itself.  Augustine compares this 
to a man learned in many disciplines about whom we do not say, when he is thinking about 
medicine, that he doesn’t know the art of grammar.55   
 
To train his readers to see that there is a difference between these two types of 
knowledge (latent and actualized) that the mind has of itself; which comes down to a 
difference between two mental acts in relation to itself: memory and understanding, involving 
two distinct acts of will, Augustine proceeded in trin. 11 to examine the mechanics of the 
soul’s activities of sense perception and spiritual vision.56  He then explored the distinction 
between the two acts of intellect leading respectively to scientia and sapientia in trin. 12.  He 
went on to stress in trin. 13, that any such intellectual/rational activity must begin from faith 
in the incarnate Christ and then returned to the question of the mind knowing itself and 
thinking about itself in trin. 14.  There he considered first the mind’s exercise of its powers of 
memory, understanding and will in relation to its faith (that with which it believes rather than 
what it believes).57  Faith, like the mind, is incorporeal, but, unlike the mind, it is temporal.  
When the mind exercises its powers of memory, understanding and will in relation to its faith, 
this activity parallels its activity of sense perception but, instead of the sense object, the sense 
informed to produce vision and the intentio voluntatis which joins the other two together, 
there is faith in the memory, thought formed in recollection and the will which connects and 
joins the other two together.58  If our faith is a thing of the past, then a parallel may be drawn 
with the activity of spiritual vision for, just as we are able to recall from memory the image of 
                                                          
53 trin. 14:10:13. 
54 trin. 10:5:7.  
55 trin. 10:5:7. Augustine goes on to develop this analogy in trin. 14 for which see infra. 
56 See chapters 2 and 3 supra. 
57 trin. 14:8:11. 
58 trin. 14:3:5. 
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a body that is no longer present, so we can recall from memory, the image of our faith that is 
no longer present.59   
 
This, then, is progress in understanding because it shows an ability to distinguish 
between an act of committing to memory and an act of subsequent understanding in relation to 
something present in itself in the mind, but there is not yet an ability to distinguish between 
the two acts in relation to the mind itself, which is always present to itself.  So Augustine 
returns to the analogy of a man learned in many disciplines (multarum disciplinarum peritus) 
explaining that everything that such a man knows is contained in his memory but nothing is in 
the view of his mind except what he is actually thinking about60 and he once again points out 
the absurdity of saying that such a man, who is skilled in both geometry and music, becomes 
deskilled in them, when he is not actually engaged in them and reacquires the skill when he 
begins to think about them again.  It is much truer to say that such a man is learned in both 
disciplines, whether he happens to be thinking about them or not and to be learned in a 
discipline means that you remember the subject, understand it and love it.61  The analogy 
works because to be skilled in the disciplinae means that a person has been trained to 
discover62 immutable, intelligible truths and the discovery is not just of present truth but of 
our present knowledge of the truth: a knowledge that we have without thought but something 
we know within ourselves (novit eas quisquis sine ulla cogitatione qualiscumque corporis 
intus agnovit eas.)63  Because learning is remembering,64 the analogy can also be expanded to 
include cases of the unlearned who do not know that they know the disciplinae and cases 
where (to extend Augustine’s own example) a person has spent so long thinking about 
                                                          
59 Ibid. 
60 trin. 14:6:8. 
61 trin. 14:7:9.  
62 imm. an. 4:6. An artem (disciplinam) is ‘not something that is observed by experience but something that is 
found out by reason’ uera rel. 30:54; 39:73. 
63 conf. 10:12:19. 
64 All learning is remembering not because the soul pre- existed but because it is intelligible and is connected in 
some way to intelligible and immutable intelligible truths so that when its attention is directed to them, it can see 
them: an. quant. 20:34 as clarified by retr. 1:8:2. Also trin. 12:15:24 but also as early as imm. an. 6:10 Augustine 
posits that the mind could not have seen the truth unless it had some kind of connection with the true (non id 
posset contemplari animus per seipsum, nisi aliqua coniunctione cum eo.)  
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geometry that he has forgotten music.65  In both these cases, a person can be reminded by 
skilful questioning to direct their attention appropriately, as in the case of the mind which has 
to be reminded to think about itself and about God.66   
 
The case of the mind which, when it turns its thought onto itself, recognizes that it is 
present to itself and is always remembering, understanding and loving itself is therefore more 
akin to sapientia: wisdom of eternal things than scientia: knowledge of temporal things.  As 
Augustine has already demonstrated with regard to faith (and the same thing applies to 
knowledge of temporal things which are brought into the mind or of virtue which arises in the 
mind), the other trinities formed are inadequate reflections of the image because they are set 
up in temporal things which have not, do not and will not always exist.67  However, these 
other trinities have served a useful paedagogic purpose because, in these cases, the act of 
committing to memory is clearly distinct from the subsequent act of understanding, which is 
its recollection in thought.68  When the mind thinks about itself, then, it sees that it is always 
remembering, understanding and willing itself and it is the thinking about itself that activates 
our understanding for, as Augustine said, ‘it is when we think about something we have found 
to be true, that we are primarily said to understand it (intellegentiae vero proprio modo 
quodam cogitationis informationem. Cogitando enim quod verum invenerimus, hoc maxime 
intellegere dicimur).69  This then is how understanding belongs to thought; it is the 
understanding we understand with as we think: the actualized understanding rather than the 
latent understanding and when this is in relation to the mind’s knowledge of itself, it is here 
                                                          
65 sol. 2:20:35 as amended by retr. 1:4:4 makes it clear that it is not just those already learned in the disciplines 
who retrieve information in this way but those who are unschooled, can be said to learn by remembering when 
they are questioned skilfully.  In sol. the fact that learning and truth could exist in an unschooled soul had been 
questioned by Augustine and accepted without the issue being fully considered sol. 2:15:27 because it required 
another book to be answered properly sol. 2:19:33.  Also see trin. 12:15:24 where he refers to Plato’s view of 
learning as recollection as being associated with the soul’s pre-existence and expressly disassociates himself 
from that view though see Hochschild 2012: chapter on Plato from which it is clear that Plato’s view was not as 
clear-cut as Augustine seemed to think. Courcelle 1969: 171 says Augustine had little direct knowledge of Plato 
but was abundantly informed of his thought through Cicero, Varro, Apuleius, Cyprian, Ambrose and the 
Neoplatonists.  
66 trin. 14:7:9. See imm. an. 4:6; conf. 10:10:17; retr. 1:4:4. See infra for training of intentio cogitationis.  
67 trin. 14:8:11-14:10:13. 
68 trin. 14:10:13. 
69 trin. 15:21:40. 
  
203 
more than anywhere else that we should locate the image of God: in memory, understanding 
and will or love of self where in addition, the will directs the mind’s thinking attention onto 
itself to recognize itself.70  
 
Actualized knowledge as the cordis verbum 
Augustine had urged people to understand the incorporeal, unchangeable nature that 
was God through the unchangeable rationes of Truth, Good, Justice and Love71 and this is 
something the purified rational soul can do ‘in the measure that it has clung to Him in love, in 
that measure, imbued in some way and illumined by him with light, intelligible light, the soul 
discerns-not with physical eyes, but with its own highest part in which lies its excellence, i.e. 
with its intelligence those reasons whose vision brings to it full blessedness.’72  In other 
words, the rationes are seen by a person whose intellectual and volitional powers are fully 
turned towards God.  They are seen through that person’s created intellectual capacity, and 
they can be seen because the rationes are illumined by the unchanging light which is God.73  
Through faith, we equate this glimpse of unchangeable truth with a glimpse of God but this 
glimpse will not enable us to understand how God is Trinity.  Similarly, although an 
examination of the powers of memory, understanding and will has given us insight into 
ourselves and the way we can reflect the Trinitarian nature of God and although our faith 
expounds the Trinitarian nature of God, neither of these avenues has allowed us to see God as 
Trinitarian.   
 
However, Augustine thought it was a perfectly reasonable proposition to be able to 
demonstrate that God is a trinity not merely to faith on the authority of scripture but also (for 
the benefit of those who wanted to engage intellectually,) to understanding through reason.74  
He therefore persists, ‘if there is some way in which we can see intellectually what we 
                                                          
70 trin. 14:7:10; trin. 14:10:13. 
71 trin. 15:3:5. See trin. 8; conf. 7:10:16 ‘The person who knows the truth knows it, and he who knows it knows 
eternity. Love knows it.’ conf. 10:24:35 ‘Where I discovered the truth there I found my God, truth itself.’ 
72 diu. qu. 83:46:2.  
73 sol. 1:8:15. See Gn. litt. 1:16:31 on the analogy of the senses: the importance of outside light without which we 
would see nothing is emphasized in Augustine’s account.  
74 trin. 15:1:1. 
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believe, what might this be?’75  To make further progress in understanding the Trinity, we 
must turn our intentio back to ourselves again and once more to the consideration of the more 
familiar territory of our own minds, which have been made in the image of God.76  Augustine 
had, earlier in trin., described the act of understanding as our inner word77 and, in trin. 15, he 
draws an analogy between this inner word and the Word of God.  He describes the 
understanding which is formed from memory through the direction of our thought (per 
intentionem cogitationis) as knowledge that is spoken and as being a word of the heart in no 
particular language (quando quod scitur dicitur, et nullius linguae cordis verbum estis),78 thus 
reflecting (however inadequately) the Word of God which speaks to us a truth which is in no 
particular language.79  We are made in the threefold image of the Trinity,80 and it is the act of 
understanding by which the mind itself is informed by thought (ad intellegentiam quae ipse 
animus rerum cogitatione formatur) which is associated with the Second Person who is the 
Word of God.81  Augustine’s reasoning was that if we could understand the nature of this 
verbum cordis, then we could begin to see some likeness of the Word of God.82  Perhaps he 
was encouraged by a possible etymological connection between verbum and verum83 to 
develop the distinction between the sound and meaning of a word, which he had used in an. 
quant. as an analogy of the body/soul relationship, into the distinction between the verbum 
quod foris sonat and the verbum quod intus lucet, which he is now using as an analogy of the 
human being’s image and likeness of God.84  In an. quant. the distinction between the part of 
                                                          
75 trin. 15:6:9. 
76 trin. 15:6:10. 
77 trin 8:6:9. 
78 trin. 15:23:43. s. 187:3 in cubili cordis quodam modo nuda est intellegenti it is that which is naked to the 
intelligence in the bed chamber of the mind. trin. 15:10:18 Thoughts are both seeings and utterances.  In the inner 
man hearing, speaking, seeing are all the same unlike the physical senses where we hear and see and speak with 
different organs. Io eu tr 18:9 We can only understand this about the Word by discovering this same thing about 
ourselves; that we hear with what we see with. 
79 conf. 11:3:5; Gn. adu. Man. 1:9:15.  
80 Gn. litt. inp. 61 (added subsequent to original composition see retr. 1:18.) 
81 ep. 11:4. where Augustine linked the second person of the trinity with form, disciplina and understanding.  
82 trin. 15:10:19. Not to mention the fact that we are called to understand His Word conf. 11:7:9. 
83 dial. 6. 
84 an. quant. 32:66; trin. 15:11:20.  
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the word that sounds and the part that remains in the thought is made85 but no likeness to the 
Word of God drawn out.  The likeness works much better, in any event, when the two parts of 
the word become two words with the inner word ‘primarily deserving the name of word’86 
because, quite apart from the fact that this is a theologically truer statement, there is no risk of 
Augustine being accused of suggesting that Christ the Word is anything other than fully God 
(the word within that abides there) and fully human (the sound that comes out of the mouth).87 
Whatever we retrieve from our memory through directing thought onto it and from which our 
thought is thereby formed, is referred to by Augustine as a word:  
 
When I want to express Carthage, I search about in myself in order to express it 
and in myself I find the image of Carthage..its image in my memory is its 
word, not the sound of two syllables made when Carthage is named, nor even 
thought about silently in a space of time, but that which I am aware of when I 
utter these two syllables with my voice or even before I utter them.88  
 
All the characteristics of the inner word are here set out: it is generated by desire 
‘When I want;’ it is the actualized image forming our thought and it is pre-linguistic.  When 
he resumes discussion on the inner word in trin. 9, Augustine more explicitly affirms that the 
mind only thinks about what it wants to think about and does what it wants with the 
knowledge obtained, so affirming the key role of intentio voluntatis in both attaining and 
applying knowledge.89  In trin. 9, we are, potentially, closer to discovering the image because 
the verbum cordis is now actualized knowledge of the ratio of truth, which we can hold in our 
thought, along with the image of the thing we are judging by it.  It is in the light of this ratio 
that we can see ourselves as we should be and how we should behave.90  When the knowledge 
                                                          
85 an. quant. 32:65. This Augustine says is called a dicibile dial. 5.  On the distinction and relationship between 
the dicibile and the inner word see O’Daly 1987: 141-4. On the philosophical sources of the inner word see 
Ayres 2010: 194-6. 
86 trin. 15:11:20.  
87 An analogy between the Word and the inner word is drawn in Io. eu. tr. 1:8; 14:7; 20:10; 29:4; 37:4.  An 
analogy between the sound as a vehicle of the inner word and the incarnation as a vehicle for communication of 
the Word is drawn in s. 28:5; doctr. chr. 1:12:13; s. 225:3. 
88 trin. 8:6:9. 
89 Ibid; trin. 9:7:13; trin. 9:10:15.  Kirwan, 2001 notes Augustine’s view that speech is an expression of will in 
the sense of expressing what we want to say.  
90 trin. 9:7:12. Augustine had glimpses of seeing himself in the light of the unchangeable truth conf. 7:10:16 ‘I 
entered and with my soul’s eye, such as it was, saw above that same eye of my soul the immutable light higher 
than my mind (intravi et vidi qualicumque oculo animae meae supra eundem oculum animae meae, supra 
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that we have desired and attained is knowledge of ourselves in our rightful, mid-way position; 
not thinking less of ourselves than we are nor more of ourselves than we are, then our inner 
word will be a perfect likeness to the mind which has generated it and its image as the Word 
will be understood.91  But, although the mind can come to an intellectual knowledge of itself 
and to the place where the image is located through the exercise of its natural powers of 
memory, understanding and will, which it has retained in its fallen condition,92 it will not 
recognize itself as being the image of God or be able to recover its full likeness, unless faith 
begins to give it back its memory so that it can begin to remember, understand and love God.93  
It is only in remembering, understanding and loving God that it recognizes itself as an image 
and sees God as the light of the mind, rather than being its own light.94    
 
The training of our intentio cogitationis 
Although we can be trained intellectually through the secular disciplinae to see 
unchangeable reality, they cannot teach us that this is God; they cannot teach us to see God’s 
Trinitarian nature and they cannot break the power of habit that we have of thinking and 
willing in a carnal manner.  Christ therefore takes on the role of the disciplinae and trains our 
intentio prompting us both intellectually and volitionally.95  We are not trained as we would 
be through the disciplinae liberales to direct our attention to the unchangeable rationes which 
transcend our minds but instead we are directed to, and trained through, the written words of 
scripture, where the rationes are written down for all the faithful, the learned and unlearned 
alike and it is by acting justly (not by seeing justice) that the idea of justice is impressed on 
our heart,96 though it is possible to see justice in the distance and by comparison with it, see 
                                                          
mentem meam, lucem incommutabilem,) …’you raised me up to make me see that what I saw is Being, and that I 
who saw am not yet Being (tu adsumpsisti me ut viderem esse quod viderem, et nondum me esse qui viderem.) 
91 trin. 9:11:16. 
92 trin. 14:14:19. 
93 trin. 14:15:21. 
94 trin. 14:13:17-14:18.  For Augustine’s ignorance that the mind needs to be enlightened by participation and is 
not itself its own light, see conf. 4:15:25. 
95 For association of The Second Person of the Trinity with training of the intellect see ep. 11:4; diu. qu. 83:38.  
96 trin. 14:15:21.  
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how unjust one is.97  Instead of being trained to come to the incorporeal truth and becoming 
wise by participation in one of the disciplinae liberales, we are trained by participating in the 
disciplina of God who is Christ.98  We are trained by Christ himself who teaches us directly 
through our intellect in the sense that He is the intelligible light which enlightens our minds99 
and indirectly through the visible creation: human teachers; the words of scripture and the 
things of creation.  Augustine stressed, from very early on, that the life of Christ was the only 
disciplina that people needed: it provided them with an education in morals (disciplina 
morum);100 His method of teaching through scripture, partly openly and partly through 
analogy, kept to the rules of all rational disciplinae in that the more able could exercise their 
minds to move from what was certain (clearly explained) to what was uncertain101 and the 
Church could be regarded as a house or school for discipline (disciplinae domus, est ecclesia 
Christi)102 which we enter through grace (in illa schola quo gratis intrauimus).103  Although 
Augustine became less enamoured of the form of education which ‘Christians call secular and 
the pagans call liberal;’104 he remained committed to its underlying rationale of training 
people to ascend a corporalibus ad incorporalia.  If, for example, we do not understand that 
the word ‘see’ does not necessarily mean seeing with the eyes of the body then, when we read 
                                                          
97 trin. 8:6:9; conf. 7:10:16. 
98 Disciplina had come to mean learned knowledge from the word discere and, as no one can know what is false, 
the disciplinae were true and as such all expressions of the truth (sol. 2:11:20; lib. arb. 1:1:2; disc. chr. 1; trin. 
14:1:1. ) and so a person was skilled to the extent that they participated in a disciplina uera rel. 30 54 and Christ 
has therefore replaced the disciplinae in the sense that he is now the disciplina in which we participate, being the 
ratio which is the complete likeness of God diu. qu. 83:23; ep. 12:1 disciplina ipsa et forma Dei Christ is the 
disciplina and form of God.  Although disciplina meant learned knowledge, Augustine discovered that scripture 
customarily used the word disciplina as a translation of the Greek παιδεία in contexts where painful instruction is 
meant en. Ps. 118:17:2.  However this must not be thought of as punitive (and Augustine specifically 
distinguishes disciplina from poena) ep. Io. tr. 10:10 but as loving discipline en. Ps. 118:17:3.  Christ is also our 
disciplina in this sense. Augustine noted the two meanings in trin. 14:1:1 preferring to retain the word disciplina 
in the corrective sense and using the word scientia for learned knowledge. 
99 trin. 15:27:50; Gn. litt. 12:31:59 ‘it is from this light that the soul understands whatever it is able to 
understand.’ mag. 11:38 ‘concerning everything we understand, we consult, not the speaker who makes noises 
outside us, but the Truth that presides over the mind within.’ Exactly how this happens is a matter of some 
dispute see conclusion infra.  
100 uera rel. 16:32. 
101 uera rel. 17:33; ciu. 16:11:2; ciu. 20:21:2. 
102 disc. chr. 1. 
103 disc. chr. 9. 
104 ciu. 6:2. 
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in scripture that the Son sees the Father, we might think that we are talking about one human 
being looking at another.105  He also regarded some of the techniques as still useful to assist 
those Christians, who were able to make use of them, in their engagement with scripture.106  
Thus, in a very short time (certainly by an. quant.,)107 Augustine had changed his view 
completely from believing that our reasoning mind could only be trained to come to 
knowledge of the truth through the disciplinae liberales to believing that all truth was 
contained in scripture.108   
 
For some people, a conversion in faith brings complete recovery of memory, 
understanding and will of God.109  But most people also need human guidance and teaching 
by degrees110 in order to direct their attention to Christ, our only teacher111 until eventually 
they come to recovery enough through faith, hope and love that they don’t have further need 
of the scriptures except for teaching others.112  Human teachers cannot convey understanding, 
                                                          
105 Io. eu. tr. 19:1; s. 126; re: John 5:19 Jesus said to them, ‘Very truly, I tell you, the Son can do nothing on his 
own, but only what he sees the Father doing; for whatever the Father does, the Son does likewise.’ See Ayres 
2010: 233-250 on historical context and sources of commentary on John 5:19 and on Augustine’s reading of it 
primarily in Io. eu. tr. 18, 19 and 23. 
106 doctr. chr. 2:17-27 –end of 2 on the value of secular learning to the study of scripture. doctr. chr. 2:42:63 is a 
statement of his later view that anything useful found outside scripture is also contained within it. 
107 an. quant. 34:78. 
108 ep. 101:2 ‘After all, what else should be said to those who though they are wicked and impious that that they 
are liberally educated, except what we read in the writings that are truly liberal? If the Son has set you free, then 
you will be truly free (John 8:36).  For he allows us to know what liberal content those disciplines have that are 
called liberal by those who have not been called to freedom. per eum namque praestatur, ut ipsae etiam, quae 
liberales disciplinae ab eis, qui in libertatem uocati non sunt, appellantur, quid in se habeant liberale, noscatur;’ 
The maxim ‘Knowledge puffs up, love builds up’ must govern our approach to scripture and its ambiguities so 
we don’t think that we know it all and realize that the things which can be learned outside scripture can all be 
found in the lowliness and humility of scripture (as well as in its mystical depths). doctr. chr. 2:41:62. 
109 sol. 1:13:23.  
110 Ibid. To reach the truth teaching by degrees was Augustine’s purpose in ord. There he had wanted to explore 
the question as to whether the ordering of divine providence included all things; good and evil but because he 
realised that his pupils wouldn’t comprehend, he decided to talk instead about the order of studies by which one 
could proceed from corporeal to incorporeal and to arrive at understanding in that way,  retr. 1:3:1. Even those 
rare cases who had apparently received the gift of understanding the obscurer passages of scripture without 
human input, had been taught to read and write by human beings doctr. chr. prol. 4,5 and 8. 
111 Concluding the dialogue with Euodius in an. quant., Augustine had assured him that if anything he has said is 
not clear then he should raise the matter at some opportune time and ‘He who is over us, the Teacher of all, will 
not fail us when our study has Him for its object.’ an. quant. 36:81. Also mag. 14:46; retr. 1:12.  
112 doctr. chr. 1:38:42 -39:43. 
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just as they cannot provide the light by which to see an object pointed to or even with which to 
see the outstretched finger with which they are pointing.113  But because learning is 
remembering, teaching is reminding114 and at first Augustine recognized the usefulness of the 
old philosophical method of dialectic in this; dialectic being nothing other than the art of 
disputation.115  In his early works, Augustine expressly used the dialectical method of 
reasoning to exercise the power and keenness of the mind in preparation for mystical 
contemplation.116  We are led to the truth by questions put in such a way as to correspond to a 
person’s “capacity for learning from his own inner self.”  The challenge is to put questions 
adapted to the person’s capacity to hear the Teacher within.117  Augustine uses the question 
and answer style in his early dialogues, demonstrating to the pupil that all that the teacher 
need do is to question him ‘And by your answers you will explain all of what you now seem 
to be after, without knowing it.’118  This is because a question prompts a person to ‘move 
himself to something within his own mind which returns to him what he had lost.’119  This is 
played out in an. quant. when Augustine suggests proceeding in the usual manner, which is 
for Euodius to follow the lead of reason and answer his own questions.  This suits Euodius 
who expresses himself in support of that method of teaching and learning and as being 
somewhat surprised that he is able to ‘answer the questions I was putting without knowing the 
answer.’120  Augustine singled out dialectic as being of the greatest value in penetrating and 
solving all kinds of problems which crop up in scripture, provided it wasn’t used ‘out of a 
passion for wrangling and a kind of childish parade of getting the better of one’s 
opponents.’121  In fact, scripture itself provides authority for this method of seeking the truth 
                                                          
113 Ibid. prologue 3. 
114 mag. 1:1; 11:36; 14:45.  Also conf. 10:10:17 nisi admonente aliquo eruerentur, ea fortasse cogitare non 
possem? unless things dug out by someone drawing attention to them perhaps I would not have thought of them. 
115 dial. 1 dialectica est bene disputandi scientia; Cresc. 1:13:16 quid est enim aliud dialectica quam peritia 
disputandi.  
116 mag. 8:21. 
117 mag. 12:40. 
118 mus. 1:7:13. 
119 mus. 6:12:35.  
120 an. quant. 15:26. See also Ibid. 20:34. 
121 doctr. chr. 2:31:48. Also sol. 2:7:14 Augustine decided to question and answer himself because on the one 
hand truth could not be better pursued than by question and answer but on the other hand the ego gets in the way. 
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(et uenite, et disputemus, dicit dominus)122 and even shows Jesus acting as a dialecticus in his 
‘question and answer sessions.’123  However, as time went on and Augustine considered what 
it might mean to engage in dialectic with God, it seems that the two-way conversation 
amounted to confession of sins on our part and on God’s part, grace spoken through His 
Word, Christ.124  In this case, the key to the exercise of our powers of memory, understanding 
and will of God is keeping our attention on God in prayer and, in this instance, the words we 
use in prayer will act as reminders to us to keep our attention on God or serve as reminders to 
others to do the same.125 
 
The inadequacy of understanding God per intentionem cogitationis. 
When considering the potential range of the objects upon which our intentio animi 
could direct our attention, Augustine expressly excluded the unchangeable Trinity.126  In this 
life therefore we can only understand God through a mirror and in an enigma (per speculum in 
aenigmate 1 Cor. 13:12):127 the mirror is ourselves and the enigma is the difficulty we have in 
seeing ourselves (let alone God).128  It is a paradox that the things that are in reality most 
present to us (ourselves and God), are the things that we have most difficulty in seeing.  The 
difficulty arises though from the fact that our act of understanding is tied to our thought and 
our thinking is problematic.  Augustine defines a thought as ‘a kind of sight of the mind’ 
(Quandoquidem cogitatio visio est animi quaedam).129  On the one hand, our power of thought 
is so great that the mind cannot see itself except when it thinks about itself (or anything else 
that is in its mind unless it is brought into view by thinking about it),130 on the other hand, 
                                                          
122 Isa. 1:18. Cresc. 1:14:18.  
123 Cresc. 1:17:21 referred to in Burton 2007.  Also Christ acts like a dialectus in s. 126:8:10 ‘the master has 
upset and bothered you in order to educate you; he has sown a doubt, a question in your mind, in order to shift its 
direction (Exagitavit magister, ut erudiret; seminavit quaestionem, ut moveret intentionem). 
124 en. Ps. 103:4:18. For Augustine’s changing view on dialectic see Heβbrűggen-Walter 2007 and Burton 2007.  
125 mag. 1: 2; mag. 7:19; ep. 130: 9:18.  
126 lib. arb. 3:25:75. 
127 cat. rud. 2 quis enim in hac vita nisi in aenigmate et per speculum videt?  
128 trin. 15:9:16; trin. 15:7:13. 
129 trin. 15:9:16.  
130 trin. 14:6:8. 
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Augustine laments thought’s unreliability;131 its transitoriness132 and its instability ‘who can 
lay hold on the heart and give it fixity, so that for some little moment it may be stable, and for 
a fraction of a time may grasp the splendour of a constant eternity?’133  The most we will ever 
arrive at is a moment of understanding because, even where we are able to transcend ourselves 
in our thought, it is only through our intentio of thought that we catch sight of God.  This is 
clear from Augustine’s description of his ascent at Ostia.  This description shows that, even if 
we are able to go beyond all images and ourselves by not thinking about ourselves (transeat se 
non se cogitando), the moment of understanding of God that we attain (this time through the 
ratio of wisdom) is still a thought, albeit all-consuming (rapida cogitatione), and therefore 
unsustainable.134  We remain inadequate images of God because, unlike God for whom 
everything is simultaneously present ‘nor does his attention (intentio) pass from one thought 
to another; all things which he knows are present at the same time to his incorporeal vision),135 
our attention flits from one thought to another, ‘hither and thither with a kind of chopping and 
changing motion (volubili quadam motione iactamus), as we think about now this and now 
that just as it occurs to us or comes our way’136  Our thinking is an inherently multiple process 
involving the gathering together of the various ideas scattered in the memory and ordering 
them by means of an act of intentio and the very word cogito suggests this, according to 
Augustine, because ‘ to bring together (cogo) and to cogitate (cogito) are words related as ago 
(I do) to agito (agitate) or facio (I make) to factito (I make frequently).’137  Cogo means inter 
alia ‘to drive together, collect, crowd, bring together,’138 and thinking is therefore an 
intensification of cogo in the sense that it consists of repeated acts of collecting together by 
                                                          
131 sol. 2:20:35; trin. 11:8:13. 
132 ‘There is only a transitory thought about a non-transitory thing. However, this transient thought is committed 
to memory through the disciplines that the consciousness is trained in, and so there is something that the thought 
can go back to when it is forced to leave it trin. 12:14:23.’ It can only ever be transitory because we cannot rid 
ourselves for long of the images that rapidly come back to cloud our thought. trin. 15:27:50.   
133 conf. 11:11:13. Our heart is the seat of our thoughts Madec AL. trin. 15:16:26. 
134 conf. 9:10:25 also described as a toto ictu cordis in conf. 9:10:24 To reach such a moment of understanding, 
which in prayer we might call a great cry of the heart (Est autem clamor cordis magna cogitationis intentio) is 
rare as well as unsustainable en. Ps. 118 (29):1. 
135 ciu. 11:21; trin. 15:7:13. 
136 trin. 15:15:25. Augustine attributes this sense of thinking as turning something over in the mind to Vergil. 
137 conf. 10:11:18. 
138 Lewis and Short. 
  
212 
force (of the will) the contents of memory rather than a single act.139  We cannot look at 
everything contained in our memory in one glance, we need to do so successively140 neither 
can we grasp the future as God can; the closest we can get is to hold in our memory what is 
about to happen in the immediate future.  We do this through our intentio provided it doesn’t 
change but, nonetheless, it is not genuine foresight.141   
 
The other problem that we have to consider is that if our understanding is tied to our 
thought, then we cannot think something that is not in our memory.142  Augustine was making 
the point in relation to sense images but on the basis that learning is remembering, the same 
must apply to any act of thought, which is an act of recollection.  However, when we 
remember the rationes or ourselves we are remembering latent but present, rather than past, 
truths and Augustine’s expansion of memory in this way from being a repository of past sense 
experience to being a way of coming back to the present143 means that we can speak of an act 
of understanding of God belonging to thought because, in bringing our attention back to God, 
it brings us back to remember God in the sense of being present to God, who is ever present to 
us.  
 
God is actually partly in our memory, although not recognizable as such, but He is 
present in the form of our restless heart (quoniam conturbata erat ad nos ipsos anima nostra, 
commemorati sumus tui, domine).144  We are not aware, though, that this restlessness is our 
longing for God145 until our faith gives us back our memory and we can begin to remember, 
                                                          
139 conf. 10:11:18.  
140 trin. 11:7:12. 
141 trin. 15:7:13. See chapter 2 for how we hold together in our present intention, both the beginning and the end 
of an act of sense perception. 
142 trin. 11:8:12-14. 
143 Solignac BA 14, 558 ‘Par rapport à celles de ces prédécesseurs, les positions d’Augustin sont originales, 
puisque, come nous le verrons, il rétablit l’existence d’une mémoire intellectuelle, tout en niant le caractère 
imaginative de ses representations.’ On the development of memory in Augustine most recently see Hochschild 
2012. 
144 conf. 13:12:13.  
145 Simpl. 1:2:16. 
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understand and love God.146  When faith begins to give us back our memory, God then begins 
to dwell recognizably in our memory and for Augustine this goes back to his Christian 
upbringing but also to his experiences of Christ in the garden at Milan (conf. 8) and at Ostia 
(conf. 9).147  Augustine is adamant that, although God is present everywhere, He is not in us 
except by means of the grace that is poured into our hearts through faith.148  Because we are in 
Him (in the sense that we are in His image), even if we are not with him (in the sense of being 
present to Him), we are capable of being reminded of Him.149  In fact, the reminders of God 
are everywhere because God is everywhere and everything is in Him, even if we do not 
recognize Him.150  
 
Tutissima est enim quaerentis intentio151 
We cannot know God fully because he is beyond thought and our understanding, as we 
have just seen, is tied to our thought: ‘He is more truly than he can be thought about (verius 
est quam cogitatur.)’152  Augustine once more draws an analogy between physical vision and 
mental vision: just as we cannot see the whole of something in one glance when we look at it, 
for example, we cannot see someone’s back when we look at his face and in order to see the 
whole we have to do so in stages (more than one thought), so we cannot grasp the whole of 
God with the mind’s eye, even when the mind is pure.  What a pure mind will enable us to do 
is to touch God rather than comprehend Him and if we think we have comprehended him, it is 
                                                          
146 trin. 14:15:21. 
147 conf. 10:25:36. O’Donnell in his commentary on this paragraph identifies these as Augustine’s moments when 
he first learnt about God. 
148 See praes. dei:5:16 on what we mean when we say God is everywhere: his divinity is in all parts of reality, 
whole but he only indwells human beings through grace according to their ability to receive. Augustine presents 
there an image of degrees of deafness as an analogy of the degree to which we are present to God. 
149 trin. 12:7:12; trin. 14:12:16-15:21.  It is clear from passages in the Old Testament that we are capable of being 
reminded. Also see trin. 2 and 3. 
150 conf. 10:26:37; trin. 14:15:21.  In trin. 14:12:16 Augustine refers to scriptural authority for proof that 
everything is in God and this replaces previous references which owed more to Platonism that everything inheres 
in intellect ord. 2:9:26 what intellect is, in which all things are, or rather, which is itself the sum total of all 
things. en. Ps. 118:23:1 No created being, not even a rational, intellectual creature, is the source of its own light; 
it is kindled by participation in everlasting truth.  
151 trin. 9:1:1. 
152 trin 7:4:7.  The best we can do in prayer is not to be distracted by other thoughts but keep our whole attention 
on God Tunc porro in toto corde clamatur, quando aliunde non cogitator en. Ps. 118 (29):1.  Though, ultimately, 
we have to understand that he is Himself beyond what can be grasped by thought s. 21:2. 
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not God we have comprehended.153   
 
At one stage of his philosophical search, Augustine became persuaded that the 
Academics were wiser than other philosophers because they seemed to teach that everything is 
a matter of doubt and that an understanding of truth lies beyond human capacity.154  But he 
realized that this view had seriously held him back from his quest for wisdom155 and had 
caused many people to be nervous of accepting anything as true and to despair of ever finding 
truth and hence his reasons for marshalling as many arguments against the Academics as he 
could so as not to discourage people from seeking the Truth.156  Relying upon the scriptural 
maxim ‘seek and you shall find’ (Matt. 7:7) he sought to reassure people that knowledge of 
the Truth could be had with the same degree of certainty as mathematical truth.157  In addition 
to those who despaired of finding truth there were those who gave up seeking prematurely 
because they believed that they had already found the truth and to these people Augustine 
counselled ‘beware lest you think that you know anything except that only which you know, 
that the sum of one, two, three, and four is ten.’158  How could we think that we could 
comprehend the Truth when we were unable to comprehend adequately what was presented to 
our senses or what we were ourselves in the inner man?  Nonetheless it is not presumptuous to 
desire to know God, provided we begin from faith, are recognizant of grace and proceed 
cautiously by way of unknowing (learning what He is not).159   
 
The scriptural maxim: Seek his face always (quaerite faciem eius semper Ps. 104:3),160 
with which Augustine framed his quest for God in trin.161 could be used to navigate between 
                                                          
153 s. 117:3:5; s. 21:2; s. 52:16. 
154 conf. 5:10:19. 
155 Acad. 3:20:43. 
156 retr. 1:1:1.  
157 Acad. 2:3:9. lib. arb. 2:2 ‘To those who already believed he said: Seek and ye shall find. He cannot be said to 
have found, who merely believes what he does not know.  And no one is fit to find God who does not first 
believe what he will afterwards learn to know. ‘ 
158 Acad. 2:3:9. 
159 trin. 5:1:2. Also ord. 2:16:44; trin. 8:2:3; Io. eu. tr. 23:9 and 10.  
160 trin. 1:3:5; trin. 15:2:2. 
161 trin. 1:3:5 and trin. 15:1:2. 
  
215 
the Scylla of despair and the Charybdis of overconfidence.  We find by faith and we continue 
to seek through hope and thus our search proceeds by means of the dialectic of finding and 
seeking: faith and understanding: knowing and loving.  In a way this is how we make progress 
in understanding anything: When something is presented to our spiritual vision, it may or may 
not be accompanied by an act of understanding.  This may be immediate and complete 
understanding or only partial: if we only have sufficient intellectual capacity to know that the 
image is a sign of something else, this will motivate us to seek its meaning.162  With 
incomprehensible things, it is the same dialectic but the search is never ending: however much 
progress we make in knowledge and love of them, there is still more progress to make in this 
life.163  The more we find, the more inspired and intense is our seeking.164  Augustine warned 
that a person shouldn’t be too quick to congratulate themselves on finding the truth but should 
take a leaf out of St Paul’s book and continue to seek with humility because those who think 
they have already reached their goal are exalting themselves in pride and are heading for a 
fall.165  Perfection in this life ‘is nothing but forgetting what lies behind and stretching out to 
what lies ahead secundum intentionem and the safest intentio is the one which goes on seeking 
(Tutissima est enim quaerentis intentio).166  This is certainly the case until the last day of this 
life and thereafter we will finally comprehend God for, as a purified rational soul, we will live 
in the House of God; a citizen of the city of God (the caelum caeli)167 the most significant 
characteristic of which is that, although it is created and, therefore, inherently mutable, it does 
not succumb to the vissitudes of time and it never turns its attention away from God but is 
always present to Him168 so that its knowing is that of the intelligence which means it ‘is a 
matter of simultaneity-not in part, not in an enigma, not through a mirror, but complete, in 
total openness, face to face.  This knowing is not of one thing at one moment and of another 
                                                          
162 Gn. litt. 12:11:22. 
163 Io. eu. tr. 61:1; en. Ps. 118:11:3. 
164 en. Ps. 104:3. en. Ps. 118:14:2 ‘since we first received the Spirit he works in us empowering us to go on 
demanding more so that by asking seeking knocking we may receive him in ever greater plenitude;’ lib. arb. 
2:17:45 glimpses of wisdom lead to greater desire; trin. 15:1:2. 
165 en. Ps. 38:14. 
166 trin. 9:1:1. 
167 conf. 12:11:12. 
168 ibid. 12:9:9; 12:11:12; 12:11:13; 12:12:15; 12:13:16; 12:15:21; 12:15:22. 
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thing at another moment but is concurrent without any temporal successiveness.’169   
 
But does this mean that the activity of intentio ceases?  Augustine certainly does not 
support, what Daniélou called, epektasis, a concept of perpetual progress or ascent of the soul, 
found in Augustine’s contemporary, Gregory of Nyssa, who derived it from epekteinomenos 
(stretching out Latin extendere) in Phil. 3:13, the passage that had so captured Augustine’s 
imagination.170  But, on the other hand, although faith is replaced by sight (to use Augustine’s 
metaphor) and hope will not be necessary because we are in possession of what we desire, 
love is necessary and so therefore is intentio because ‘unless it (the soul) has fastened its eye 
with surpassing love and has never withdrawn its gaze, it will not be able to continue in that 
most blessed vision (et nisi ingenti amore oculum infixerit, nec ab aspiciendo uspiam 
declinaverit, manere in illa beatissima visione non poterit.)’171  However, this will not be 
activity but where the soul’s attention will come to rest because ‘when the soul, after this life, 
unites itself wholly to God, charity will remain to keep it there (Sed cum post hanc vitam tota 
se in Deum collegerit, caritas restat qua ibi teneatur)’172 and ‘the very end of all seeking shall 
be reached in that world where perfection shall admit of no further activity of intentio.’ (ibi 
fiat finis quaerendi, ubi ubi perfectioni non superest intentio proficiendi.)173 
 
Conclusion 
 
Having reached the end of intentio’s activity, we can now see the full import of the 
statement that memory is in effect explained by intentio (la mémoire, en effet, s’explique par 
l’intentio’).174  In addition to its role in making and recalling the images of sense perception, it 
is also by an act of intentio that our thought is directed to, and linked with, intelligible objects 
of the memory, which are present in themselves in the memory.  This includes directing the 
                                                          
169 ibid. 12:13:16. 
170 Daniélou 1944: 291-307.  
171 sol. 1:7:14. 
172 Ibid. 
173 Io. eu. tr. 63:1. 
174 Hayen 1954: 40. 
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mind’s attention to itself which then sees that it is present to itself.  Although the mind in itself 
is created and therefore inherently mutable and unable to stop its thoughts from wandering, its 
ability to come back to something present is akin to a person’s returning to think about a 
disciplina he already has expertise in or, indeed, on the grounds that learning is remembering, 
to one that he is learning for the first time because, in these cases, what we see in our thought 
is certain knowledge and when we direct our thought onto the knowledge in our memory or 
onto the mind itself, we have an act of understanding formed through the intentio of thought 
which is the understanding we understand with as we think.   
 
When it comes to judging the temporal world, we are holding together two separate 
thoughts, formed by two separate acts of intentio, distinguishable only by reason, namely, the 
thought in which we see a particular image and the thought in which we see the ratio 
(universal) against which to judge that image.  This is therefore an inherently multiple 
operation.  Similarly, when intentio directs the mind’s attention onto itself, it must also direct 
it above itself so that it can judge itself in the light of the ratio of truth: again an inherently 
multiple operation, even though only reason can distinguish the two thoughts.  When we 
connect with the ratio of truth or wisdom, this is an act of pure thought but we can only 
connect momentarily because of our inability to keep our attention from wandering.  
However, this act of pure thought, which touches rather than embraces, God is the closest we 
come to seeing God in this life and, in answer to Augustine’s Videamus tamen quousque 
progredi vestra latens possit intentio,175 this is as far as the activity of intentio can go. 
                                                          
175 ord. 2:5:17.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
When drawn to its full extent, the bow encloses the “All” in itself, explained the 
Master, and that is why it is important to learn how to draw it properly.1 
 
Intentio was destined to become ‘one of the most problematic terms in Scholasticism’ 
and has been described as a foreign word which ‘degenerated into a dangerous catchword 
because it is often used rather haphazardly.’2  This is because by the end of the High 
Scholastic period, it had come to mean many different things in the context of Scholastic 
philosophy.  Augustine has been seen as an influence on the Scholastic use of intentio though 
there is debate as to the extent to which his use of intentio contributed to the Scholastic 
doctrine of intentionality: a contribution to this debate is beyond the remit of this thesis.  
However, there is nothing complicated about intentio in Augustine: it was simply the term he 
used to denote the tensional, volitional activity of directing the mind’s attention: an activity 
which was essential to the healthy and ordered functioning of being in the world and to the 
living of a Christian life.   
The topic of attention came relatively late into the discipline that became known as 
psychology3 as compared with such topics as sense perception, memory and imagination.  It 
was Wolff’s discussion of attention in 1740, in which he formulated several generalisations 
about attention, which marked its formal appearance as a topic to be studied in the field of 
psychology.  In the 1970s, Neumann carried out a survey of the introduction of the 
characteristics of attention from the earliest period: narrowing; active directing; involuntary 
shifts of attention; clarity; fixation over time; effector sensitivity and motivational aspect.  The 
introduction of two of these characteristics – involuntary shifts of attention and motivational 
aspect- has been attributed to Augustine.4   
                                                          
1 Herrigel 1976: 30. 
2 Spiegelberg, 1976: 126. 
3 Psychology was not recognized as an independent natural science until the late 19th century but it was by no 
means a new discipline and instead, as Hatfield has pointed out, if psychology is understood in its literal meaning 
as the science of the soul, then it can be dated back as an independent discipline to Aristotle’s de anima. Hatfield, 
1998.   
4 Ibid.  
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We began this thesis with Augustine’s image of a bow as signifying the mind’s 
intentio, evoking its tensional, volitional and directional aspects.  The tribes of Israel had 
turned into a crooked bow because they worshipped idols instead of God and therefore could 
be said to be directing their aim the wrong way: away from God rather than towards God.5  
Translated through the New Testament into Christian terms and taking a cue from scripture 
that ‘Christ is the end of the law, bringing justification to everyone who believes (Rom. 10:4), 
Augustine said that the right end of intentio is Christ, the Wisdom of God (Dei Sapientia, et 
rectus finis omnis intentionis animae)6 and ‘He is called ‘the end’ because whatever we do is 
referred to him, and when we have reached him we shall have nothing further to seek.’7 
 
In this thesis we have traced the emergence of intentio from being a ‘favourite term’ of 
Augustine’s used in connection with the various psychological activities of the soul8  to its 
employment as a significant concept in Augustine’s understanding of the life of faith and the 
soul’s ascent to God: all of which is dependent upon the activity of attention.  Intentio 
emerges early (in imm. an. and then in mus.), as a solution to the problem of the distentio of 
temporal successiveness, which would otherwise impede our ordinary, everyday, physical 
activity and experience of the temporal world.9  As it is time which separates us from God, 
this suggests that intentio might be fruitfully employed towards the bridging of that separation 
but this would be to think like a Platonist for, of course, it is God himself who bridges that 
separation by coming to us incarnate.10  However, there is a place for intentio within the life of 
faith, for to live a Christian life is to aim at being fully human in imitation of the humanity of 
Christ; which is simply to exercise the powers of the soul, including intentio, with reference to 
Christ.  From about 393, beginning with s. dom. m., Augustine began to use intentio with 
regard to the life of faith.11  It is in this treatise on the Sermon on the Mount that he begins to 
                                                          
5 en. Ps. 77:34. 
6 en. Ps. 12:1; en. Ps. 54:1; en. Ps. 56:2; s. 347:3. 
7 sol. 1:6:13; en. Ps. 54:1; en. Ps. 56:2. 
8 O’Daly 1987: 43. 
9 intentio…. exprime l'acte de l'esprit qui vise et unifie la totalité de ses moments.' BA 14: 590. 
10 conf. 11:29:39. 
11 At about the same time see exp. Gal. 4:4 where Augustine interprets ‘subverting the gospel of Christ’ in Gal. 
1:7 as drawing the attention of believers away from spiritual things and back to carnal things  (ab spiritalibus ad 
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link intentio with the heart as the seat of our thoughts.  Prayer, for example, does not consist 
of words but the direction of our thought (intentione cogitationis) towards God12 and purity of 
heart is a single-minded intentio.13  Furthermore, intentio is also first employed here by 
Augustine in connection with conversion and interiority as he sets out his spiritual 
interpretation of the precepts given in the Sermon on the Mount.14  Soon after writing this, 
Augustine discovered the possibilities of Phil. 3:14 with its reference to secundum intentionem 
as a ‘framework for contemplation’15 and there was no looking back.  But also no possibility 
of reaching the finishing line in this life, rather there was a continual stretching ahead focusing 
on Christ in holy desire, growing more like God by the increasing assimilation of our wills 
until ‘we shall be like him; because we shall see him as he is.16  In the next decade, 
Augustine’s use of intentio came to fruition.  First of all, in Gn. litt.  a physiological 
examination of the soul’s activity of sensation revolves around intentio and shows both its 
normal and abnormal functioning.  Then in the roughly parallel trin., intentio becomes 
explicitly associated with voluntatis for the first time in a fruitful combination with intentio 
voluntatis being integral to each level of perception: corporeal, spiritual and intellectual and 
the connecting link between all three levels of perception.  Descriptions of the soul’s different 
activities of perception have been introduced by Augustine in trin.  as analogies for people 
who want to develop a habit of reasoning in the light of their faith.17  In this ascent through 
analogies, not only is each activity of perception dependent on intentio voluntatis but also the 
move through the levels is dependent on intentio voluntatis, which means that our whole 
experience of being in the world is dependent on intentio: the volitional activity of the 
                                                          
carnalia revocant intentionem credentium.) 
12 s. dom. m. 2:3:13. 
13 Ibid. 2:2:9; 2:3:11; 2:13:45; 2:13:46; 2:14:48; 2:19:63; 2:22:75. 
14 Ibid. 2:3:14 orationis intentio cor nostrum serenat et purgat… Fit ergo in oratione conversio cordis ad eum… 
conversione purgatio interioris oculi; ibid 2:7:25 An potest quisque de ea re pro qua adipiscenda orat non esse 
sollicitus, cum tanta intentione animi oratio dirigenda sit, ut ad hoc totum illud referatur quod de claudendis 
cubiculis dictum est; ibid. 2:12:40; Manifestum est his praeceptis omnem nostram intentionem in interiora 
gaudia dirigi, ne foris quaerentes mercedem huic saeculo conformemur. 
15 O’Donnell conf. 9:10:23 notes that this first occurred in conf. and thereafter occurs frequently. 
16 ep. Io tr. 4:6 (1 John 3:2). 
17 See Schumacher 2011: 56 n. 147 for works rehabilitating analogies and 57 n. 149 for works criticizing them as 
setting in motion the individualism that continues to dog Western thought.  
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direction of attention. 
Augustine became interested in the metaphor of ascent because it is suggestive of 
process and progress, giving the lie both to the sufficiency for salvation of a one-off 
experience or baptism.  The process is one in which our intentio (attention, desire) is trained 
and gradually redirected through ‘the faith that works through love’ so that we make progress 
in our ablity to maintain the focus of our attention and desire on God: the more we can keep 
him in mind, the more we are able to relate to the world in an ordered way.  This means seeing 
it and ourselves as His creation and therefore as dependent, thereby evoking the appropriate 
spirit of humility and awe which comes from seeing the invisible in the visible.18   
 
‘God is not something that a finger can be pointed at but is something the mind can 
point towards.’19  However, the ascent begins from the corporeal where the attention begins to 
be directed by means of the corporeal (Aliud ergo sensus, aliud per sensum),20 and the whole 
process may indeed begin with the pointing of a finger (intentione digiti ostenditur).21  In 
mag., where the import of the dialogue was to show that Christ was the only teacher,22 
Augustine shows up the ambiguity of what, in other contexts, has been called ‘ostensive 
learning.’23  He considers the example of a wall which, as something visible, can be pointed to 
when the word ‘wall’ is said and this pointing of a finger is a sign by means of which the wall 
can be seen (Nam et intentio digiti non est utique paries, sed signum datur per quod paries 
possit videri.)24  Lest it should seem odd that Augustine has spent the first half of mag. 
concentrating on signs, before he goes on to point out the ambiguity of the signs, he reveals 
                                                          
18 That this is the ultimate experience in this life - seeing the extraordinary in the ordinary-  is clear from the fact 
that Rom. 1:20 is cited at the peak of Augustine’s ascents at Milan in conf. 7:10:16 and 7:17:23 and from conf. 
10:6:10. 
19 s. 261:3.  extendatur and intendat are used as synonyms in this passage. This was the purpose of the ascension: 
to draw people’s attention away from the corporeal (incarnate Christ) to the incorporeal (divinity of Christ) trin. 
1:9:18. 
20 ord. 2:11:34. 
21 mag. 7:19. Augustine speaks of pointing the finger literally and uses it metaphorically to mean ‘drawing 
attention to’ in f. et symb. 10:23. 
22 retr. 1:12. 
23 Matthews 2001: 173. 
24 mag. 3:5; 3:6; 7:19. 
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that it is all in the service of exercising the powers and keenness of the mind (exercendi vires 
et mentis aciem), in preparation for contemplation.25  The whole purpose of a sign, notes 
Adeodatus, is to direct our attention to what is signified (signo dato id quod significatur 
attendere),26  As the dialogue proceeds not only is it made clear that signs are inferior to the 
reality to which they point27 and that therefore knowledge of the reality to which they point is 
more valuable than knowledge of the sign,28 but also that the sign cannot teach us anything 
about the reality it signifies, it can only direct our attention to it.29  In fact, taking the example 
of a word (the word ‘caput,’) which is itself a sign, Augustine shows that the pointing of a 
finger cannot tell us anything, either about the reality the word signifies, which we can see for 
ourselves (God providing the light in which we see)30 or about the sign (the word ‘head’) 
which is not what is being pointed to.31  But, nonetheless, the pointing of the finger is of value 
because it directs our attention to what is to be seen (a head).32  This is the beginning of a 
process of learning and understanding, which is a process of being reminded to direct our 
attention to the truth which dwells within; which alone can reveal to us the true meaning of 
everything and access to which is dependent on our will alone.33  As Madec has said, ‘En 
somme toute réalité extérieure ou corporelle peut être, pour peu qu’on y prête attention, une 
incitation à rejoindre la réalité spirituelle intérieure.’34 
 
It has been observed that ‘no other important aspect of Augustine’s philosophy has 
proved as difficult to understand and to explain as this notion that God in some way illumines 
the mind of Man.’35  The truth of this statement is evident from the different interpretations 
                                                          
25 mag. 8:21. 
26 Ibid. 8:23. Adeodatus was Augustine’s son conf. 9:6:14. 
27 mag. 9:25. 
28 Ibid. 9:27. 
29 Ibid. 10:33. 
30 Ibid. 9:32. 
31 Ibid 10:34. 
32 Ibid. 10:35. 
33 Ibid. 11:38. 
34 Madec AL 98 
35 Nash 2003: 93. 
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that have been placed on Augustine’s theory of knowledge throughout the centuries; some of 
which are as diametrically opposed as Augustine and Euodius were on the matter in an. 
quant.36  The diverse interpretations of Augustine’s theory have most recently been collated by 
Schumacher.37  She, first of all, categorizes them into two: intrinsic and extrinsic:  the intrinsic 
category, of which Aquinas is the only proponent, argues that Augustine saw God as having 
created human beings with a cognitive capacity to form ideas in the manner of Aristotle, that 
is, to abstract universal principles from sense experience;  the extrinsic category argues that 
Augustine saw God as having impressed on the mind the ideas themselves, either as content of 
thought, as a priori concepts to regulate our thought or as predispositions to know which 
convey certainty.38  The intrinsic view confers the ability to be an active knowing agent, 
whereas the extrinsic view confers a passive role on the mind in its acts of knowing.39  
Schumacher observes that the extrinsic view therefore marries well with Augustine’s views on 
grace ‘What have we got that we’ve not received’ (1 Cor. 4:7) but that it devalues the part 
played by the senses in knowledge and reinforces Platonic dualism40 because, in the most 
popular manifestation of that view (innatism), it suggests that it is only by turning away from 
the experience of created reality that one can gain knowledge of created reality.41  Schumacher 
herself espouses the view of Aquinas, which is contrary to received opinion42 and a view 
which Nash had dismissed as being out of keeping with Augustine’s heritage, which was 
Platonic rather than Aristotelian, and notes ‘almost without exception contemporary scholars 
agree that whatever virtue Aquinas’ theory may have had as an independent position, it cannot 
draw support from Augustine.’43  Schumacher’s view, however, has been given most recent 
support by Hochschild’s conclusion in her work on memory in Augustine that ‘in the end we 
find Augustine more at home with Aristotelian epistemology.’44   
                                                          
36 an. quant. 20:34. 
37 Schumacher 2011. 
38 Ibid. 8-11. 
39 Ibid. 12. 
40 Ibid. 13. 
41 Ibid. 10. 
42 Ibid. 18-19. 
43 Nash 1969: 96. 
44 Hochschild 2012: 2. 
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Our interest here is not to enter fully into this debate but only to see, if looking at it 
through the lens of intentio, sheds any light on the matter.  Our submission is that it does: on 
the one hand, Augustine’s stress on the activity of intentio and his insistence that the ascent 
begins from the senses support Schumacher’s view that we have been gifted with an 
intellectual capacity only, the proper functioning of which we recover under the influence of 
faith, and that this brings us to the truth.  On the other hand, when the possibilities of 
ambiguity arising from ostensive learning are endless and Augustine says they can only be 
resolved by illumination, he cannot be advocating the extraction of a universal principle from 
particulars, because no matter how many particular instances are pointed to the ambiguity 
cannot be resolved.45  Augustine does indeed stress the activity of the soul: its activity is both 
a blessing and a curse.  It is a blessing because it proves that it is superior to the body46 but it is 
a curse because it is its love of activity which takes it away from contemplation.47  In an. 
quant. Augustine stresses that each stage of ascent is the act of the soul;48 even the last stage 
which he calls the act of contemplatio.49  In trin. it is the volitional activity of directing the 
mind’s thinking attention from corporalia to incorporalia that moves a person towards an act 
of understanding through the intentio of thought onto the contents of the memory.  What the 
act of intentio abstracts is the form from the particular sense object and what it recalls is either 
the image of that particular sense object or, in addition, the ratio to which the mind has access 
because it is connected to it50 and which it can use to compare and judge the image of the 
                                                          
45 Matthews 2001: 181. 
46 One of Augustine’s concerns early on was to stress the activity of the soul on the body in order to show its 
superiority. In an. quant. he presents this example based on the fact that physical strength is made up of three 
components: the will (voluntas); muscular control and physical weight. A man who excels in all three will be the 
strongest but it is possible that a man lighter in weight but with more muscular control will be stronger and vice 
versa someone with less muscular control but considerable weight. But if the will fails in a person then however 
developed his muscular control and however heavy his weight he will lose. This proves the superiority of the 
soul even in regard to the activity it performs through the body an. quant. 22:38.   
47 mus. 6:13:40. 
48 an. quant. 34:78. 
49 The fact that he calls this last stage an act reinforces the fact that he is referring to degrees of contemplation 
possible in this life rather than the state of contemplation in the next which he regarded as rest rather than 
activity. 
50 trin. 12:15:24. Augustine’s process of reasoning from manifestations of the truth to abstract the unchangeable 
ratio of the true in sol. 1:15:27-29. 
  
225 
particular object sensed.  Augustine does not go on to explicitly suggest that intentio is 
involved in a process of generating universals from particulars. But if an Aristotelian view is 
taken of Augustine’s theory of knowledge, the activity of intentio is at least to ensure that the 
particulars are not taken as ends in themselves, but are referred to their ratio and ultimate end 
in God.   
The importance of training of the mind to see the truth was stressed by Augustine in 
an. quant. where he observed that a trained soul is more likely to remember what it has learnt 
and an untrained soul more likely to forget (though not all learning promotes healthy growth: 
only that which leads to the truth).51  But we mustn’t forget the role of the body in all this and 
here we will return, in conclusion, to the image of the bow.  In an. quant. Augustine also 
emphasized the importance of the training of the body which might otherwise thwart the 
soul’s aim.  If the same person were to shoot small light reeds from a loose-stringed bow, 
however hard it is stretched, they would not reach as far as genuine arrows weighted with 
iron, enlivened with feather vanes and shot from a very tight bow.  Whatever the skill of the 
archer, whether or not his aim is successful in reaching its target, depends on the effectiveness 
of the instruments he uses.52  The less attention the body demands of us in this life, the better 
because we are not capable of directing our attention to the body and to the contemplation of 
God at the same time.53  But that will not be the case hereafter: 
‘What toughness of mind there will be, what immortality and durability of body, to 
ensure that the mind’s attention doesn’t flag (mentis deficiat intentio) in contemplating 
God and the body’s limbs don’t collapse with continuously praising God.’54  
Therefore Augustine urges: 
Let our footsteps not falter, our eyes not waver, but let us advance with intentio fidei 
till we come to what, here and now, ‘eye has not seen nor ear heard nor has it come 
into the heart of man (1 Cor. 2:9).’  This is believed before it can be seen, so that when 
it comes we who have believed will not be confounded.  Let us stretch forth then, 
walking in hope, hoping for what we do not yet possess, believing what we do not yet 
                                                          
51 an. quant. 15:25; 19:33. 
52 Ibid. 22:39.  
53 retr. 1:11:2. 
54 s. 252:9. 
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see, loving what we do not yet embrace.  The exercise of our minds in faith, hope and 
love makes them fit to grasp what is yet to come.55 
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